History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2

by William Francis Patrick Napier

CHAPTER II.

The English general’s resolution to halt at Talavera made little impression upon Cuesta. A French corps had retreated before him, and Madrid, nay, the Pyrennees themselves, instantly rose on the view of the sanguine Spaniard: he was resolved to be the first in the capital, and he pushed forward in pursuit, reckless alike of military discipline and of the friendly warnings of sir Arthur; who vainly admonished him to open his communications as quickly as possible with Venegas, and to beware how he let the enemy know that the British and Spanish armies were separated. In the fulness of his arrogant vanity, Cuesta crossed the Alberche on the 24th, and being unable to ascertain the exact route of the French, pursued them, by the road of Toledo, as far as Cebolla, and, by the road of Madrid, as far as El Bravo. On the 25th, still inflated with pride, he caused the troops at Cebolla to move on to Torrijos, and marched himself to St. Ollalla. The 26th he discovered that he had been pursuing a tiger. Meanwhile sir Arthur Wellesley, foreseeing the consequence of this imprudence, had sent general Sherbrooke, with two divisions of British infantry and all the cavalry, across the Alberche, to Cazalegas, where, being centrically situated with respect to Talavera, St. Ollalla, and Escalona, he could support the Spaniards, and, at the same time, hold communication with sir Robert Wilson, who had been at the latter town since the 23d. But a great and signal crisis was at hand, the full importance of which cannot be well understood without an exact knowledge of the situation and proceedings of all the armies involved in this complicated campaign.

The 30th of June, Soult, when at Zamora, received a despatch from the emperor, dated near Ratisbon, conferring on him the supreme command of the second, fifth, and sixth corps, with orders to concentrate them, and act decisively against the English. “Wellesley,” said Napoleon, “will probably advance, by the Tagus, against Madrid: in that case, pass the mountains, fall on his flank and rear, and crush him;” for, at that distance, and without other information than what his own sagacity supplied, this allknowing soldier foresaw the leading operations even as soon and as certainly as those who projected them.

The duke of Dalmatia immediately imparted these instructions to the king, and, at the same time, made known his own opinions and designs with respect to the probable projects of the allies. He was ignorant of the precise object and exact position of sir Arthur Wellesley, but, judging from the cessation of hostility in the north, that the English were in march with the design of joining Cuesta, and acting by the line of the Tagus, he proposed to concentrate the third corps at Salamanca, besiege Ciudad Rodrigo, and menace Lisbon, which, he justly observed, would bring the English army back to the northern provinces of Portugal; and if, as some supposed, the intention of sir Arthur was to unite, at Bragança, with Romana, and open the campaign to the north of the Douro, the French army would still be in a suitable position to oppose them.

In pursuance of this opinion, Soult ordered Mortier to approach Ciudad Rodrigo, with the double view of preparing for the siege and covering the quarters of refreshment so much needed by the second corps after its fatigues. Ney also was directed to march with the sixth corps, by the left bank of the Esla, to Zamora; but the spirit of discord was strong, and it was at this moment that the king, alarmed by Sebastiani’s report, drew the fifth corps to Villa Castin; while marshal Ney, holding it imprudent to uncover Astorga and Leon, mortified, also, at being placed under the orders of another marshal, refused to move to Zamora. Soult, crossed by these untoward circumstances, sent the division of light cavalry, under his brother, and one of infantry, commanded by Heudelet, from Zamora and Toro to Salamanca, with orders to explore the course of the Tormes, to observe Alba and Ledesma, and especially to scour the roads leading upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Plasencia: these troops relieved a division of dragoons belonging to Kellerman, who was still charged with the general government of the province.

The 10th of July, the march of the British upon Plasencia became known, and it was manifest that sir Arthur had no design to act north of the Douro; wherefore the duke of Dalmatia resolved to advance, with the remainder of the second corps, to Salamanca, and, partly by authority, partly by address, he obliged Ney to put the sixth corps in movement for Zamora, leaving Fournier’s dragoons to cover Astorga and Leon. Meanwhile, king Joseph, having returned from his fruitless excursion against Venegas, was at first incredulous of the advance of sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta, but he agreed to Soult’s project against Ciudad Rodrigo, and ordered Mortier to return to Valladolid, where that marshal arrived, with his first division, on the 16th of July: his second division, under general Gazan, halted, however, at Medina del Campo and Nava del Rey, on the route from Salamanca to Valladolid, and an advanced guard was sent forward to Alba de Tormes.

The 13th of July, Soult, being assured that the British army was on the eastern frontier of Portugal, and that considerable reinforcements had been disembarked at Lisbon, became certain that sir Arthur meant to operate by the line of the Tagus; wherefore, he again addressed the king to move him to an immediate siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, promising to have the three corps under his own command in full activity in fifteen days, provided his demands were complied with, the most important being—1º. The formation of a battering-train;—2º. The concentration of an immense number of detachments, which weakened the active corps;—3º. A reinforcement of fifteen or twenty thousand conscripts, drawn from France, to enable the old troops, employed on the line of communication, to join the corps d’armée. The first corps should, he said, continue to watch the Spanish army of Estremadura, S.
Journal of Operations MSS. and be prepared either to prevent it from uniting with the English to disturb the siege, or to join the first, second, and sixth corps, and give battle, if that should become necessary. The siege might thus be pressed vigourously, Ciudad would fall, Almeida be next invested, and the communications of the English army, with Lisbon, threatened.

