Operations on the Garonne. (March, 1814.)
Soult, a native of these parts, had chosen Toulouse as a strategic post, because that ancient capital of the south, having fifty thousand inhabitants, commanded the principal passage of the Garonne, was the centre of a great number of roads on both sides of that river, and the chief military arsenal of the south of France. There he could most easily feed his troops, assemble, arm, and discipline the conscripts, control and urge the civil authorities with more power, and counteract the machinations of the discontented; it also gave him command of various lines of operations. He could retire upon Suchet by Carcassonne, or towards Lyons by Alby. He could go behind the Tarn and defend successively that river and the Lot, or even retreat upon Decaen’s army near Bordeaux, and thus draw the allies down the right bank of the Garonne as he had before drawn them up the left bank; assured that Wellington must follow him, and with weakened forces, as it would be necessary to leave troops in observation of Suchet.
Thus reasoning, he placed a separate body of troops recently assembled by General Loverdo from the interior, at Montauban, with orders to construct a bridge-head on the left of the Tarn. This secured the passage of that river, a point of assembly for detachments observing the Garonne below Toulouse, and the command of several great roads. But to hold Toulouse was a great political object. It was the last point connecting him at once with Suchet and Decaen; while he held it, the latter general and the partizans organized in the mountains about Lourdes could act, each on their own side, against Wellington’s long lines of communication. At Toulouse Suchet could aid him, either with his whole force, or by a detachment to the Upper Garonne, where General Lafitte had collected seven or eight hundred national guards and other troops: Suchet, however, though strongly urged, treated this proposition, as he had done those before made, with contempt.
Toulouse was not less valuable as a position of battle.
The Garonne, flowing along the allies’ right, presented the concave of a deep loop, at the bottom of which was a bridge masked by the suburb of St. Cyprien; this last, originally protected by an ancient brick wall three feet thick and flanked by massive towers, was now strengthened by Soult with a line of exterior entrenchments.
Beyond the river was the city, inclosed by an old wall flanked with towers, and so thick as to hold twenty-four pound guns.
The great canal of Languedoc, which joined the Garonne a few miles below the town, was generally within point-blank shot of this wall, covering it on the north and east, as the Garonne and St. Cyprien did on the west.
Eastward, two suburbs, St. Stephen and Guillermerie, lying on both sides of this canal, were entrenched and protected by the hills of Sacarin and Cambon, which were also entrenched, and flanked the approaches to the canal above and below the suburbs.
Eight hundred yards beyond these hills a high ridge called Mont Rave ran nearly parallel with the canal, its outer slope was exceedingly rugged, and overlooked a marshy plain, through which the Ers river flowed.
South of the town was a plain, but there the suburb of St. Michel furnished another outwork; and some distance beyond it a range of heights, called the Pech David, commenced, trending westward up the Garonne in a nearly parallel direction.
Such being Soult’s position, he calculated, that as Wellington could not force the passage by the suburb of St. Cyprien without an enormous sacrifice of men, he must seek to turn the flanks above or below Toulouse, leaving a force to blockade St. Cyprien lest the French should issue thence against his communications. If he passed the Garonne above Toulouse, and above its confluence with the Arriege, he would have to cross the latter river also, which could only be effected at Cintegabelle, one march higher up. He would then have to come down the right bank, through a country at that time impracticable for guns, from rain. If he passed the Garonne below the confluence of the Arriege, his movements would be overlooked from the Pech David, and the heads of his columns attacked; if that failed, Toulouse and the Mont Rave remained as a position of battle, from whence there was a secure retreat upon Montauban.
For these reasons the passage above Toulouse could lead to no decisive result: but a passage below was a different matter. Wellington would then cut the army off from Montauban and attack Toulouse from the northern and eastern quarters; and the French, losing the battle, could only retreat by Carcassonne to unite with Suchet in Roussillon; where with their backs to the mountains and the allies between them and France they would starve. Convinced therefore that the attack would be on that side, Soult lined the Garonne with his cavalry as far as the confluence of the Tarn, and called up some troops, recently collected at Agen under General Despeaux, to line the Tarn itself, his design being to attack the allies if they crossed between that river and the Garonne rather than lose his communication with Montauban.
