History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2

by William Francis Patrick Napier

CHAPTER IV.

OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.

It will be remembered, that when the second siege of Gerona was raised, in August, 1808, general Duhesme returned to Barcelona, and general Reille to Figueras; after which, the state of affairs obliged those generals to remain on the defensive. Napoleon’s measures to aid them were as prompt as the occasion required. While the siege of Gerona was yet in progress, he had directed troops to assemble at Perpignan in such numbers, as to form with those already in Catalonia, an army of more than forty thousand men, to be called the “7th corps.” St. Cyr’s Journal of Operations. Then appointing general Gouvion St. Cyr to command it, he gave him this short but emphatic order: “Preserve Barcelona for me. If that place be lost, I cannot retake it with 80,000 men.”

The troops assembled at Perpignan were the greatest part but raw levies; Neapolitans, Etruscans, Romans, and Swiss: there were, however, some old regiments; but as the preparations for the grand army under the emperor absorbed the principal attention of the administration in France, general St. Cyr was straightened in the means necessary to take the field; and his undisciplined troops, suffering severe privations, were depressed in spirit, and inclined to desert.

The 1st of November, Napoleon, who was at Bayonne, sent orders to the “7th corps” to commence its operations; and St. Cyr, having put his divisions in motion on the 3d, crossed the frontier, and established his head-quarters at Figueras on the 5th.

In Catalonia, as in other parts of Spain, lethargic vanity, and abuses of the most fatal kind, had succeeded to the first enthusiasm, and withered the energy of the people. The local junta issued, indeed, abundance of decrees, and despatched agents to the supreme junta, and to the English commanders in the Mediterranean, and in Portugal, all charged with the same instructions, namely, to demand arms, ammunition, and money. And although the central junta treated their demands with contempt, the English authorities answered them generously and freely. Lord Collingwood lent the assistance of his fleet. From Malta and Sicily arms were obtained; and sir Hew Dalrymple having completely equipped the Spanish regiments released by the convention of Cintra, despatched them to Catalonia in British transports. Yet it may be doubted if the conduct of the central junta were not the wisest; for the local government established at Tarragona had already become so negligent, or so corrupt, that the arms thus supplied were, instead Lord Collingwood’s Correspondence. of being used in defence of the country, sold to foreign merchants! and such being the political state of Catalonia, it naturally followed that the military affairs should be ill conducted.

The count of Caldagues, who had relieved Gerona, returned by Hostalrich, and resumed the line of the Llobregat; and fifteen hundred men, drawn from Cabanes. the garrison of Carthagena, having reached Taragona, the marquis of Palacios, accompanied by the junta, quitted the latter town, and fixed his head-quarters at Villa Franca, within twenty miles of Caldagues. The latter disposed his troops, five thousand in number, at different points between Martorel and San Boy, covering a line of eighteen miles, along the left bank of the river.

General Duhesme rested a few days, and then marching from Barcelona with six thousand men in the night, arrived the 2d of September at day-break on the Llobregat, and immediately attacked Caldagues’ line in several points, but principally at San Boy and Molino del Rey. The former fort was carried, some guns and stores were captured, and the Spaniards were pursued to Vegas, a distance of seven or eight miles; but at Molino del Rey the French were repulsed, and Duhesme then returned to Barcelona.

It was the intention of the British ministers, that an auxiliary force should have sailed from Sicily about this period, to aid the Catalans; and doubtless it would have been a wise and timely effort: but Napoleon’s foresight prevented the execution; for he directed Murat to menace Sicily with a descent; and that prince, feigning to collect forces on the coast of Calabria, spread many reports of armaments being in preparation, and, as a preliminary measure, attacked and carried the island of Capri; upon which occasion sir Hudson Lowe first became known to history, by losing in a few days a post that, without any pretensions to celebrity, might have been defended for as many years. Murat’s demonstrations sufficed to impose upon sir John Stuart, and from ten to twelve thousand British troops were thus paralyzed at a most critical period: but such will always be the result of a policy which has no fixed and definite object in view. When statesmen cannot see their own way clearly, the executive officers will seldom act with vigour.

