CHAPTER V.
The duke of Dalmatia, a general, who, if the emperor be excepted, was no wise inferior to any of his nation, commenced his pursuit of the English army with a vigour that marked his eager desire to finish the campaign in a manner suitable to the brilliant opening at Gamonal.
The main body of his troops followed the route of Foncevadon and Ponteferrada, a second column took S.
Journal of Operations. MS. the road of Cambarros and Bembibre, and general Franceschi, with the light cavalry, entering the valley of the Syl, ascended the course of that river, and turned the position of Villa Franca del Bierzo. Thus sir John Moore, after having twice baffled the emperor’s combinations, was still pressed in his retreat with a fury that seemed to increase every moment. The separation of his light brigades, a measure which he adopted, after the advice of his quarter-master-general, weakened the army by three thousand men; but he still possessed nineteen thousand of all arms, good soldiers to fight, and strong to march, yet by the disorders at Valderas and Astorga, much shaken in their discipline; for the general’s exertions to restore order and regularity were by many officers slightly seconded, and by some with scandalous levity disregarded.
There was no choice but to retreat. The astonishing rapidity with which the emperor had brought up his overbearing numbers, and thrust the English army into Gallicia, had rendered the natural strength of the country unavailing. The resources were few, even for an army in winter quarters, and for a campaign in that season, there were none at all. All the draft cattle that could be procured would scarcely have supplied the means to transport ammunition for two battles, but the French, sweeping the rich plains of Castille with their powerful cavalry, might have formed magazines at Astorga and Leon, and from thence have been supplied in abundance, while the English were starving.
Before he advanced from Salamanca, sir John Moore, foreseeing that his movement must sooner or later end in a retreat, had sent officers to examine the [Appendix, No. 13], sections 2 and 8. roads of Gallicia and the harbours which offered the greatest advantages for embarkation. By the reports of those officers, which arrived from day to day, Sir John Moore’s Papers. MSS. and by the state of the magazines he had directed to be formed, his measures were constantly regulated. The magazines of Astorga, Benevente, and Labaneza, we have seen, were, by untoward circumstances, and the deficiency of transport, rendered of no avail beyond the momentary supply they afforded; and part of their contents falling into the enemy’s hands, gave him some cause of triumph; but those at Villa Franca and Lugo contained about fourteen days’ consumption; and there were other small magazines formed on the line of Orenze and Vigo; more than this could not have been accomplished.
It was now only the fifteenth day since sir John Moore had left Salamanca, and already the torrent of war, diverted from the south, was foaming among the rocks of Gallicia. Nineteen thousand British troops, posted in strong ground, might have offered battle [Appendix, No. 28.] to very superior numbers; but where was the use of merely fighting an enemy who had three hundred thousand men in Spain? Nothing could be gained by such a display of courage; but the English general, by a quick retreat, might reach his ships unmolested, embark, and carrying his army from the narrow corner in which it was cooped, to the southern provinces, establish there a good base of operations, and renew the war under favourable circumstances. It was by this combination of a fleet and army, that the greatest assistance could be given to Spain, and the strength of England become most formidable. A few days’ sailing would carry the troops to Cadiz; but six weeks’ constant marching would not bring the French army from Gallicia to that neighbourhood. The northern provinces were broken, subdued in spirit, and possessed few resources. The southern provinces had scarcely seen an enemy, were rich and fertile, and there also was the seat of government. Sir John Moore reasoned thus, and resolved to fall down to the coast and embark, with as little loss or delay as might be. Vigo, Coruña, and Ferrol were the principal harbours; and their relative advantages could not be determined except by the reports of the engineers, none of which were yet received, so rapidly had the crisis of affairs come on; but as those reports could only be obtained from day to day, the line of retreat became of necessity subject to daily change.
When the duke of Dalmatia took the command of the pursuing army, Hope’s and Fraser’s divisions were, as I have said, at Villa Franca, sir David Baird’s at Bembibre, the reserve and cavalry at Cambarros, six miles from Astorga. Behind Cambarros the mountains [Appendix, No. 13], section 2d,
see colonel Carmichael Smith’s report. of Gallicia rose abruptly, but there was no position, because, after the first rise at the village of Rodrigatos, the ground continually descended to Calcabellos, a small town, only four miles from Villa Franca, and the old road of Foncevadon and Ponteferrada, which turned the whole line, was choked with the advancing columns of the enemy. The reserve and the cavalry marched during the night to Bembibre: on their arrival Baird’s division proceeded to Villa Franca, but the immense wine-vaults of Bembibre had such temptations, that many hundred of his men remained behind inebriated; the followers of the army crowded the houses, and a number of Romana’s disbanded men were mixed with this heterogeneous mass of marauders, drunkards, muleteers, women, and children; the weather was dreadful, and, notwithstanding the utmost exertions of the general-in-chief, when the reserve marched the next morning, the number of those unfortunate wretches was not diminished. Leaving a small guard to protect them, sir John Moore proceeded to Calcabellos; but scarcely had the reserve marched out of the village, when some French cavalry appeared. In a moment the road was filled with the miserable stragglers, who came crowding after the troops, some with loud shrieks of distress and wild gestures, others with brutal exclamations; many, overcome with fear, threw away their arms. Those who preserved theirs were too stupidly intoxicated to fire; and kept reeling to and fro, alike insensible to their danger and to their disgrace. The enemy’s horsemen perceiving this confusion, bore down at a gallop, broke through the disorderly mob, cutting to the right and left as they passed, and riding so close to the columns, that the infantry were forced to halt in order to check their audacity.
