FOOTNOTES:
[1] By this ship His LORDSHIP received some newspapers from England, one of which contained a paragraph stating that General MACK was about to be appointed to the command of the Austrian armies in Germany. On reading this, His LORDSHIP made the following observation: "I know General MACK too well. He sold the King of Naples; and if he is now entrusted with an important command, he will certainly betray the Austrian monarchy."
[2] CAPTAIN HARDY left England in a bad state of health, with which he had been afflicted during the last twelve months; but was now in a progressive state of amendment. Lord NELSON asked the Surgeon this day, "how long he thought it might be before Captain HARDY'S perfect recovery;" and on the Surgeon's answering that "he hoped not more than a fortnight,"—"Ah!" replied His LORDSHIP, "before a fortnight the Enemy will be at sea, the business will be done, and we shall be looking out for England."
[3] These Instructions will be found at the end of the Narrative.
[4] HIS LORDSHIP did not wear his sword in the Battle of Trafalgar: it had been taken from the place where it hung up in his cabin, and was laid ready on his table; but it is supposed he forgot to call for it. This was the only action in which he ever appeared without a sword.
[5] It has been since recollected that on the 21st of October 1757, His LORDSHIP'S maternal uncle, Captain SUCKLING, in the Dreadnought, in company with two other line of battle ships, attacked and beat off a French squadron of four sail of the line and three frigates, off Cape François. The French Commodore was towed into Cape François; and the English ships, being too much disabled to follow up their success, bore away to Jamaica to refit.
[6] This phrase has been subjected to misconstruction; to the Writer of these pages, however, both the purport and expression of it seem very clear, thus; "might have been offered" (though it was not).
[7] The Victory's sick-report for this day numbered only ten convalescents, who all attended their respective quarters during the battle; and the whole Fleet was in a high state of health. Indeed the excellent health enjoyed by the crew of the Victory from December 1804 up to this period, is perhaps unprecedented: and is attributable solely to Captain HARDY'S attention to their subordination, temperance, warm clothing, and cleanliness; together with the means daily adopted to obviate the effects of moisture, and to accomplish the thorough ventilation of every part of the ship.
The Victory arrived at Spithead from the memorable and arduous chace of the Enemies' Fleets to Egypt and the West Indies, in August 1805: and notwithstanding the operation of the unfavourable circumstances of rapid change of climate, and the privation of refreshments experienced in that chace, as well as frequent increase of numbers (as in the West Indies there were at one time embarked in her above 990 souls), there was not now a single hospital-patient on board, nor did any occur during the several weeks of her stay in England; with which Lord NELSON expressed himself highly pleased when he joined the ship again, on the 14th of September, at St. Helen's. The Victory's casualties from the 29th of December 1804 to the 20th of October following, were only five fatal cases (one of these by accidental injury), and two patients sent to a naval hospital.
[8] It has been reported, but erroneously, that His LORDSHIP was actually requested by his Officers to change his dress, or to cover his stars.
[9] His LORDSHIP just at this time found fault with the Officer commanding on the forecastle, because the lee (or starboard) lower studding-sail had not been set sooner; a circumstance which, though trivial in itself, shews how well Captain HARDY knew His LORDSHIP'S sentiments.
[10] His LORDSHIP in a few minutes after this called Lieutenant PASCO, Mr. OGILVIE, and some other Officers, near him, and desired them to set their watches by the time of that which His LORDSHIP wore.
[11] The Enemy's fire continued to be pointed so high throughout the engagement, that the Victory did not lose a man on her lower deck; and had only two wounded on that deck, and these by musket-bulls.
[12] The reader may judge of the Surgeon's feelings at this momentous period, when informed that that excellent young Officer Mr. RAM was one of his dearest friends.
[13] The instance here alluded to occurred in the month of July, in the Victory's return to Europe from the West Indies; and the man survived the injury thirteen days. HIS LORDSHIP, during the whole of that time, manifested much anxiety at the protracted sufferings of an individual whose dissolution was certain, and was expected every hour.
