CHAPTER III.
While discord prevailed at Cadiz, the siege of Badajos continued. Early in March, the second parallel being completed and the Pardaleras taken into the works, the approaches were carried by sap to the covered way, and mines were prepared to blow in the counterscarp. Nevertheless, Rafael Menacho, the governor, was in no manner dismayed; his sallies were frequent and vigorous, his activity and courage inspired his troops with confidence, he had begun to retrench in the streets behind the part attacked, and as the fire of the besiegers was also inferior to that of the besieged, every thing seemed to promise favourably for the latter: but, on the evening of the 2d, during a sally, in which the nearest French batteries were carried, the guns spiked, and trenches partly ruined, Menacho was killed, and the command fell to Imas, a man so unworthy that a worse could not be found. At once the spirit of the garrison died away, the besiegers’ works advanced rapidly, the ditch was passed, a lodgement was made on one of the ravelins, the rampart was breached, and the fire of the besieged being nearly extinguished, on the 10th of March the place was summoned in a peremptory manner.
At this time the great crisis of the campaign had passed, and a strong body of British and Portuguese troops were ready to raise the siege of Badajos. In three different ways, by telegraph, by a letter, and by a confidential messenger, the governor was informed, that Massena was in full retreat and that the relieving army was actually in march. The breach was still impracticable, provisions were plentiful, the garrison above eight thousand strong, the French army reduced, by sickness, by detachments Lord Wellington’s Despatch.and the previous operations, to less than fourteen thousand men. Imas read the letter, and instantly surrendered, handing over at the same moment the intelligence thus obtained to the enemy. But he also demanded that his grenadiers should march out of the breach, it was granted, and he was obliged to enlarge the opening himself ere they could do so! Yet this man so covered with opprobrium, and who had secured his own liberty while consigning his fellow soldiers to a prison, and his character to infamy, was never punished by the Spanish rulers: lord Wellington’s indignant remonstrances forced them, indeed, to bring him to trial, but they made the process last during the whole war.
When the place fell, Mortier marched against Campo Mayor, and Latour Maubourg seizing Albuquerque and Valencia d’Alcantara, made six hundred prisoners; but Soult, alarmed by the effects of the battle of Barosa, returned to Andalusia, having, in fifty days, mastered four fortresses and invested a fifth; having killed or dispersed ten thousand men, and having taken twenty thousand with a force which, at no time, exceeded the number of his prisoners: yet great and daring and successful as his operations had been, the principal object of his expedition was frustrated, for Massena was in retreat. Lord Wellington’s combinations had palsied the hand of the conqueror.
While the siege of Badajos was proceeding, no change took place in the main positions of either army at Santarem. The English general, certain that the French, who were greatly reduced by sickness, must soon quit their ground if he could relieve Badajos, was only waiting for his reinforcements to send Beresford with fourteen thousand men against Soult; when the battle of the Gebora ruined this plan and changed his situation. The arrival of the reinforcements could not then enable him to detach a sufficient number of men to relieve Badajos, and it was no longer a question of starving Massena out, but of beating him, before Soult could take Badajos and the two armies be joined. In this difficulty, abandoning the design of raising the siege by a detachment, lord Wellington prepared to attack Massena’s army in front on the side of Tremes, while Beresford, crossing at Abrantes, fell upon the rear; he hoped thus to force back the French right and centre, and to cut off the left and to drive it into the Tagus. However, nothing could be attempted until the troops from England arrived, and day after day passed in vain expectation of their coming. Being embarked in January, they would have reached Lisbon before the end of that month, had sir Joseph Yorke, the admiral, charged to conduct the fleet, taken advantage of a favourable wind, which blew when the troops were first put on board; but he neglected this opportunity, contrary gales followed, and a voyage of ten days was thus prolonged for six weeks.
On the other hand, the French general’s situation was becoming very perilous. To besiege Abrantes was above his means, and although that fortress was an important strategic point for the allies who had a moveable bridge, it would not have been so for the French. Massena could only choose then, to force the passage of the Tagus alone, or to wait until Soult appeared on the left bank, or to retreat. For sometime he seemed inclined to the first, shewing great jealousy of the works opposite the mouth of the Zezere, and carrying his boats on wheel-carriages along the banks of the Tagus, as if to alarm Beresford and oblige him to concentrate to his left: yet that general relaxed nothing of his vigilance, neither spy nor officer passed his lines of observation, and Massena knew, generally, that Soult was before Badajos, but nothing more. However, time wore away, sickness wasted the army, food became daily scarcer, the organization of the troops was seriously loosened, the leading generals were at variance, and See Vol. IIthe conspiracy to put St. Cyr at the head of the army in Spain was by no means relinquished.
