CHAPTER II.
Lord Wellington’s plans were deeply affected by the invasion of Andalusia: but before treating of the stupendous campaign he was now meditating, it is necessary, once more to revert to the operations in the other parts of the Peninsula, tracing them up to a fixed point; because, although bearing strongly on the main action of the war, to recur to them chronologically, would totally destroy, the unity of narrative indispensable to a just handling of the subject.
OPERATIONS IN NAVARRE, ARAGON, AND VALENCIA.
Suchet, being ordered to quell the disorders in Navarre, repaired to Pampeluna, but previously directed an active pursuit of the student Mina, who, availing himself of the quarrel between the military governor and the viceroy, was actually master of the country between that fortress and Tudela, and was then at Sanguessa. General Harispe, with some battalions, marched straight against him from Zaragoza, while detachments from Tudela and Pampeluna endeavoured to surround him by the flanks, and a fourth body moving into the valleys of Ainsa and Medianoz, cut him off from the Cinca river.
Suchet’s Memoirs.
Harispe quickly reached Sanguessa, but the column from Pampeluna being retarded, Mina, with surprising boldness, crossed its line of march, and attacked Tafalla, thus cutting the great French line of communication; the garrison, however, made a strong resistance, and Mina disappeared the next day. At this period, however, reinforcements from France were pouring into Navarre, and a division, under Loison, was at Logroño, wherefore Harispe having, in concert with this general and with the garrison of Pampeluna, occupied Sanguessa, Sos, Lodosa, Puenta de Reyna, and all the passages of the Arga, Aragon, and Ebro rivers, launched a number of moveable columns, that continually pursued Mina, until chased into the high parts of the Pyrenees, cold and hunger obliged his band to disperse. The enterprising chief himself escaped with seven followers, and when the French were tracking him from house to house, he, with a romantic simplicity, truly Spanish, repaired to Olite, that he might see Suchet pass on his way from Zaragoza to Pampeluna.
But that general, while seemingly occupied with the affairs of Pampeluna, was secretly preparing guns and materials, for a methodical war of invasion, beyond the frontiers of Aragon, and when general Reynier, coming soon afterwards from France, with troops intended to form an eighth corps, was appointed governor of Navarre, Suchet returned to Zaragoza. During his absence, some petty actions had taken place, but his general arrangements were not disturbed, and the emperor having promised to increase the third corps to thirty thousand men, with the intention of directing it at once against Valencia, all the stores befitting such an enterprise were collected at Terruel in the course of January. The resistance of Gerona, and other events in Catalonia having, however, baffled Napoleon’s calculations, this first destination of the third corps was changed. Suchet was ordered to besiege Tortoza or Lerida; the eighth corps, then forming at Logroño, was directed to cover his rear, and the seventh corps to advance to the Lower Ebro and support the siege. Nor was this arrangement definitive; fresh orders sent the eighth corps towards Castile, and just at this moment Joseph’s letter from Cordoba, calling upon Suchet to march against Valencia, arrived, and gave a new turn to the affairs of the French in Spain.
A decree of the emperor, dated the 8th of January, and constituting Aragon a particular government, rendered Suchet independent of the king’s orders, civil or military. But this decree, together with a renewed order to commence the siege of Lerida, had been intercepted, and the French general, doubtful of Napoleon’s real views, undertook the enterprise against Valencia. Desirous, however, of first intimidating the partisans hanging on the borders of Aragon, he detached Laval against Villa Campa, and the latter being defeated on the side of Cuença, his troops dispersed for the moment.
Suchet then fortified a post at Terruel, to serve as a temporary base of operations, and drew together at that place twelve battalions of infantry, a regiment of cuirassiers, several squadrons of light cavalry, and some field artillery, and, at the same time, caused six battalions and three squadrons of cavalry to be assembled at Alcanitz, under general Habert. The remainder of the third corps was distributed on the line of the Cinca, and on the right bank of the Ebro. The castles of Zaragoza, Alcanitz, Monzon, Venasque, Jaca, Tudela, and other towns, were placed in a state of defence, and four thousand men, newly arrived from France, were pushed to Daroca, to link the active columns to those left in Aragon. These arrangements occupied the whole of February, and, on the 1st of March, a duplicate of the order, directing Suchet to commence the siege of Lerida, reached Terruel. But as Habert’s column having marched on the 27th, by the road of Morella, was already committed in the province of Valencia, the operation went on.
INCURSION TO VALENCIA.
