CHAPTER II.
For many years antecedent to the French invasion, the royal family of Spain was distracted with domestic quarrels; the son’s hand was against his mother, the father’s against his son, and the court was a scene of continual broils, under cover of which artful men, as is usual in such cases, pushed their own interest forward, while they seemed to act only for the sake of the party whose cause they espoused. Nellerto.[3] Charles IV. attributed this unhappy state of his house to the intrigues of his sister-in-law, the queen of the Two Sicilies. He himself, a weak and inefficient old man, was governed by his wife, and she again by don Manuel Godoy, of whose person she was enamoured even to folly. Vide Doblado’s Letters. From the rank of a simple gentleman of the Royal Guards, this person had, through her influence, been raised to the highest dignities; and the title of Prince of the Peace was conferred upon a man whose name must be for ever connected with one of the bloodiest wars that fill the page of history.
Ferdinand prince of the Asturias, naturally hated this favourite, and the miserable death of his young wife, his own youth and apparently forlorn condition created such an interest in his favour, that the people partook of his feelings; and the disunion of the royal family extending its effects beyond the precincts of the court, involved the nation in ruin. Those who know how a Spaniard hates, will readily comprehend why Godoy, who was really a mild, good-natured man, although a sensual and corrupt one, has been so overloaded with imprecations, as if he, and he alone, had been the cause of the disasters of Spain.
Napoleon in Las Casas.
The canon, Escoiquiz, a daring and subtile politician, appears to have been the chief of Ferdinand’s party; finding the influence of the Prince of the Peace too strong, he looked for support in a powerful quarter; Nellerto.and under his tuition, Ferdinand wrote upon the 11th of October, 1807, to the emperor Napoleon; in this letter he complained of the influence which bad men had obtained over his father, prayed for the interference of the “hero destined by Providence,” so run the text, “to save Europe and to support thrones;” asked an alliance by marriage with the Buonaparte family, and finally desired that his communication might be kept secret from his father, lest it should be taken as a proof of disrespect. To this letter he received no answer, and fresh matter of quarrel being found by his enemies at home, he was placed in arrest, and upon the 29th of October, Charles denounced him to the Emperor as guilty of treason, and of having projected the assassination of his own mother. Napoleon caught eagerly at this pretext for interfering in the domestic policy of Spain, and thus the honour and independence of a great people were placed in jeopardy by the squabbles of two of the most worthless persons in the nation.
Some short time before this, Godoy, either instigated by an ambition to found a dynasty, or fearing that the death of the king would expose him to the vengeance of Ferdinand, had made proposals to the French court to concert a plan for the conquest and division of Portugal, promising the assistance of Spain, on condition that a principality for himself should be set apart from the spoil. At least such is the turn given by Napoleon to this affair; but the article which provided an indemnification for the king of Etruria a minor, who had just been obliged to surrender his Italian dominions to France, renders it very doubtful if the first offer came from Godoy. That, however, is a point of small interest, for Napoleon eagerly adopted the project if he did not propose it; and the advantages were all on his side. Under the pretext of supporting his army in Portugal, he might fill Spain with his troops; the dispute between the father and the son, now referred to his arbitration, placed the golden apples within his reach, and he resolved to gather the fruit if he had not planted the tree.
A secret treaty was immediately concluded at Fontainebleau, between marshal Duroc on the part of France, and Eugenio Izquerdo on the part of Spain. This treaty, together with a convention dependant on it, was signed the 27th, and ratified by Napoleon on the 29th of October; the contracting parties agreeing to the following conditions.
The house of Braganza to be driven forth of Portugal, and that kingdom divided into three portions, of which the province of Entre Minho e Duero and the town of Oporto, forming one, was to be given as an indemnification to the dispossessed king of Etruria, and to be called the kingdom of North Lusitania.
The Alemtejo and the Algarves to be erected into a principality for Godoy, who taking the title of prince of the Algarves, was still to be in some respects dependant upon the Spanish crown.