At Calcabellos the reserve took up a position, and the general-in-chief went on to Villa Franca. In that town great excesses had been committed by the preceding divisions; the magazines were plundered, the bakers driven away from the ovens, the wine stores forced, and the commissaries prevented from making the regular distributions; the doors of the houses were broken, and the scandalous insubordination of the soldiers proved that a discreditable relaxation of discipline on the part of the officers had taken place. The general immediately arrested this disorder, caused one man taken in the act of plundering a magazine to be shot in the market-place, and issued severe orders to prevent a recurrence of such inexcusable conduct, after which he returned to the reserve at Calcavellos.
The Guia, a small, but at this season of the year a deep stream, run through that town, and was crossed by a stone bridge. On the Villa Franca side, a lofty ridge, rough with vineyards and stone walls, was occupied by two thousand five hundred infantry, with a battery of six guns. Four hundred[23] riflemen and about the same number of cavalry were posted on a hill two miles beyond the river, to watch the two roads of Bembibre and Foncevadon. The 3d of January, a little after noon, the French general Colbert approached this hill with six or eight squadrons; but observing the ground behind Calcabellos strongly occupied, he demanded reinforcements. Marshal Soult, believing that the English did not mean to make a stand, sent orders to Colbert to charge without delay; and the latter, stung by the message, obeyed with precipitate fury. From one of those errors so frequent in war, the British cavalry, thinking a greater force was riding against them, retired at speed to Calcabellos. The riflemen, who, following their orders, had withdrawn when the French first came in sight, were just passing the bridge, when a crowd of staff officers, the cavalry, and the enemy, came in upon them in one mass; in the confusion thirty or forty men were taken, and Colbert crossing the river, charged on the spur up the road. The remainder of the riflemen threw themselves into the vineyards, and permitting the enemy to approach within a few yards, suddenly opened such a deadly fire, that the greatest number of the French horsemen were killed on the spot, and among the rest Colbert himself. His fine martial figure, his voice, his gestures, and, above all, his daring valour had excited the admiration of the British, and a general feeling of sorrow was predominant when the gallant soldier fell. The French voltigeurs now crossed the river; a few of the 52d regiment descended from the upper part of the ridge to the assistance of the riflemen, and a sharp skirmish commenced, in which two or three hundred men of both sides were killed or wounded: towards evening Merle’s division of infantry appeared on the hills in front of the town, and made a demonstration of crossing the river opposite to the left of the English position; but the battery of the latter checked this movement, and night coming on the combat ceased.
From Villa Franca to Lugo the road led through a rugged country; the cavalry were therefore sent on to the latter town at once. During the night the French patroles broke in upon the rifle piquets, and wounded some men, but were beaten back without being able to discover that the English troops had abandoned the position.
The reserve reached Herrerias, a distance of eighteen miles, on the morning of the 5th. Baird’s division was at Nogales, Hope’s and Fraser’s near Lugo. At Herrerias, sir John Moore, who constantly directed the movements of the rear-guard himself, received the first reports of the engineers relative to the harbours. It appeared that Vigo, besides its greater distance, offered no position to cover the embarkation, but Coruña and Betanzos did. This induced him to relinquish his first intention of going to Vigo, and made him regret the absence of his light brigades. The transports were now ordered round from Vigo to Coruña; and in the mean time the general sent orders to the leading division to halt at Lugo, his intention being to rally the army there, to restore discipline, and to offer battle to the enemy if he was inclined to accept it.
These orders were carried to sir David Baird by one of the aides-de-camp of the commander-in-chief; but sir David forwarded them by a private dragoon, who got drunk and lost the despatch. This blameable irregularity was ruinous to general Fraser’s troops: in lieu of resting two days at Lugo, that general unwittingly pursued his toilsome journey towards St. Jago de Compostella, and then returned without food or rest, losing by this pilgrimage above four hundred stragglers. The 4th, the reserve reached Nogales, having by a forced march of thirty-six miles gained twelve hours’ start of the enemy. At the entrance of this village they met a large convoy, consisting of English clothing, shoes, and ammunition; intended for Romana’s army but moving towards the enemy; a circumstance perfectly characteristic of the Spanish mode of conducting public affairs. There was a bridge at Nogales which the engineers failed to destroy; but this was a matter of little consequence, as the river was fordable above and below; indeed the general was unwilling, unless for some palpable advantage, which seldom presented itself, to injure the communications of a country that he was unable to serve. The bridges were commonly very solidly constructed, and the arches having very little span, could be rendered passable again in a shorter time than they could be destroyed.