The 17th, the king replied, through marshal Jourdan, that he approved of the plan, but had not means to meet several of Soult’s demands, and he proposed that the latter should reinforce Kellerman and Bonnet, with ten thousand men, to enable them to seize the Asturias, and thus strengthen the communications with France. This drew from the duke of Dalmatia the following remonstrance:—“Under present circumstances we cannot avoid some sacrifice of territory. Let us prepare, first, by concentrating, on a few points capable of defence and covering the hospitals and depôts which may be on the extremity of our general position. This will not be so distressing as it may appear, because the moment we have beaten and dispersed the enemy’s masses we shall recover all our ground.” Then reiterating his own advice, he concluded thus:—“I conceive it impossible to finish this war by detachments. It is large masses only, the strongest that you can form, that will succeed.” It is remarkable that sir Arthur Wellesley, writing at this time, says, “I conceive that the French are dangerous only when in large masses.”

Meanwhile, Heudelet’s division, having pushed back the advanced guards of the duke del Parque upon Ciudad Rodrigo, ascertained that a great movement of troops was taking place near that city, and that sir Arthur Wellesley, advancing quicker than was expected, had already reached Plasencia; wherefore, on the 18th, Soult directed Mortier to march upon Salamanca with the fifth corps, and, at the same time, reinforced Heudelet’s division with Merle’s; the latter’s place, at Zamora, being supplied by a division of the sixth corps, the remainder of which continued on the Esla, fronting the Tras os Montes. Thus, not less than fifty thousand men were at or close to Salamanca, with their cavalry-posts pointing to the passes of Baños, on the very day that sir Arthur Wellesley crossed the Tietar to effect his junction with Cuesta. Yet, neither through the duke del Parque, nor Beresford, nor the guerillas, nor the peasantry, did intelligence of this formidable fact reach him!

Having put the three corps in motion, Soult despatched general Foy to Madrid, with information of sir Arthur’s march, and to arrange the future combinations of the two armies. “It is probable,” he said, “that the concentration of my army at Salamanca will oblige the English general to change his plan; but, if he shall already have advanced on the road to Madrid, we should assemble all our forces, both on the Tagus and on this side, fall upon him altogether, and crush him. Thus, his campaign will be finished, and our operations may go on with advantage.”

Foy arrived, the 22d, at Madrid; and, a few hours afterwards, intelligence reached the king that the allies were at Talavera, in front of the first corps, and that sir Robert Wilson (whose strength was much exaggerated) was at Escalona. The die was now cast; Joseph directed Soult to march immediately upon Plasencia, then, leaving general Belliard, with only three thousand men, in the Retiro, set out himself, with his guards and reserve, by the road of Mostoles, to join Victor at Talavera. The 23d, being at Naval-Carneiro, he received notice that the first corps would retreat that night to Torrijos, and, in two days, would be behind the Guadarama river; whereupon, turning to the left, Joseph descended the Guadarama to Vargas, and effected his junction with the duke of Belluno on the 25th.

During this time, Sebastiani, who had been watching Venegas near Damyel, deceived that general, and, returning to Toledo by forced marches, left three thousand men there, with the design of obliging him to cross the Tagus, at Aranjues. With the remainder of the fourth corps Sebastiani joined the king: and thus nearly fifty thousand fighting men and ninety pieces of artillery were concentrated, on the morning of the 26th, behind the Guadarama, and within a few miles of Cuesta’s advanced guard. But, on the side of the allies, the main body of the Spaniards was at St. Ollalla; Sherbrooke with two divisions and the cavalry, at Casalegas; and the rest of the English in Talavera. So that, while the French were concentrated and in full march to attack; the allies were separated in four nearly equal and unconnected parts, of which three were enclosed, as it were, in a net, between the Alberche and the Tagus! On such an occasion Napoleon would have been swift and deadly.

In retiring upon Toledo, instead of Madrid, the duke of Belluno showed himself an able commander. Toledo was the strategic pivot upon which every movement turned. It was the central point, by holding which the army of Venegas was separated from the allies on the Alberche. If the latter advanced, Soult’s operations rendered every forward step a stride towards ruin. If, leaving Venegas to his fate, they retired, it must be rapidly, or there would be neither wisdom nor safety in the measure. The king knew that Foy would reach Soult the 24th, and as that marshal had already assembled his army about Salamanca, which was only four days’ march from Plasencia, he might be in the valley of the Tagus by the 30th; hence, to insure complete success, the royal army needed only to keep the allies in check for four or five days. This was the plan that Soult had recommended, that the king promised to follow, and that marshal Jourdan strenuously supported. The unskilful proceedings of Cuesta and Venegas, the separation of the allies, the distressed state of the English army, actually on the verge of famine, (a circumstance that could hardly be unknown to Victor,) greatly facilitated the execution of this project, which did not preclude the king from punishing the folly of the Spanish general, whose army, scattered and without order, discipline, or plan, so strongly invited an attack.

I have said that Cuesta was playing with a tiger: he had some faint perception of his danger on the 25th, and he gave orders to retreat on the 26th; but the French, suddenly passing the Guadarama, at two o’clock in the morning of that day, quickly drove the Spanish cavalry out of Torrijos, and pursued them to Alcabon. Here general Zayas had drawn up four thousand infantry, two thousand horsemen, and eight guns, on a plain, and offered battle.

COMBAT OF ALCABON.

The Spanish right rested on the road of Domingo Perez, and the left on a chapel of the same name. The French cavalry, under Latour Maubourg, advanced in a parallel line against the Spaniards, and a cannonade commenced; but, at that moment, the head of the French infantry appearing in sight, the Spaniards broke, and fled in disorder towards St. Ollalla, followed, at full gallop, by the horsemen, who pressed them so sorely that the panic would, doubtless, have spread through the whole army, but for the courage of Albuquerque, who, coming up with a division of three thousand fresh cavalry, held the enemy in play, while Cuesta retreated, in the greatest disorder, towards the Alberche.