The central provinces of Estremadura, Beira, and the Tras os Montes, together with the town of Lisbon, to be held in deposit until a general peace, and then to be exchanged under certain conditions for English conquests.
The ultra-marine dominions of the exiled family to be equally divided between the contracting parties, and in three years at the longest, the king of Spain to be gratified with the title of Emperor of the Two Americas. Thus much for the treaty. The terms of the convention were:
That France should employ 25,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. Spain 24,000 infantry, 30 guns, and 3,000 cavalry.
The French contingent to be joined at Alcantara by the Spanish cavalry, artillery, and one-third of the infantry, and from thence to march at once to Lisbon. Of the remaining Spanish infantry 10,000 were to take possession of the Entre Minho e Duero and Oporto, and 6,000 were to invade Estremadura and the Algarves. In the mean time a reserve of 40,000 men was to be assembled at Bayonne, ready to take the field by the 20th of November, if England should interfere, or the Portuguese people resist.
If the king of Spain or any of his family joined the troops, the chief command was to be vested in the person so joining, but with that exception, the French general was to be obeyed whenever the armies of the two nations came into contact, and during the march through Spain the French soldiers were to be fed by that country, but paid by their own government.
The revenues of the conquered provinces were to be administered by the general actually in possession, and for the benefit of the nation in whose name the province was held.
Although it is evident that this treaty and convention favoured Napoleon’s ulterior operations in Spain, by enabling him to mask his views, and introduce large bodies of men into that country without creating much suspicion of his real intention; it does not follow, as some authors have asserted, that they were contrived by the emperor for the sole purpose of rendering the Spanish royal family odious to the world, and by this far-fetched expedient to prevent other nations from taking an interest in their fate when he should find it convenient to apply the same measure of injustice to his associates that they had accorded to the family of Braganza.
To say nothing of the weakness of such a policy, founded as it must be on the error that governments acknowledge the dictates of justice at the expense of their supposed interests; it must be observed that Portugal was intrinsically a great object. History does not speak of the time when the inhabitants of that country were deficient in spirit; the natural obstacles to an invasion had more than once frustrated the efforts of large armies, and the long line of communication between Bayonne and the Portuguese frontier could only be supported by Spanish co-operation. Add to this, the facility with which England could, and the probability that she would, succour her ancient ally, and the reasonable conclusion is, that Napoleon’s first intentions were in accordance with the literal meaning of the treaty of Fontainebleau, Voice from St. Helena, vol. ii. and that his subsequent proceedings were the result of new projects conceived as the wondrous imbecility of the Spanish Bourbons became manifest.
Again, the convention provided for the organization of a large Spanish force, to be stationed in the north and south of Portugal, that is, in precisely the two places from whence they could most readily march to the assistance of their country, if it was invaded; and in fact the division of the marquis of Solano in the south, and that of general Taranco in the north of Portugal, did afterwards (when the Spanish insurrection broke out) form the strength of the Andalusian and Gallician armies, the former of which gained the victory at Baylen, while the latter contended for it, although ineffectually, at Rio Seco.
The French force destined to invade Portugal was already assembled at Bayonne, under the title of the first army of the Garonne. It was commanded by general Junot, a young man of a bold ambitious disposition, but of greater reputation for military talent than he was able to support. The men were principally conscripts, and ill fitted to endure the hardships which awaited them.
Thiebault, Exp. du Portugal.
At first, by easy marches and in small divisions, Junot led his army through Spain; the inhabitants were by no means friendly to their guests; but whether from any latent fear of what was to follow, or from a dislike of foreign soldiers common to all secluded people, does not clearly appear. When the head of the columns reached Salamanca, Junot halted, intending to complete the organization of his troops in that rich country, and there to await the most favourable moment for penetrating the sterile frontier which guarded his destined prey; but political events marched faster than his calculations, and fresh instructions from the emperor prescribed an immediate advance upon Lisbon. Junot obeyed, and the family of Braganza, at his approach, fled to the Brazils. The series of interesting transactions which attended this invasion will be treated of hereafter; at present I must return to Spain already bending to the first gusts of that hurricane, which was soon to sweep over her with such destructive violence.
