No. XIII.
JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR JOHN MOORE’S AND OTHER CORRESPONDENCE.
SECTION I.—RELATING TO WANT OF MONEY.
Sir John Moore to lord William Bentinck, October 22, 1808.
“Sir David Baird has unfortunately been sent out without money. He has applied to me, and I have none to give him.” ... “I undertake my march in the hope that some will arrive; if it does not, it will add to the number of a great many distresses.”
Sir John Moore to general Hope, October 22, 1808.
“Baird has sent his aide-de-camp Gordon to me: he is without money, and his troops only paid to September. He can get none at Coruña.”
Sir John Moore to sir David Baird, October 22, 1808.
“We are in such want of money at this place that it is with difficulty I have been able to spare 8000l., which went to you in the Champion this day.”
Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, October 27.
“It is upon the general assurance of the Spanish government that I am leading the army into Spain without any established magazines. In this situation nothing is more essentially requisite than money, and unfortunately we have been able to procure very little here.”
Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, November 10, 1808.
“I understand from sir David Baird that you were kind enough to lend him 40,000l. from the money you brought with you from England. We are in the greatest distress for money. I doubt if there is wherewithal after the 24th of this month to pay the troops their subsistence.”
Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, Nov. 24, 1808.
“I am without a shilling of money to pay, and I am in daily apprehension that from the want of it our supplies will be stopped. It is impossible to describe the embarrassments we are thrown into from the want of that essential article.”
SECTION II.—RELATING TO ROADS.
Sir John Moore to general Anstruther, at Almeida, dated Lisbon, October 12, 1808.
“A division under Beresford is marching upon Coimbra, and a part of it will proceed on to Oporto or not, as information is received from you, that the road from thence to Almeida is or is not practicable. Some officers of the Spanish engineers, employed in the quarter-master-general’s department, with commissaries, are sent from Madrid to obtain information on the subjects you will want with respect to roads, subsistence, &c. &c. from Almeida to Burgos.”
Sir John Moore to lord William Bentinck, October 22, 1808.
“Colonel Lopez has no personal knowledge of this part of Spain; but what he has told me accords with other information I had before received, that the great Madrid road was the only one by which artillery could travel; the French brought theirs from Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara, but by this it was destroyed.” ... “The difficulty of obtaining correct information of roads, and the difficulties attending the subsistence of troops through Portugal, are greater than you can believe.”
Sir John Hope to sir John Moore, Madrid, Nov. 20.
“I sent Wills of the engineers by Placentia to Salamanca, and before this time I suppose he may have made his report to you of the roads from the Tagus at Almaraz and Puente de Cardinal to Salamanca.” ... “Delancy is upon this road, and I have directed him to communicate with you at Salamanca, as soon as possible.”
Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, Oct. 27, 1808.
“I am under the necessity of sending lieutenant-general Hope, with the artillery, &c. by the great road leading from Badajos to Madrid, as every information agreed that no other was fit for the artillery.”
Substance of a report from captain Carmichael Smyth of the engineers, 26th December, 1808.
“The country round about Astorga is perfectly open, and affords no advantage whatsoever to a small corps to enable it to oppose a large force with any prospect of success. In retreating, however, towards Villa Franca, at the distance of about two leagues from Astorga, the hills approaching each other form some strong ground; and the high ground in particular in the rear of the village of Rodrigatos appears at first sight to offer a most advantageous position. One very serious objection presents itself nevertheless to our making a stand near Rodrigatos, or indeed at any position before we come to the village of Las Torres (about one league from Bembibre), as the talus, or slope of the ground, from Manzanal (close to Rodrigatos) until Las Torres, would be in favour of an enemy should we be forced at Rodrigatos, and we should be consequently obliged to retreat down hill for nearly two leagues, the enemy having every advantage that such a circumstance would naturally give them.
“From Las Torres to Bembibre the ground becomes more open, but with the disadvantage, however, of the slope being still against us. From Bembibre to Villa Franca there is great variety of ground, but no position that cannot easily be turned, excepting the ground in the rear of Calcavellos, and about one league in front of Villafranca. This is by far the strongest position between Astorga and Villafranca. It is also necessary to add, that the position at Rodrigatos can easily be turned by the Foncevadon road (which, before the establishment of the Camina real, was the high road towards Coruña). This is not the case with the position in front of Villafranca, as the Foncevadon road joins the Camina real at Calcavallos in front of the proposed position.”
SECTION III.—RELATING TO EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.
Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, October 9, 1808.
“At this instant the army is without equipment of any kind, either for the carriage of the light baggage of regiments, artillery stores, commissariat stores, or other appendages of an army, and not a magazine is formed on any of the routes by which we are to march.”
Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, Oct. 18, 1808.
“In none of the departments is there any want of zeal, but in some of the important ones there is much want of experience.” ... “I have no hope of getting forward at present with more than the light baggage of the troops, the ammunition immediately necessary for the service of the artillery, and a very scanty supply of medicines.”
Sir John Moore’s Journal.
“My anxiety is to get out of the rugged roads of Portugal before the rains.”
Sir John Moore to lord William Bentinck, Oct. 22, 1808.
“The season of the year admitting of no delay, there was a necessity for beginning the march, and trusting for information and supplies as we get on unfortunately our commissariat is inexperienced, and a **** of a contractor, Mr. Sattaro, has deceived us.”
Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, October 29, 1808.
“The want of provisions for the men and forage for the horses has been one of the most serious obstacles we have had to contend with. Nor do I at present feel at all easy upon that subject.”—“The horses are suffering very severely, both for want of proper accommodations and food.” ... “From lord Castlereagh’s letter, I was led to expect that every preparation for our equipment had been made previous to our leaving England; I need hardly say how different the case was, and how much I have been disappointed.”
Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, November 17, 1808.
“The continued slowness of the junta is the only explanation I can offer for the want of proper arrangements on the routes for the reception of the English troops.”
SECTION IV.—RELATING TO THE WANT OF INFORMATION.
Sir John Moore’s Journal, November 28, 1808.
“I am not in communication with any of the (Spanish) generals, and neither know their plans nor those of the government. No channel of information has been opened to me, and I have no knowledge of the force or situation of the enemy, but what, as a stranger, I pick up.”
Ditto, Salamanca.
“It is singular that the French have penetrated so far (Valladolid), and yet no sensation has been made upon the people. They seem to remain quiet, and the information was not known through any other channel but that of a letter from the captain-general of the province to me.”
Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, Astorga, Nov. 19, 1808.
“The local authorities have not only failed in affording us the least benefit in that respect (supplies), but have neglected to give us any kind of information as to the proceedings of the armies or the motions of the enemy.”
Ditto, Astorga, 23d November.
“It is clearly apparent how very much exaggerated the accounts generally circulated of the strength of the Spanish armies have been.” ... “It is very remarkable that I have not procured the least intelligence, or received any sort of communication from any of the official authorities at Madrid, or either of the Spanish generals.”
Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, Villafranca, Dec. 12, 1808.
“I also enclose a letter from the marquis of Romana; you will be fully able to appreciate the degree of reliance that may be placed on the verbal communication made to him by the extraordinary courier from Madrid. It was from the same kind of authority that he desired the information he conveyed to me of a supposed brilliant affair at Somosierra, which turned out to be an inconsiderable skirmish altogether undeserving of notice.”
Colonel Graham to sir John Moore, Madrid, Oct. 4, 1808.
“The deputies sent over knew nothing but just concerning their own provinces and pour se faire valoir, they exaggerated every thing; for example, those of the Asturias talked louder than any body, and Asturias as yet has never produced a man to the army; thus government, with all their wish to get information (which cannot be doubted), failed in the proper means.”
Lord Wm. Bentinck to sir John Moore, Madrid, Nov. 20, 1808.
“I must at the same time take the liberty of stating my belief, that reliance cannot be placed upon the correctness of information, even if such information should not be kept back, which does not come through the channel of a British officer. It is the choice of officers, rather than the system, that seems to have failed.”
Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Madrid, Nov. 19, 1808.
“In your direct communications with Spanish generals, you must, however, be contented with their version of the state of affairs, which I do not think can always be relied on, because they only put matters in the view in which they wish you to see them.”
Ditto, Nov. 29.
“The calculation of force which the junta hope may be united in the army under your command will be as follows, if no impediment prevents the different corps reaching the points selected for their junction.”
| Remarks by the author. | |||
| British | 35,000 | They were only 23,500. | |
| La Romana | 20,000 | ... only 5000 armed. | |
| San Juan | 15,000 | Totally dispersed. | |
| Levies from the south, say | 10,000 | None ever arrived. | |
| ——— | |||
| 80,000 | Real total, 28,500. | ||
| ——— |
Lieut. Boothby, royal engineers, to sir John Moore, La Puebla, Jan. 1, 1809.