After reaching St. Ollalla, the French slackened their efforts; the main body halted there, and the advanced guards, save a few cavalry-posts, did not pass El Bravo, and no attempt was made to profit from the unconnected position of the allies—a gross and palpable error; for, either by the sword or dispersion, the Spaniards lost, on that day, not less than four thousand men; and such was their fear and haste that it required but a little more perseverance in the pursuit to cause a general rout. Albuquerque, alone, showed any front; but his efforts were unavailing, and the disorder continued to increase until general Sherbrooke, marching out of Cazalegas, placed his divisions between the scared troops and the enemy. Still the danger was imminent; there was no concert between the commanders, the ground on the left of the Alberche was unfavourable to a retiring party, and, as yet, no position upon which the combined forces could retire had been agreed upon! What, then, would have been the consequence if the whole French army had borne down, compact and strong, into the midst of the disordered masses?

Sir Arthur Wellesley, who, at the first alarm, had hastened to the front, seeing the confusion beyond the Alberche, knew that a battle was at hand; and, being persuaded that in a strong defensive position only could the Spaniards be brought to stand a shock, earnestly endeavoured to persuade Cuesta, while Sherbrooke’s people could yet cover the movement, to withdraw to Talavera, where there was ground suited for defence; but Cuesta’s uncouth nature again broke forth; his people were beaten, dispirited, fatigued, bewildered; clustered on a narrow slip of low, flat land, between the Alberche, the Tagus, and the heights of Salinas; and the first shot fired by the enemy must have been the signal of defeat; yet it was in vain that sir Arthur Wellesley pointed out those things, and entreated of him to avoid the fall of the rock that trembled over his head; he replied, that his troops would be disheartened by any further retreat, that he would fight where he stood: and in this mood he passed the night.

The 27th, at day-light, the British general renewed his solicitations, at first, fruitlessly, but when the enemy’s cavalry came in sight, and Sherbrooke prepared to retire, Cuesta sullenly yielded, yet, turning to his staff with frantic pride, observed that “He had first made the Englishman go down on his knees.” Sir Arthur Wellesley, by virtue of his genius, now assumed the direction of both armies. General Mackenzie’s division and a brigade of light cavalry were left on the Alberche, to cover the retrograde movement: but the rest of the allied troops was soon in full march for the position, which was about six miles in the rear. Sir Robert Wilson, who had reached Naval Carneiro on the 25th, and opened a communication with Madrid, and who would certainly have entered that capital but for the approaching battle, was also recalled. He returned, on the 28th, to Escalona, and hung on the enemy’s rear, but did not attempt to join the army.

Between the Alberche and the town of Talavera, the country was flat, and covered with olives and cork-trees; and, on the north, nearly parallel to the Tagus, and at a distance of about two or three miles, a chain of round but steep hills bounded the woody plain. Beyond these hills, but separated from them by a deep and rugged valley, something less than half a mile wide, was the high mountain-ridge which divides the bed of the Alberche from that of the Tietar. Hence, a line drawn perpendicularly from the Tagus would cross the first chain of hills at the distance of two miles, and at two miles and a half would fall on the mountains.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, taking the town of Talavera, which was built close to the river, as his fixed point, placed the right of the Spaniards there, drawing their army up in two lines, with the left resting upon a mound, where a large field-redoubt was constructed, and behind which a brigade of British light cavalry was posted. The front was covered by a convent, by ditches, mud walls, breast-works, and felled trees. The cavalry was posted behind the infantry; and the rear was supported by a large house in the wood, well placed, in case of defeat, to cover a retreat on to the main roads leading from Talavera to Arzobispo and Oropesa. In this position they could not be attacked seriously, nor their disposition be even seen; and, thus, one-half of the line necessary to be occupied by the allies was rendered nearly impregnable, and yet held by the worst troops.

The front of battle was prolonged by the British infantry. General Campbell’s division, formed in two lines, touched the Spanish left; general Sherbrooke’s division stood next to Campbell’s, but arranged on one line only, because general Mackenzie’s division, destined to form the second, was then near the Alberche. It was intended that general Hill’s division should close the left of the British, by taking post on the highest hill, in the chain before mentioned, as bounding the flat and woody country; but, by some accident, the summit of this height was not immediately occupied.

The whole line, thus displayed, was about two miles in length, the left being covered by the valley between the hill and the mountain; and from this valley a ravine, or water-course, opened, deeply, in the front of the British left, but being gradually obliterated in the flat ground about the centre of the line. Part of the British cavalry was with general Mackenzie, and in the plain in front of the left, and part behind the great redoubt, at the [Appendix, No. 11]. junction of the allied troops. The British and Germans under arms that day were somewhat above nineteen thousand sabres and bayonets, with thirty guns. The Spaniards, after their previous defeat, could only produce from thirty-three to thirty-four thousand men; but they had seventy guns. The combined army, therefore, offered battle with forty-four thousand infantry, nearly ten thousand cavalry, and a hundred pieces of artillery; and the French were coming on with at least eighty guns, and, including the king’s guards, nearly fifty thousand men, of which above seven thousand were cavalry. But what a difference in the quality of the troops! The French were all hardy veterans, while the genuine soldiers of the allied army did not exceed nineteen thousand.