At this period of the retreat the road was crowded with stragglers and baggage; the peasantry, although armed, did not molest the French; but fearing both sides alike, drove their cattle and carried off their effects into the mountains on each side of the line of march; even there the villanous marauders contrived to find them, and in some cases were by the Spaniards killed; a just punishment for quitting their colours. Under the most favourable circumstances, the tail of a retreating force exhibits terrible scenes of distress; and on the road near Nogales, the followers of the army were dying fast from cold and hunger. The soldiers, barefooted, harassed, and weakened, by their excesses at Bembibre and Villa Franca, were dropping to the rear by hundreds. Broken carts, dead animals, and the piteous appearance of women with children, struggling or falling exhausted in the snow, completed a picture of war, which, like Janus, has a double face.
Towards evening the French recovered their lost ground, and passed Nogales, galling the rear-guard with a continual skirmish; and here it was that dollars to the amount of twenty-five thousand pounds were abandoned. This small sum was kept near head-quarters to answer sudden emergencies, and the bullocks that drew it being tired, the general, who could not save the money without risking an ill-timed action, had it rolled down the side of the mountain; part of it was gathered by the enemy, part by the Gallician peasants[24].
This day also, general Franceschi, who after turning Villa Franca and scouring the valley of the Syl, had ascended the banks of the Minho with his S.
Journal of Operations, MS. cavalry, fell into the line of march at Becerea, and rejoined the French army. Towards evening the reserve approached Constantino; the French were close upon the rear, and a hill within pistol shot of the bridge offered them such an advantage, that there was little hope to effect the passage without great loss. The general caused the riflemen and artillery to take possession of the hill, under cover of which the remainder of the reserve hastily passed across the river without being perceived by the enemy, who were unusually cautious, and not aware of the vicinity of the bridge; the guns then descended at a trot, the riflemen followed, and when the French, now undeceived, came up at a brisk pace, the passage was effected, and a good line of battle formed at the other side; a fight commenced, but notwithstanding that the assailants were continually reinforced as their columns of march arrived, general Paget maintained the post with two regiments until nightfall, and then retired to Lugo, in front of which the whole army was assembled. A few of the French cavalry showed themselves on the 6th, but the infantry did not appear.
The 7th, sir John Moore, in a general order, gave a severe but just rebuke to the officers and soldiers for their previous want of discipline, and at the same time announced his intention to offer battle. It has been well said, that a British army may be gleaned in a retreat, but cannot be reaped. Whatever may be their misery, the soldiers will always be found clean at review, and ready at a fight. Scarcely was this order issued, when the line of battle, so attenuated before, was filled with vigorous men, full of confidence and valour. Fifteen hundred had fallen in action, or dropped to the rear; but as three fresh battalions left by sir David Baird in his advance to Astorga had joined the army between Villa Franca and Lugo, nineteen thousand combatants were still under arms when the French columns appeared in sight. The right of the English position was in comparatively flat ground, and partially protected by a bend of the Minho. The centre was amongst vineyards, with low stone walls. The left, which was somewhat withdrawn, rested on the mountains, being supported and covered by the cavalry. It was the intention of the general to engage deeply with his right and centre before he closed with his left wing, in which he had posted the flower of his troops, hoping thus to bring on a decisive battle, and trusting to the valour of the men to handle the enemy in such sort as that he should be glad to let the army continue its retreat unmolested. Other hope than this, to re-embark the troops without loss, there was none, except by stratagem; for Soult, an experienced general, commanding soldiers habituated to war, might be tempted, but could never be forced to engage in a decisive battle among those rugged mountains, where whole days would pass in skirmishing, without any progress being made towards crippling an adversary.
It was mid-day before the French marshal arrived in person at the head of ten or twelve thousand men; the remainder of his power followed in some disarray; for the marches had not been so easy but that many even of the oldest soldiers had dropped behind. As the French columns came up, they formed in order of battle along a strong mountainous ridge fronting the English. The latter were not distinctly seen, from the inequalities of the ground, and Soult feeling doubtful if they were all before him, took four guns, and some squadrons commanded by colonel Lallemande, advanced towards the centre, and opened a fire, which was soon silenced by a reply from fifteen pieces. The marshal being then satisfied that something more than a rear guard was in his front, retired. About an hour after he made a feint on the right, and at the same time sent a column of infantry and five guns against the left. On that side the three regiments which had lately joined were drawn up. The French pushed the outposts hard, and were gaining the advantage; when the English general-in-chief arriving, rallied the light troops, and with a vigorous charge broke the adverse column, and treated it very roughly in the pursuit. The estimated loss of the French was between three and four hundred men.
As it was now evident that the British meant to give battle, the duke of Dalmatia hastened the march of Laborde’s division, which was still in the rear, and requested marshal Ney, who was then at Villa Franca, S.