The Spanish army was now daily increasing; the tercios of Migueletes were augmented in number, and a regiment of hussars, that had been most absurdly kept in Majorca ever since the beginning of the insurrection, arrived at Taragona.

Mariano Alvarez, the governor of Gerona, was appointed to the command of the vanguard, composed of the garrisons of Gerona and Rosas, and of the corps of Juan Claros, and other partizans.

Francisco Milans and Milans de Bosch, with their Migueletes, kept the mountains to the northward and eastward of Barcelona; and while the latter hemmed in the French right, the former covered the district of El Vallés, and like a bird of prey watched the French foragers in the plain surrounding Barcelona.

Palacios remained at Villa Franca, and the count of Caldagues continued to guard the line of the Llobregat.

The little port of St. Felice de Quixols, near Palamos Bay, was filled with privateers, and the English frigates off the coast not only aided the Spaniards in all their enterprizes, but carried on a littoral warfare in the gulf of Lyons with great spirit and success.

During the month of September several petty skirmishes happened between the French marauding parties and the Migueletes about Barcelona; but on the 10th of October, Duhesme attacked and dislodged Francisco Milans from the mountains to the north of that city; and designing to forage the district of El Vallés, sent on the 11th a column of two thousand men along the sea coast towards Mattaro, with orders to turn from thence to the left, clear the heights beyond the Besos, of Migueletes, and push for Granollers on the route to Vich: this column he supported by a second of nearly equal strength, under general Millossewitz.

The first column reaching Granollers on the 12th, put the local junta of that district to flight, captured some provisions and other stores, and, finally, joined the second column, which was posted at Mollet. Millossewitz, leaving a part of his force at the pass of Moncada, then proceeded to San Culgat. Caldagues, hearing of this excursion, drew together three thousand infantry, a hundred and fifty cavalry, and six guns from his line on the Llobregat, and was in full march by the back of the mountains for the pass of Moncada, expecting to intercept the French in their return to Barcelona: Cabanes. but, falling in with them at San Culgat, a confused action ensued, and both sides claimed the victory; the French, however, retreated across the mountains to Barcelona without having foraged the district, and Caldagues returned to his former position, justly proud of this vigorous and soldier-like movement.

The 28th of October, Palacios quitted Catalonia to command the levies in the Sierra Morena. General Vives succeeded him, and the army was again reinforced by some infantry from Majorca. The Spanish regiments, released by the convention of Cintra, also arrived at Villa Franca, and seven or eight thousand Granadian levies were brought up to Tarragona by general Reding, and, at the same time, six thousand men drafted from the army of Aragon, reached Lerida, under the command of the marquis de Lazan.

The whole force, including the garrisons of Hostalrich, Gerona, and Rosas, was now not less than thirty-six thousand men; of which twenty-two St. Cyr.
Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS. thousand infantry, and twelve hundred cavalry, were in the neighbourhood of Barcelona, or in march for the Llobregat. This force, organized in six divisions, of which the troops in the Ampurdan formed one, took the name of the army of the right, and Vives seeing himself at the head of such a power, and in possession of all the hills and rivers encircling Barcelona, resolved to besiege that city.

The 3d of November, he transferred his head-quarters to Martorel; the 8th he commenced a series of trifling skirmishes, to drive the French posts back into the town: but they repulsed him; and, from that time until the blockade was raised, a warfare of the most contemptible nature was carried on by the Spaniards: the French, who were about ten thousand strong, always maintaining their outposts.

Notwithstanding this appearance of strength, Catalonia was a prey to innumerable disorders. Vives, a weak, indolent man, had been a friend of Godoy, and was not popular; he it was that, commanding in the islands, had retained the troops in them with such tenacity as to create doubts of his attachment to the cause; but, although the supreme junta privately expressed their suspicions, and Lord Collingwood’s Correspondence. requested lord Collingwood to force Vives to an avowal of his true sentiments, they, at the same time, wrote to the latter, publicly, in the most flattering terms, and, finally, appointed him captain-general of Catalonia. By the people, however, both he and others were vehemently suspected, and, as the mob governed throughout Spain, the authorities, civil and military, were more careful to avoid giving offence to the multitude than anxious to molest the enemy. Catalonia was full of strong places: but they were neither armed nor provisioned, and, like all other Spaniards, the Catalans were confident that the French only thought of retreating.