[14] CAPTAIN HARDY deemed it his duty to give this information to Admiral COLLINGWOOD as soon as the fate of the day was decided; but thinking that HIS LORDSHIP might feel some repugnance to this communication, he left directions for Lieutenant HILLS to be detained on deck at his return, till he himself (Captain HARDY) should come up from the cockpit. Lieutenant HILLS was dispatched on this mission from the Victory, at the very time when the Enemy's van ships that had tacked were passing her to windward and firing at her.
[15] Meaning that in case of HIS LORDSHIP'S surviving till all resistance on the part of the Enemy had ceased, Captain HARDY was then to anchor the British Fleet and the prizes, if it should be found practicable.
[16] Alluding to some wishes previously expressed by HIS LORDSHIP to Captain HARDY respecting the place of his interment.
[17] IT must occur to the reader, that from the nature of the scene passing in the cockpit, and the noise of the guns, the whole of His LORDSHIP'S expressions could not be borne in mind, nor even distinctly heard, by the different persons attending him. The most interesting parts are here detailed.
[18] Immediately after HIS LORDSHIP expired, Captain HARDY went on board the Royal Sovereign, to communicate the melancholy event, and the nature of HIS LORDSHIP'S last orders, to Admiral COLLINGWOOD.
[19] The Redoutable lay alongside and still foul of the Temeraire for some time after this, and till several Seamen were sent from the latter to the assistance of the two Officers and men belonging to the Victory who had before taken possession of the prize.
[20] These were the ships commanded by Admiral DUMANNOIR, and afterwards captured by the squadron under the command of Sir RICHARD STRACHAN. They were nearly half an hour in passing to windward, during the whole of which time they continued firing on the British ships.
[21] About twenty of the Redoutable's guns were dismounted in the action. Those on that side of her lower deck opposed to the Victory, were all dismounted except five or six.
[22] Many of those who were slightly wounded did not apply for assistance till after the public return of killed and wounded had been transmitted to Admiral COLLINGWOOD, which therefore reports a smaller number than here stated.
[23] Brandy was recommended by the Surgeon in preference to rum, of which spirit also there was plenty on board. This circumstance is here noticed, because a very general but erroneous opinion was found to prevail on the Victory's arrival in England, that rum preserves the dead body from decay much longer and more perfectly than any other spirit, and ought therefore to have been used: but the fact is quite the reverse, for there are several kinds of spirit much better for that purpose than rum; and as their appropriateness in this respect arises from their degree of strength, on which alone their antiseptic quality depends, brandy is superior. Spirit of wine, however, is certainly by far the best, when it can be procured.
[24] Of the Victory's wounded, three died before she reached Gibraltar, one on the day of her arrival there, and another at the naval hospital at that place a few days afterwards: all the rest got well on board except the five left at Gibraltar, and five others not perfectly recovered from their wounds in January following; when the Victory being put out of commission at Chatham, they were sent to the Sussex hospital-ship at Sheerness.
[25] The ball was not fired from a rifle piece.
[26] It was not deemed necessary to insert in this Report the precise time which HIS LORDSHIP survived his wound. This, as before stated, was in reality two hours and three quarters.
[27] FIG. 1. in the annexed Plate represents the Ball in the exact state in which it was extracted. Drawn by Mr. W.E. DEVIS, who was then on board the Victory.
FIG. 2. (drawn also by Mr. DEVIS) shews the Ball in its present state; as set in crystal by Mr. YONGE, and presented to the Writer of this Narrative by Sir THOMAS HARDY.
The Ball, in perforating the epaulette, passed through many of the silk cords supporting the bullions, and through the pad and a doubling of silk besides; as the bag of the pad was composed of yellow silk. This circumstance militates strongly against an opinion entertained by some, that silk possesses in an eminent degree the power of resisting the force, or arresting the velocity, of a musket or pistol ball.
[28] The stock of spirit of wine on board was exhausted and from the sound state of the Body, brandy was judged sufficient for its preservation.
