History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3

by William Francis Patrick Napier

CHAPTER V.

Massena entered Portugal with sixty-five thousand men; his reinforcements while at Santarem were about ten thousand; he repassed the frontier with forty-five thousand; hence the invasion of Portugal cost him about thirty thousand men, of which fourteen thousand might have fallen by the sword or been taken. Not more than six thousand were lost during the retreat; but had lord Wellington, unrestrained by political considerations, attacked him vigorously at Redinha, Condeixa, Casal Nova, and Miranda de Corvo, half the French army would have been lost. It is unquestionable that a retreating army should fight as little as possible.

When Massena reached the Agueda, his cavalry detachments, heavy artillery, and convalescents, again augmented his army to more than fifty thousand men, but the fatigues of the retreat and the want of provisions, would not suffer him to shew a front to the allies; wherefore, drawing two hundred thousand rations from Ciudad, he fell back to Salamanca, and lord Wellington invested Almeida. The light division occupied Gallegos and Espeja, the rest of the army were disposed in villages on both sides of the Coa, and the head-quarters were transferred to Villa Formosa.

Here colonel Waters, who had been taken near Belmonte during the retreat, rejoined the army. Confident in his own resources, he had refused his parole, and, when carried to Ciudad Rodrigo, rashly mentioned his intention of escaping to the Spaniard in whose house he was lodged. This man betrayed him; but a servant, detesting his master’s treachery, secretly offered his aid, and Waters coolly desired him to get the rowels of his spurs sharpened. When the French army was near Salamanca, Waters, being in the custody of gens d’armes, waited until their chief, who rode the only good horse in the party, had alighted, then giving the spur to his own beast, he galloped off! an act of incredible resolution and hardihood, for he was on a large plain, and before him, and for miles behind him, the road was covered with the French columns. His hat fell off, and, thus distinguished, he rode along the flank of the troops, some encouraging him, others firing at him, and the gens d’armes, sword in hand, close at his heels; but suddenly breaking at full speed, between two columns, he gained a wooded hollow, and, having baffled his pursuers, evaded the rear of the enemy’s army. The third day he reached head-quarters, where lord Wellington had caused his baggage to be brought, observing that he would not be long absent.

Appendix, [No. VII.]

Massena, having occupied Salamanca, and communicated with Bessieres, sent a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, and lord Wellington was unable to prevent its entrance. He had sent the militia to their homes, disposed his army between the Coa and the Agueda, and blockaded Almeida; but the Portuguese regulars were in a dreadful state, and daily decreasing in numbers; while the continued misconduct of the Regency, and the absolute want of money gave no hope of any amelioration; it was therefore impossible to take a position beyond the Agueda.

The depôts were re-established at Lamego on the Douro, and at Raiva on the Mondego; and magazines of consumption were formed at Celerico, from whence the mule-brigades brought up the provisions by the way of Castello Bom: measures were also taken at Guarda, Pena Macor, and Castello Branco, to form commissariat establishments which were to be supplied from Abrantes. But the transport of stores was difficult, and this consideration, combined with the capricious nature of the Agueda and Coa, rendered it dangerous to blockade both Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida; seeing that the troops would have those rivers behind them, while the position itself would be weak and extended. The blockade of Almeida was undertaken because, from intercepted letters and other sources, it was known to have provisions only for a fortnight; but the operation formed no part of the plan which lord Wellington was now revolving in his mind, and he was even prepared to relinquish it altogether if hardly pressed.

The success in Portugal had given stability to the English ministers; and it would appear that they at first meant to limit their future efforts to the defence of that country, for lord Liverpool required the return of many battalions. But offensive warfare in Spain, occupied the general’s thoughts, and two lines of operation had presented themselves to his mind.—1º. Under the supposition Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, May 7th, 1810. MSS.that it would be long ere Massena could again make any serious attempt on Portugal; to remain on the defensive in Beira, and march against the army of the South to raise the siege of Cadiz. 2º. If Almeida fell to the blockade, to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo; or if Almeida did not so fall, to besiege both together, and, when they were taken, march at once into the heart of Spain, and open a communication with Valencia and with the army of Sicily. This great and lofty conception would have delivered Andalusia as certainly as any direct operation; for thus Madrid, the great depôt of the French, would have been taken, the northern and southern armies cut asunder, and the English base momentarily fixed on the Mediterranean coast: then the whole of the Spanish and British force could have been concentrated, and one or two great battles must have decided the fate of Spain.

Filled with this grand project lord Wellington demanded reinforcements from England, and leave to carry his design into execution, if occasion offered: yet he checked his secret aspirations, when reflecting upon the national pride and perverseness of the Spaniards, and on their uncertain proceedings, and the great difficulty, if not impossibility, of ensuring any reasonable concert and assistance. When to this he also added the bad disposition of the Portuguese Regency, and the timid temper of the English ministers, so many jarring elements were presented that he could make no fixed combinations. Nevertheless, maturing the leading points of action in his own mind, he resolved to keep them in view; adapting his proceedings to circumstances as they should arise.