Such was the state of the province and of the armies, when Napoleon, being ready to break into the northern parts of Spain, general St. Cyr commenced his operations. His force (including a Muster rolls of the French army, MSS. German division of six thousand men, not yet arrived at Perpignan) amounted to more than thirty St. Cyr. thousand men, ill-composed, however, and badly provided; and St. Cyr himself was extremely discontented with his situation. The Emperor had given him discretionary powers to act as he judged fitting, only bearing in mind the importance of relieving Barcelona; but marshal Berthier neglected the equipment of the troops; and Duhesme declared that his magazines would not hold out longer than December.

To march directly to Barcelona was neither an easy nor an advantageous movement. That city could only be provisioned from France; and, until the road was cleared, by the taking of Gerona and Hostalrich, no convoys could pass except by sea, yet, to attack these places with prudence, it was essential to get possession of Rosas, not only to secure an intermediate port for French vessels passing with supplies to Barcelona, but to deprive the English of a secure harbour, and the Spaniards of a point from whence they could, in concert with their allies, intercept the communications of the French army: and even blockade Figueras, which, from the want of transport, could not be provisioned at this period. These considerations having determined St. Cyr to commence by the siege of Rosas, he repaired to Figueras, in person, the 6th of November; and, on the 7th, general Reille being charged to conduct the operation, after a sharp action, drove in the Spaniards before the place and completed the investment.

SIEGE OF ROSAS.

This town was but a narrow slip of houses built along the water’s edge, at the head of the gulph of the same name.

The citadel, a large irregular pentagon, stood on one side of the town, and, on the other, the mountains that skirt the flat and swampy plain of the Ampurdan, rose, bluff and rocky, at the distance of half a mile. An old redoubt was built at the foot of these hills, and, from thence to the citadel, an entrenchment had been drawn to cover the houses. Hence, Rosas, looking towards the land, had the citadel on the left hand, the mountains on the right, and the front covered by this entrenchment. The roadstead permitted ships of the line to anchor within cannon-shot of the place; and, on the right hand coming up the gulph, a star fort, called the Trinity, crowned a rugged hill about a mile and a quarter distant from the citadel, the communication between it and the town being by a narrow road carried between the foot of the hills and the water’s edge.

The garrison of Rosas consisted of nearly three thousand men, two bomb-vessels, and an English seventy-four (the Excellent), were anchored off the town, and captain West, the commodore, reinforced the garrisons of the Trinity and the citadel with marines and seamen from these vessels; but the damages sustained in a former siege had been only partially repaired; both places were ill-found in guns and stores, and the Trinity was commanded at the distance of pistol-shot from a point of the mountains called the Puig Rom.

The force under Reille, consisting of his own and general Pino’s Italian division, skirmished daily with the garrison; but the rain, which fell in torrents, having flooded the Ampurdan, the roads became impassable for the artillery, and delayed the opening of the trenches. Meanwhile, Souham’s division took post between the Fluvia and Figueras, to cover the operations of the siege on the side of Gerona, and an Italian brigade, under general Chabot, was posted at Rabos and Espollas, to keep the Somatenes down.

But, before Chabot’s arrival, Reille had detached a battalion to that side; and, being uneasy for its safety, sent three more to its assistance: this saved the battalion, which was in great danger; and two companies were actually cut off by the Somatenes. This loss, however, proved beneficial, as it enraged the Italians, and checked their disposition to desert; and St. Cyr, unwilling to pursue the system of St. Cyr. burning villages, and yet anxious to repress the insidious hostility of the peasants, in reprizal for the loss of his two companies, seized an equal number of villagers, and sent them prisoners to France.

The inhabitants of Rosas having embarked or taken refuge in the citadel, the houses, and the entrenchments covering them, were left to the French; but the latter were prevented, by the fire of the English ships, from effecting a permanent lodgement in the deserted town; and, after a few days, a detachment from the garrison, consisting of soldiers and townsmen, established a post there.