Under these accumulating difficulties even Massena’s obstinacy gave way; he promised to retreat when he had no more provisions left than would serve his army for the march. A tardy resolution; yet adopted at the moment, when to maintain his position was more important than ever, as ten days longer at Santarem would have insured the co-operation of Soult. General Pelet says, that the latter marshal, by engaging in the siege of Badajos and Olivenza, instead of coming directly down upon the Tagus, was the cause of Massena’s failure; this can hardly be sustained. Before those sieges and the battle of the Gebora, Mendizabel could have assembled twenty thousand men on Soult’s rear, and there was a large body of militia on the Ponçul and the Elga; Beresford had fourteen thousand British and Portuguese regulars, besides ordenança; while the infinite number of boats at lord Wellington’s command would have enabled him to throw troops upon the left bank of the Tagus, with a celerity that would have baffled any effort of Massena to assist the duke of Dalmatia. Now, if the latter had been defeated; with what argument could he have defended his reputation as a general, after having left three or four garrisoned fortresses and thirty-five thousand men upon his flank and rear; to say nothing of the results threatened by the battle of Barosa.
The true cause of Massena’s failure was the insufficiency of his means to oppose the English general’s combinations. The French army reduced by sickness to forty thousand fighting men, exclusive of Drouet’s troops at Leiria, would have been unable to maintain its extended position against the attack meditated by lord Wellington; and when Massena, through the means of the fidalgos, knew that the English reinforcements were come, he prepared to retreat. Those troops landed the 2d of March, and, the 6th, the French had evacuated the position of Santarem.
Muster-Rolls of the French Army.
At this time Napoleon directed the armies of Spain to be remodelled. The king’s force was diminished; the army of the south increased; general Drouet was ordered to march with eleven thousand men to the fifth corps, which he was appointed to command, in place of Mortier; the remainder of the ninth corps was to compose two divisions, under the command of Clausel and Foy, and to be incorporated with the army of Portugal. Marmont was appointed to relieve Ney in the command of the sixth corps; Loison was removed to the second corps; and Bessieres was ordered to post six thousand men at Ciudad Rodrigo, to watch the frontiers of Portugal and support Claparede. Of the imperial guards; seven thousand were to assemble at Zamora, to hold the Gallicians in check, and the Appendix, [No. VII.]remainder at Valladolid, with strong parties of cavalry in the space between those places, that intelligence of what was passing in Portugal might be daily received. Thus Massena was enabled to adopt any operation that might seem good to him, without reference to his original base; but the order for the execution of these measures did not reach the armies until a later period.
RETREAT OF THE FRENCH FROM SANTAREM.
Several lines of operation were open to the prince of Esling. 1º. He could pass the Tagus, between Punhete and Abrantes, by boats or by fords, which were always practicable after a week of dry weather. 2º. He could retire, by the Sobreira Formosa, upon Castello Branco, and open a communication with the king by Placentia, and with the duke of Dalmatia by Alcantara. 3º. He could march, by the Estrada Nova and Belmonte, to Sabugal, and afterwards act according to circumstances. 4º. He could gain the Mondego, and ascend the left bank of that river towards Guarda and Almeida; or, crossing it, march upon Oporto through an untouched country. Of these four plans, the first was perilous, and the weather too unsettled to be sure of the fords. The second and third were difficult, from the ruggedness of the Sobreira, and exposed, because the allies could break out by Abrantes upon the flank of the army while in retreat. Massena decided on the last, but his actual position being to the left of the line of retreat, he was necessarily forced to make a flank movement, with more than ten thousand sick men and all his stores, under the beard of an adversary before he could begin his retreat. Yet this he executed, and in a manner bespeaking the great commander.