Nellerto.
The accusation of treason and intended parricide, preferred by Charles IV. against his son Ferdinand, gave rise to some judicial proceedings which ended in the submission of the latter; and Ferdinand being Historia de la Guerra contra Nap. absolved of the imputed crime, wrote a letter to his father and mother, acknowledging his own faults, but accusing the persons who surrounded him of being the instigators of deeds which he abhorred. The intrigues of his advisers, however, continued, and the plans of Napoleon advanced as a necessary consequence of the divisions in the Spanish court.
By the terms of the convention of Fontainebleau, forty thousand men were to be held in reserve at Bayonne; but a greater number were assembled on different points of the frontier; and in the course of December, two corps had entered the Spanish territory, and were quartered in Vittoria, Miranda, Briviesca, and the neighbourhood. The one, commanded by general Dupont, was called the second army of observation of the “Gironde.” The other, commanded by marshal Moncey, took the title of the army of observation of the “Côte d’Ocean.” Return of the French army.[Appendix.]
Journal of Dupont’s Operations MSS. In the gross they amounted to fifty-three thousand men, of which above forty thousand were fit for duty; and in the course of the month of December, Dupont advanced to Valladolid, while a reinforcement for Junot, four thousand seven hundred in number, took up their quarters at Salamanca.
It thus appeared as if the French troops were quietly following the natural line of communication between France and Portugal; but in reality Dupont’s position cut off the capital from all intercourse with the northern provinces, while Moncey secured the direct road from Bayonne to Madrid. Small divisions Notes of Napoleon. [Appendix, No. 2.] under different pretexts continually reinforced these two bodies, and through the Eastern Pyrenees twelve thousand men, commanded by general Duhesme, penetrated into Catalonia, and established themselves in Barcelona.
In the mean time the dispute between the king and his son, or rather between the Prince of the Peace and the advisers of Ferdinand, was brought to a crisis by insurrections at Aranjuez and Madrid, which took place upon the 17th, 18th, and 19th of March, 1808. The old king, deceived by intrigues, or frightened at the difficulties which surrounded him, had determined, as it is supposed by some, to quit Spain, and, in imitation of his brother of Portugal, to retire from the turmoil of European politics, and take refuge in his American dominions. Certain it is that every thing was prepared for a flight to Seville, when the prince’s grooms commenced a tumult, in which the populace of Aranjuez joined, and were only pacified by the assurance that no journey was in contemplation.
Upon the 18th the people of Madrid, following the example of Aranjuez, sacked the house of the obnoxious favourite, Manuel Godoy. Upon the 19th the riots recommenced in Aranjuez: the Prince of the Peace secreted himself from the fury of the mob; but his retreat being discovered, he was maltreated, and on the point of being killed, when the soldiers of the royal guard rescued him. Upon the 18th Charles IV., terrified by the violent proceedings of his subjects, abdicated. This event was proclaimed at Madrid on the 20th, and Ferdinand was declared king, to the great joy of the nation at large: little did the people know what they rejoiced at, time has since taught them that the fable of the frogs and their monarch had its meaning.
During these transactions, Murat, grand duke of Berg, who had taken the command of all the French troops in Spain, quitted his quarters at Aranda de Duero, passed the Somosierra, and entered Madrid the 23d, with Moncey’s corps and a fine body of cavalry, Dupont at the same time deviating from the road to Portugal, crossed the Duero and occupied Segovia, the Escurial, and Aranjuez.
Ferdinand arrived at Madrid on the 24th, but was not recognised by Murat as king; nevertheless, at the demand of that powerful guest, he surrendered the sword of Francis I., which was delivered with much ceremony to the French general. Charles, who had sent a paper to Murat, declaring that his abdication had been the result of force, wrote also to Napoleon in the same strain; and this state of affairs being unexpected by the emperor, he employed general Savary Napoleon in Las Casas. to conduct his plans, which appear to have been considerably deranged by the vehemence of the people, and the precipitation of Murat in taking possession of the capital.