Captain West’s despatch.

The 8th captain West, in conjunction with the governor, made a sally, but was repulsed; and, on the 9th several yards of the citadel ramparts crumbled; but, with the assistance of the British seamen, the breach was repaired in the night before the enemy became aware of the accident.

The 15th an obstinate assault made on the Trinity was repulsed, the English seamen bearing a principal share in the success.

The 16th the roads being passable, the French battering-train was put in motion. The way leading up to the Puig Rom was repaired, and two battalions were posted there, on the point commanding the Trinity.

The 19th three guns were mounted against the Trinity, and the trenches were opened at the distance of four hundred yards from the citadel.

The 20th the fire of some French mortars obliged the vessels of war to anchor beyond the range of the shells. During this time, Souham was harassed by the Migueletes from the side of Gerona. The French cavalry, unable to find forage, were sent back to France; and Napoleon, rendered uneasy by the reports of general Duhesme, ordered the seventh corps to advance to Barcelona, so as to St. Cyr. arrive there by the 26th of November; but St. Cyr refused to abandon the siege of Rosas without a positive order.

The assistance afforded to the besieged by captain West was represented to the junta as an attempt of that officer to possess himself of the place. The junta readily believed this tale, and entered into an angry correspondence with don Pedro O’Daly, the governor, relative to the supposed treachery; but no measures were taken to raise the siege. During this correspondence, the Excellent sailed from Rosas, and was succeeded by the Fame, captain Bennet. This officer landed some men under the Trinity on the 23d, and endeavoured, but ineffectually, to take the battery opposed to that fort.

The 27th the besiegers assaulted the Spaniards, who, to the number of five hundred, had entrenched themselves in the deserted houses of the town. A hundred and sixty were taken, and fifty escaped into the citadel; the rest were slain. Breaching batteries were immediately commenced among the ruins of the houses, and the communication with the shipping rendered so unsafe, that Lazan, who had come from Lerida to Gerona with six thousand men, and had collected provisions and Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS. stores at the mouth of the Fluvia, with the intention of supplying Rosas by sea, abandoned his design. The ruinous condition of the front, exposed to the fire of the besiegers, now induced Reille to summon the place a second time; but the governor refused to surrender.

The 30th of November, the engineers reported that the breach in the Trinity was practicable, and an assault was ordered; although an Italian officer, appointed to lead the storming party of fifty men, and who had formerly served in the fort, asserted that the breach was not a true one. The Spanish commandant thought his post untenable; and two days before, the marines of the Fame had been withdrawn by captain Bennet: but at this time, lord Cochrane, a man of infinite talent in his profession, and of a courage and enterprise that have seldom, if ever, been surpassed, arrived in the Imperieuse frigate, and immediately threw himself, with eighty men, into the fort.

The Italian’s representations being unheeded, he advanced to the assault like a man of honour, and was killed, together with all his followers, excepting four, two of whom escaped back to their own side, the other two being spared by the English seamen, were drawn up with cords into the fort. The breach had, however, been practicable at first; but it was broken in an old gallery, which lord Cochrane immediately filled with earth and hammocks, and so cut off the opening. In the course of a few days, a second assault was made, but the French were again repulsed with loss. Meanwhile the breaching batteries opened against the citadel, and a false attack was commenced on the opposite side.

The 4th December the garrison made a sally, in the night, from the citadel, and with some success; but the walls were opened by the enemy’s fire, and the next day O’Daly, hopeless of relief, surrendered with about two thousand four hundred men, of which two hundred were wounded. Lord Cochrane, also, blew up the magazine, and abandoned Fort Trinity. General St. Cyr observes that the garrison of Rosas might have been easily carried off, at night, by the British shipping; but to embark two thousand five hundred men, in the boats of two ships, and under a heavy fire, whether by night or day, is not an easy operation; nevertheless, the censure seems well founded, because sufficient preparation might have been previously made.