The first day, brought Suchet’s column, in presence of the Valencian army, for Ventura Caro, captain-general of that province, was in march to attack the French at Terruel, and his advanced guard of five or six thousand regulars, accompanied by armed peasants, was drawn up on some high ground behind the river Mingares, the bed of which is a deep ravine so suddenly sunk, as not to be perceived until close upon it. The village and castle of Alventoza, situated somewhat in advance of the Spaniard’s centre, were occupied, and commanded a bridge over the river. Their right rested on the village and bridge of Puenseca, and their left on the village of Manzanera, where the ground was rather more practicable.
Suchet, judging that Caro would not fight so far from Valencia, while Habert’s column was turning his right, sent a division before daylight, on the 2d, to turn the left of the position, and cut off the retreat; but, although the French, after a skirmish, crossed the ravine, the Spaniards retired with little loss upon Segorbe, and Caro fell back to the city of Valencia. Suchet entered Segorbe the 3d, and on the 4th was at Murviedro, the ancient Saguntum, four leagues from Valencia. At the same time, Habert, who had defeated a small corps at Morella, arrived at Villa Real on the sea coast. The country between their lines of march was mountainous and impracticable, but after passing Saguntum, the Huerta, or garden of Valencia, the richest and most delightful part of Spain, opened, the two columns, united, and arriving before the city on the 5th of March, seized the suburb Seranos, and the harbour called the Grao.
Suchet’s spies at first confirmed the hopes of an insurrection within the walls, but the treason was detected, the leader, a baron Pozzo Blanco, publicly executed, and the archbishop and many others imprisoned; in fine, the plan had failed, the populace were in arms, and there was no movement of French troops on the side of Murcia. Five days the French general remained before the city, vainly negotiating, and then, intrigue failing, and his army being inadequate to force the defences, he resolved to retire. In the night of the 10th he commenced his retreat in one column by Segorbe and Terruel. Meanwhile the Spanish partisans were gathering on his rear. Combats had already taken place at Liria and Castellon de la Plana, and general Villa Campa, who had reassembled his dispersed troops, captured four guns, with their ammunition and escort, between Terruel and Daroca; cut off another detachment of a hundred men left at Alventoza, and, having invested the post at Terruel, on the 7th, by a bold and ready witted attempt, nearly carried the castle. The 12th, however, the head of Suchet’s column came in sight, Villa Campa retired, and the 17th the French general reached Zaragoza.
During his absence, Perena had invested Monzon, and when the garrison of Fraga marched to its relief, the Spaniards from Lerida, entered the latter town, and destroyed the bridge and French entrenchments. Mina, also, was again become formidable, and, although several columns were sent in chase of him, it is probable, that they would have done no more than disperse his band for the moment, but for an accident, which threw him into their hands a prisoner.
Suchet’s failure at Valencia was more hurtful to the French than would at first sight appear. It happened at the moment when the National Cortes, so long desired, was at last directed to assemble; and as it seemed to balance the misfortunes of Andalusia, it was hailed by the Spaniards as the commencement of a better era. But the principal military advantage was the delaying of the sieges of Lerida and Mequinenza, whereby the subjection of Catalonia was retarded: and although Suchet labours, and successfully, to show that he was drawn into this enterprise by the force of circumstances, Napoleon’s avowed discontent was well founded. The operations in Catalonia were so hampered by the nature of the country, that it was only at certain conjunctures, any progress could be made, and one of the most favourable of those conjunctures, was lost, for want of the co-operation of the third corps; but to understand this, the military topography of Catalonia must be well considered.
That province is divided in its whole length by shoots from the Pyrenees, which, with some interruptions, run to the Atlantic shores; for the sierras separating Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia from the central parts of Spain, are but continuations of those shoots. The Ebro, forcing its way transversely through the ridges, parts Catalonia from Valencia, but the hills, thus broken by the river, push their rocky heads southward to the sea, cutting off Taragona from Tortoza, and enclosing what may be called the eastern region of Catalonia, which contains Rosas, Gerona, Hostalrich, Vich, Barcelona, Manreza, Taragona, Reus, and many more Vol. I. Book I. Chap. VI.towns. The torrents, the defiles, and other military features of this region have been before described. The western portion of Catalonia lying beyond the principal spine, is bounded partly by Aragon, partly by Valencia; and, like the eastern region, it is an assemblage of small plains and rugged valleys, each, the bed of a river, descending towards the Ebro from the Pyrenees. It contains the fortresses of Balaguer, Lerida, Mequinenza, Cervera, and, near the mouth of the Ebro, Tortoza, which, however, belongs in a military view rather to Valencia than Catalonia.