The king, having passed the night of the 26th at St. Ollalla, put his troops in motion again before day-light, on the 27th. Latour Maubourg, with the cavalry, preceeded the column, and the first and fourth corps, the royal guards, and reserve, followed in succession. The appearance of the leading squadrons, near Cazalegas, hastened, as we have seen, Cuesta’s decision, and, about one o’clock in the afternoon, the first corps reached the heights of Salinas, from whence the dust of the allies, as they took up their position, could be perceived; but neither their situation nor disposition could be made out, on account of the forest, which, clothing the country from the Tagus nearly to the foot of the first range of hills, masked all their Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS. evolutions. The duke of Belluno, however, being well acquainted with the ground, instantly guessed their true position; and, in pursuance of his advice, the king ordered the fourth corps to march against the left of the allies; the cavalry against the centre, and Victor himself, with the first corps, against the right: the guards and the reserve supported the fourth corps.

Two good routes, suitable to artillery, led from the Alberche to the position; the one, being the royal road to Talavera, was followed by the fourth corps and the reserve; the other, passing through a place called the Casa des Salinas, led directly upon sir Arthur Wellesley’s extreme left, and was followed by the first corps: but to reach this Casa, which was situated near the plain in front of the British left wing, it was necessary to ford the Alberche, and to march for a mile or two through the woods. A dust, which was observed to rise near the Casa itself indicated the presence of troops at that place; and, in fact, general Mackenzie’s division, and a brigade of light cavalry, were there posted: the infantry in the forest, the cavalry on the plain; but no patroles were sent to the front; and this negligence gave rise to the

COMBAT OF SALINAS.

For, about three o’clock, Lapisse and Ruffin’s division having crossed the Alberche, marched in two columns towards the Casa de Salinas, and their light infantry came so suddenly on the British outposts that the latter were surprised, and sir Arthur Wellesley, who was in the Casa, nearly fell into the enemy’s hands. The French columns followed briskly, and charged so hotly, that the English brigades were separated; and being composed principally of young battalions, got into confusion, one part fired upon another, and the whole were driven into the plain. But, in the midst of the disorder, the forty-fifth, a stubborn old regiment, and some companies of the fifth battalion of the sixtieth, were seen in perfect array; and when sir Arthur rode up to the spot, the fight was restored, and maintained so steadily, that the enemy was checked. The infantry, supported by two brigades of cavalry, then crossed the plain, and regained the left and centre of the position, having lost about four hundred men. General Mackenzie, with one brigade, immediately took post in second line behind the guards; the other, commanded by colonel Donkin, finding the hill on the left unoccupied, drew up there, and so completed the position. The cavalry was formed in column behind the left of the line.

Victor, animated by the success of this first operation, brought up Villatte’s division, together with all the artillery and light cavalry, to the Casa de Salinas; then, issuing from the forest, rapidly crossed the plain; and advancing, with a fine military display, close up to the left of the position, occupied an isolated hill directly in front of colonel Donkin’s ground, and immediately opened a heavy cannonade upon that officer’s brigade. Meanwhile, the fourth corps and the reserve approaching the right more slowly, and being unable to discover the true situation of Cuesta’s troops, sent their light cavalry forward to make that general shew his lines. The French horsemen rode boldly up to the front, and commenced skirmishing with their pistols, and the Spaniards answered them with a general discharge of small arms; but then, ten thousand infantry, and all the artillery, breaking their ranks, fled to the rear: the artillery-men carried off their horses; the infantry threw away their arms, and the adjutant-general O’Donoghue was amongst the foremost of the fugitives. Nay, Cuesta himself was in movement towards the rear. The panic spread, and the French would fain have charged; but sir Arthur Wellesley, who was at hand, immediately flanked the main road with some English squadrons: the ditches on the other side rendered the country impracticable; and the fire of musketry being renewed by those Spaniards who remained, the enemy lost some men, and finally retreated in disorder.

The greatest part of Cuesta’s runaways fled as far as Oropesa, giving out that the allies were totally defeated, and the French army in hot pursuit; thus, the rear became a scene of incredible disorder: the commissaries went off with their animals; the paymasters carried away their money chests; the baggage was scattered; and the alarm spread far and wide; nor is it to be concealed, that some English officers disgraced their uniform on this occasion. Cuesta, however, having recovered from his first alarm, sent many of his cavalry regiments to head the fugitives, and drive them back; and a part of the artillery, and some thousands of the infantry, were thus recovered during the night; but, in the next day’s fight, the Spanish army was less by six thousand men than it should have been, and the great redoubt in the centre was silent for want of guns.

COMBAT ON THE EVENING OF THE 27TH.

The hill on the left of the British army was the key of the whole position. It was steep and rugged on the side towards the French, and it was rendered more inaccessible by the ravine at the bottom; but towards the English side it was of a smoother ascent. Semelé’s Journal of Operations MSS. Victor, however, observing that the extreme summit was unoccupied, and that Donkin’s brigade was feeble, conceived the design of seizing it by a sudden assault. The sun was sinking; and the twilight and the confusion among the Spaniards on the right, appeared so favourable to his project that, without communicating with the king, he immediately directed Ruffin’s division to attack, Villatte to follow in support, and Lapisse to fall on the German legion, so as to create a diversion for Ruffin, but without engaging seriously himself. The assault was quick and vigorous: colonel Donkin beat back the enemy in his front, but his force was too weak to defend every part; and many of the French turned his left, and mounted to the summit behind him. At this moment, general Hill was ordered to reinforce him; and it was not yet dark, when that officer, while giving orders to the colonel of the 48th regiment, was fired at by some troops from the highest point. Thinking they were stragglers from his own ranks, firing at the enemy, he rode quickly up to them, followed by his brigade-major, Fordyce; and in a moment found himself in the midst of the French. Fordyce was killed; and Hill’s own horse was wounded by a grenadier, who immediately seized the bridle; but the general, spurring the animal hard, broke the man’s hold, and galloping down the descent met the 29th regiment, and, without an instant’s delay, led them up with such a fierce charge, that the enemy could not sustain the shock.