Before Savary’s arrival, don Carlos the brother of Ferdinand, departed from Madrid hoping to meet the emperor Napoleon, whose presence in that city was confidently expected; and upon the 10th of April, Ferdinand, having first appointed a supreme junta, of which his uncle, don Antonio, was president, and Murat a member, commenced his own remarkable journey to Bayonne, the true causes of which certainly have not yet been developed; and perhaps when they shall be known, some petty personal intrigue may be found to have had a greater share in producing it, than the grand machinations attributed to Napoleon, who could not have anticipated, much less have calculated, a great political measure upon such a surprising example of weakness.
The people everywhere manifested their repugnance to this journey; at Vittoria they cut the traces of Ferdinand’s carriage, and at different times several gallant men offered, at the risk of their lives, to carry him off, in defiance of the French troops quartered along the road. But Ferdinand, unmoved by their entreaties and zeal, and regardless of the warning contained in a letter that he received at this period from Napoleon (who, withholding the title of majesty, sharply reproved him for his past conduct, and scarcely expressed a wish to meet him), continued his progress, and on the 20th of April, 1808, found himself a prisoner in Bayonne. In the mean time Charles, who, under the protection of Murat, had resumed his rights, and obtained the liberty of Godoy, quitted Spain, and also threw himself, his cause, and kingdom, into the hands of the emperor.
These events were in themselves quite enough to urge a more cautious people than the Spaniards into action; but other measures had been pursued, which proved beyond the possibility of doubt, that the country was destined to be the spoil of the French. The troops of that nation had been admitted without reserve or precaution into the different fortresses upon the Spanish frontier, and, taking advantage of this hospitality to forward the views of their chief, they got possession, by various artifices, of the citadels of St. Sebastian in Guipuscoa, of Pampeluna in Navarre, and of that of Figueras, and the forts of Monjuik, and citadel of Barcelona in Catalonia; and thus, under the pretence of mediating between the father and the son, in a time of profound peace, a foreign force was suddenly established in the capital—on the communications—and in the principal frontier fortresses; its chief was admitted to a share of the government, and a fiery, proud, and jealous nation was laid prostrate at the feet of a stranger, without a blow being struck, without one warning voice being raised, without a suspicion being excited in sufficient time to guard against those acts, upon which all were gazing in stupid amazement.
It is idle to attribute this surprising event to the subtlety of Napoleon’s policy, to the depth of his deceit, or to the treachery of Godoy. Such a fatal calamity could only be the result of bad government, and a consequent degradation of public feeling; and it matters but little to those who wish to derive a lesson from experience, whether it be a Godoy or a Savary that strikes the last bargain of corruption, the silly father or the rebellious son that signs the final act of degradation and infamy. Fortunately, it is easier to oppress the people of all countries, than to destroy their generous feelings; when all patriotism is lost among the upper classes, it may still be found among the lower. In the Peninsula it was not found, but started into life, and with a fervour and energy that ennobled even the wild and savage form in which it appeared; nor was it the less admirable that it burst forth attended by many evils. The good feeling displayed was the people’s own; their cruelty, folly, and perverseness, were the effects of bad government.
There are many reasons why Napoleon should have meddled with the interior affairs of Spain; there seems to be no good one for his manner of doing it. It is true that the Spanish Bourbons could never have been sincere friends to France while Buonaparte held the sceptre, and the moment that the fear of his power ceased to operate, it was quite certain that their apparent friendship would change to active hostility; the proclamation issued by the Spanish cabinet just before the battle of Jena, is evidence of this feeling; but if the Bourbons were his enemies, it did not follow that the people sympathised with their rulers. The resources of the country were, it is said, already at his disposal; but that availed him little, as the corruption and weakness of the administration had reduced those resources to the lowest ebb. His great error was, that he looked only to the court, and treated the nation with contempt. Had Napoleon taken care to bring the people and their government into hostile contact first,—and how many points of contact would not such a government have afforded!—instead of appearing as the treacherous arbitrator in a domestic quarrel, he would have been hailed as the deliverer of a great people.