Journal of Operations, MS. to detach a division of the sixth corps by the Val des Orres to Orense. Ney, however, merely sent some troops into the valley of the Syl, and pushed his advanced posts in front as far as Nogales, Poyo, and Dancos.
At daybreak on the 8th the two armies were still embattled. On the French side, seventeen thousand Ibid. infantry, four thousand cavalry, and fifty pieces of artillery were in line, but Soult deferred the attack until the 9th. On the English part, sixteen thousand infantry, eighteen hundred cavalry, and forty pieces of artillery, impatiently awaited the assault, and blamed their adversary for delaying a contest which they ardently desired; but darkness fell without a shot having being fired, and with it fell the English general’s hope to engage his enemy on equal terms.
What was to be done? assail the French position? remain another day in expectation of a battle? or, in secrecy, gain a march, get on board without being molested, or at least obtain time to establish the army in a good situation to cover the embarkation? The first operation was warranted neither by present nor by future advantages, for how could an inferior army expect to cripple a superior one, posted as the French were, on a strong mountain, with an overbearing cavalry to protect their infantry should the latter be beaten; and when twenty thousand fresh troops were at the distance of two short marches in the rear. The British army was not provided to fight above one battle. There were no draught cattle, no means of transporting reserve ammunition, no magazines, no hospitals, no second line, no provisions. A defeat would have been ruin, a victory useless. A battle is always a serious affair; but two battles under such circumstances, though both should be victories, would have been destruction.
But why fight at all, after the army had been rallied, and the disasters of the march from Astorga had been remedied? What, if beating first Soult and then Ney, the British had arrived once more above Astorga, with perhaps ten thousand infantry, and half as many hundred cavalry? From the mountains of Gallicia their general might have cast his eyes as far as the Sierra Morena, without being cheered by the sight of a single Spanish army; none were in existence to aid him, none to whom he might give aid. Even Mr. Frere acknowledged that at this period six thousand ill-armed men collected at Despeñas Peros formed the only barrier between the French and Seville, and sir John Moore was sent out not to waste English blood in fruitless battles, but to assist the universal Spanish nation!
The second proposition was decided by the state of the magazines; there was not bread for another day’s consumption remaining in the stores at Lugo. It Sir John Moore’s Papers. was true that the army was in heart for fighting, but distressed by fatigue and bad weather, and each moment of delay increased privations that would soon have rendered it inefficient for a campaign in the south, which was the only point where its services could now be effectual. For two whole days sir John Moore had offered battle; this was sufficient to rally the troops, to restore order, and to preserve the reputation of the army. Lugo was strong ground in itself, but it did not cover Coruña. The road leading from Orense to St. Jago de Compostella turned it; the French ought to have been on that line, and there was no reason to suppose that they were not. Soult, we have seen, pressed Ney to follow it. It was then impossible to remain at Lugo, and useless if it had been possible.
The general adopted the third plan, and prepared to decamp in the night; he ordered the fires to be kept bright, and exhorted the troops to make a great exertion, which he trusted would be the last required of them.
The country immediately in the rear of the position was intersected by stone walls and a number of intricate lanes; precautions were taken to mark the right tracks, by placing bundles of straw at certain distances, and officers were appointed to guide the columns. At ten o’clock the troops silently quitted their ground, and retired in excellent order; but a moody fortune pursued sir John Moore throughout this campaign, baffling his prudence, and thwarting his views, as if resolved to prove the unyielding firmness of his mind. A terrible storm of wind and rain, mixed with sleet, commenced as the army broke up from the position; the marks were destroyed, and the guides lost the true direction; only one of the divisions happily gained the main road, the other two were bewildered, and when daylight broke, the rear columns were still near to Lugo. The fatigue, the depression of mind, occasioned by this misfortune, and the want of shoes, broke the order of the march, and the stragglers were, becoming numerous, when unfortunately, one of the generals commanding a leading division, thinking to relieve the men during a halt which took place in the night, desired them to take refuge from the weather in some houses a little way off the road. Complete disorganization followed this imprudent act: from that moment it became impossible to make the soldiers of the division keep their ranks; plunder succeeded, the example was infectious, and what with real suffering, and evil propensity encouraged by this error of inexperience, the main body of the army, which had bivouaced for six hours in the rain, arrived at Betanzos on the evening of the 9th, in a state very discreditable to its discipline.
The commander-in-chief, with the reserve and the cavalry, as usual, covered the march; in the course Mr. James Moore’s Narrative. of it he ordered several bridges to be destroyed, but the engineers failed of success in every attempt. Fortunately, the enemy did not come up with the rear before the evening, and then only with their cavalry, otherwise many prisoners must have fallen into their hands. The number of stragglers uncovered by the passage of the reserve was so numerous, that being pressed by the enemy’s horse, they united in considerable bodies and repulsed them, a signal proof that the disorder was occasioned as much by insubordination in the regiments as by the fatigue of the march.