The summit was thus recovered; and the 48th regiment and the first battalion of detachments were immediately brought forward, and, in conjunction with the 29th and colonel Donkin’s brigade, presented a formidable front of defence; and in good time, for the troops thus beaten back were only a part of the 9th French regiment, forming the advance of Ruffin’s division; but the two other regiments of that division had lost their way in the ravine; hence the attack had not ceased, but only subsided for a time. Lapisse was in motion, and soon after opened his fire against the German legion; and all the battalions of the 9th, being re-formed in one mass, again advanced up the face of the hill with redoubled vigour. The fighting then became vehement; and, in the darkness, the opposing flashes of the musketry shewed with what a resolute spirit the struggle was maintained, for the combatants were scarcely twenty yards asunder, and for a time the event seemed doubtful; but soon the well known shout of the British soldier was heard, rising above the din of arms, and the enemy’s broken troops were driven once more into the ravine below. Lapisse, who had made some impression on the German legion, immediately abandoned his false attack, and the fighting of the 27th ceased. The British lost about eight hundred men, and the French about a thousand on that day. The bivouac fires now blazed up on both sides, and the French and British soldiers became quiet; but, about twelve o’clock, the Spaniards on the right being alarmed at some horse in their front, opened a prodigious peal of musketry and artillery, which continued for twenty minutes without any object; and during the night, the whole line was frequently disturbed by desultory firing from both the Spanish and English troops, by which several men and officers were unfortunately slain.

The duke of Belluno, who had learned, from the prisoners, the exact position of the Spaniards, until then unknown to the French generals, now reported his own failure to the king, and proposed that a second attempt should be made in the morning, at day-light; but marshal Jourdan opposed this, as being a partial enterprize, which could not lead to any great result. Victor, however, was earnest for a trial, and, resting his representation on his intimate knowledge of the ground, pressed the matter so home, that he won Joseph’s assent, and immediately made dispositions for the attack. The guns of the first corps, being formed in one mass, on the height corresponding to that on which the English left was posted, were enabled to command the great valley on their own right, to range the summit of the hill in their front, and obliquely to search the whole of the British line to the left, as far as the great redoubt between the allied armies.

Ruffin’s division was placed in advance, and Villatte’s in rear, of the artillery; but the former kept one regiment close to the ravine.

Lapisse occupied some low table-land, opposite to Sherbrooke’s division.

Latour Maubourg’s cavalry formed a reserve to Lapisse; and general Beaumont’s cavalry formed a reserve to Ruffin.

On the English side, general Hill’s division was concentrated; the cavalry was massed behind the left, and the parc of artillery and hospitals established under cover of the hill, between the cavalry and Hill’s division.

COMBAT ON THE MORNING OF THE 28TH.

About daybreak, Ruffin’s troops were drawn up, two regiments abreast, supported by a third, in columns of battalions; and, in this order, went forth against the left of the British, a part directly against the front, and a part from the valley on the right, thus embracing two sides of the hill. Their march was rapid and steady; they were followed by Villatte’s division, and their assault was preceded by a burst of artillery, that rattled round the height, and swept away the English ranks by whole sections. The sharp chattering of the musketry succeeded, the French guns were then pointed towards the British centre and right, the grenadiers instantly closed upon general Hill’s division, and the height sparkled with fire. The inequalities of the ground broke the compact formation of the troops on both sides, and small bodies were seen here and there struggling for the mastery with all the virulence of a single combat; in some places the French grenadiers were overthrown at once, in others they would not be denied, and reached the summit; but the reserves were always ready to vindicate their ground, and no permanent footing was obtained. Still the conflict was maintained with singular obstinacy; Hill himself was wounded, and his men were falling fast; but the enemy suffered more, and gave back, step by step at first, and slowly, to cover the retreat of their wounded; but, finally, unable to sustain the increasing fury of the English, and having lost above fifteen hundred men in the space of forty minutes, the whole mass broke away in disorder, and returned to their own position, covered by the renewed play of their powerful artillery.

To this destructive fire no adequate answer could be made, for the English guns were few, and of small calibre; and when sir Arthur Wellesley desired a reinforcement from Cuesta, the latter sent him only two pieces; yet even those were serviceable, and the Spanish gunners fought them gallantly. The principal line of the enemy’s retreat was by the great valley, and a favourable opportunity for a charge of horse occurred; but the English cavalry, having retired, during the night, for water and forage, were yet too distant to be of service. However, these repeated efforts of the French against the hill, and the appearance of some of their light troops on the mountain, beyond the left, taught the English general that he had committed a fault in not prolonging his flank across the valley; and he hastened to rectify it. For this purpose, he placed the principal mass of his cavalry there, with the leading squadrons looking into the valley, and, having obtained, from Cuesta, general Bassecour’s division of infantry, posted it on the mountain itself, in observation of the French light troops. Meanwhile, the duke of Albuquerque, discontented with Cuesta’s arrangements, came, with his division, to sir Arthur Wellesley, who placed him behind the British, thus displaying a formidable array of horsemen, six lines in depth.