The journey of Ferdinand, the liberation of Godoy, and the flight of Charles, the appointing Murat to be a member of the governing Junta, and the movements of the French troops, who were advancing from all parts towards Madrid, roused the indignation of the Spanish people; tumults and assassinations had Journal of Dupont’s Operations. MSS. taken place in various parts; and at Toledo a serious riot occurred on the 23d of April; the peasants joined the inhabitants of the town, and it was only by the advance of a division of infantry and some cavalry of Dupont’s corps (then quartered at Aranjuez) that order was restored. The agitation of the public mind, however, increased, the French troops were all young men, or rather boys, taken from the last conscription, and disciplined after they had entered Spain, their youth and apparent feebleness excited the contempt of the Spaniards, who pride themselves much upon individual prowess; and the swelling indignation at last broke out.
Upon the 2d of May, a carriage being prepared (as the people supposed) to convey don Antonio, the uncle of Ferdinand, to France, a crowd collected about it, and their language indicated a determination not to permit the last of the royal family to be spirited away: the traces of the carriage were cut, and loud imprecations against the French burst forth on every side. At that moment, colonel La Grange, an aide-de-camp of Murat’s, appearing amongst them, was assailed and maltreated; in an instant the whole city was in commotion, and the French soldiers expecting no violence, were taken unawares and killed in every quarter: above seven hundred fell. The hospital was attacked by the populace; but the attendants and the sick beat them off; and the alarm having spread to the camp outside the town, the French cavalry came to the assistance of their countrymen by the gate of Alcala; while general Lanfranc, with a column of three thousand infantry, descending from the heights on the north-west quarter, entered the Calle Ancha de Bernardo. As this column crossed the street of Maravelles, in which the arsenal was situated, two Spanish officers, named Daois and Velarde, who were in a state of great excitement, discharged some guns upon the passing troops, and were immediately put to death by the voltigeurs; meanwhile, the column, continuing its march, released, as it advanced, several superior French officers, who were in a manner besieged in the houses by the mob. The cavalry at the other end of the town, treating the affair as a tumult, Memoir of Azanza and O’Farril. and not as an action, made some hundred prisoners; and by the exertions of marshal Moncey, general Harispe, Gonzalvo O’Farril, and some others, order was soon restored.
After night-fall, the peasantry of the neighbourhood came armed and in considerable numbers towards the city, and the French guards at the different gates firing upon them, killed twenty or thirty, and wounded others, some few were also crushed to death or lamed by the cavalry in the morning.
In the first moment of irritation, Murat ordered all the prisoners to be tried by a military commission, which condemned them to death; but the municipality interfered, and represented to that prince the extreme cruelty of visiting this angry ebullition of an injured and insulted people with such severity. Murat admitted the weight of their arguments, and forbade any executions on the sentence; but it is said that general Grouchy, in whose immediate power the prisoners remained, exclaiming that his own life had been attempted! that the blood of the French soldiers was not to be spilt with impunity! and that the prisoners having been condemned by a council of war, ought and should be executed! proceeded to shoot them in the Prado; and forty were thus slain before Murat could cause his orders to be effectually obeyed. The next day some of the Spanish authorities having discovered that a colonel commanding the imperial guards still retained a number of prisoners in the barracks, applied to the duke of Berg to have them released. Murat consented to have those prisoners also enlarged: but the colonel getting intelligence of what was passing, and being enraged at the loss of so many choice soldiers, put forty-five of the captives to death before the order could arrive to stay his bloody proceedings[4].
Such were nearly the circumstances that attended this celebrated tumult, in which the wild cry of Spanish warfare was first heard; but as many authors, adopting without hesitation all the reports of the day, have represented it sometimes as a wanton and extensive massacre on the part of the French, at another as a barbarous political stroke to impress a dread of their power, I think it necessary to make the following observations.