The reserve, commanded by general Edward Paget, an officer distinguished during the retreat by his firmness, ability, and ardent zeal, remained in position, during the night, a few miles from Betanzos. The rest of the army was quartered in that town, and as the enemy could not gather in strength on the 10th; the commander-in-chief halted that day, and the cavalry passed from the rear-guard to the head of the column.
The 11th, the French interrupted those employed to destroy the bridge of Betanzos; the twenty-eighth regiment repulsed the skirmishers, but the bridge, though constructed of wood, was only partially destroyed.
In the meantime sir John Moore assembled the army in one solid mass. The loss of men in the march from Lugo to Betanzos had been greater than [Appendix, No. 26.] that in all the former part of the retreat, added to all the waste of the movement in advance and the loss sustained in the different actions: nevertheless fourteen thousand infantry were still in column, and by an orderly march to Coruña under the personal direction of the commander-in-chief, demonstrated, that inattention and the want of experience in the officers was the true cause of those disorders which had afflicted the army far more than the sword of the enemy or the rigour of the elements.
As the troops approached Coruña the general’s looks were directed towards the harbour; an open expanse of water painfully convinced him, that to Fortune at least he was no way beholden; contrary winds detained the fleet at Vigo, and the last consuming exertion made by the army was thus rendered fruitless! The men were now put into quarters, and their leader awaited the progress of events. Three divisions occupied the town and suburbs, the reserve was posted with its left at the village of El Burgo, and its right on the road of St. Jago de Compostella. For twelve days these hardy soldiers had covered the retreat, during which time they had traversed eighty miles of road in two marches, passed several nights under arms in the snow of the mountains, were seven times engaged with the enemy, and they now assembled at the outposts, having fewer men missing from the ranks (including those who had fallen in battle) than any other division in the army. An admirable instance of the value of good discipline, and a manifest proof of the malignant injustice with which sir John Moore has been accused of precipitating his retreat beyond the measure of human strength.
The bridge of El Burgo was immediately destroyed, and an engineer was sent to blow up that of Cambria, situated a few miles up the Mero river; this officer was mortified at the former failures, and so anxious to perform his duty in an effectual manner, that he remained too near the mine, and was killed by the explosion; but there was also a bridge at Celas, two leagues higher up, and at that place Franceschi’s cavalry crossed on the 12th, intercepted some stores coming from St. Jago, and made a few prisoners.
The town of Coruña, although sufficiently strong to oblige an enemy to break ground before it, was weakly fortified, and to the southward commanded by some heights close to the walls. Sir John Moore caused the land front to be repaired and strengthened, and also disarmed the sea face of the works, and occupied the citadel. The inhabitants cheerfully and honourably joined in the labour, although they were fully aware that the English intended to embark, and that they compromised their own safety by aiding the operation. Such flashes of light from the dark cloud which at this moment covered Spain may startle the mind of the reader, and make him doubt if the Spaniards could have been so insufficient to their own defence as they have been represented in the course of this history. I can only answer, that the facts were as I have told them, and that it was such paradoxical indications of character that deceived the world at this time, and induced men to believe that the reckless daring defiance of the power of France so loudly proclaimed by the patriots, would be strenuously supported. Of proverbially vivid imagination and quick resentments, the Spaniards feel and act individually rather than nationally; and during this war, that which appeared to be in them constancy of purpose, was in reality a repetition of momentary fury, a succession of electric sparks generated by a constant collision with the French army, and daily becoming fainter as custom reconciled them to those injuries and insults which are commonly the attendants of war.
Procrastination and improvidence are the besetting sins of the nation: at this moment a large magazine of arms and ammunition was in Coruña; these stores had been sent in the early part of the preceding year from England, and they were still unappropriated and unregarded by a nation infested with three hundred thousand enemies, and possessing a hundred thousand soldiers unclothed and without weapons.
Three miles from the town, four thousand barrels of powder were piled in a magazine built upon a hill; a smaller quantity, collected in another storehouse, was at some distance from the first: to prevent these magazines from falling a prey to the enemy, they were both exploded on the 13th. The inferior one blew up with a terrible noise and shook the houses in the town; but when the train reached the great store, there ensued a crash like the bursting forth of a volcano, the earth trembled for miles, the rocks were torn from their bases, and the agitated waters rolled the vessels as in a storm; a vast column of smoke and dust, shooting out fiery sparks from its sides, arose perpendicularly and slowly to a great height, and then a shower of stones, and fragments of all kinds, bursting out of it with a roaring sound, killed several persons who remained too near the spot. A stillness, only interrupted by the lashing of the waves on the shore, succeeded, and the business of the war went on.
The ground in front of Coruña is impracticable for cavalry, and as the horses still left alive were generally foundered, and that it was impossible to embark them all in the face of an enemy, a great number were reluctantly ordered to be shot. These poor animals, already worn down and feet broken, would otherwise have been distributed among the French cavalry, or used as draft cattle, until by procrastinated sufferings of the nature they had already endured, they should be killed.