Commencing his preparations by destroying munition, and all guns that could not be horsed, he passed his sick and baggage, by degrees, upon Thomar, keeping only his fighting-men in the front, and at the same time indicating an intention of passing the Zezere. But when the impediments of the army had gained two marches, Ney suddenly assembled the sixth corps and the cavalry on the Lys, near Leiria, as if with the intention of advancing against Torres Vedras, a movement that necessarily kept lord Wellington in suspense. Meanwhile, the second and eighth corps, quitting Santarem, Tremes, and Alcanhete, in the night of the 5th, fell back, by Pernes, upon Torres Novas and Thomar, destroying the bridges on the Alviella behind them. The next morning the boats were burnt at Punhete, and Loison retreated by the road of Espinal to cover the flank of the main line of retreat; the remainder of the army, by rapid concentric marches, made for a position in front of Pombal: the line of movement to the Mondego was thus secured, and four days gained; for lord Wellington, although aware that a retreat was in execution, was quite unable to take any decided step, lest he should open the Lines to his adversary. Nevertheless he had caused Beresford to close to his right on the 5th, and at daylight, on the 6th, discovering the empty camps of Santarem, followed the enemy closely with his own army.
Thomar seemed to be the French point of concentration; but as their boats were still maintained at Punhete, general William Stewart crossed the Tagus, at Abrantes, with the greatest part of Beresford’s corps, while the first, fourth, and sixth divisions, and two brigades of cavalry, marched to Golegao; the light division also reached Pernes, where the bridge was rapidly repaired by captain Tod, of the royal staff-corps. The 7th, the enemy having burnt his boats on the Zezere, the Abrantes bridge was brought down to that river, and Stewart, crossing, moved to Thomar; on which place the divisions at Golegao were likewise directed. But the retreat being soon decidedly pronounced for the Mondego, the troops at Thomar were ordered to halt; and the light division, German hussars, and royal dragoons followed the eighth corps, taking two hundred prisoners.
This day’s march disclosed a horrible calamity. A large house, situated in an obscure part of the mountains, was discovered, filled with starving persons. Above thirty women and children had sunk, and, sitting by the bodies, were fifteen or sixteen survivors, of whom one only was a man, but all so enfeebled as to be unable to eat the little food we had to offer them. The youngest had fallen first; all the children were dead; none were emaciated in the bodies, but the muscles of the face were invariably drawn transversely, giving the appearance of laughing, and presenting the most ghastly sight imaginable. The man seemed most eager for life; the women appeared patient and resigned, and, even in this distress, had arranged the bodies of those who first died, with decency and care.
While one part of the army was thus in pursuit, the third and fifth divisions moved, from the Lines, upon Leiria; the Abrantes’ boats fell down the river to Tancos, where a bridge was fixed; and the second and fourth divisions, and some cavalry, were directed to return from Thomar to the left bank of the Tagus, to relieve Badajos: Beresford also, who remained with a part of his corps near Barca, had already sent a brigade of cavalry to Portalegre for that purpose. This was on the morning of the 9th; but the enemy, instead of continuing his retreat, concentrated the sixth and eighth corps and Montbrun’s cavalry on a table-land, in front of Pombal, where the light division skirmished with his advanced posts, and the German horse charged his cavalry with success, taking some prisoners.
Lord Wellington, finding the French disposed to accept battle, was now compelled to alter his plans. To fight with advantage, it was necessary to bring up, from Thomar, the troops destined to relieve Badajos; not to fight, was giving up to the enemy Coimbra, and the untouched country behind, as far as Oporto: Massena would thus retire with the advantages of a conqueror. However, intelligence received that morning, from Badajos, described it as being in a sufficient state, and capable of holding out yet a month. This decided the question.
The fourth division and the heavy cavalry, already on the march for the Alemtejo, were countermanded; general Nightingale, with a brigade of the first division and some horse, was directed by the road of Espinal, to observe the second corps; and the rest of the army was concentrically directed upon Pombal. How dangerous a captain Massena could be, was here proved. His first movement began the 4th, it was the 11th before a sufficient number of troops could be assembled to fight him at Pombal, and, during these seven days, he had executed one of the most difficult operations in war, gained three or four marches, and completely organized his system of retreat.
SKIRMISH AT POMBAL.