The defence of Rosas (with the exception of lord Cochrane’s efforts) cannot be deemed brilliant, whether with relation to the importance of the place, the assistance that might have been rendered from the sea, or the number of the garrison compared with that of the besiegers. It held out, however, thirty days, and, if that time had been well employed by the Spaniards, the loss of the garrison would have been amply repaid; but Vives, wholly occupied with Barcelona, was indifferent to the fate of Rosas. A fruitless attack on Souham’s posts, by Mariano Alvarez, was the only effort made to interrupt the siege, or to impede the farther progress Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS. of the enemy. Lazan, although at the head of six or seven thousand men, could not rely upon more than three thousand; and his applications to Vives for a reinforcement were unheeded.

The fall of Rosas enabled St. Cyr to march to the relief of Barcelona, and he resolved to do so: yet the project, at first sight, would appear rather insane than hardy; for the roads, by which Gerona and Hostalrich were to be turned, being mere paths impervious to carriages, no artillery, and little ammunition, could be carried, and the country was full of strong positions. The Germans had not yet arrived at Perpignan; it was indispensable to leave Reille in the Ampurdan, to protect Rosas and Figueras; and, these deductions being made, less than eighteen thousand men, including the cavalry, which had been recalled from France, remained disposable for the operation.

But, on the Spanish side, Reding having come up, there were twenty-five thousand men in the camp before Barcelona, and ten thousand others, under Lazan and Alvarez, were at Gerona. All these troops were, however, exceedingly ill organized. Cabanes. Two-thirds of the Migueletes only carried pikes, and many were without any arms at all. There was no sound military system; the Spanish generals were ignorant of the French movements and strength; and their own indolence and want of vigilance drew upon them the contempt and suspicion of the people.

The 8th of December St. Cyr united his army on the left bank of the Fluvia. The 9th he passed that river, and, driving the Spaniards over the Ter, established his head-quarters at Mediñya, ten miles from Gerona. He wished, before pursuing his own march, to defeat Lazan, lest the latter should harass the rear of the army; but, finding that the marquis would not engage in a serious affair, he made a show of sitting down before Gerona on the 10th, St. Cyr. hoping thereby to mislead Vives, and render him slow to break up the blockade of Barcelona: and Cabanes. this succeeded; for the Spaniard remained in his camp, irresolute and helpless, while his enemy was rapidly passing the defiles and rivers between Gerona and the Besos.

The nature of the country between Figueras and Barcelona has been described in the first volume; referring to that description, the reader will find that the only carriage-routes by which St. Cyr could march were, one by the sea-coast, and one leading through Gerona and Hostalrich. The first, exposed to the fire of the English vessels, had also been broken up by lord Cochrane, in August; and, to use the second, it was necessary to take the fortresses, or to turn them by marching for three days through the mountains. St. Cyr adopted the latter plan, trusting that rapidity and superior knowledge of war would enable him to separate Lazan and Alvarez from Vives, and so defeat them all in succession.

The 11th, he crossed the Ter and reached La Bisbal; here he left the last of his carriages, delivered out four days’ biscuit and fifty rounds of ammunition to the soldiers, and with this provision, a drove of cattle, and a reserve of ten rounds of ammunition for each man, he commenced his hardy march the 12th of December, making for Palamos. On the route he encountered and beat some Migueletes that Juan Claros had brought to oppose him, and, when near Palamos, he suffered a little from the fire of the English ships; but he had gained a first step, and his hopes were high.

The 13th, he turned his back upon the coast, and, by a forced march, reached Vidreras and Llagostera, and thus placed himself between Vives and Lazan, for the latter had not yet passed the heights of Casa de Selva.

The 14th, marching by Mazanet de Selva and Martorel, he reached the heights above Hostalrich, and encamped at Grions and Masanas. During this day’s journey, his rear was slightly harassed by Lazan and Claros; but he was well content to find the strong banks of the Tordera undefended by Vives. The situation of the army was, however, extremely critical. Lazan and Claros had, the one on the 11th, the other on the 12th, informed Vives of the movement; hence the bulk of the Spanish force before Barcelona might be expected, at any moment, in some of the strong positions in which the country abounded, and the troops from Gerona were, as we have seen, close in the rear; the Somatenes were gathering thickly on the flanks, Hostalrich was in front, and the French soldiers had only sixty rounds of ammunition.