The enemy were now collecting in force on the Mero, and it became necessary to choose a position of battle. A chain of rocky elevations commencing on the sea-coast, north-west of the place, and ending on the Mero just behind the village of El Burgo, offered an advantageous line of defence; covered by a branch of the Mero, which, washing a part of the base, would have obliged the enemy to advance by the road of Compostella; but this ridge was too extensive for the English army, and if not wholly occupied, the French might have turned it by the right, and moved along a succession of eminences to the very gates of Coruña. There was no alternative but to take post on an inferior range, enclosed as it were within the other, and completely commanded by it within cannon-shot.
The French army had been so exhausted by continual toil, that it was not completely assembled on the Mero before the 12th. The infantry took post opposite El Burgo; the cavalry of La Houssaye lined the river as far as the ocean, and Franceschi, as we have seen, crossed at the bridge of Celas, seven miles higher up. The 14th, the bridges of El Burgo being rendered practicable for artillery, two divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry, passed the river. To cover this march some guns opened on the English posts at El Burgo, but were soon silenced by a superior fire. The same evening, the transports from Vigo hove in sight, and soon after entered the harbour of Coruña, and the dismounted cavalry, the sick, all the best horses, and fifty-two pieces of artillery, were embarked during the night; eight British, and four Spanish guns, were, however, retained on shore ready for action.
Noble’s Expedition de Galice.
The 15th, La Borde’s division arrived, and the French occupied the great ridge enclosing the British position, placing their right on the intersection of the roads leading from St. Jago and Betanzos, and their left upon a rocky eminence which overlooked both lines. Towards evening, their cavalry, supported by some light troops, extended towards the left, and a slight skirmish took place in the valley below. At the same time the English piquets opposite the right of the French, got engaged, and being galled by the fire of two guns, colonel M’Kenzie of the fifth, at the head of some companies, endeavoured to seize the battery; but a line of infantry, hitherto concealed by some stone walls, arose, and poured in such a fire of musketry, that the colonel was killed, and his men forced back with loss.
In the course of the night, marshal Soult with great difficulty established a battery of eleven guns, (eight and twelve-pounders,) on the rocks which formed the Noble’s Expedition de Galice. left of his line of battle. Laborde’s division was posted on the right; half of it occupied the high ground, the other half was placed on the descent towards the river. Merle’s division was in the centre. Mermet’s division formed the left. The position was covered in front of the right by the villages of Palavia Abaxo, and Portosa, and in front of the centre by a wood; the left was strongly posted on the rugged heights where the great battery was established. The distance from that battery to the right of the English line was about twelve hundred yards, and, midway, the little village of Elvina was held by the piquets of the latter nation.
The late arrival of the transports, the increasing force of the enemy, and the disadvantageous nature of the ground, augmented the difficulty and danger Sir John Moore’s Letter to Ld. Castleh. of the embarkation so much, that several general officers proposed to the commander-in-chief, that he should negotiate for leave to retire to his ships upon terms. There was little chance of such a proposal being agreed to by the enemy, and there was no reason to try. The army had suffered, but not from defeat; its situation was dangerous, but far from desperate; and the general would not consent to remove the stamp of energy and prudence which marked his retreat, by a negotiation that would have given an appearance of timidity and indecision to his previous operations, as opposite to their real character as light is to darkness. His high spirit and clear judgment revolted at the idea, and he rejected the degrading advice without hesitation.
All the encumbrances of the army were shipped in the night of the 15th and on the morning of the 16th, and every thing was prepared to withdraw the fighting men as soon as the darkness would permit them to move without being perceived. The precautions taken would, without doubt, have insured the success of this difficult operation, but a more glorious event was destined to give a melancholy but graceful termination to the campaign. About two o’clock in the afternoon a general movement along the French line gave notice of the approaching
BATTLE OF CORUÑA.
The British infantry, fourteen thousand five hundred strong, occupied the inferior range of hills already spoken of. The right was formed by Baird’s division, and, from the oblique direction of the ridge, approached the enemy, while the centre and left were of necessity withheld in such a manner that the French battery on the rocks raked the whole of the Vide Plan of the Battle. line. General Hope’s division, crossing the main road, prolonged the line of the right’s wing, and occupied strong ground abutting on the muddy bank of the Mero. A brigade from Baird’s division remained in column behind the extremities of his line, and a brigade of Hope’s was posted on different commanding points behind the left wing. The reserve was drawn up near Airis, a small village situated in the rear of the centre. This last point commanded the valley which separated the right of Baird’s division from the hills occupied by the French cavalry; the latter were kept in check by a regiment detached from the reserve, and a chain of skirmishers extending across the valley connected this regiment with the right of Baird’s line. General Fraser’s division remaining on the heights immediately before the gates of Coruña, was prepared to advance to any point, and also watched the coast road. These dispositions were as able as the unfavourable nature of the ground would admit of, but the advantage was all on the enemy’s side. His light cavalry, under Franceschi, reaching nearly to the village of St. Christopher, a mile in the rear of Baird’s division, obliged sir John Moore to weaken his front by keeping back Fraser’s division until Soult’s plan of attack should be completely developed. There was, however, one circumstance to compensate for these disadvantages. In the Spanish stores were found many thousand English muskets; the troops exchanged their old rusty and battered arms for these new ones; their ammunition also was fresh, and their fire was therefore very superior to their adversary’s in proportion to the numbers engaged.