Immediately after the failure of Ruffin’s attack, king Joseph, having, in person, examined the whole position of the allies, from left to right, demanded of Jourdan and Victor if he should deliver a general battle. The former replied that the great valley and the mountain being unoccupied, on the 27th, Marshal Jourdan. sir Arthur Wellesley’s attention should have been drawn to the right by a feint on the Spaniards; that, during the night, the whole army should have been silently placed in column, at the entrance of the great valley, ready, at daybreak, to form a line of battle, on the left, to a new front, and so have attacked the hill from whence Victor had been twice repulsed. Such a movement, he said, would have obliged the allies to change their front also, and, during this operation, they might have been assailed with hopes of success. But this project could not now be executed; the English, aware of their mistake, had secured their left flank, by occupying the valley; and the mountain and their front was inattackable. Hence, the only prudent line was to take up a position on the Alberche, and await the effect of Soult’s operations on the English rear.

Marshal Victor opposed this counsel; he engaged to carry the hill on the English left, notwithstanding his former failures, provided the fourth corps would attack the right and centre at the same moment; and he finished his argument by declaring that, if such a combination failed, “It was time to renounce making war.”

The king was embarrassed. His own opinion coincided with Jourdan’s; but he feared that Victor would cause the emperor to believe a great opportunity had been lost; and, while thus wavering, a despatch arrived from Soult, by which it appeared that his force could only reach Plasencia between the 3d and 5th of August. Now, a detachment from the army of Venegas had already appeared near Toledo, and that general’s advanced guard was approaching Aranjuez. The king was troubled by the danger thus threatening Madrid, because all the stores, the reserve artillery, and the general hospitals of the whole army in Spain were deposited there; and, moreover, the tolls received at the gates of that town formed almost the only pecuniary resource of his court, so narrowly did Napoleon reduce the expenditure of the war.

These considerations overpowered his judgement, and, adopting the worse and rejecting the better counsel, he resolved to succour the capital; but, before separating the army, he determined to try the chance of a battle. Indecision is a cancer in war: Joseph should have adhered to the plan arranged with Soult; the advantages were obvious, the ultimate success sure, and the loss of Madrid was nothing in the scale, because it could only be temporary; but, if the king thought otherwise, he should have decided to fight for it at once; he should have drawn the fifth corps to him, prepared his plan, and fallen, with the utmost rapidity, upon Cuesta, the 26th; his advanced guard should have been on the Alberche that evening, and, before twelve o’clock on the 27th, the English army would have been without the aid of a single Spanish soldier. But, after neglecting the most favourable opportunity when his army was full of ardour, he now, with singular inconsistency, resolved to give battle, when his enemies were completely prepared, strongly posted, and in the pride of success, and when the confidence of his own troops was shaken by the partial action of the morning.

While the French generals were engaged in council, the troops on both sides took some rest, and the English wounded were carried to the rear; but the soldiers were suffering from hunger; the regular service of provisions had ceased for several days, and a few ounces of wheat, in the grain, formed the whole subsistence of men who had fought, and who were yet to fight, so hardly. The Spanish camp was full of confusion and distrust. Cuesta inspired terror, but no confidence; and Albuquerque, whether from conviction or instigated by momentary anger, just as the French were coming on to the final attack, sent one of his staff to inform the English commander that Cuesta was betraying him. The aide-de-camp, charged with this message, delivered it to colonel Donkin, and that officer carried it to sir Arthur Wellesley. The latter, seated on the summit of the hill which had been so gallantly contested, was intently watching the movements of the advancing enemy; he listened to this somewhat startling message without so much as turning his head, and then drily answering—“Very well, you may return to your brigade,” continued his survey of the French. Donkin retired, filled with admiration of the imperturbable resolution and quick penetration of the man; and, indeed, sir Arthur’s conduct was, throughout that day, such as became a general upon whose vigilance and intrepidity the fate of fifty thousand men depended.

BATTLE OF TALAVERA.

The dispositions of the French were soon completed. Ruffin’s division, on the extreme right, was destined to cross the valley, and, moving by the foot of the mountain, to turn the British left.

Villatte’s orders were to menace the contested height with one brigade, and to guard the valley with another, which, being strengthened by a battalion of grenadiers, connected Ruffin’s movement with the main attack.

Lapisse, supported by Latour Maubourg’s dragoons, and by the king’s reserve, was instructed to pass the ravine in front of the English centre, and to fall, with half his infantry, upon Sherbrooke’s division, while the other half, connecting its attack with Villatte’s brigade, mounted the hill, and made a third effort to master that important point.

Milhaud’s dragoons were left on the main road, opposite Talavera, to keep the Spaniards in check; but the rest of the heavy cavalry was brought into the centre, behind general Sebastiani, who, with the fourth corps, was to assail the right of the British army. A part of the French light cavalry supported Villatte’s brigade in the valley, and a part remained in reserve.

A number of guns were distributed among the divisions, but the principal mass remained on the hill, with the reserve of light cavalry; where, also, the duke of Belluno stationed himself, to direct the movements of the first corps.

From nine o’clock in the morning until mid-day the field of battle offered no appearance of hostility; the weather was intensely hot, and the troops, on both sides, descended and mingled, without fear or suspicion, to quench their thirst at the little brook which divided the positions; but, at one o’clock in the afternoon, the French soldiers were seen to gather round their eagles, and the rolling of drums was heard along the whole line. Half an hour later, the king’s guards, the reserve, and the fourth corps were descried, near the centre of the enemy’s position, marching to join the first corps; and, at two o’clock, the table-land and the height on the French right, even to the valley, were covered with the dark and lowering masses. At this moment some hundreds of English soldiers, employed to carry the wounded to the rear, returned in one body, and were, by the French, supposed to be sir Robert Wilson’s corps joining the army; nevertheless, the duke of Belluno, whose arrangements were now completed, gave the signal for battle: and eighty pieces of artillery immediately sent a tempest of bullets before the light troops, who, coming on swiftly and with the violence of a hail-storm, were closely followed by the broad, black columns, in all the majesty of war.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, from the summit of the hill, had a clear view of the whole field of battle; and first he saw the fourth corps rush forwards, with the usual impetuosity of French soldiers, and clearing the intersected ground in their front, fall upon Campbell’s division with infinite fury; but that general, assisted by Mackenzie’s brigade, and by two Spanish battalions, withstood their utmost efforts. The English regiments, putting the French skirmishers aside, met the advancing columns with loud shouts, and, breaking in on their front, and lapping their flanks with fire, and giving no respite, pushed them back with a terrible carnage. Ten guns were taken; but, as general Campbell prudently forbore pursuit, the French rallied on their supports, and made a show of attacking again: vain attempt! The British artillery and musketry played too vehemently upon their masses, and a Spanish regiment of cavalry charging on their flank at the same time, the whole retired in disorder, and the victory was secured in that quarter.