Pack’s brigade and the cavalry, the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and light divisions, and the Portuguese troops, which were attached, like the ancient Latin auxiliaries of the Roman legion, to each British division, were assembling in front of the enemy on the 10th; when Massena, who had sent his baggage over the Soure river in the night by the bridge of Pombal, suddenly retired through that town. He was so closely followed by the light division, that the streets being still encumbered, Ney drew up a rear-guard on a height behind the town, and threw a detachment into the old castle of Pombal. He had, however, waited too long. The French army was moving in some confusion and in a very extended column of march, by a narrow defile, between the mountains and the Soure river, which was fordable; and the British divisions were in rapid motion along the left bank, with the design of crossing lower down, and cutting Massena’s line of retreat. But darkness came on too fast, and the operation terminated with a sharp skirmish at Pombal, whence the ninety-fifth and the third caçadores of the light division, after some changes of fortune, drove the French from the castle and town with such vigour, that the latter could not destroy the bridge, although it was mined. About forty of the allies were hurt, and the loss of the enemy was somewhat greater.
In the night Massena continued his retreat, which now assumed a regular and concentrated form. The baggage and sick, protected by the reserve cavalry, marched first; these were followed by the eighth corps; and the sixth, with some light cavalry, and the best horsed of the artillery, were destined to stem the pursuit. Ney had been ordered to detach Marcognet’s brigade on the 10th, from the Lys, to seize Coimbra; but some delay having taken place, Montbrun was now appointed for that service.
Lord Wellington’s immediate object was to save Coimbra, and he designed, by skilful, rather than daring, operations, to oblige Massena to quit the Portuguese territory: the moral effect of such an event, he judged, would be sufficient; but as his reinforcements were still distant, he was obliged to retain the fourth division and the heavy cavalry from the relief of Badajos, and was therefore willing to strike a sudden stroke, if a fair occasion offered. Howbeit the country was full of strong positions, the roads hollow and confined by mountains on either hand, every village formed a defile; the weather also, being moderate, was favourable to the enemy, and Ney, with a wonderfully happy mixture of courage, readiness, and skill, illustrated every league of ground by some signal combination of war.
Day-break, on the 12th, saw both armies in movement, and eight miles of march, and some slight skirmishing, brought the head of the British into a hollow way, leading to a high table-land on which Ney had disposed five thousand infantry, a few squadrons of cavalry, and some light guns. His centre was opposite the hollow road, his wings were covered by wooded heights, which he occupied with light troops; his right rested on the ravine of the Soure, his left on the Redinha, which circling round his rear fell into the Soure. Behind him the village of Redinha, situated in a hollow, covered a narrow bridge and a long and dangerous defile; and, beyond the stream, some very rugged heights, commanding a view of the position in front of the village, were occupied by a division of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a battery of heavy guns; all so skilfully disposed as to give the appearance of a very considerable force.
COMBAT OF REDINHA.
After examining the enemy’s position for a short time, lord Wellington first directed the light division, now commanded by sir William Erskine, to attack the wooded slopes covering Ney’s right: in less than an hour these orders were executed. The fifty-second, the ninety-fifth, and the caçadores, assisted by a company of the forty-third, carried the ascent and cleared the woods, and their skirmishers even advanced on to the open plain; but the French battalions, supported by four guns, immediately opened a heavy rolling fire, and at the same moment, colonel Ferriere, of the third French hussars, charged and took fourteen prisoners. This officer, during the whole campaign, had never failed to break in upon the skirmishers in the most critical moments; sometimes with a squadron, sometimes with only a few men; he was, however, sure to be found in the right place, and was continually proving how much may be done, even in the most rugged mountains, by a small body of good cavalry.
Erskine’s line, consisting of five battalions of infantry and six guns, being now formed in such a manner that it outflanked the French right, tending towards the ford of the Redinha, was reinforced with two regiments of dragoons; meanwhile Picton seized the wooded heights protecting the French left, and thus Ney’s position was laid bare. Nevertheless, that marshal observing that lord Wellington, deceived as to his real numbers, was bringing the mass of the allied troops into line; far from retreating, even charged Picton’s skirmishers, and continued to hold his ground with an astonishing confidence if we consider his position; for the third division was nearer to the village and bridge than his right, and there were already cavalry and guns enough on the plain to overwhelm him. In this posture both sides remained for about an hour, when, three shots were fired from the British centre as a signal for a forward movement, and a most splendid spectacle of war was exhibited. The woods seemed alive with troops; and in a few moments thirty thousand men, forming three gorgeous lines of battle, were stretched across the plain; but bending on a gentle curve, and moving majestically onwards, while horsemen and guns, springing forward simultaneously from the centre and from the left wing, charged under a general volley from the French battalions: the latter were instantly hidden by the smoke, and when that cleared away no enemy was to be seen.