[29] These complaints were the consequence of indigestion, brought on by writing for several hours together. HIS LORDSHIP had one of these attacks from that cause a few days before the battle, but on resuming his accustomed exercise he got rid of it. This attack alarmed him, as he attributed it to sudden and violent spasm; but it was merely an unpleasant symptom (globus hystericus) attending indigestion.
APPENDIX.
INSTRUCTIONS
Issued by LORD NELSON to the Admirals and Captains of his Fleet, several days previous to the Battle.
Victory, off Cadiz, 10th of October, 1805.
GENERAL MEMORANDUM sent to the Commanders of Ships.
Thinking it almost impossible to bring a Fleet of forty sail of the line into a line of battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other circumstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the Enemy to battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive, I have therefore made up my mind to keep the Fleet in that position of sailing, with the exception of the First and Second in Command, that the order of sailing is to be the order of battle: placing the Fleet in two lines, of sixteen ships each with an advanced squadron of eight of the fastest-sailing two-decked ships; which will always make, if wanted, a line of twenty-four sail, on whichever line the Commander in Chief may direct.
The Second in Command will, after my intentions are made known to him, have the entire direction of his line; to make the attack upon the Enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed.
If the Enemy's Fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle, and that the two lines and advanced squadron could fetch them, they will probably be so extended that their van could not succour their rear. I should therefore probably make the Second in Command's signal to lead through about their twelfth ship from their rear; or wherever he could fetch, if not able to get so far advanced. My line would lead through about their centre: and the advanced squadron to cut three or four ships ahead of their centre, so as to ensure getting at their Commander in Chief, on whom every effort must be made to capture.
The whole impression of the British Fleet must be, to overpower from two or three ships ahead of their Commander in Chief (supposed to be in the centre) to the rear of their Fleet.
I will suppose twenty sail of the Enemy's line to be untouched: it must be some time before they could perform a manoeuvre to bring their force compact to attack any part of the British Fleet engaged, or to succour their own ships; which indeed would be impossible, without mixing with the ships engaged. The Enemy's Fleet is supposed to consist of forty-six sail of the line; British, forty:[30] if either is less, only a proportional number of Enemy's ships are to be cut off; British to be one-fourth superior to the Enemy cut off.
Something must be left to chance: nothing is sure in a sea-fight, beyond all others; shot will carry away masts and yards of friends as well as foes: but I look with confidence to a victory before the van of the Enemy could succour their rear; and then that the British Fleet would most of them be ready to receive their twenty sail of the line, or to pursue them should they endeavour to make off.
If the van of the Enemy tack, the captured ships must run to leeward of the British Fleet: if the Enemy wear, the British must place themselves between the Enemy and captured, and disabled British ships: and should the Enemy close, I have no fear for the result.
The Second in Command will, in all possible things, direct the movements of his line, by keeping them so compact as the nature of the circumstances will admit. Captains are to look to their particular line as their rallying-point; but in case signals cannot be seen or clearly understood, no Captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an Enemy.
Plan of the intended attack from to-windward, the Enemy in line of battle ready to receive an attack:
————- Advanced squadron.}
————————— Weather line. } British.
————————— Lee line. }
————————————————————————-
Enemy's line.
The divisions of the British Fleet will be brought nearly within gun-shot of the Enemy's centre. The signal will be made for the lee line to bear up together; to set all their sail, even studding-sails, in order to get as quickly as possible to the Enemy's line; and to cut through, beginning from the twelfth ship from the Enemy's rear. Some ships may not get through their exact place, but they will always be at hand to assist their friends. If any are thrown in the rear of the Enemy, they will effectually complete the business of twelve sail of the Enemy.
Should the Enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large, still the twelve ships composing in the first position the Enemy's rear, are to be the object of attack of the lee line, unless otherwise directed by the Commander in Chief: which is scarcely to be expected; as the entire management of the lee line, after the intentions of the Commander in Chief are signified, is intended to be left to the Admiral commanding that line.
The remainder of the Enemy's Fleet, thirty-four sail, are to be left to the management of the Commander in Chief; who will endeavour to take care that the movements of the Second in Command are as little interrupted as possible.
NELSON AND BRONTE.
By Command of the Vice Admiral.
JNO. SCOTT.