CHAPTER VII.
OPERATIONS OF BESSIERES AGAINST BLAKE AND CUESTA.
While the moveable columns of Bessieres’ corps ranged over the Asturian and Biscayan mountains, and dispersed the insurgent patriots of those provinces, Cuesta, undismayed by his defeat at Cabezon, collected another army at Benevente, and, in concert with the Gallician forces, prepared to advance again towards Burgos.
Filanghieri, the captain-general of Gallicia, had organised the troops in that kingdom without difficulty, because the abundant supplies poured in from England were beginning to be felt; and patriotism is never more efficacious than when supported by large sums of money. Taranco’s soldiers joined to the garrisons of Ferrol and Coruña were increased, by new levies, to twenty-five thousand men, organised in four divisions, and being well equipped, and provided with a considerable train of artillery, were assembled at Manzanal, a strong post in the mountains, twelve miles behind Astorga.
The situation of that city offered great advantages to the Spaniards; the old Moorish walls which surrounded it were complete, and susceptible of being strengthened, so as to require a regular siege; but a siege could not be undertaken by a small force, while the army of Gallicia was entrenched at Manzanal, and while Cuesta remained at Benevente; neither could Bessieres, with any prudence, attack the Gallicians at Manzanal while Cuesta was at Benevente, and while Astorga contained a strong garrison. Filanghieri appears to have had some notion of its value, for he commenced forming an entrenched camp in the mountains; but being slain by his soldiers, don Joachim Blake succeeded to the command, and probably fearing a similar fate if the army remained stationary, left one division at Manzanal, and with the remainder marched towards Benevente to unite with Cuesta.
On the French side, marshal Bessieres collected his scattered columns at Palencia; his plan, founded upon instructions from Bayonne, was to make a S.
Journal of Bessieres’ Operations. MSS. rapid movement against Cuesta, in the hope of beating him, while Blake was still behind Leon; then wheeling to his right, to attack and drive the Napoleon’s Notes, [Appendix, No. 2.] Gallicians back to the mountains, to overrun the flat country with his numerous cavalry, to open a communication with Portugal, and after receiving certain reinforcements then preparing for him, to subdue Gallicia, or assist Junot, as might seem most fitting at the time.
At this period the king was on his journey to Madrid, and the military system of Napoleon was brought to its first great crisis; for unless Bessieres was successful, there could be no sure footing for the French in the capital, and as Madrid was the base of Moncey’s and Dupont’s operations, the farther prosecution of their plans depended upon the result of the approaching struggle in the plains of Leon. Napoleon, foreseeing this crisis, had directed Savary to occupy Segovia, to send general Gobert’s division Ibid. to Valladolid, and to hold Vedel’s and Frere’s, the one in La Mancha, a few marches from the capital, and the other at San Clemente, a central point connecting Moncey, Dupont, and Madrid. But Savary, unable to estimate justly the relative importance of the different operations, sent Vedel and Gobert into Andalusia to reinforce Dupont, when he should rather have recalled the latter to the northern side of the Sierra Morena; he caused Frere, as we have seen, to quit San Clemente, and march by Requeña against Valencia, at the moment when Moncey was retiring from that city through Murcia to San Clemente, and thus dispersed and harassed his reserves by long marches to the south without any definite object when the essential interests were at stake in the north; and now, struck with fear at the approach of Cuesta and Blake, whose armies he had hitherto disregarded, he precipitately recalled Frere, Vedel, Gobert, and even Dupont to Madrid, too late to take part with Bessieres in the coming battle, but exactly timed to frustrate Moncey’s projects, and, as we shall hereafter find, to ensure the ruin of Dupont. In this manner steering his vessel before every wind that blew, he could not fail of storms.