“I shall consider of any means that may more completely ensure the earliest information of the enemy’s movements towards this quarter; but the Spaniards are the most difficult people in the world to employ in this way, they are so slow, so talkative, and so credulous.”
SECTION V.—RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF THE LOCAL JUNTAS.
Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, Coruña, Oct. 24, 1808.
“The answer of the supreme government to our application as read by Mr. Frere last night in the presence of the junta of this province, is certainly very different from what I expected. Instead of expressing an anxiety to promote our views and dissatisfaction at the impediments thrown in the way of our measures by the Gallician government, it merely permits us to land here in the event of its being found impracticable to send us by sea to St. Andero, and directs that if our disembarkation takes place, it should be made in detachments of 2000 or 3000 men each! to be successively pushed on into Castille, without waiting for the necessary equipment of mules and horses.”
Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, Coruña, Nov. 7.
“We have received no sort of assistance from the government.”
Ditto, Astorga, Nov. 19.
“Had the Spanish government afforded us any active assistance, the state of our equipments would have been much more advanced.”
Colonel Graham to sir John Moore, Madrid, Oct. 4, 1808.
“All this instead of at once appointing the fittest men in the country to be ministers, looks much like private interest and patronage being the objects more than the public good.”
Colonel Graham to sir John Moore, Tudela, Nov. 9, 1808.
“It is hoped that the Arragonese army will come over to fill it” (the line) “up, but being an independent command, no order has yet been sent. An express went after Palafox, who will return here this morning, and then, it is hoped, that he will send an order to general O’Neil at Sanguessa to march instantly; and further, it is hoped, that general O’Neil will obey this order without waiting for one from his immediate chief, Palafox, the captain-general of Arragon, who is at Zaragoza; at all events, there is a loss of above 24 hours by the happy system of independent commands, which may make the difference of our having 18,000 men more or less in the battle that may be fought whenever the French are ready.” ... “Making me compliments of there being no secrets with their allies, they” (the members of the council of war) “obliged me to sit down, which I did for a quarter of an hour, enough to be quite satisfied of the miserable system established by this junta” ... “In short, I pitied poor Castaños and poor Spain, and came away disgusted to the greatest degree.”
Col. Graham to Lord W. Bentinck, Centruenigo, Nov. 13, 1808.
“If any thing can make the junta sensible of the absurdity of their conduct this will. It would indeed have been more felt if a great part of the division had been lost, as might well have happened. But the difficulty of passing so many men with artillery, and in small boats, and the time that would have been required so great, that I can hardly persuade myself these people can be so foolish as ever seriously to have entertained the idea. But with whatever intentions, whether merely as a pretence for assuming the command for the purpose of irritating Castaños; whether from the silly vanity of exercising power, and doing something which, if by great good luck it had succeeded, might have proved what might be done with a more active commander; or whether from a real conviction of the excellence of the scheme, it must be equally evident to every military man, indeed to every man of common sense, that it is impossible things can succeed in this way; and then the junta itself interferes, and to worse purpose.”
Castaños’s Vindication.
“The nation is deceived in a thousand ways; as an example, it believed that our armies were greatly superior to those of the enemy, reckoning 80,000 men that of the centre, when your excellencies” (the junta) “knew that it only amounted to 26,000 men.” ... “Madrid possessed money and riches; the nobles and loyal inhabitants of that capital wished to give both the one and the other; but whilst the armies were suffering the horrors of famine, naked, and miserable, the possessions and jewels of the good Spaniards remained quiet in Madrid, that they might be soon seized by the tyrant, as they were in the end.”
Stuart’s Despatch, August 7, 1808.
“No province shares the succours granted by Great Britain, although they may not be actually useful to themselves. No gun-boats have been sent from Ferrol to protect St. Ander or the coast of Biscay; and the Asturians have in vain asked for artillery from the dépôts of Gallicia. The stores landed at Gihon, and not used by the Asturians, have remained in that port and in Oviedo, although they would have afforded a seasonable relief to the army of general Blake. The money brought by the Pluto for Leon, which has not raised a man, remains in the port where it was landed.”
Major Cox to sir Hew Dalrymple, Seville, August 3, 1808.
“I freely confess that I cannot help feeling some degree of apprehension that this great and glorious cause may be ruined by the baneful effects of jealousy and division.”
Major Cox to sir Hew Dalrymple, Seville, August 27.