St. Cyr’s design was to turn Hostalrich, and get into the main road again behind that fortress. The smugglers of Perpignan had affirmed that there was no pathway, but a shepherd assured him that there was a track by which it could be effected; and, when the efforts of the staff-officers to trace it failed, St. Cyr himself discovered it, but nearly fell into the hands of the Somatenes during the search.

The 15th, at day-break, the troops being put in motion, turned Hostalrich and gained the main road. The garrison of that place, endeavouring to harass their rear, were repulsed; but the Somatenes on the flanks, emboldened because the French, to save ammunition, did not return their fire, became exceedingly troublesome; and, near San Celoni, the head of the column encountered some battalions of Migueletes, which Francisco Milans had brought up from Arenas de Mar, by the pass of Villa Gorguin.

Milans, not being aware of St. Cyr’s approach, was soon beaten, and his men fell back, part to Villa Gorguin, part to the heights of Nuestra Señora de Cordera: the French thus gained the defile of Treintapasos. But they were now so fatigued that all desired to halt, save St. Cyr, who insisted upon the troops clearing the defile, and reaching a plain on the other side: this was not effected before ten o’clock. Lazan’s troops did not appear during the day; but Vives’ army was in front, and its fires were seen on the hills between Cardadeu and Llinas.

Information of St. Cyr’s march, as I have already observed, had been transmitted to Vives on the 11th, and there was time for him to have carried the bulk of his forces to the Tordera before the French could pass that river; but intelligence of the battle of Tudela, and of the appearance of the French near Zaragoza, arrived at the same moment, Cabanes. and the Spanish general betrayed the greatest weakness and indecision, at one moment resolving to continue before Barcelona, at another designing to march against St. Cyr. He had, on Doyle’s Correspondence, MS. the 9th, sent Reding with six guns, six hundred cavalry, and one thousand infantry, to take the command in the Ampurdan; but, the 12th, after receiving Lazan’s report, he reinforced Reding, who was still at Granollers, and directed him upon Cardadeu.

The 14th, he ordered Francisco Milans to march by Mattaro and Arenas de Mar, to examine the coast road, and, if the enemy was not in that line, to repair also to Cardadeu.

The 15th, Milans, as we have seen, was beaten at St. Celoni; but, in the night, he rallied his whole division on the heights of Cordera, thus flanking the left of the French forces at Llinas.

A council of war was held on the 13th. Caldagues advised that four thousand Migueletes should be left to observe Duhesme, and that the rest of the army should march at once to fight St. Cyr. Good and soldier-like advice; but Vives was loth to abandon the siege of Barcelona, and, adopting half-measures, left Caldagues, with the right wing of the army, to watch Duhesme, and carried the centre and the left, by the route of Granollers, to the heights between Cardadeu and Llinas, where (exclusive of Milan’s division) he united, in the night of the 15th, about eight thousand regulars, besides several thousand Somatenes. Duhesme immediately occupied the posts abandoned by Vives, and thus separated him from Caldagues.

St. Cyr’s position, on the morning of the 16th, would have been dangerous, if he had been opposed by any but Spanish generals and Spanish troops. Vives and those about him, irresolute and weak as they were in action, were not deficient in boasting words; they called the French army, in derision, “the succour;” and, in allusion to the battle of Baylen, announced that a second “bull-fight,” in St. Cyr. which Reding was again the “matador,” would be exhibited. But Dupont and St. Cyr were men of a different stamp: the latter justly judging that the Spaniards were not troops to stand the shock of a good column, united his army in one solid mass, at day-break on the 16th, and marched straight against the centre of the enemy, giving orders that the head of the column should go headlong on, without either firing or forming line.

BATTLE OF CARDADEU.

The hills which the Spaniards occupied were high and wooded; the right was formed by Reding’s division, the left by Vives, and the Somatenes hung on the sides of a lofty ridge, which was only separated from the right of the position by the little river Mogent. The main road from Llinas led straight upon the centre, and there was a second road conducting to Mataro, which, branching off from the first, run between the Mogent and the right of Reding’s ground.

