REPORTS
Reports cover a wide range of subjects. When a leader is in doubt as to whether an event is important enough to report, he had better take the wise course and send in his description of what has happened. Very few occurrences in the military service are so unessential as to be rightfully ignored.
They may take either one of two forms: either they may be dated, headed “Report on so-and-so” (see example on following), and inclosed with a letter of transmittal; or they may themselves be in the form of letters addressed directly to the person or office for whom they are destined.
Reports may consist of expository description on the one hand or of a narration on the other, but they usually consist of a combination of the two.
Here is an example of highly expository description. It is the report upon the German raid which was given us under Operation Orders.
In the field, 12th April, 1916.
Captain Wagener’s Report on the Raid on the Evening
of 11th April, 1916
At 4 p. m. the raiding party marched from Martinpuich through Pozières, then by the Lattorf Graben—Regimentstrichter—Krebs Graben to the Appointed dug-outs on the left of Sap No. 3, where the evening meal was found ready prepared.
At 8 p. m. the artillery preparation commenced as prearranged. Shortly after fire was opened, the whole of the enemy’s position from Windmühle to Besenhecke was wrapped in greyish-white smoke, which the wind drove back over Sap No. 3 into our lines.
By 8.10 p. m. it was impossible to remain in our trench east of Sap No. 3 without wearing a gas mask. This was still the case at 8.20 p. m., when the patrols moved forward from their dug-outs to the Hohlweg, in the order Stradtmann, Dumas, Böhlefeld, and Freund. Lieutenant Boenig followed close behind Lieutenant Stradtmann.
By 8.25 p. m. the party was posted ready in the Hohlweg. The clouds of gas and smoke, however, still hung so thick over the enemy’s trenches that it was impossible to distinguish whether our own shells were still falling on the point of entry or whether our artillery had already lengthened their range.
At 8.27 p. m. Lieutenant Stradtmann received the order to advance to the attack with his patrol. Lieutenant Boenig, with the six stretcher bearers, left the Hohlweg simultaneously and in rear of Stradtmann’s patrol, and posted connecting files, whose positions were marked by red signal lamps shaded to the front and to the sides.
At 8.28 p. m. Dumas’ and Böhlefeld’s patrols advanced. Following the line of connecting files, they reached the point of entry, to find that Stradtmann’s patrol was already in possession of 16 yards of trench, and had captured three prisoners. The latter had come out of their dug-outs just as Lieutenant Stradtmann appeared in front of the enemy’s trench. They carried hand grenades and rifles with bayonets fixed, but were immediately disarmed by Lieutenants Boenig and Stradtmann.
Dumas’ patrol immediately turned to the left down the trench, and, in a few steps, came upon a half-destroyed machine gun emplacement. Reservist Nadolny, of Stradtmann’s patrol, was already occupied in digging out the buried machine gun. Lieutenant Dumas penetrated further along the enemy’s trench, and soon reached the communication trench which runs, roughly along the dividing line between Target Sectors 79 and 80, towards the Weisse Steinmauer. At this point a large dug-out had been wrecked, apparently by a direct hit. Lieutenant Dumas had previously sent three men of his patrol along behind the enemy’s trench; they reached the communication trench about 11 yards behind the front line trench. A few Englishmen, who came out of this communication trench, endeavored to reach the parados of the front line trench, whence they evidently intended to defend it. They were, however, surprised by our three men and bayoneted.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Dumas, with the rest of his men, forced his way further along the trench, and just north of Besenhecke reached the communication trench which leads to the brown prolongation of the Weisse Steinmauer (white stone wall). They passed another wrecked dug-out, in which dead bodies were seen. Adjoining the above-mentioned communication trench, another large dug-out was found, which the patrol intended to clear. As, however, a number of Englishmen advanced upon Dumas’ patrol from the communication trench and alongside it, a mêlée ensued with grenades, rifles and pistols, in the course of which the enemy, after suffering evident loss, either retreated or surrendered, while none of Dumas’ patrol received wounds of any account.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Böhlefeld advanced along the enemy’s trench to the right of the point of entry, and, in a few yards, came to three large dug-outs, of which one was wrecked and full of dead and wounded. At his summons, the enemy came out of the others and surrendered without more ado. Lieutenant Böhlefeld sent back the prisoners and asked for reinforcements in order to clear the dug-outs, undertaking, meanwhile, to hold the enemy’s trench with two men.
At 8.30 p. m., as no noise came from the point of entry, or from the right of the same, while from a point some 65 yards to the left shots and reports of grenades could be heard, I ordered Vice-Sergeant Major Elb to advance with five men and reinforce Dumas’ patrol. Lieutenant Erb, the regimental adjutant, attached himself to this party. He was wearing an oxygen-breathing apparatus and had been waiting in the Hohlweg. Shortly after, the sounds of fighting ceased on the left, and the first batch of prisoners was brought back from the enemy’s trench. I had come to the conclusion that we had the upper hand everywhere, especially on the right, and with a view to exploiting fully our success, I ordered Lieutenant Freund to cross the enemy’s trench at the point of entry with 15 men of the supports, and to attack the Spion from the rear. At the same time, I sent forward Vice-Sergeant Major Wölfle with 4 men to reinforce Lieutenant Böhlefeld.