That it was commenced by the Spaniards is undoubted: their fiery tempers, the irritation produced by passing events, and the habits of violence which they had acquired by their late successful insurrection against Godoy, rendered an explosion inevitable. But if the French had secretly stimulated this disposition, and had prepared in cold blood to make a terrible example, undoubtedly they would have prepared some check on the Spanish soldiers of the garrison, and they would scarcely have left their hospital unguarded; still less have arranged the plan so that their own loss should far exceed that of the Spaniards; and surely nothing would have induced them to relinquish the profit of such policy after having suffered all the injury. Yet marshal Moncey and general Harispe were actively engaged in restoring order; Manifesto of the council of Castile. Page 28. and it is certain that, including the peasants shot outside the gates, the executions on the Prado and in the barracks of the imperial guards, the whole number of Spaniards slain did not amount to one hundred and twenty persons, while more than seven hundred French fell. Of the imperial guards seventy Surgical Campaigns of Baron Larrey. men were wounded, and this fact alone would suffice to prove that there was no premeditation on the part of Murat; for if he was base enough to sacrifice his own men with such unconcern, he would not have exposed the select soldiers of the French empire in preference to the conscripts who abounded in his army. The affair itself was certainly accidental, and not very bloody for the patriots, but policy induced both sides to attribute secret motives, and to exaggerate the slaughter. The Spaniards in the provinces, impressed with an opinion of French atrocity, were thereby excited to insurrection on the one hand; and, on the other, the French, well aware that such an impression could not be effaced by an accurate relation of what did happen, seized the occasion to convey a terrible idea of their power and severity; but, while it is the part of history to reduce such amplifications, it is impossible to remain unmoved in recording the gallantry and devotion of a populace that could thus dare to assail the force commanded by Murat, rather than abandon one of their princes; such, however, was the character of the lower classes of Spain throughout this war; fierce, confident, and prone to sudden and rash actions, they had an intuitive perception of all that was great and noble, but were miserably weak in execution.
The commotion of the 2d of May was the forerunner of insurrections in every part of Spain, few of which were so honourable to the actors as that of Madrid. Unprincipled villains hailed this opportunity of directing the passions of the multitude, and, under the mask of patriotism, turned the unthinking fury of the people against whoever it pleased them to rob or to destroy: pillage, massacres, assassinations, cruelties of the most revolting kind were everywhere perpetrated; and the intrinsic goodness of the cause was disfigured by the enormities committed at Cadiz, Seville, Badajos, and other places, but chiefly at Valencia, pre-eminent in barbarity at a moment when all were barbarous! The first burst of popular feeling being thus misdirected, and the energy of the people wasted in assassinations; lassitude and fear succeeded to the insolence of tumult at the approach of real danger; for it is one thing to shine in the work of butchery, and another to establish that discipline which can alone sustain the courage of the multitude in the hour of trial.
To cover the suspicious measure of introducing more troops than the terms of the convention warranted, a variety of reports relative to the ultimate intentions of the French emperor had been propagated: at one time Gibraltar was to be besieged, and officers were despatched to examine the Mediterranean coasts of Spain and Barbary; at another, Portugal was to become the theatre of great events, and a mysterious importance was attached to all the movements of the French armies, with a view to deceive a court that fear and sloth disposed to the belief of any thing but the truth, and to impose upon a people whose unsuspicious ignorance was at first mistaken for tameness.
In the mean time, active agents were employed to form a French party at the capital; but as the insurrections of Aranjuez and Madrid discovered the fierceness of the Spanish character, Napoleon enjoined more caution and prudence upon his lieutenants than the latter were disposed to practise. In fact, Murat’s precipitation was the cause of hastening the discovery of his master’s real views before they were ripe for execution; for Dupont’s first division and cavalry crossed the Duero as early as the 14th of March, and upon the 10th of April occupied Aranjuez, while his second and third divisions took post at the Escurial and at Segovia; thus encircling the capital while Moncey’s corps occupied it. Hence an intention to control the provincial government left by Ferdinand became manifest, and the riot at Toledo, although promptly quelled by the interference of the French troops, indicated the state of the public mind before the explosion at Madrid had placed the parties in a state of direct hostility.