Now the mountain ridge, parting the eastern from the western region of Catalonia, could only be passed by certain routes, for the most part impracticable for artillery, and those practicable, leading upon walled towns at both sides of the defiles. Thus Cervera is situated on the principal and direct line from Lerida to Barcelona; Balaguer, Cardona, and Montserrat, on another and more circuitous road to the same city. Between Lerida and Taragona, stands Momblanch, and between Taragona, and Tortoza, the Fort St. Felippe blocks the Col de Balaguer. All these places were in the hands of the Spaniards, and a number of smaller fortresses, or castles, such as Urgel, Berga, and Solsona, served as rallying points, where the warlike Somatenes, of the higher valleys, took refuge from the moveable columns, and from whence, supplied with arms and ammunition, they sallied, to harass, the flanks and rear, of both the French corps.
In the eastern region, the line of operations for the seventh corps, was between the mountains and the sea-coast, and parallel with both; hence, the Spanish irregular forces, holding all the communications, and the high valleys on both sides of the great dividing spine, could at all times descend upon the rear and flanks of the French, while the regular troops, opposed to them on a narrow front, and supported by the fortresses of Gerona, Hostalrich, and Taragona, could advance or retire as circumstances dictated. And upon this principle, the defence of Catalonia was conducted.
Detachments and sometimes the main body of the Spanish army, passing by the mountains, or by sea from Taragona, harassed the French flanks, and when defeated, retired on Vich, Manresa, Montserrat, or Cervera, and finally to Taragona. From this last, the generals communicated with Tortoza, Valencia, Gibraltar, the Balearic Isles, and even Sicily, and drew succours of all kinds from those places, and meanwhile the bands in the mountains continued to vex the French communications; and it was only during the brief period of lassitude in the Spanish army, following any great defeat, that the seventh corps could chase those mountaineers. Nor, until Gerona and Hostalrich fell, was it easy to make any but sudden and short incursions towards Taragona, because the Miguelettes from the higher valleys, and detachments from the army at Taragona, again passing by the hills or by sea, joined the garrisons, and interrupted the communications; and thus obliged the French to retire, because the country beyond the Llobregat could never feed them long.
But when Barcelona could not be succoured by sea, it was indispensable to conduct convoys by land, and to insure their arrival, the whole army was obliged to make frequent movements in advance, retiring again when the object was effected; and this being often renewed, offered many opportunities for cutting off minor convoys, detachments, and even considerable bodies isolated by the momentary absence of the army. Thus, during the siege of Gerona, Blake passed through the mountains and harassed the besiegers. When the place fell, he retired again to Taragona, and Augereau took the occasion to attack the Miguelettes, and Somatenes, in the high valleys; but in the midst of this operation admiral Baudin’s squadron, was intercepted by admiral Martin; and the insatiable craving of Barcelona, obliged Augereau to reassemble his army, and conduct a convoy there by land. Yet he was soon obliged to return again, lest he should himself consume the provisions he brought for the city. This retreat, as usual, drew on the Spaniards, who were again defeated; and Augereau once more advanced, in the intention of co-operating with the third corps, which, he supposed, would, following the Emperor’s design, be before Lerida or Tortoza. However, when Augereau thus advanced, Suchet was on the march to Valencia; and Henry O’Donnel who had succeeded Blake in the command, recommenced the warfare on the French communications, and forced Augereau again to retire to Gerona, at the moment when Suchet, having returned to Aragon, was ready to besiege Lerida; thus, like unruly horses in a chariot dragging different ways, the French impeded each other’s movements. I shall now briefly narrate the events touched upon above.
OPERATIONS OF THE SEVENTH CORPS.
Gerona having fallen, general Souham with a division, scoured the high valleys, beating the Miguelettes of Claros and Rovira, at Besalu, Olot, Ribas, and Campredon; and at Ripoll, he destroyed a manufactory for arms. Being afterwards reinforced with Pino’s division, he marched from Olot, by the road of Esteban and Manlieu; the Somatenes disputed the defiles near the last point, but the French forcing the passage, again took possession of Vich. Meanwhile Blake having been called to Andalusia, the Provincial Junta of Catalonia rejecting the duke Del Parque, took upon themselves to give the command to Henry O’Donnel, whose courage during the siege of Gerona had gained him a high reputation. He was now with the remains of Blake’s army at Vich, and as the French approached that town he retired to the pass of Col de Sespina, from whence he had a free retreat upon Moya and Manresa. Souham’s advanced guard, pursued, and at Tona, captured some baggage, but the Spaniard turned on finding his rear pressed, and when the pursuers mounted the heights of Sespino, charged with a shock, that sent them headlong down the hills again. Souham rallied the beaten troops in the plain, and the next day offered battle; but O’Donnel continued his retreat, and the French general returned to Vich.