Ney keenly watching the progress of this grand formation, had opposed Picton’s foremost skirmishers with his left, and, at the same moment, withdrew the rest of his people with such rapidity, that he gained the village ere the cavalry could touch him: the utmost efforts of Picton’s skirmishers and of the horse-artillery scarcely enabled them to gall the hindmost of the French left with their fire. One howitzer was, indeed, dismounted close to the bridge, but the village of Redinha was in flames; and the marshal wishing to confirm the courage of his soldiers at the commencement of the retreat, in person superintended the carrying it off: this he effected, yet with the loss of fifteen or twenty men, and with great danger to himself, for the British guns were thundering on his rear, and the light troops of the third division, chasing like heated blood hounds, passed the river almost at the same time with the French. The reserves of the latter cannonaded the bridge from the heights beyond, but a fresh disposition of attack being made by lord Wellington, while the third division continued to press the left, Ney fell back upon the main body, then at Condeixa, ten miles in the rear.
The British had twelve officers and two hundred men killed and wounded in this combat, and the enemy lost as many; but he might have been utterly destroyed; for there is no doubt, that the duke of Elchingen remained a quarter of an hour too long upon his first position, and that, deceived by the skilful arrangement of his reserve, lord Wellington paid him too much respect. Yet the extraordinary facility and precision with which the English general handled so large a force, was a warning to the French commander, and produced a palpable effect upon the after operations.
On the 13th, the allies renewed the pursuit, and before ten o’clock discovered the French army, the second corps which was at Espinhal excepted, in order of battle. The crisis of Massena’s retreat had arrived, the defiles of Condeixa, leading upon Coimbra, were behind him; those of Miranda de Corvo, leading to the Puente de Murcella, were on his left; and in the fork of these two roads Ney was seated on a strong range of heights covered by a marsh, his position being only to be approached by the highway leading through a deep hollow against his right. Trees were felled to obstruct the passage; a palisado was constructed across the hollow; breast-works were thrown up on each side, and Massena expected to stop the pursuit, while Montbrun seized Coimbra: for he designed to pass the Mondego, and either capture Oporto or maintain a position between the Douro and the Mondego, until the operations of Soult should draw the British away; or until the advance of Bessieres with the army of the north, should enable himself again to act offensively. Hitherto the French general had appeared the abler tactician, but now his adversary assumed the superiority.
When at Thomar lord Wellington had sent Baccellar orders to look to the security of Oporto, and had directed Wilson and Trant also to abandon the Mondego and the Vouga the moment the fords were passable, retiring across the Douro; breaking up the roads as they retreated, and taking care to remove or to destroy all boats and means of transport. Now, Wilson was in march for the Vouga, but Trant having destroyed an arch of the Coimbra bridge on the city side, and placed guards at the fords as far as Figueras, resolved to oppose the enemy’s passage; for the sound of guns had reached his outposts, the river was rising, and he felt assured that the allied army was close upon the heels of the enemy.
As early as the evening of the 11th, the French appeared at the suburb of Santa Clara, and a small party of their dragoons actually forded the Mondego at Pereiras that day: on the 12th, some French officers examined the bridge of Coimbra, but a cannon-shot from the other side wounded one of them, and a general skirmish took place along the banks of the river, during which a party attempting to feel their way along the bridge, were scattered by a round of grape. The fords were, however, actually practicable for cavalry, and there were not more than two or three hundred militia and a few guns at the bridge; for Baccellar had obliged Trant to withdraw the greatest part of his force on the 11th; nevertheless the latter opposed the enemy with the remainder, and it would appear that the French imagined the reinforcement, which reached Lisbon the 2d of March, had been sent by sea to the Mondego and Campagne des Français en Portugal.was in Coimbra. This was an error. Coimbra was saved by the same man and the same militia that had captured it during the advance.
Montbrun sent his report to Massena early on the 13th, and the latter too readily crediting his opinion of Trant’s strength, relinquished the idea of passing the Mondego, and determined to retire by the Puente de Murcella: but to ensure the power of changing his front, and to secure his communication with Reynier and Loison, he had carried Clausel’s division to Fonte Coberta, a village about five miles on his left; situated at the point where the Anciao road falls into that leading to Murcella. There Loison rejoined him, and being thus pivotted on the Anciao Sierra, and covering the line of communication with the second corps while Ney held Condeixa, he considered his position secure. His baggage was, however, observed filing off by the Murcella road when the allies first came upon Ney, and lord Wellington instantly comprehending the state of affairs, as instantly detached the third division by a very difficult path over the Sierra de Anciao to turn the enemy’s left.