But, while this was passing on the right, Villatte’s division, preceded by the grenadiers, and supported by two regiments of light cavalry, was seen advancing up the great valley against the left, and, beyond Villatte’s, Ruffin was discovered marching towards the mountain. Sir Arthur Wellesley immediately ordered Anson’s brigade of cavalry, composed of the twenty-third light dragoons and the first German hussars, to charge the head of these columns; and this brigade, coming on at a canter, and increasing its speed as it advanced, rode headlong against the enemy, but, in a few moments, came upon the brink of a hollow cleft, which was not perceptible at a distance. The French, throwing themselves into squares, opened their fire; and colonel Arenstchild, commanding the hussars, an officer whom forty years’ experience had made a master in his art, promptly reined up at the brink, exclaiming, in his broken phrase, “I will not kill my young mens!”

The English blood was hotter! The twenty-third, under colonel Seymour, rode wildly down into the hollow, and men and horses fell over each other in dreadful confusion. The survivors, still untamed, mounted the opposite bank by two’s and three’s; Seymour was wounded; but major Frederick Ponsonby, a hardy soldier, rallying all who came up, passed through the midst of Villatte’s columns, and, reckless of the musketry, from each side, fell, with inexpressible violence, upon a brigade of French chasseurs in the rear. The combat was fierce but short; Victor had perceived the first advance of the English, and detached his Polish lancers, and Westphalian light-horse, to the support of Villatte; and these fresh troops coming up when the twenty-third, already overmatched, could scarcely hold up against the chasseurs, entirely broke them. Those who were not killed or taken made for Bassecour’s Spanish division, and so escaped, leaving behind two hundred and seven men and officers, or about half the number that went into action.

During this time the hill, the key of the position, was again attacked, and Lapisse, crossing the ravine, pressed hard upon the English centre; his own artillery, aided by the great battery on his right, opened large gaps in Sherbrooke’s ranks, and the French columns came close up to the British line in the resolution to win; but they were received with a general discharge of all arms, and so vigorously encountered, that they gave back in disorder; and, in the excitement of the moment, the brigade of English guards, quitting the line, followed up their success with inconsiderate ardour. The enemy’s supporting columns and dragoons advanced, the men who had been repulsed turned again, and the French batteries pounded the flank and front of the guards.

Thus maltreated, the latter drew back, and, at the same moment, the German legion, being sorely pressed, got into confusion. Hill’s and Campbell’s divisions, on the extremities of the line, still held fast; but the centre of the British was absolutely broken, and the fate of the day seemed to incline in favour of the French, when, suddenly, colonel Donellan, with the forty-eighth regiment, was seen advancing through the midst of the disordered masses. At first, it seemed as if this regiment must be carried away by the retiring crowds, but, wheeling back by companies, it let them pass through the intervals, and then, resuming its proud and beautiful line, marched against the right of the pursuing columns, and plied them with such a destructive musketry, and closed upon them with such a firm and regular pace, that the forward movement of the French was checked. The guards and the Germans immediately rallied; a brigade of light cavalry came up from the second line at a trot; the artillery battered the enemy’s flanks without intermission, and the French, beginning to waver, soon lost their advantage, and the battle was restored.

In all actions there is one critical and decisive moment which will give the victory to the general who knows how to seize it. When the guards first made their rash charge, sir Arthur Wellesley, foreseeing the issue of it, had ordered the forty-eighth down from the hill, although a rough battle was going on there; and, at the same time, he directed Cotton’s light cavalry to advance. These dispositions gained the day. The French relaxed their efforts by degrees; the fire of the English grew hotter; and their loud and confident shouts—sure augury of success—were heard along the whole line.

In the hands of a great general, Joseph’s guards and the reserve, which were yet entire, might have restored the combat: but all combination was at an end on the French side. The fourth corps, beaten back on the left with the loss of ten guns, was in confusion; the troops in the great valley on the right, amazed at the furious charge of the twenty-third, and awed by the sight of four distinct lines of cavalry, still in reserve, remained stationary. No impression had been made on the hill; Lapisse himself was mortally wounded, and, at last, his division giving way, the whole army retired to its position, from whence it had descended to the attack. This retrograde movement was covered by skirmishers and an increasing fire of artillery; and the British, reduced to less than fourteen thousand sabres and bayonets, and exhausted by toil, and the want of food, could not pursue. The Spanish army was incapable of any evolution, and about six o’clock all hostility ceased, each army holding the position of the morning. But the battle was scarcely over when, the dry grass and shrubs taking fire, a volume of flames passed with inconceivable rapidity across a part of the field, scorching, in its course, both the dead and the wounded.