“The fact is, their” (the junta of Seville) “attention has been for some time past so much occupied by vain and frivolous disputes, and by views of private interest and advantage, that they seem to have neglected entirely every concern of real importance, and almost to have lost sight of the general interests of the country.” ... “A million of dollars have, I understand, been sent out.” ... “It certainly would not be prudent to intrust so large a sum to the management of the temporary government of a particular province, without having a sufficient security for its proper application. My own opinion is, that the less money which is given to them the better, until the general government is formed. This junta have shown too evident signs of a wish to aggrandize themselves, and a disinclination to afford those aids to other provinces, which they had it in their power to grant, not to afford just grounds of suspicion, that their boasted loyalty and patriotism have at times been mixed with unworthy considerations of self-interest and personal advantage.”
Ditto, Sept. 5.
“By Mr. Duff’s present instructions, he would have had no option” (distributing the money), “even though the iniquitous project of partition, which your excellency knows was once contemplated, were still in existence.”
Ditto, Sept. 7.
“A dispute between the two juntas” (Seville and Grenada), “which had nearly been productive of the most serious consequences, and would probably have ended in open hostility, had it not been prevented by the moderate, but decided conduct, of general Castaños.”
Ditto, Sept. 10.
“The supreme junta of Seville have latterly manifested very different views, and, I am sorry to say, they seem almost to have lost sight of the common cause, and to be wholly addicted to their particular interests: instead of directing their efforts to the restoration of their legitimate sovereign and the established form of national government, they are seeking the means of fixing the permanency of their own, and endeavouring to separate its interests from those of the other parts of Spain. To what other purpose can be attributed the order given to general Castaños, not to march on any account beyond Madrid? To what the instructions given to their deputy, don Andrea Miñiano, to uphold the authority, and preserve the integrity of the junta of Seville; to distinguish the army to which he is attached by the name of the army of Andalusia; to preserve constantly the appellation, and not to receive any orders but what came directly from this government? And above all, what other motive could induce the strong and decided measure of enforcing obedience to those orders, by withholding from general Castaños the means of maintaining his troops, in case of his refusing to comply with them?”—“What has been the late occupation of the junta of Seville? Setting aside the plans which were formed for augmenting the Spanish army in these provinces, and neglecting the consideration of those which have been proposed in their stead, their attention has been taken up in the appointment of secretaries to the different departments, in disposing of places of emolument, in making promotions in the army, appointing canons in the church, and instituting orders of knighthood. Such steps as these make their designs too evident.”
Captain Carrol to sir David Baird, Llanes, Dec. 17, 1808.
“This province” (Asturias), “the first to declare war with France, has, during seven months, taken no steps that I can discover to make arrangements against the event of the enemy’s entering the province.” ... “What has been done with the vast sums of money that came from England, you will naturally ask? Plundered and misapplied: every person who had or has any thing to do with money concerns endeavouring to keep in hand all he can, and be ready, let affairs turn out as they may, to help himself.”
Lord William Bentinck to sir Hew Dalrymple, Seville, Sept. 19, 1808.
“Notwithstanding the professions of the Junta, their conduct has evidently fallen short of them, and I think it would be very desirable that more money should not fall into their hands.”
Major Cox to sir H. Dalrymple, Seville, 10 July and 27th do.
“The proclamation of Florida Blanca was received here some time ago, but was carefully suppressed by the government.”
Other publications containing maxims similar to those inculcated by the proclamation of Florida Blanca have appeared, but are suppressed here with equal care.
SECTION VI.—CENTRAL JUNTA.
Lord Wm. Bentinck to sir John Moore, Madrid, Oct. 4, 1808.
“I am sorry to say that the new government do not seem to proceed with the despatch and energy which the critical situation of the country demands.”
Ditto to sir H. Burrard, Madrid, Oct. 8.
“In my last letter I adverted to the inactivity and apparent supineness which prevailed in the central council in regard to the military, as well as to the other business of the government.”
Ditto to sir John Moore, Nov. 8.
“But it is upon the spot where the exact state of the armies, and the extraordinary inefficiency of the government, whose past conduct promises so little for the future, are known, that the danger must be the more justly appreciated.” ... “The most simple order, however urgent the case, cannot be obtained from the government without a difficulty, solicitation, and delay, that is quite incredible.”
Sir John Hope to sir John Moore, Madrid, Nov. 20, 1808.