During these events, Augereau, leaving a detachment in Hostalrich to blockade the castle, marched to Barcelona, by the road of Cardedieu, having previously ordered Duhesme, to post three battalions and five squadrons of cuirassiers, with some guns, near the junction, of the roads of Cardedieu and Manresa, to watch O’Donnel. Colonel Guery, commanding this detachment, placed one battalion at Granollers, a second at Santa Perpetua, and with the remainder occupied Mollet, taking however no military precautions; and O’Donnel who had been joined by Campo Verde, from the side of Cervera, sent him to fall upon the French posts. Campo Verde, passing by Tarrassa and Sabadel, surprised and put to the sword or captured all the troops at Santa Perpetua and Mollet; but those at Granollers, threw themselves into a large building, and defended it for three days, when by the approach of Augereau they were relieved. The marshal finding the streets of Mollet strewed with French carcasses, ordered up the division of Souham from Vich, but passed on himself to Barcelona. When there, he became convinced how oppressive Duhesme’s conduct had been, and sent him to France in disgrace; after which, unable to procure provisions without exhausting the magazines of Barcelona, he resumed his former position at Gerona, and Souham, passing the defiles of Garriga, returned to Vich.
All this time the blockade of Hostalrich continued; but the retreat of Augereau, and the success of Campo Verde’s enterprise, produced extraordinary joy over all Catalonia. The prisoners taken, were marched from town to town, and the action everywhere exaggerated; the decree for enrolling a fifth of the male population was enforced with vigour, and the execution entrusted to the Baron d’Erolles, a native of Talarn, who afterwards obtained considerable celebrity. The army, in which there was still a large body of Swiss troops, was thus reinforced; the confidence of the people increased hourly, and a Local Junta was established at Arenys de Mar, to organise the Somatenes on the coast, and to direct the application of succours from the sea. The Partisans, also reassembling their dispersed bands in the higher valleys, again vexed the Ampurdan, and incommoded the troops blockading the citadel of Hostalrich.
O’Donnel himself, moving to Manresa, called the Miguelettes from the Lerida side, to his assistance; and soon formed a body of more than twelve thousand fighting-men, with which he took post at Moya, in the beginning of February, and harassed the French in front of Vich, while, in the rear of that town, Rovira occupied the heights above Roda. Souham, seeing the crests of the hills thus swarming with enemies, and, having but five thousand men of all arms to oppose to them, demanded reinforcements; but Augereau paid little attention to him: and, on the 20th, O’Donnel, descending the mountain of Centellas, entered the plains in three columns, and the French general had scarcely time to draw up his troops a little in front of the town, ere he was attacked with a vigour hitherto unusual with the Spaniards.
COMBAT OF VICH.
Rovira commenced the action, by driving the enemy’s posts, on the side of Roda, back upon the town, and soon afterwards O’Donnel, coming close up on the front of the French position, opened all his guns, and, throwing out skirmishers along the whole of the adverse line, filed his cavalry, under cover of their fire, to the right, intending to outflank Souham’s left; but the latter general, leaving a battalion to hold Rovira in check, encouraged his own infantry, and sent his dragoons against the Spanish horsemen, who, at the first charge, were driven back in confusion. The foot then fell in on the French centre, but, failing to make any serious impression, the Spanish general, whose great superiority of numbers enabled him to keep heavy masses in reserve, endeavoured to turn both flanks of the enemy at the same time. Souham was now hard pressed, his infantry were few, his reserves all engaged, and himself severely wounded in the head. O’Donnel, who had rallied his cavalry, and brought up his Swiss regiments, was full of confidence, and in person fiercely led the whole mass once more against the left; but, at this critical period, the French infantry, far from wavering, firmly closed their ranks, and sent their volleys more rapidly into the hostile ranks, while the cavalry, sensible that the fate of all (for there was no retreat) hung upon the issue of their charge, met their adversaries with such a full career that horse and man went down before them, and the Swiss, being separated from the rest, surrendered. Rovira was afterwards driven away, and the Spanish army returned to the hills, having lost a full fourth of its own numbers, and killed or wounded twelve hundred of the enemy.