In order to have a reserve in hand for meeting all eventualities, I ordered up the commanders of the two groups on the flank of the 12th Company, which was stationed immediately to the right of Sap No. 3. The groups had been warned in the afternoon and given the necessary instructions. Whilst Vice-Sergeant Majors Elb and Wölfle, with their men, went in search of Dumas’ and Böhlefeld’s patrols, Lieutenant Freund dashed across the enemy’s trench at the point of entry and followed it along to the right as far as the communication trench which leads into the front line trench near the Spion. Freund’s patrol leapt into the enemy’s front line trench on both sides of the communication trench, captured 10 men almost without a struggle, and secured several rifles and articles of equipment. A few Englishmen who offered resistance were bayoneted; Volunteer Herrmann, of the 7th Company, and Lance Corporal Haufler, of the 4th Company, particularly distinguished themselves. A few Englishmen attempted to get away, but were shot dead.
Volunteer Herrmann further discovered an extemporized trench mortar. The latter could not be carried off, however, as it was securely built in. Vice-Sergeant Major Wölfle, who arrived on the scene shortly after, destroyed the trench mortar as well as he could with hand grenades and pistol shots.
Böhlefeld’s reinforced patrol had accompanied the advance of Freund’s patrol along the trench, and came across three or four more wrecked dug-outs, which were filled with dead. Individuals standing about in the trench were killed by the patrol or made prisoner. During this affair, Under Officer Nössler, of the 11th Company, repeatedly distinguished himself.
Whilst our party was breaking into the enemy’s trenches or perhaps even before, a party of the enemy, approximately 25 to 30 strong, succeeded in getting away from the front line trench and making their way back to the Weisse Steinmauer, but were again driven back by our artillery fire, and now came running towards Stradtmann’s patrol. The latter, apprehending a counter-attack, opened fire. Ersatz Reservist Walzer, of the 11th Company, followed by Under Officer Staiger, of the 10th Company and others, raised a cheer and charged the Englishmen, bayoneting two of them. Those who did not put up their hands and surrender, were killed.
Lieutenant Erb had soon caught up Dumas’ patrol and took part in the subsequent fighting, which was practically continuous, for almost every one of the enemy offered resistance. With hand grenade and pistol, Dumas’ patrol killed more than 20 of the enemy, besides wounding a large number. In this fighting Volunteer Hees, of the 6th Company, particularly distinguished himself. Always to the fore, he alone accounted for several Englishmen. On our side only one man was slightly wounded.
In consequence of the events described above, Dumas’ patrol remained in the enemy’s trench considerably longer than intended. When all the other patrols had returned to the Hohlweg, the Dumas-Erb patrol was still missing.
Hereupon, Lieutenants Boenig and Stradtmann, with several non-commissioned officers and men, went back to the enemy’s lines and searched the trench to the left until they met the Dumas-Erb patrol on its way back. Here again Under Officer Nössler, of the 11th Company, 110th Reserve Infantry Regiment, distinguished himself.
At 8.50 p. m., the last men of the entire party had returned to the Hohlweg and went back to their dug-outs.
At 8.51 p. m., the first shell fell on the front line trenches east of Sap No. 3.
At 8.57 p. m., the artillery commander was informed that the artillery fire could be gradually broken off.
At 9 p. m., a heavy battery near Albert dropped a few shells near Sap No. 3.
At 9.05 p. m., the conclusion of the operation was reported.
The following were captured: 24 unwounded and 5 wounded prisoners, 1 Lewis gun, 1 rifle with telescopic sights, 20 ordinary rifles, and a large number of steel helmets, belts with ammunition pouches, packs, haversacks, and gas helmets.
Our casualties consisted of one man slightly wounded in the forehead by a splinter from a hand grenade. He was bandaged in the advanced dressing-station and immediately returned to the patrol.
(Signed) WAGENER,
Captain and Company Commander.
40 copies, as appendices to the Report of the 110th Reserve Infantry Regiment on the raid of the 11th April, 1916.
A more narrative form of report is represented by the following extract from Gen. Bragg’s report during the Civil War:
“To meet our successful advance and retrieve his losses in the front of his left, the enemy early transferred a portion of his reserve from his left to that flank, and by 2 o’clock had succeeded in concentrating such a force on Lieutenant General Hardee’s front as to check his further progress. Our two lines had, by this time, become almost blended, so weak were they by losses, exhaustion, and extension to cover the enemy’s whole front. As early as 10 a. m. Major General Breckinridge was called on for one brigade, and soon after for a second, to reinforce or act as a reserve to General Hardee. His reply to the first call represented the enemy as crossing Stone’s River in heavy force in his immediate front; and on receiving the second order he informed me they had already crossed in heavy force and were advancing on him in two lines. He was immediately ordered not to wait attack but to advance and meet them. About this same time a report reached me that a heavy force of the enemy’s infantry was advancing on the Lebanon Road about five miles in Breckinridge’s front. Brigadier General Pegram, who had been sent to that road to cover the flank of the infantry with the cavalry brigade (save two regiments, detached with Wheeler and Wharton), was ordered forward immediately to develop such movement. The orders for the two brigades from Breckinridge were countermanded, whilst dispositions were made at his request to reinforce him. Before they could be carried out, the movements ordered disclosed the facts that no force had crossed Stone’s River; that the only enemy in our immediate front there was a small body of sharpshooters, and that there was no advance on the Lebanon Road.
“These unfortunate misapprehensions on that part of the field (which, with proper precaution, could not have existed) withheld from active operation three fine brigades until the enemy had succeeded in checking our progress, had reëstablished his lines, and had collected many of his broken battalions.”
The above example, in addition to its value as a narrative report, illustrates the dependence of a commander upon proper information.