Wellington having suffered the French to gain three days’ march in the retreat from Tarbes had little choice of operations. He could not halt until the Andalusians and Del Parque’s troops joined him, without giving Soult time to strengthen his defence; nor without appearing fearful of the French people, which would have been very dangerous. Still less could he wait for the fall of Bayonne. He had taken the offensive, and the invasion of France being begun could not be relinquished. Leading an army victorious and superior in numbers, his business was to fight; and as he could not force St. Cyprien, he had to pass the Garonne above or below Toulouse.
A passage below was undoubtedly the prudent course; but Wellington, observing that, when across, the south side of the city would be most open to attack, resolved to cast his bridge at Portet, six miles above Toulouse; designing to throw his right wing suddenly into the open country between the Garonne and the canal of Languedoc, while with his centre and left he assailed the suburb of St. Cyprien.[39] Hence, at eight o’clock in the evening of the 27th, one of Hill’s brigades approached the river, some men were ferried over and the bridge was commenced; but the river being measured was too wide for the pontoons, there were no trestles, and that project was necessarily abandoned. Had it been effected, some great advantage would have been gained; for Soult only knew of the attempt two days later, and then by emissaries, not by scouts. Wellington persisted. Collecting a great body of infantry about Portet, he began by driving the French horsemen from the Touch river, which was in his front, for his army lined the bank of the Garonne above Toulouse, and did not face St. Cyprien. In this operation a single squadron of the 18th Hussars, under Major Hughes, being inconsiderately pushed by Colonel Vivian across the bridge of St. Martin de la Touch, suddenly came upon a regiment of French cavalry. The rashness of the act, as often happens in war, proved the safety of the British; for the enemy, thinking a strong support must be at hand, discharged their carbines and retreated at a canter; Hughes followed, the speed of both parties increased; and as the road did not admit egress by the sides, this great body of horsemen was pushed headlong by a few men under the batteries of St. Cyprien.
Soult’s attention being thus attracted below Toulouse, a bridge was laid near Pensaguel, two miles above the confluence of the Arriege, and Hill passed the Garonne with thirteen thousand sabres and bayonets, eighteen guns, and a rocket brigade. His advanced guard then pushed on rapidly by the great road to seize the bridge of Cintegabelle fifteen miles up the Arriege; and to secure a ferry-boat known to be at Vinergue. The main body followed with intent to pass the Arriege at Cintegabelle, and so come down the right bank to attack Toulouse on the south, while Wellington assailed St. Cyprien. This march was to have been made privily in the night of the 30th, but the pontoon bridge was not finished until five in the morning of the 31st; Soult thus got notice in time to observe the strength of the column, and ascertain that the great body of the army was still in front of St. Cyprien. Knowing what swamps were to be passed, and having the suburbs of St. Michel and St. Etienne now in a state of defence, he thought the operation only a feint to draw off a part of his army from Toulouse while St. Cyprien was assaulted or the Garonne passed below the city; wherefore, keeping his infantry in hand, he merely sent cavalry up the Arriege in observation, and directed Lafitte, who had some regular horsemen and national guards higher up, to hang upon Hill’s skirts and pretend to be the van of Suchet’s army. He was, however, disquieted, because the allies’ baggage, to avoid encumbering the march, had been sent higher up the Garonne, to cross at Carbonne, and was by the scouts reported as a second column increasing Hill’s force to eighteen thousand men.
While in this uncertainty, Soult first heard of the measurement of the river made at Portet in the night of the 27th, and that many guns were still there; hence, as he could not know why the bridge was not thrown, he concluded the intent was to cross there also when Hill should descend the Arriege. To meet this danger, he gave Clausel orders to fall upon the head of the allies with four divisions if they should attempt the passage before Hill came down; resolving in the contrary case to fight in the suburbs of Toulouse and on the Mont Rave, because the positions on the right of the Arriege were all favourable to the assailants. He was, however, soon relieved from anxiety. Hill passed the Arriege at Cintegabelle and sent his cavalry forward; but his artillery were unable to follow in that deep country, and as success and safety alike depended on rapidity, he returned and recrossed the Garonne in the night, keeping a flying bridge and a small guard of infantry and cavalry on the right bank: he was followed by Lafitte’s horsemen, who picked up a few stragglers and mules, but no other event occurred, and Soult was well pleased that his adversary had thus lost three or four important days.