For some time all appeared quiet in the French lines. Massena, in repairing to Fonte Coberta, had left Ney orders, it is said, to fire Condeixa at a certain hour when all the divisions were simultaneously to concentrate at Casal Nova, in a second position, perpendicular to the first, and covering the road to Puente Murcella. But towards three o’clock Picton was descried winding round the bluff end of a mountain, about eight miles distant, and as he was already beyond the French left, instant confusion pervaded their camp: a thick smoke arose from Condeixa, the columns were seen hurrying towards Casal Nova; and the British immediately pushed forward. The felled trees and other obstacles impeded their advance at first, and a number of fires, simultaneously kindled, covered the retreating troops with smoke, while the flames of Condeixa stopped the artillery, hence the skirmishers and some cavalry only could close with the rear of the enemy, but so rapidly, as to penetrate between the division at Fonte Coberta and the rest of the French; and it is affirmed that the prince of Esling, who was on the road, only escaped capture by taking the feathers out of his hat and riding through some of the light troops.
Condeixa being thus evacuated, the British cavalry pushed towards Coimbra, opened the communication with Trant, and cutting off Montbrun, captured a part of his horsemen. The rest of the army kindled their fires, and the light division planted piquets close up to the enemy; but, about ten at night, the French divisions, whose presence at Fonte Coberta was unknown to lord Wellington, stole out, and passing close along the front of the British posts, made for Miranda de Corvo. The noise of their march was heard, but the night was dark, it was imagined to be the moving of the French baggage to the rear, and being so reported to sir William Erskine, that officer, without any further inquiry, put the light division in march at day-light on the 14th.
COMBAT OF CASAL NOVA.
The morning was so obscured that nothing could be descried at the distance of a hundred feet, but the sound of a great multitude was heard on the hills in front; and it being evident that the French were there in force, many officers represented the rashness of thus advancing without orders and in such a fog; but Erskine, with an astounding negligence, sent the fifty-second forward in a simple column of sections, without a vanguard or other precaution, and even before the piquets had come in from their posts. The road dipped suddenly, descending into a valley, and the regiment was immediately lost in the mist, which was so thick, that the troops unconsciously passing the enemy’s outposts had like to have captured Ney himself, whose bivouac was close to the piquets. The riflemen followed in a few moments, and the rest of the division was about to plunge into the same gulf; when the rattling of musketry and the booming of round shot were heard, and the vapour slowly rising, discovered the fifty-second on the slopes of the opposite mountain, engaged, without support, in the midst of the enemy’s army.
At this moment lord Wellington arrived. His design had been to turn the left of the French, for their front position was very strong, and behind it they occupied the ridges, in succession, to the Deuca river and the defiles of Miranda de Corvo. There was, however, a road leading from Condeixa to Espinhal, and the fourth division was already in march by it for Panella, having orders, to communicate with Nightingale; to attack Reynier; and to gain the sources of the Deuca and Ceira rivers: between the fourth division and Casal Nova the third division was more directly turning the enemy’s left flank; and meanwhile the main body was coming up to the front, but as it marched in one column, required time to reach the field. Howbeit Erskine’s error forced on this action, and the whole of the light division were pushed forward to succour the fifty-second.
The enemy’s ground was so extensive, and his skirmishers so thick and so easily supported, that, in a little time, the division was necessarily stretched out in one thin thread, and closely engaged in every part, without any reserve; nor could it even thus present an equal front, until Picton sent the riflemen, of the sixtieth, to prolong the line. Nevertheless, the fight was vigorously maintained amidst the numerous stone enclosures on the mountain side; some advantages were even gained, and the right of the enemy was partially turned; yet the main position could not be shaken, until Picton near and Cole further off, had turned it by the left. Then, the first, fifth, and sixth divisions, the heavy cavalry, and the artillery, came up on the centre, and Ney commenced his retreat, covering his rear with guns and light troops, and retiring from ridge to ridge with admirable precision, and, for a long time, without confusion and with very little loss. Towards the middle of the day, however, the British guns and the skirmishers got within range of his masses, and the retreat became more rapid and less orderly; yet he finally gained the strong pass of Miranda de Corvo, which had been secured by the main body of the French.