O’Donnel’s advance, had been the signal, for all the irregular bands to act against the various quarters of the French; they were, however, with the exception of a slight succour, thrown into Hostalrich, unsuccessful, and, being closely pursued by the moveable columns, dispersed. Thus the higher valleys were again subdued, the Junta fled from Arenys de Mar, Campo Verde returned to the country about Cervera, and O’Donnel, quitting the Upper Llobregat, retired by Taraza, Martorel, and Villa Franca to the camp of Taragona, leaving only an advanced guard at Ordal.
It was at this moment, when Upper Catalonia was in a manner abandoned by the Spanish general, that the emperor, directed the seventh corps upon the Lower Ebro, to support Suchet’s operations against Lerida and Mequinenza. Augereau, therefore, leaving a detachment under Verdier, in the Ampurdan, and two thousand men to blockade Hostalrich, ordered his brother and general Mazzucchelli (the one commanding Souham’s, and the other Pino’s division) to march upon Manreza, while he himself, with the Westphalian division, repaired once more to Barcelona, and from thence directed all the subsequent movements.
General Augereau, passing by Col de Sespina, entered Manreza, the 16th of March, and there joined Mazzucchelli; but the inhabitants abandoned the place, and general Swartz was sent with a brigade, from Moncada, to take possession, while the two divisions continued their movement, by Montserrat, upon Molino del Rey. The 21st they advanced to Villa Franca, and the Spaniards retired from Ordal towards Taragona. But the French, acting under orders from Barcelona, left a thousand men in Villa Franca, and, after scouring the country on the right and left, passed the Col de San Cristina, and established their quarters about Reus, by which the Spanish army at Taragona was placed between them and the troops at Villa Franca.
O’Donnel, whose energy and military talents, were superior to his predecessors, saw, and instantly profited from this false position. By his orders, general Juan Caro marched, with six thousand men, against the French in Villa Franca, and, on the 28th, killed many and captured the rest, together with some artillery and stores; but, being wounded himself, resigned the command to general Gasca, after the action. Augereau, alarmed for Manreza, detached troops, both by Olesa and Montserrat, to reinforce Swartz. The first reached their destinations, but the others, twelve hundred strong, were intercepted by Gasca, and totally defeated at Esparaguera on the 3d of April. Campo Verde then, coming down from the side of Cervera, took the chief command, and proceeded against Manreza, by Montserrat, while Milans de Boch, and Rovira, hemmed in the French on the opposite side, and the Somatenes gathered on the hills to aid the operations. Swartz evacuated the town in the night, and thinking to baffle the Spaniards, by taking the road of Taraza and Sabadel, was followed closely and beaten, by Rovira and Milans, on the 5th of April, and, with great difficulty and the loss of all his baggage, reached Barcelona.
These operations having insulated the French divisions at Reus, an officer was despatched, by sea, with orders to recall them to Barcelona. Meanwhile count Severoli, who had taken the command of them, and whose first instructions were to co-operate with Suchet, feared to pass the mountains between Reus and the Ebro, lest he should expose his rear to an attack from Taragona, and perhaps fail of meeting the third corps at last. Keeping, therefore, on the defensive at Reus, he detached colonel Villatte, at the head of two battalions and some cavalry, across the hills, by Dos Aguas and Falcet, to open a communication with the third corps, a part of which had just seized Mora and Flix, on the Lower Ebro. Villatte accomplished his object, and returned with great celerity, fighting his way through the Somatenes, who were gathering round the defiles in his rear. He regained Reus, just as Severoli, having received the order of recall, was commencing his march for Barcelona.
Vacani Istoria Militáre degl’Italiani in Ispagna.
In the night of the 6th, this movement took place, but in such confusion, that, from Taragona, O’Donnel perceived the disorder; and sending a detachment, under colonel Orry, to harass the French, followed himself with the rest of his army. Nevertheless, Severoli’s rear guard, covered the retreat successfully, until a position was attained near Villa Franca; and there Orry, pressing on too closely, was wounded and taken, and his troops rejoined their main body. As these divisions arrived, Campo Verde fell back to Cervera, Severoli reached Barcelona, and Augereau retired to Gerona, having lost more than three thousand men, by a series of most unskilful movements. The situation in which he voluntarily placed himself, was precisely such as a great general would rejoice to see his adversary choose.