General Laborde’s division being come up, the French force could not be less than twenty thousand men; and the duke of Dalmatia having made his arrangements, did not lose any time in idle evolutions, but distributing his lighter guns along the front of his position, opened a heavy fire from the battery on his left, and instantly descended with three solid masses to the assault. A cloud of skirmishers led the way, and the British piquets being driven back in disorder, the village of Elvina was carried by the first column, which afterwards dividing, one half pushed on against Baird’s front, the other turned his right by the valley. The second column made for the centre. The third engaged the left by the village of Palavia Abaxo. The weight of the French guns overmatched the English six-pounders, and their shot swept the position to the centre.
Sir John Moore observing, that, according to his expectations, the enemy did not show any body of infantry beyond that which, moving up the valley, outflanked Baird’s right, ordered general Paget to carry the reserve to where the detached regiment was posted, and, as he had before arranged with him, to turn the left of the French attack and menace the great battery. Then directing Fraser’s division to support Paget, he threw back the fourth regiment, which formed the right of Baird’s division, opened a heavy fire upon the flank of the troops penetrating up the valley, and with the fiftieth and forty-second regiments met those breaking through Elvina.
The ground about that village was intersected by stone walls and hollow roads; a severe, scrambling fight ensued, but in half an hour the French were borne back with great loss. The fiftieth regiment entered the village with them, and after a second struggle drove them for some distance beyond it. Meanwhile the general bringing up a battalion of the brigade of guards to fill the space in the line left vacant by those two regiments, the forty-second mistook his intention, and retired, and at that moment the enemy, being reinforced, renewed the fight beyond the village, the officer commanding the fiftieth[25] was wounded and taken prisoner, and Elvina became the scene of a second struggle; this being observed by Moore’s Narrative. the commander-in-chief, who directed in person the operations of Baird’s division, he addressed a few animating words to the forty-second, and caused it to return to the attack. General Paget, with the reserve, now descended into the valley, and the line of skirmishers being thus supported, vigorously checked the advance of the enemy’s troops in that quarter, while the fourth regiment galled their flank. At the same time the centre and left of the army also became engaged; sir David Baird was severely wounded, and a furious action ensued along the line, in the valley, and on the hills.
Sir John Moore, while earnestly watching the result of the fight about the village of Elvina, was struck on the left breast by a cannon shot; the shock threw him from his horse with violence; he rose again in a sitting posture; his countenance unchanged, and his stedfast eye still fixed upon the regiments engaged in his front; no sigh betrayed a sensation of pain; but in a few moments, when he was satisfied that the troops were gaining ground, his countenance brightened, and he suffered himself to be taken to the rear. Then was seen the dreadful nature of his hurt; the shoulder was shattered to pieces, the arm was hanging by a piece of skin, the ribs over the heart broken, and bared of flesh, and the muscles of the breast torn into long strips, which were interlaced by their recoil from the dragging of the shot. As the soldiers placed him in a blanket his sword got entangled, and the hilt entered the wound. Captain Hardinge, a staff officer, who was Mr. James Moore’s Narrative. near, attempted to take it off, but the dying man stopped him, saying, “It is as well as it is. I had Hardinge’s Letter. rather it should go out of the field with me.” And in that manner, so becoming to a soldier, Moore was borne from the fight.
During this time the army was rapidly gaining ground. The reserve, overthrowing every thing in the valley, and obliging La Houssaye’s dragoons (who had dismounted) to retire, turned the enemy’s left, and even approached the eminence upon which the great battery was posted. On the left, colonel Nicholls, at the head of some companies of the fourteenth, carried Palavio Abaxo (which general Foy defended but feebly), and in the centre, the obstinate dispute for Elvina terminated in favour of the British; so that when the night set in their line was considerably advanced beyond the original position of the morning, and the French were falling back in confusion.
If at this time general Fraser’s division had been brought into action along with the reserve, the enemy could hardly have escaped a signal overthrow; for the little ammunition Soult had been able to bring up was nearly exhausted, the river Mero, with a full tide, was behind him, and the difficult communication by the bridge of El Burgo was alone open for a retreat. On the other hand, to continue the action in the dark was to tempt fortune, for the French were still the most numerous, and their ground was strong. The disorder they were in offered such a favourable opportunity to get on board the ships, that sir John Hope, upon whom the command of the army had devolved, satisfied with having repulsed the attack, judged it more prudent to pursue the original plan of embarking during the night, and this operation was effected without delay; the arrangements being so complete that neither confusion nor difficulty occurred.
click here for larger image.
