THE RAILROAD TO CALIFORNIA.

The facilities of social and commercial intercourse between our Atlantic and Pacific borders, yet to be created, present a problem of great practical importance. The present route, via Chagres and Panama, may be regarded as a necessity to be superseded as soon as practicable, by a railroad directly across the continent, within our own jurisdiction. Besides the formidable political objections to being dependent on foreign powers for a connection between our remotest and most important commercial points, the distance, via Chagres and Panama, or by any railroad or canal across the Isthmus yet to be made, in connection with the effects of a hot climate on animal and vegetable products, as subjects of trade between our Atlantic and Pacific coasts, present most insuperable obstacles to a permanent reliance on that route. It is now ascertained, that instead of thirty days between New York and San Francisco, or forty days to the mouth of the Columbia river by steam, or three to six months by sailing craft, either of these points may be reached in seven to eight days by railroad direct, avoiding altogether the deleterious effects of climate on articles of trade, as well as on health and life. These two considerations, so potent and overruling in commercial intercourse, will undoubtedly prove paramount to all antagonistic interests, and the railroad, directly across, may be regarded as already decided by the demands of trade between these remote parts of our present extended domain.

But what shall be the plan, Mr. Whitney’s or a government enterprise? If the government undertake it, the chances are a thousand to one, that, like the Cumberland road, it will be broken down by party strifes. Neither of the two great parties of the country would, in any probability, risk the responsibility of taking it on its shoulders as a government work. Shall it, then, be done by a corporate company, with an adequate loan of public credit, as has been proposed? Besides other insuperable objections to a plan of this kind, of a party political character, it must be seen, that all transport on a road built on this plan, must pay a toll to satisfy the interest of the capital invested; whereas, on the Whitney plan, no toll will be exacted, except to keep the road and its machinery in repair. This difference, in its operation on trade and commerce, will be immense, sufficient, as any one may see, to decide the question at once and forever between the two plans. The company proposed will have to borrow its capital, the interest of which must be provided for by tolls. This tax on trade and intercourse will necessarily prevent that grand movement of commercial exchanges between the Atlantic and Pacific states, between the United States and Asia, and between Europe and Asia, which is the great object of the enterprise. But the Whitney plan does not borrow, but creates, by its own progress, out of the increased value of the lands through which it passes, the capital required to build the road; and thus dispensing with all tolls to pay for the use of capital, it will invite and secure the passage on this line of the great bulk of commerce around the entire globe, and between the great masses of the industrial and producing portions of the human family, which, as will be seen, lie on one great belt of the earth, demanding precisely the direct and cheap channel of intercommunication here proposed, instead of the circuitous, long, and expensive routes of commerce heretofore used.

Moreover, on the company plan, the increased value of the lands on the route, will all go to the corporation; whereas, on the Whitney plan, it will go to the people of the United States, whose property it is, and to the benefit of that trade and commerce which it sets in motion.

The Whitney plan, once executed, will merge in one the interests of our population on the Pacific slope of this continent and those of our population on the Atlantic slope, and by that means they will remain one forever. But the failure of this enterprise, by the neglect of Congress to authorize it, would make the interests of these two vast regions forever independent of and opposed to each other. Such a dereliction of duty, so apparent, would ere long, as a natural if not necessary consequence, create an independent nation on the Pacific.

THE END.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

  1. P. [206], changed “buck was not be captured” to “buck was not to be captured”.
  2. P. [263], changed “flea is not be trifled with” to “flea is not to be trifled with”.
  3. Silently corrected obvious typographical errors and variations in spelling.
  4. Retained archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as printed.
  5. Portraits of Hon. Wm. M. Gwin and Jacob R. Snyder are not present.