Murat seems to have been intrusted with only a half confidence, and as his natural impetuosity urged him to play a rash rather than a timid part, he appeared with the air of a conqueror before a ground of quarrel was laid; not that he acted entirely without grounds, for a letter addressed to him about this time by Napoleon, contained the following instructions: “The duke of Infantado has a party in Madrid; they will attack you; dissipate them, and seize the government.” But Murat’s policy, as his after life proved, was too coarse and open for such difficult affairs.
At Bayonne the political events kept pace with those of Madrid. Charles IV. having reclaimed his rights in presence of Napoleon, sent orders to the infant, don Antonio, to resign his office, the presidency of the governing junta, to Murat, who, at the same time, received the title of lieutenant-general of the kingdom: this appointment, and the restoration of Charles to the regal dignity, were proclaimed in Madrid, with the acquiescence of the council of Castile, on the 10th of May; but five days previous to that period, the old monarch had again resigned his sceptre into the hands of Napoleon, and Ferdinand and himself were consigned, with large pensions, to the tranquillity of private life.
The throne of Spain being now vacant, the right to fill it was assumed by the French emperor, in virtue of the cession made by Charles IV. He desired that a king might be chosen from his own family, and after some hesitation upon the part of the council of Castile, that body, in concert with the municipality of Madrid, and the governing junta, declared that their choice had fallen upon Joseph Buonaparte, at that time king of Naples. Cardinal Bourbon, primate of Spain, first cousin of Charles IV., and archbishop of Toledo, not only acceded to this arrangement, but actually wrote to Napoleon a letter testifying his adhesion to the new order of things.
As it was easy to foretel the result of the election, the king of Naples was already journeying towards Bayonne, and arrived there on the 7th of June. The principal men of Spain were also invited to meet in that town upon the 15th, with a view to obtain their assent to a constitution prepared by Napoleon. At this meeting, called “the Assembly of Notables,” ninety-one Spaniards of eminence appeared, and, first accepting Joseph as their king, proceeded to discuss the constitution in detail, and after several sittings adopted it, and swore to maintain its provisions. Thus finished the first part of this eventful drama.
The new constitution was calculated to draw forth the resources of Spain: compared to the old system it was a blessing, and it would have been received as such under different circumstances; but now arms were to decide its fate, for in every province of Spain the cry of war had been raised. In Catalonia, in Valencia, in Andalusia, Estremadura, Gallicia, and the Asturias, the people were gathering, and fiercely declaring their determination to resist French intrusion.
But Joseph, apparently contented with the acquiescence of the ninety-one notables, and trusting to the powerful support of his brother, crossed the frontier on the 9th of July; and on the 12th arrived at Vittoria. The inhabitants still nourishing the discontent caused by Ferdinand’s journey to Bayonne, seemed disposed to hinder Joseph’s entrance; but their opposition did not break out into actual violence, and the next morning he continued his progress by Miranda del Ebro, Breviesca, Burgos, and Buitrago. The 20th of July he entered Madrid, and upon the 24th he was proclaimed king of Spain and the Indies, with all the solemnities usual upon such occasions; not hesitating to declare himself the enemy of eleven millions of people, the object of a whole nation’s hatred; calling, with a strange accent, from the midst of foreign bands, upon that fierce and haughty race, to accept of a constitution which they did not understand, and which few of them had ever heard of; his only hope of success resting on the strength of his brother’s arms; his claims upon the consent of an imbecile monarch, and the weakness of a few pusillanimous nobles, in contempt of the rights of millions now arming to oppose him. This was the unhallowed part of the enterprise; this it was that rendered his offered constitution odious, covered it with a leprous skin, and drove the noble-minded far from the pollution of its touch!