On the British side two generals (Mackenzie and Langworth), thirty-one officers of inferior rank, and seven hundred and sixty-seven serjeants and soldiers were killed upon the spot; and three generals, a hundred and ninety-two officers, three thousand seven hundred and eighteen serjeants and privates wounded. Nine officers, six hundred and forty-three serjeants and soldiers were missing; thus making a total loss of six thousand two hundred and sixty-eight, in the two days’ fighting, of which five thousand four hundred and twenty-two fell on the 28th.

The French suffered more severely. Two generals and nine hundred and forty-four killed; Marshal Jourdan, MSS. six thousand two hundred and ninety-four wounded, and a hundred and fifty-six prisoners; furnishing a Semelé’s Journal of Operations of the First Corps, MSS. total of seven thousand three hundred and eighty-nine men and officers, of which four thousand were of the first corps. Of seventeen guns captured, ten were taken by general Campbell’s division, and seven were left in the woods by the French.

The Spaniards returned above twelve hundred men, killed and wounded, but the correctness of the report was very much doubted at the time.

The 29th, at day-break, the French army quitted its position, and, before six o’clock, was in order of battle on the heights of Salinas, behind the Alberche. That day, also, general Robert Craufurd reached the English camp, with the forty-third, fifty-second, and ninety-fifth or rifle regiment, and immediately took charge of the outposts. These troops, after a march of twenty miles, were in bivouac near Malpartida de Plasencia, when the alarm, caused by the fugitive Spanish, spread to that part. Craufurd allowed the men to rest for a few hours, and then, withdrawing about fifty of the weakest from the ranks, commenced his march with the resolution not to halt until he reached the field of battle. As the brigade advanced, crowds of the runaways were met with; and those not all Spaniards, propagating the vilest falsehoods: “the army was defeated,”—“Sir Arthur Wellesley was killed,”—“the French were only a few miles distant;” and some, blinded by their fears, affected even to point out the enemy’s advanced posts on the nearest hills. Indignant at this shameful scene, the troops hastened, rather than slackened, the impetuosity of their pace; and, leaving only seventeen stragglers behind, in twenty-six hours they had crossed the field of battle in a close and compact body, having, in that time, passed over sixty-two English miles, and in the hottest season of the year, each man carrying from fifty to sixty pounds weight upon his shoulders. Had the historian Gibbon known of such a march, he would have spared his sneer about the “delicacy of modern soldiers!”

OBSERVATIONS.

1º. The moral courage evinced by sir Arthur Wellesley, when, with such a coadjutor as Cuesta, he accepted battle, was not less remarkable than the judicious disposition which, finally, rendered him master of the field. Yet it is doubtful if he could have maintained his position had the French been well managed, and their strength reserved for the proper moment, instead of being wasted on isolated attacks during the night of the 27th, and the morning of the 28th. A pitched battle is a great affair. A good general will endeavour to bring all the moral, as well as the physical, force of his army into play at the same time, if he means to win, and all may be too little.

Marshal Jourdan’s project was conceived in this spirit, and worthy of his reputation; and it is possible, that he might have placed his army, unperceived, on the flank of the English, and by a sudden and general attack have carried the key of the position, and so commenced his battle well: but sir Arthur Wellesley’s resources would not then have been exhausted. He had foreseen such a movement, and was prepared, by a change of front, to keep the enemy in check with his left wing and cavalry; while the right, marching upon the position abandoned by the French, should cut the latter off from the Alberche. In this movement the allies would have been reinforced by Wilson’s corps, which was near Cazalegas, and the contending armies would then have exchanged lines of operation. The French could, however, have gained nothing, unless they won a complete victory; but the allies would, even though defeated, have ensured their junction with Venegas. Madrid and Toledo would have fallen; and before Soult could unite with Joseph, a new line of operations, through the fertile country of La Mancha, would have been obtained. But these matters are only speculative.

2º. The distribution of the French troops for the great attack cannot be praised. The attempt to turn the English left with a single division was puerile. The allied cavalry was plainly to be seen in the valley; how, then, could a single division hope to develop its attack upon the hill, when five thousand horsemen were hanging upon its flank? and, in fact, the whole of Ruffin’s, and the half of Villatte’s division, were paralyzed by the charge of a single regiment. To have rendered this movement formidable, the principal part of the French cavalry should have preceded the march of the infantry; but the great error was fighting at all, before Soult reached Plasencia.

3º. It has been said, that to complete the victory sir Arthur Wellesley should have caused the Spaniards to advance; but this would, more probably, have led to a defeat. Neither Cuesta, nor his troops, were capable of an orderly movement. The infantry of the first and the fourth corps were still above twenty thousand strong; and, although a repulsed, by no means a discomfited force. The cavalry, the king’s guards, and Dessolle’s division, had not been engaged at all, and were alone sufficient to beat the Spaniards. A second panic, such as that of the 27th, would have led to the most deplorable consequences, as those, who know with what facility French soldiers recover from a repulse, will readily acknowledge. This battle was one of hard honest fighting, and the exceeding gallantry of the troops honoured the nations to which they belonged. The English owed much to the general’s dispositions and something to fortune. The French owed nothing to their commander; but when it is considered that only the reserve of their infantry were withheld from the great attack on the 28th, and that, consequently, above thirty thousand men were closely and unsuccessfully engaged for three hours with sixteen thousand British, it must be confessed that the latter proved themselves to be truly formidable soldiers; yet the greatest part were raw men, so lately drafted from the militia regiments that many of them still bore the number of their former regiments on their accoutrements.

Plate 7. to face Pa. 409

Operations of the
BRITISH, FRENCH & SPANISH ARMIES,
in July & August 1809.

London. Published by T. & W. BOONE, July 1829.