When the French commenced their march, the Somatenes galled their left flank, and general Pino, whose division headed the column of attack, instead of falling upon the centre, sent back for fresh instructions, St. Cyr. and meanwhile extended his first brigade in a line to the left. St. Cyr, who had reiterated the order to fight in column, was sorely troubled at Pino’s error, the ill effects of which were instantly felt, because, Reding advancing against the front and flank of the extended brigade, obliged it to commence a fire, which it was impossible to sustain for want of ammunition.

In this difficulty the French general acted with great ability and vigour: Pino’s second brigade was directed to do that which the first should have done. Two companies were sent to menace the left of the Spaniards, and St. Cyr, at the same time, rapidly carried Souham’s division, by the Mataro road, against Reding’s extreme right. The effect was instantaneous and complete, the Spaniards overthrown on their centre and right, and charged by the cavalry, were beaten and dispersed in every direction, leaving all their artillery and ammunition, and two thousand prisoners behind.

Vives, escaping on foot across the mountain, reached Mataro, where he was taken on board an English vessel. Reding fled on horseback by the main road; and the next day, having rallied some of the fugitives at Monmalo, retreated by the route of San Culgat to Molino del Rey. The loss of the French was six hundred men; but the battle, which lasted only one hour, was so complete, that St. Cyr resolved to push on to Barcelona immediately, without seeking to defeat Milans or Lazan, whom he judged too timid to venture an action: moreover, he hoped that Duhesme, who had been informed, on the 7th, of the intended march, and who could hear the sound of the artillery, would intercept and turn back the flying troops.

The French army had scarcely quitted the field of battle when Milans arrived; but, finding how matters stood, retired to Arenas de Mar, and gave notice to Lazan, who retreated to Gerona. St. Cyr’s rear was thus cleared; but Duhesme, heedless of what was passing at Cardadeu, instead of intercepting the beaten army, sent Lecchi to attack Caldagues. The latter general, however, concentrated his division on the evening of the 16th, repulsed Lecchi, and retired behind the Llobregat, but left behind some artillery and the large magazines which Vives had collected for the siege and accumulated in his camp.

St. Cyr reached Barcelona without encountering any of Duhesme’s troops, and, in his Memoirs of this campaign, represents that general as astonishingly negligent, seeking neither to molest the enemy nor to meet the French army; treating everything belonging to the service with indifference, making false returns, and conniving at gross malversation in his generals.

St. Cyr.

St. Cyr, now reflecting upon the facility with which his opponents could be defeated, and the difficulty of pursuing them, resolved to rest a few days at Barcelona, in hopes that the Spaniards, if unmolested, would re-assemble in numbers behind the Llobregat, and enable him to strike an effectual blow, for his design was to disperse their forces so as they should not be able to interrupt the sieges which he meditated; nor was he deceived in his calculations. Reding joined Caldagues, and rallied from twelve to fifteen thousand men behind the Llobregat, and Vives, having relanded at Sitjes, sent orders to Lazan and Milans to march likewise to that river by the district of Vallés. The arrival of the latter was, however, so uncertain that the French general, judging it better to attack Reding at once, united Chabran’s division to his own, on the 20th, and advanced to St. Felieu de Llobregat.

The Spaniards were drawn up on the heights behind the village of San Vincente; their position was lofty and rugged, commanding a free view of the approaches from Barcelona. The Llobregat covered the front, and the left flank was secure from attack, except at the bridge of Molino del Rey, which was entrenched, guarded by a strong detachment, and protected by heavy guns. Reding’s cavalry amounted to one thousand, and he had fifty pieces of artillery, the greatest part of which were in battery at the bridge of Molino del Rey; but his right was accessible, because the river was fordable in several places. The main road to Villa Franca led through this position, and, at the distance of ten or twelve miles in the rear, the pass of Ordal offered another post of great strength.

Vives was at San Vincente on the 19th, but returned to Villa Franca the same day; hence, when the French appeared on the 20th, the camp was thrown into confusion.