SKETCH OF THE
BATTLE OF CORUÑA
16th. Jany. 1808.
The piquets kindling a number of fires, covered the retreat of the columns, and were themselves withdrawn at daybreak, and embarked, under the protection of general Hill’s brigade, which was posted near the ramparts of the town. When the morning dawned, the French, observing that the British had abandoned their position, pushed forward some battalions to the heights of St. Lucie, and about mid-day succeeded in establishing a battery, which playing upon the shipping in the harbour, caused a great deal of disorder among the transports. Several masters cut their cables, and four vessels went ashore; but the troops being immediately removed by the men of war’s boats, the stranded vessels were burnt, and the whole fleet at last got out of harbour. General Hill’s brigade then embarked from the citadel; but general Beresford, with a rear guard, still kept possession of that work until the 18th, when the wounded being all put on board, his troops likewise embarked[26]. The inhabitants faithfully maintained the town against the French, and the fleet sailed for England.
Thus ended the retreat to Coruña; a transaction which, up to this day, has called forth as much of falsehood and malignity as servile and interested writers could offer to the unprincipled leaders of a base faction, but which posterity will regard as a genuine example of ability and patriotism.
From the spot where he fell, the general who had conducted it was carried to the town by a party of soldiers. The blood flowed fast, and the torture of his wound increased; but such was the unshaken firmness of his mind, that those about him judging from the resolution of his countenance that his hurt was not mortal, expressed a hope of his recovery. Hearing this, he looked stedfastly at the injury for Captain’s Hardinge’s Letter. a moment, and then said, “No, I feel that to be impossible.” Several times he caused his attendants to stop and turn him round, that he might behold the field of battle, and when the firing indicated the advance of the British he discovered his satisfaction, and permitted the bearers to proceed. Being brought to his lodgings the surgeons examined his wound, but there was no hope; the pain increased, and he spoke with great difficulty. At intervals he asked if the French were beaten, and addressing his old friend colonel Anderson, he said, “You know that I always Mr. James Moore’s Narrative. wished to die this way.” Again he asked if the enemy were defeated, and being told they were, observed, “It is a great satisfaction to me to know we have beaten the French.” His countenance continued firm, and his thoughts clear; once only, when he spoke of his mother, he became agitated. He inquired after the safety of his friends, and the officers of his staff, and he did not even in this moment forget to recommend those whose merit had given them claims to promotion. His strength was failing fast, and life was just extinct, when, with an unsubdued spirit, as if anticipating the baseness of his posthumous calumniators, he exclaimed, “I hope the people of England will be satisfied! I hope my country will do me justice!” The battle was scarcely ended, when his corpse, wrapped in a military cloak, was interred by the officers of his staff in the citadel of Coruña. The guns of the enemy paid his funeral honours, and Soult, with a noble feeling of respect for his valour, raised a monument to his memory.
Thus ended the career of sir John Moore, a man whose uncommon capacity was sustained by the purest virtue, and governed by a disinterested patriotism more in keeping with the primitive than the luxurious age of a great nation. His tall graceful person, his dark searching eyes, strongly defined forehead, and singularly expressive mouth, indicated a noble disposition and a refined understanding. The lofty sentiments of honour habitual to his mind, adorned by a subtle playful wit, gave him in conversation an ascendancy that he could well preserve by the decisive vigour of his actions. He maintained the right with a vehemence bordering upon fierceness, and every important transaction in which he was engaged increased his reputation for talent, and confirmed his character as a stern enemy to vice, a stedfast friend to merit, a just and faithful servant of his country. The honest loved him, the dishonest feared him; for while he lived, he did not shun but scorned and spurned the base, and, with characteristic propriety, they spurned at him when he was dead.
A soldier from his earliest youth, he thirsted for the honours of his profession, and feeling that he was worthy to lead a British army, hailed the fortune that placed him at the head of the troops destined for Spain. The stream of time passed rapidly, and the inspiring hopes of triumph disappeared, but the austerer glory of suffering remained; with a firm heart he accepted that gift of a severe fate, and confiding in the strength of his genius, disregarded the clamours of presumptuous ignorance; opposing sound military views to the foolish projects so insolently thrust upon him by the ambassador, he conducted a long and arduous retreat with sagacity, intelligence, and fortitude. No insult could disturb, no falsehood deceive him, no remonstrance shake his determination; fortune frowned without subduing his constancy; death struck, and the spirit of the man remained unbroken when his shattered body scarcely afforded it a habitation. Having done all that was just towards others, he remembered what was due to himself. Neither the shock of the mortal blow, nor the lingering hours of acute pain which preceded his dissolution, could quell the pride of his gallant heart, or lower the dignified feeling with which (conscious of merit) he asserted his right to the gratitude of the country he had served so truly.
If glory be a distinction, for such a man death is not a leveller!