Being now sure the next attempt would be below Toulouse, he changed his design of marching down the Garonne to fight between that river and the Tarn; and as his works for the city and suburbs were nearly complete, he concluded to hold Toulouse in any circumstances, and set his whole army and all the labouring population to entrench the Mont Rave, beyond the canal, thinking thus to bear the shock of battle, come on which side it would. Fortune favoured him. The Garonne continued so full and rapid that Wellington remained inactive before St. Cyprien until the evening of the 3rd, when, forced to adopt the lower passage, and the flood having abated, the pontoons were carried in the night to Grenade, fifteen miles below Toulouse. The bridge was then well thrown, and thirty guns placed in battery on the left bank to protect it. The third, fourth, and sixth divisions, with three brigades of cavalry, the whole under Beresford, immediately passed; and the horsemen being pushed to the front and flanks captured a large herd of bullocks destined for the French. But again the Garonne flooded high, the light division and the Spaniards were unable to follow, the bridge got damaged and was taken up.
Soult soon heard by his cavalry scouts of this passage, but not of the force across, and as Morillo’s Spaniards, whom he mistook for Freyre’s, were then in front of St. Cyprien, he thought Hill had moved also to Grenade, and that the greatest part of the allied army was over the Garonne. Wherefore, observing Beresford with cavalry, he continued to work at his field of battle, his resolution to fight for Toulouse being confirmed by hearing that the allied sovereigns had entered Paris.
On the 8th the water subsided again, and the bridge was once more laid; Freyre’s Spaniards and the Portuguese artillery then crossed, and Wellington in person advanced within five miles of Toulouse. Marching up both banks of the Ers, his columns were separated by that river, which was impassable without pontoons, and it was essential to secure one of the stone bridges. Hence, when his left approached the heights of Kirie Eleison, on the great road of Alby, Vivian’s horsemen first drove Berton’s cavalry up the right of the Ers towards the bridge of Bordes; then the 18th Hussars descended towards that of Croix d’Orade, where after some skirmishing a French regiment suddenly appeared in front of the bridge. The opposite bank of the river was as instantly lined with dismounted carbineers, and the two parties stood facing each other, hesitating to begin, until the approach of some British infantry, when both sounded a charge at the same moment; but the English horses were so quick the French were in an instant jammed up on the bridge, and their front ranks sabred, while the rear went off in disorder. They had many killed or wounded, lost above a hundred prisoners, and were pursued through the village of Croix d’Orade, yet rallied beyond on the rest of their brigade and advanced again; whereupon the hussars recrossed the bridge, which was now defended by the British infantry. The communication between the allied columns was thus secured. The credit of this brilliant action was erroneously given to Colonel Vivian in the despatch. That officer was wounded by a carbine shot previous to the charge at the bridge, and the attack was conducted by Major Hughes.
Wellington having, from the heights of Kirie Eleison, examined the French general’s position, decided to attack on the 9th; and, to shorten his communications with Hill, had his bridge on the Garonne relaid higher up at Seilh, where the light division were to cross at daybreak; but the pontoons were not relaid until late in the day, and he, extremely incensed at the failure, was forced to defer his battle until the 10th.
Soult had now by means of his fortresses, his battles, the sudden change of his line of operations after Orthes, his rapid retreat from Tarbes, and his clear judgment in fixing upon Toulouse as his next point of resistance, reduced the strength of his adversary to an equality with his own. He had gained seventeen days for preparation, and had compelled Wellington to fight on ground naturally adapted for defence and well fortified; where one-third of his force was separated by a great river from the rest; where he could derive no advantage from his numerous cavalry, and was overmatched in artillery. Covering three sides of Toulouse the French position was indeed very strong. The left was at St. Cyprien on the west; the centre at the canal on the north; the right at Mont Rave on the east; the reserve of conscripts manned the ramparts of Toulouse, and the urban guards within the town aided the transport of artillery and ammunition to different posts.