A council of war being held, one party was for fighting, another for retreating to Ordal: an officer Cabanes. was then sent to Vives for orders, but he returned with a message, that Reding might retreat if he could not defend his post. The latter, however, fearing that he should be accused, and perhaps sacrificed for returning without reason, resolved to fight, although he anticipated nothing but disaster. The season was extremely severe; snow was falling, and both armies suffered from the cold and wet. The Spanish soldiers were dispirited by past defeats, and the despondency and irresolution of their generals could not escape observation: but the French and Italian troops were confident in their commander, and flushed with success. In these dispositions the two armies passed the night before

THE BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY.

St. Cyr observing that Reding’s attention was principally directed to the bridge of Molino, ordered Chabran’s division to that side, with instructions to create a diversion, by opening a fire from some artillery, and then retiring, as if his guns could not resist the weight of the Spanish metal; in short, to persuade the enemy that a powerful effort would be made there; but when the centre and right of the Spaniards should be attacked, Chabran was to force the passage of the bridge, and assail the heights beyond it. This stratagem succeeded; Reding massed his troops on the left, and neglected his right, which was the real point of attack.

The 21st of December, Pino’s division crossed the Llobregat at daylight, by a ford in front of St. Felieu, and marched against the right of the Spanish position: Chabot’s division followed; and Souham’s, which had passed at a ford lower down, and then ascended by the right bank, covered Pino’s passage. The light cavalry were held in reserve behind Chabot’s division, and a regiment of cuirassiers was sent to support Chabran at Molino del Rey.

The Spanish position consisted of two mountain heads, separated by a narrow ravine and a torrent; and as the troops of the right wing were exceedingly weakened, they were immediately chased off their headland by the leading brigade of Pino’s division. Reding then seeing his error, changed his front, and drew up on the other mountain, on a new line, nearly perpendicular to the Llobregat; but he still kept a strong detachment at the bridge of Molino, which was thus in rear of his left. The French divisions formed rapidly for a fresh effort. Souham on the right, Pino in the centre, Chabot on the left. The latter gained ground in the direction of Villa Franca, and endeavoured to turn the Spaniards’ right, and cut off their retreat; while the light cavalry making way between the mountain and the river, sought to connect themselves with Chabran at Molino.

St. Cyr’s columns, crossing the ravine that separated them from the Spaniards, soon ascended the opposite mountain. The Catalans had formed quickly, and opposed their enemies with an orderly, but ill directed fire. Their front line then advanced, and offered to charge with an appearance of great intrepidity; but their courage sunk, and they turned as the hostile masses approached. The reserves immediately opened a confused volley upon both parties; and in this disorder, the road to Villa Franca being intercepted by Chabot, the right was forced upon the centre, the centre upon the left, and the whole pushed back in confusion upon Molino del Rey.

Meanwhile a detachment from Chabran’s division had passed the Llobregat above Molino, and so blocked the road to Martorel; and in this miserable situation the Spaniards were charged by the light cavalry, and scarcely a man would have escaped if Chabran had obeyed his orders, and pushing across the bridge of Molino had come upon their rear; but that general, at all times feeble in execution, remained a tranquil spectator of the action, until the right of Souham’s division reached the bridge; and thus the routed troops escaped, by dispersing, and throwing away every thing that could impede their flight across the mountains. Vives reached the field of battle just as the route was complete, and was forced to fly with the rest. The victorious army pursued in three columns; Chabran’s in the direction of Igualada, Chabot’s by the road of San Sadurni, which turned the pass of Ordal, and Souham’s by the royal route of Villa Franca, at which place the head-quarters were established on the 22d. The posts of Villa Nueva and Sitjes were immediately occupied by Pino, while Souham pushed the fugitives to the gates of Tarragona.

The loss of the Spaniards, owing to their swiftness, was less than might have been expected; not more than twelve hundred fell into the hands of the French, but many superior officers were killed or wounded; and, on the 22d, the count de Caldagues was taken, a man apparently pedantic in military affairs, and wanting in modesty, but evidently possessed of both courage and talent. The whole of the artillery, and vast quantities of powder, were captured, and with them a magazine of English muskets, quite new. Yet many of the Migueletes were unarmed, and the junta were unceasing in their demands for succours of this nature; but the history of any one province was the history of all Spain.