Greatly was Napoleon discontented with these errors; he relied, and with reason, on the ability of Bessieres for a remedy; but to Savary he sent the following instructions, dated the 13th of July:
“The French affairs in Spain would be in an excellent state if Gobert’s division had marched upon Valladolid, and Frere’s had occupied San Clemente, with a moveable column, three or four marches upon the route of general Dupont. Gobert having been directed upon Dupont, Frere being with Moncey, harassed and enfeebled by marches and countermarches, the position of the French army is become less advantageous.
“Marshal Bessieres is this day at Medina del Rio Seco with fifteen thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery; the 15th or 16th he will attack Benevente, open a communication with Portugal, drive the rebels into Gallicia, and seize upon Leon. If his operations succeed thus, and in a brilliant manner, the position of the French army will again be as good as it was.
“If general Cuesta retires from Benevente without fighting, he will move by Zamora and Salamanca to gain Avila and Segovia, certain that then Bessieres cannot pursue him, as, in that case, he would be menaced by the army of Gallicia, whose advanced guard is at Leon. The general who commands at Madrid must then be able to assemble six or seven thousand men and march upon Cuesta; the citadel of Segovia must be occupied by three or four hundred convalescents, with some guns and six weeks biscuit. It was a great fault not to have occupied this citadel when the major-general ordered it; of all the possible positions, Segovia is the most dangerous for the army; the capital of a province, situated between two routes, it deprives the army of all its communications, and the enemy once posted in the citadel, the French army cannot dislodge him. Three or four hundred convalescents, a good commandant, and a squad of artillery, will render the castle of Segovia impregnable for some time, and will insure to the army the important position of Segovia.
“If general Cuesta throws himself into Gallicia without fighting or suffering a defeat, the position of the army will become better; of course it will be still better if he does so after having suffered a defeat.
“If marshal Bessieres faces Cuesta at Benevente without attacking him, or if he is repulsed by him, his object will always be to cover Burgos, and to hold the enemy in check as long as possible; he could, perhaps, be reinforced with the three hundred troops of the line which accompany the king, but then there would be no room for hesitation. If Bessieres retires without a battle, he must be reinforced instantly with six thousand men. If he retreats after a battle wherein he has suffered great loss, it will be necessary to make great dispositions; to recall Frere, Gobert, Caulaincourt, and Vedel by forced marches to Madrid; to withdraw Dupont into the Sierra Morena, or even bring him nearer to Madrid (keeping him always, however, seven or eight marches off), then crush Cuesta and all the Gallician army, while Dupont will serve as an advanced guard to hold the army of Andalusia in check.”
Before Bessieres could collect his troops, Blake effected a junction with Cuesta at Benevente. Three plans were open to those generals:
1º. To remove into the mountains, and take a position covering Gallicia.
2º. To maintain the head of the Gallician army in advance of Astorga, while Cuesta, with his Castilians, pushing by forced marches through Salamanca and Avila, reached Segovia.
3º. To advance farther into the plains, and try the fate of a battle.
This last plan was rash, seeing that Bessieres was well provided with horsemen, and that the Spaniards had scarcely any; but Cuesta, assuming the chief command, left a division at Benevente to protect his stores, and advanced, much against Blake’s wishes, with twenty-five thousand infantry (regular troops), a few hundred cavalry, and from twenty to thirty pieces of artillery, in the direction of Palencia. His march, as we have seen, dismayed Savary. To use Napoleon’s expressions, he who had been “hitherto acting as if the army of Gallicia was not in existence,” now acted “as if Bessieres was already beaten;” but that marshal, firm and experienced, rather than risk an action of such importance with insufficient means, withdrew even the garrison from the important post of St. Ander, and having quickly collected fifteen thousand men and thirty pieces of artillery at Palencia, moved forward on the 12th of July to the encounter. His line of battle consisted of two divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry, and twenty-four guns, his reserve was formed of four battalions and some horse grenadiers of the imperial guards, with six pieces of artillery.
S.
Journal of Bessieres’ Operations.