Montbrun also rejoined the army at Miranda. He had summoned Coimbra on the 13th at noon, and, without waiting for an answer, passed over the mountain and gained the right bank of the Deuca by a very difficult march. The loss of the light division this day was eleven officers and a hundred and fifty men; that of the enemy was greater, and about a hundred prisoners were taken.
During the action of the 14th, Reynier, seeing the approach of the fourth division, hastily abandoned Panella; and Cole having effected a junction with Nightingale, passed the Deuca; when Massena fearing lest they should gain his rear, set fire to the town of Miranda, and passed the Ceira that night. His whole army was now compressed and crowded in one narrow line, between the higher sierras and the Mondego; and to lighten the march, he destroyed a great quantity of ammunition and baggage; yet his encumbrances were still so heavy, and the confusion in his army so great, that he directed Ney to cover the passage with a few battalions; yet charged him not to risk an action. Ney, however, disregarding this order, kept on the left bank, ten or twelve battalions, a brigade of cavalry, and some guns.
COMBAT OF FOZ D’ARONCE.
The 15th, the weather was so obscure that the allies could not reach the Ceira, before four o’clock in the evening, and the troops, as they came up, proceeded to kindle fires for the night; thinking that Ney’s position being strong, nothing would be done. The French right rested on some thickly wooded and rugged ground, and their left upon the village of Foz d’Aronce, but lord Wellington, having cast a rapid glance over it, directed the light division, and Pack’s brigade, to hold the right in play, ordered the third division against the left, and at the same moment the horse-artillery, galloping forward to a rising ground, opened with a great and sudden effect. Ney’s left wing being surprised and overthrown by the first charge of the third division, dispersed in a panic, and fled in such confusion towards the river, that some, missing the fords, rushed into the deeps and were drowned, and others crowding on the bridge were crushed to death. On the right the ground was so rugged and close that the action resolved itself into a skirmish, and thus Ney was enabled to use some battalions to check the pursuit of his left, but meanwhile darkness came on and the French troops in their disorder fired on each other. Only four officers and sixty men fell on the side of the British. The enemy’s loss was not less than five hundred, of which one-half were drowned; and an eagle was afterwards found in the bed of the river when the waters subsided.
In the night Massena retired behind the Alva; yet Ney, notwithstanding this disastrous combat, maintained the left bank of the Ceira, until every encumbrance had passed; and then blowing up seventy feet of the bridge, sent his corps on, but remained himself, with a weak rear guard, on the opposite bank. Thus terminated the first part of the retreat from Santarem, during which the French commander, if we except his errors with regard to Coimbra, displayed infinite ability, but withal a harsh and ruthless spirit.
I pass over the destruction of Redinha, Condeixa, Miranda de Corvo, and many villages on the route; the burning of those towns covered the retrograde movements of the army, and something must be attributed to the disorder, which usually attends a forced retreat: but the town of Leiria, and the convent of Alcobaça, were given to the flames by express orders from the French head-quarters; Lord Wellington’s Despatchesand, although the laws of war rigorously interpreted, authorize such examples when the inhabitants take arms, it can only be justly done, for the purpose of overawing the people, and not from a spirit of vengeance when abandoning the country. But every horror that could make war hideous attended this dreadful march! Distress, conflagrations, death, in all modes! from wounds, from fatigue, from water, from the flames, from starvation! On every side unlimited violence, unlimited vengeance! I myself saw a peasant hounding on his dog, to devour the dead and dying; and the spirit of cruelty once unchained smote even the brute creation. On the 15th the French general, to diminish the encumbrances of his march, ordered a number of beasts of burthen to be destroyed; the inhuman fellow, charged with the execution, hamstringed five hundred asses and left them to starve, and thus they were found by the British army on that day. The mute but deep expression of pain and grief, visible in these poor creatures’ looks, wonderfully roused the fury of the soldiers; and so little weight has reason with the multitude, when opposed by a momentary sensation, that no quarter would have been given to any prisoner at that moment. Excess of feeling would have led to direct cruelty. This shews how dangerous it is in war to listen to the passions at all, since the most praiseworthy could be thus perverted by an accidental combination of circumstances.