Hill was in front of St. Cyprien, and he could only communicate with the main body by the pontoon bridge at Seilh, a circuit of ten or twelve miles. Wellington was advancing from the north, but being still intent to assail on the south, where Soult was weakest in defence, he examined the country on the left of the Ers, designing under cover of that river to make a flank march and gain the open ground which he had formerly vainly endeavoured to reach by passing at Portet and Pinsaguel. Again he was baffled by the deep country, which he could not master so as to pass the Ers by force in the upper part; and all the bridges there, with the exception of Croix d’Orade, were mined or destroyed. There was no choice then but to attack the north and east fronts. The first, open and flat, and easily approached by the great roads of Montauban and Alby, was yet impregnable in defence; because the canal, the bridges over which were strongly defended by works, was under the fire of the ramparts of Toulouse, and for the most part within musket-shot. Wherefore, as at St. Cyprien, a fortress, not a position, was opposed, and the assault was necessarily confined to the Mont Rave or eastern front.
Naturally strong and rugged, that ridge was covered by the Ers river, and presented two distinct platforms, Calvinet and St. Sypière. Between them, where the ground dipped a little, two routes called the Lavaur and Caraman roads led to Toulouse, passing the canal at the Guillemerie and St. Etienne suburbs.
The Calvinet platform was fortified on the left with two large redoubts, having open entrenchments in front. On the right were two other large forts, called the Colombette and Tower of Augustines.
St. Sypière had also two redoubts, one on the extreme right called St. Sypière, the other without a name near the road of Caraman.
The whole occupation was two miles long, and to attack the front it was necessary to cross the Ers under fire, advancing over ground naturally marshy and now almost impassable from artificial inundations to the assault of the ridge and its works. If the assailants should force a way between the two platforms, they would, while their flanks were battered by the redoubts above, come in succession upon new works, at Cambon and Sacarin; upon the suburbs of Guillemerie and Etienne; upon the canal; and finally upon the ramparts of the town. But the Ers could not be passed except at Croix d’Orade, and Wellington was reduced to a flank march under fire, between that river and Mont Rave, until he could gain ground to present a front to the latter and storm it; after which the canal was to be crossed above ere the army could be established on the south of Toulouse. To impose that march had been Soult’s object, and his army was disposed in the following order to render it disastrous.
Reille defended St. Cyprien with Taupin’s and Maransin’s divisions.
Daricau’s division lined the canal on the north from its junction with the Garonne to the road of Alby, defending the bridge-head of Jumeaux, the convent of the Minimes, and the Matabiau bridge.
Harispe’s division held the Mont Rave, his right being at St. Sypière, his centre at the Colombette, about which Vial’s horsemen were also collected; his left looked down the road of Alby, having in front a detached eminence within cannon-shot, called the Hill of Pugade, occupied by St. Pol’s brigade.
Soult’s remaining divisions were in columns behind the Mont Rave.
This order of battle formed an angle, each side about two miles long, the apex towards the Alby road being covered by the Pugade hill.
Wellington made the following dispositions of attack for the 10th. Hill to menace St. Cyprien, augmenting or abating his efforts according to the progress of the main battle. The third and light divisions and Freyre’s Spaniards to move against the northern front; the two first, supported by Bock’s cavalry, were to menace the line of canal defended by Daricau—Picton at the bridge of Jumeaux and the Minimes; Alten to connect him with Freyre, who, reinforced with the Portuguese artillery, was to carry the hill of Pugade, and then halt to cover Beresford’s column. This last, composed of the fourth and sixth divisions with three batteries, was to move round the left of the Pugade, and along the low ground between the Mont Rave and the Ers, until the rear should pass the road of Lavaur in the centre, when it was to wheel into line and attack the platform of St. Sypière. Freyre was then to assail that of Calvinet, and Ponsonby’s dragoons were to connect that general’s left with Beresford’s column. Meanwhile Lord Edward Somerset’s hussars and Vivian’s cavalry were to ascend both banks of the Ers in observation of Berton’s cavalry; because the latter could by the bridges of Bordes and Montaudran pass from the right to the left bank, destroy the bridges, and fall on the head of Beresford’s troops.