Barcelona, the centre of his operations, was encircled by mountains, to be passed only at certain defiles; now Reus and Manresa, were beyond those defiles, and several days march from each other. Rovira and Milans being about San Culgat, cut the communication between Manresa and Barcelona; and O’Donnel, at Taragona, was nearer to the defiles of Cristina, than the French divisions at Reus. His communication with Campo Verde, was open by Valls, Pla, and Santa Coloma de Querault; and with Milans and Rovira, by Villa Franca, San Sadurni, and Igualada.
Augereau indeed, placed a battalion in Villa Franca, but this only rendered his situation worse; for what could six hundred men effect in a mountainous country against three considerable bodies of the enemy? The result was inevitable. The battalion, at Villa Franca, was put to the sword; Swartz only saved a remnant of his brigade by a timely flight; the divisions at Reus with difficulty made good their retreat; and O’Donnel, who, one month before, had retired from the battle of Vich, broken and discomfited by only five thousand French, now, with that very beaten army, baffled Augereau, and obliged him, although at the head of more than twenty thousand men, to abandon Lower Catalonia, and retire to Gerona with disgrace: a surprising change, yet one in which fortune had no share.
Napoleon’s Memoirs.
Augereau’s talents for handling small corps in a battle, have been recorded by a master hand. There is a vast difference between that and conducting a campaign; but the truth is, that Catalonia had, like Aragon, been declared a particular government, and Augereau, afflicted with gout, remained in the palace of Barcelona, affecting the state of a viceroy, when he should have been at the head of his troops in the field. On the other hand, his opponent, a hardy resolute man, excited by a sudden celebrity, was vigilant, indefatigable, and eager. He merited the success he obtained; and, with better and more experienced troops, that success would have been infinitely greater. Yet if the expedition to Valencia had not taken place, O’Donnel, distracted by a double attack, would have remained at Taragona; and neither the action of Vich, nor the disasters at Mollet, Villa Franca, and Esparaguera, would have taken place.
Napoleon, discontented, as he well might be, with these operations, appointed M’Donald, duke of Tarentum, to supersede Augereau; but, in the meantime, the latter, having reached Gerona, disposed his troops in the most commodious manner to cover the blockade of Hostalrich, giving Severoli the command.
FALL OF HOSTALRICH CASTLE.
This citadel was invested early in January. Situated on a high rock, armed with forty guns, well garrisoned, and commanded by a brave man, it was nearly impregnable; and the French at first endeavoured to reduce it by a simple blockade: but, towards the middle of February, commenced the erection of mortar-batteries. Severoli also pressed the place more vigorously than before, and although O’Donnel, collecting convoys on the side of Vich and Mattaro, caused the blockading troops to be attacked at several points by the Miguelettes, every attempt to introduce supplies failed. The garrison was reduced to extremity, and honourable terms were offered, but the governor, Julian Estrada, rejected them, and prepared to break through the Napoleon’s Memoirs.enemy’s line, an exploit always expected from a good garrison in Turenne’s days, and, as Napoleon has shewn by numerous examples, generally successful.
O’Donnel, who could always communicate with the garrison, being aware of their intention, sent some vessels to Arenys de Mar, and made demonstrations from thence, and from the side of St. Celoni, to favour the enterprise; and in the night of the 12th, Estrada, leaving his sick behind, came forth with about fourteen hundred men. He first made as if for St. Celoni, but afterwards turning to his right, broke through on the side of St. Felieu de Buxalieu and pushed for Vich; but the French closing rapidly from the right and left, pursued so closely, that Estrada himself was wounded, and taken, together with about three hundred men; many also were killed, the rest dispersed in the mountains, and eight hundred reached Vich in safety. This courageous action was therefore successful. Thus, on the 14th of May, after four months of blockade and ten weeks of bombardment, the castle fell, the line of communication with Barcelona was completed, and the errors committed by Duhesme were partly remedied, but at an expense of two years of field operations, many battles, and four sieges.
Two small islands, called Las Medas, situated at the mouth of the Ter, and affording a safe anchorage, were next seized, and this event which facilitated the passage of the French vessels, stealing from port to port with provisions, or despatches, finished Augereau’s career. It had been the very reverse of St. Cyr’s. The latter, victorious in the field, was humane afterwards; but Augereau endeavouring, to frighten those people into submission, Victoires et Conquêtes des Français.who he had failed to beat, erected gibbets along the high-roads, upon which every man taken in arms was hung up without remorse, producing precisely the effect that might be expected. The Catalans more animated by their successes, than daunted by this barbarous severity, became incredibly savage in their revenge, and thus all human feeling lost, both parties were alike steeped in blood and loaded with crimes.