“It is perfectly evident that they” (the junta) “are altogether without a plan as to their future military operations, either in the case of success or misfortune. Every branch is affected by the disjointed and inefficient construction of their government.”
Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Madrid, Oct. 18, 1808.
“Lord William Bentinck, as well as myself, have made repeated representations, and I have given in paper after paper to obtain something like promptitude and vigour; but though loaded with fair promises in the commencement, we scarcely quit the members of the junta before their attention is absorbed in petty pursuits and the wrangling which impedes even the simplest arrangements necessary for the interior government of a country.” ... “In short, we are doing what we can, not what we wish; and I assure you we have infamous tools to work with.”
Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Seville, Jan. 2, 1809.
“Morla’s treason is abused, but passed over; and the arrival of money from Mexico, which is really the arrival of spoil for the French, seems to have extinguished every sentiment the bad views and the desperate state of things ought to have created.”
Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Jan. 10, 1809.
“Castaños, Heredia, Castelar, and Galluzzo, are all here. These unfortunate officers are either prisoners or culprits, waiting the decision of government on their conduct in the late transactions. If the state of affairs should allow the government to continue in existence they will probably wait many months, for no determination is to be expected from people who have in no one instance punished guilt or rewarded merit since they ruled the country. The junta indeed, to say the truth, is at present absolutely null, and although they represent the sovereign authority I have never witnessed the exercise of their power for the public good.”
Mr. Frere to sir John Moore. Las Santos, Dec. 16, 1808.
“The subject of the ships in Cadiz had not escaped me, but I thought it so very dangerous to suggest to the junta any idea except that of living and dying on Spanish ground, that I avoided the mention of any subject that could seem to imply that I entertain any other prospects.”
SECTION VII.—RELATING TO THE PASSIVE STATE OF THE PEOPLE.
Sir John Moore’s Journal, Dec. 9, 1808.
“In this part the people are passive. We find the greatest difficulty to get people to bring in information.”
Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere. Sahagun, Dec. 23, 1808.
“If the Spaniards are enthusiastic or much interested in this cause, their conduct is the most extraordinary that was ever exhibited.”
Sir John Moore to lord Castlereagh, Dec. 31, 1808, Astorga.
“I arrived here yesterday, where, contrary to his promise, and to my expectation, I found the marquis la Romana, with a great part of his troops. Nobody can describe his troops to be worse than he does, and he complains as much as we do of the indifference of the inhabitants, his disappointment at their want of enthusiasm; and said to me in direct terms, that had he known how things were, he neither would have accepted the command nor have returned to Spain. With all this, however, he talks of attacks and movements which are quite absurd, and then returns to the helpless state of his army and of the country.”
Mr. Stuart to sir John Moore, Nov. 17, 1808.
“The tranquillity of Madrid is truly wonderful.”
Sir David Baird to sir John Moore, Dec. 6.
“Destitute as we are of magazines, and without receiving even a show of assistance either from the government or inhabitants of the country, who, on the contrary, in many instances, even thwarted our plans and measures; we could not have advanced without exposing ourselves to almost certain destruction.”
Sir David Baird to lord Castlereagh, Nov. 22, 1808, Astorga.
“Major Stuart of the 95th regiment, who was despatched in front of this place to obtain information, reports that the inhabitants appear perfectly depressed by their losses, and seem to abandon all hope of making a successful resistance.”
Captain Carrol to sir John Moore, Dec. 17, 1808.
“On my arrival at Oviedo all was confusion and dismay; the confidence between the people, the army, and the junta destroyed.” ... “Is it to be expected that the peasantry can be as hearty in the cause of patriotism as if they were treated with justice.”
Lieut. Boothby to sir J. Moore. La Puebla, Jan. 1. 1809.
“The Spanish soldiers now here (about 700) are merely on their way to the marquis de la Romana; and as to any neighbouring passes, there are no people whom I can call upon to occupy them, or should expect to defend them, however naturally strong they may be, for I see no people who are thinking of the enemy’s advance with any sentiments beyond passive dislike, and hopes of protection from God and the English army.”
The prince of Neufchatel to the duke of Dalmatia, Dec. 10, 1808.
“The city of Madrid is quite tranquil, the shops are all open, the public amusements are resumed.”
General Thouvenot to the prince of Neufchatel. St. Sebastian, 29th Nov. 1808.
“The successes obtained by the armies of the emperor, and those which are also foreseen, begin to make a sensible impression upon the authorities of the country, who become from day to day more affable towards the French, and more disposed to consider the king as their legitimate sovereign.”