The 13th he halted at Ampudia and Torre de Mormojon, from thence advancing on the 14th in two columns, he drove in an advanced guard of one hundred and fifty Spanish cavalry, and arrived about nine o’clock in front of Rio Seco, where Cuesta’s army was drawn up like a heavy domestic animal awaiting the spring of some active wild beast.
BATTLE OF RIO SECO.
The first line of the Spaniards was posted along the edge of a step of land, with an abrupt fall towards the French; the heaviest guns were distributed along the front. The second line, composed of the best troops, strengthened, or rather weakened, by seventeen or eighteen thousand peasants, was displayed at a great distance behind the first; the town of Rio Seco was in rear of the centre.
Bessieres was at first startled at their numbers, and doubted if he should attack; but soon perceiving the vice of Cuesta’s disposition, he ordered general Lasalle to make a feint against the front with the light cavalry, while he himself marching obliquely to the right, outstretched the left of the Spaniards, and suddenly thrust Merle’s and Mouton’s divisions and the imperial guards, horse and foot, between their lines, and threw the first into confusion; at that S.
Journal of Bessieres’ Operations. moment Lasalle charging furiously, the Spanish front went down at once, and fifteen hundred dead bodies strewed the field; but the victor’s ranks were disordered, and Cuesta made a gallant effort to retrieve the day, for, supported by the fire of all his remaining artillery, he fell with his second line upon the French, and with his right wing broke in boldly and took six guns; but his left hanging back, the flank of the right was exposed. Bessieres, with great readiness, immediately charged on this naked flank with Merle’s division and the horse grenadiers, while the fourteenth provisionary regiment made head against the front; a fierce short struggle ensued; and the Spaniards were overborne, were broken and dispersed; meanwhile the first line rallied in the town of Rio Seco, but were a second time defeated Ibid. by Mouton’s division, and fled over the plains, pursued by the light cavalry, and suffering severely in their flight.
Mr. Stuart’s Papers.
From five to six thousand Spaniards were killed and wounded on the field, and twelve hundred prisoners, eighteen guns, and a great store of ammunition, remained in the hands of the French. The vanquished sought safety in all directions, but chiefly on the side of Benevente. Blake and Cuesta separated in wrath with each other, the former making for the mountains of Gallicia, the latter towards Leon, and the division left at Benevente dispersed.
The French, who had lost fifty killed and three hundred wounded, remained at Rio Seco all the 15th; the 16th they advanced to Benevente, where they found many thousand English muskets and vast quantities of ammunition, clothing, and provisions.
The communication with Portugal was now open, and Bessieres at first resolved to give his hand to Junot; but hearing that the fugitives were likely to rally on the side of Leon, he pursued them by the road of Villa-fere. On his march, learning that Cuesta was gone to Mayorga, he turned aside to that place, and on the 22d captured there another great collection of stores; for, the Spanish general, with the usual improvidence of his nation, had established all his magazines in the open towns of the flat country.
After this Bessieres entered the city of Leon and remained there until the 29th, during which time he received the submission of the municipality, and prepared to carry the war into Gallicia. The junta of Castile and Leon, whose power had hitherto been restrained by Cuesta, now retired to Puente-Ferrada and assumed supreme authority, and the quarrel between the generals becoming rancorous, they sided with Blake. This appearing to Bessieres a favourable occasion to tamper with the fidelity of those chiefs; he sent his prisoners back, and endeavoured, by offering the vice-royalty of Mexico to the one, and by reasoning on the hopeless state of the insurrection, and the promise of rank and honours to the other, to shake the loyalty of both; but neither would listen to him.
This failing, he marched to Puente Orvigo the 31st, intending to break into Gallicia, but he was suddenly recalled from thence to protect the retreat of the king from Madrid. Dupont had surrendered with a whole army in Andalusia, the court was in consternation, the victory of Rio Seco was rendered fruitless; and Bessieres retracing his steps to Mayorga, took a defensive position near that town.