The commandant Meslin to the prince of Neufchatel. Vittoria, 29th Nov. 1808.
“The public feeling is still bad, still incredulous of our successes.” ... “As to the tranquillity of the country, it appears certain.”
Mr. Frere to sir John Moore. Merida, Dec. 14, 1808.
“A thousand barriers would be interposed against that deluge of panic which sometimes overwhelms a whole nation, and of which at one time I was afraid I saw the beginning in this country.” ... “The extinction of the popular enthusiasm in this country, and the means which exist for reviving it, would lead to a very long discussion.”
SECTION VIII.—MISCELLANEOUS.
Lord Collingwood to sir H. Dalrymple. Ocean, Cadiz, June 23, 1808.
“At Minorca and Majorca they describe themselves to be strong, and having nothing to apprehend. However, they made the proposal for entering into a convention with us for their defence, and in the course of it demanded money, arms, and the protection of the fleet. When, in return for them, it was required that their fleet should be given up to us, to be held for their king Ferdinand, or that a part of them should join our squadron against the enemy, they rejected all those proposals: so that whatever we did for them was to be solely for the honour of having their friendship.”
Captain Whittingham to sir Hew Dalrymple, June 12, 1808.
“12th June. I returned to Xerez at three o’clock, A.M. The general sent for me and requested I would go without delay to Gibraltar, and inform lieut.-general sir Hew Dalrymple that he at present occupied Carmona with 3000 men (regulars), having his head-quarters at Utrera, where his regular force would amount to 12,000 men; that it was not his intention to attempt to defend Seville; that the heavy train of artillery, consisting of 80 pieces, was already embarked for Cadiz, under the pretext that they were wanting for the defence of its works; and that every thing was prepared for burning the harness, timbers, &c. &c. of the field pieces; that he intended to fall gradually back upon Cadiz, if forced to retreat; and that he did not at present desire that any English troops should be landed till their numbers should amount to 8 or 10,000 men, lest the ardour of the people should oblige him to commence an offensive system of warfare before the concentration of a considerable Spanish and English force should afford reasonable hopes of success.”
Capt. Whittingham to sir H. Dalrymple. Utrera, June 29, 1808.
“The president approved of the idea, condemned the policy which had led Spain to attempt to establish manufactories by force, and showed clearly that the result had been the loss of a considerable branch of the revenue, the increase of smuggling, and consequently an enormous expense, in the payment of nearly one hundred thousand custom or rather excise officers, distributed about the country, and the ruin of numberless families seduced by the prospect of immediate profit to engage in illicit traffic.”
Lord William Bentinck to sir H. Dalrymple. Madrid, Oct. 2, 1808.
“A passage of lord Castlereagh’s letter, of which I received from you a copy, instructed you, if possible, to ascertain the intentions of the Spanish government after the expulsion of the French. Though not positively directed by you to ask this information, yet the occasion appeared to make the question so natural, and seemingly of course, and even necessary, that I availed myself of it, and gave to general Castaños, to be laid before count Florida Blanca, a memorandum, of which I enclose a copy, marked A.”
Extract from the copy marked A.
“It seems probable in such case that no diversion could be more effectual or more formidable to Buonaparte than the march of a large combined British and Spanish army over the Pyrenees, into that part of France where there are no fortified places to resist their passage into the very heart of the country, and into that part where great disaffection is still believed to exist.”
Major Fletcher, royal engineers, to sir John Moore. Betanzos, Jan. 5, 1809.
“I have the honour to report to your excellency that, in obedience to your orders, I have examined the neck of land between the harbour of Ferrol and the bridge of Puente de Humo. This ground does not appear to possess any position that has not several defects.” ... “I did not find any ground so decidedly advantageous, and containing a small space, as to render it tenable for the vanguard of an army to cover the embarkation of the main body.” ... “I should have sent this report much sooner, but found it impossible to procure post horses until my arrival at Lugo, and since that time I have had very bad ones.”
Ditto to Ditto. Coruña, Jan. 6, 1809.
“I am therefore led to suggest, that as Coruña is fortified, reveted, and tolerably flanked (though the ground about it is certainly not favourable), as it could not be carried by a coup-demain if properly defended, as it contains a great quantity of cover for men; and as, even against artillery, it might make resistance for some days, it may be worth consideration whether, under present circumstances, it may not be desirable to occupy it in preference to the peninsula of Betanzos, should the army not turn off for Vigo.”