OBSERVATIONS.
1º. As Blake was overruled by Cuesta he is not responsible for the errors of this short campaign; but the faults were gross on both sides, and it seems difficult to decide whether Savary or Cuesta made the greatest number.
2º. If the former had sent Gobert’s division to Valladolid, Bessieres would have had twenty-two thousand men and forty pieces of artillery in the field, a force not at all too great, when it is considered that the fate of three French armies depended upon the success of a battle to which Cuesta might have brought at least double that number. The latter having determined upon an offensive movement, disregarded the powerful cavalry of his enemy, chose a field of battle precisely in the country where that arm would have the greatest advantage, and when he should have brought every man to bear upon the quarter which he did attack, he displayed his ignorance of the art of war by fighting the battle of Rio Seco with twenty-five thousand men only, and leaving ten thousand disciplined troops guarding positions in his rear, which could not be approached until he himself was first beaten. Neither was the time well chosen for his advance; had he waited a few days the port of St. Ander would have been attacked by eight English frigates and a detachment of Spanish troops under the command of general da Ponte, an enterprise that would have distracted and weakened Bessieres, but which was relinquished in consequence of the battle of Rio Seco.
3º. Once united to Blake, Cuesta’s real base of operations was Gallicia, and he should have kept all his stores within the mountains, and not have heaped them up in the open towns of the flat country, exposed to the marauding parties of the enemy, or covered, as in the case of Benevente, by strong detachments which weakened his troops in the field and confined him to a particular line of operations in the plain.
4º. The activity and good sense of marshal Bessieres overbalanced the errors of Savary; and the victory of Rio Seco was of infinite importance, because as we have seen a defeat in that quarter would have shaken the French military system to its centre and have obliged the king, then on his journey to Madrid, to halt at Vittoria, until the distant divisions of the army were recalled to the capital, and a powerful effort made to crush the victorious enemy. Napoleon’s observations are full of strong expressions of discontent at the imprudence of his lieutenant. “A check given to Dupont,” he says, “would have a slight effect, but a wound received by Bessieres would give a locked jaw to the whole army. Not an inhabitant of Madrid, not a peasant of the valleys that does not feel that the affairs of Spain are involved in the affair of Bessieres; how unfortunate, then, that in such a great event you have wilfully given the enemy twenty chances against yourself.” When he heard of the victory he exclaimed that it was the battle of Almanza, and that Bessieres had saved Spain.
The prospect was indeed very promising; the king had arrived in Madrid, bringing with him the veteran brigade of general Rey and some of the guards, and all fears upon the side of Leon being allayed, the affairs of Andalusia alone were of doubtful issue; for Napoleon’s Notes, [Appendix, No. 3.] Zaragoza, hard pushed by Verdier, was upon the point of destruction in despite of the noble courage of the besieged; nor did the subjugation of Andalusia appear in reason a hard task, seeing that Moncey was then at San Clemente, and from that point threatened Valencia without losing the power of succouring Dupont, and Frere’s and Caulincourt’s troops were disposable for any operation. The French army possessed the centre, and the Spaniards were dispersed upon a variety of points on the circumference without any connexion with each other, and in force only upon the side of Andalusia.
5º. The great combinations of the French emperor were upon the point of being crowned with success, when a sudden catastrophe overturned his able calculations and raised the sinking hopes of the Spaniards. It was the campaign in Andalusia which produced such important effects, and it offers one of the most interesting and curious examples recorded by history of the vicissitudes of war; for there disorder unaccompanied by superior valour triumphed over discipline; inexperienced officers were successful against practised generals; and a fortuitous combination of circumstances enabled the Spaniards, without any skill, to defeat in one day an immense plan wisely arranged, embracing a variety of interests, and until that moment happily conducted in all its parts. This blow, which felled Joseph from his throne, marked the French army with a dishonourable scar, the more conspicuous, because it was the only one of its numerous wounds that misbecame it.