His projects were however necessarily conditional upon whether Napoleon reinforced his armies again, which would create new combinations; and before any other measure, it was essential to recapture Badajos; not only as its possession by the enemy affected the safety of Cadiz, but, as it bore upon the execution of both the above-mentioned plans, and upon the safety of Portugal, by enabling the enemy to besiege Elvas: yet so deeply and sagaciously had he probed the nature of the contest, that we shall find his after operations strictly conformable to these his first conceptions, and always successful. Judging now that Massena would be unable to interrupt the blockade of Almeida, lord Wellington left the command of the northern army to general Spencer, and departed for the Alemtejo, where Beresford was operating: but, as this was one of the most critical periods of the war, it is essential to have a clear notion of the true state of affairs in the South, at the moment when Beresford commenced his memorable campaign.

Soult returned to Andalusia immediately after the fall of Badajos, leaving Mortier to besiege Campo Mayor, and his arrival at Seville and the fame of his successes restored tranquillity in that province, and confidence amongst the troops. Intercepted Letter from Chief of Engineers, Garbé, Mar. 25th.Both had been grievously shaken by the battle of Barosa, and the works of Arcos, Lucar, Medina, and Alcalade Gazules, intended to defend the rear of the first corps, had been stopped, and the utmost despondency prevailed. Discontent and gloom Official Abstract of Military Reports, from Cadiz, 1811. MSS.were, however, also strong in Cadiz, the government had for some days pretended to make a fresh effort against Victor; but the fall of Badajos menaced the city with famine, and hence Zayas was finally detached with six thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry to Huelva. His object was to gather provisions in the Conda de Neibla, where Ballasteros had, on the 10th, surprised and dispersed Remond’s detachment. The French, were however soon reinforced, Zayas was checked by D’Aremberg, and as many of his men deserted to Ballasteros, he withdrew the rest. Blake then assumed the command, Ballasteros and Copons were placed under his orders, and the united corps, amounting to eleven thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry, were called the fourth army. Meanwhile Mendizabal rallying his fugitives from the battle of the Gebora, at Villa Viciosa, re-formed a weak corps, called the fifth army; during these proceedings, Mortier occupied Albuquerque and Valencia d’Alcantara, and carried on the

SIEGE OF CAMPO MAYOR.

This fortress being commanded, at four hundred yards distance, by a hill, on which there was an abandoned horn-work, would have fallen at once, but for the courage and talents of major Tallaia, a Portuguese engineer. With only two hundred men and five mounted guns, he made such skilful dispositions, that the French opened regular trenches, battered the wall in breach with six guns, bombarded the palace with eleven mortars, and pushed a sap to the crest of the glacis. At the end of five days a breach was made, but Tallaia, although ill seconded by the garrison, repulsed one partial assault, and, being summoned for the second time, demanded and obtained twenty-four hours to wait for succour. None arrived, and this brave man surrendered the 21st of March. Mortier then returned to the Guadiana, leaving Latour Maubourg to dismantle the works and remove the artillery and stores to Badajos.

Such was the posture of affairs when Beresford who had quitted the northern army after the combat of Foz d’Aronce, arrived at Portalegre with twenty thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and eighteen guns.

His instructions were to relieve Campo Mayor, and to besiege Olivenza and Badajos. The first had already surrendered, but the marshal, being within two marches of it, judged that he might surprise the besieging corps, and, with this view, put his troops in motion the 23d. In the morning of the 25th his advanced guard of cavalry, supported by a detachment of infantry, under colonel Colborne, came suddenly upon Campo Mayor, just as Latour Maubourg was marching out in confusion, with twelve hundred cavalry, three battalions of infantry, some horse-artillery and the battering train of thirteen guns. The allies pursued him, and passing over a wooded rise of ground, issued forth at the other side by some gentle slopes on either flank of the French, who were in a fine plain. Colonel Colborne was on the right and at a considerable distance from the enemy, but colonel Head, with the thirteenth light dragoons, was on the left, close to them, and supported by colonel Otway with two squadrons of the seventh Portuguese. The heavy cavalry was in reserve; and while in this state the French hussars, suddenly charging with a loose rein from behind their infantry, fell some on the Portuguese and some on the thirteenth dragoons. So fiercely did these last on both sides come together, that many men were dismounted by the shock, and both parties pierced clear through to the opposite side, then re-formed, and passed again in the same fearful manner to their own ground: but Head’s troopers rallied quicker than the French, and riding a third time closely in upon them, overthrew horse and man, receiving at the same time the fire of the infantry squares. Nevertheless, without flinching, they galloped upon the battering train, hewed down the gunners, and, drawing up beyond the French line of march, barred the way, in expectation that the heavy cavalry would also fall on; but Beresford would not suffer the latter to charge, and the French infantry returned for their guns and resumed their march. The thirteenth and the Portuguese, however, continued the pursuit, in a rash and disorderly manner, even to the bridge of Badajos, and being repulsed by the guns of that fortress, were followed by Mortier in person, and lost some prisoners. Of the allies one hundred men were killed or hurt, and above seventy taken. Of the enemy about three hundred suffered, one howitzer was captured, and the French colonel Chamorin was slain in single combat by a trooper of the thirteenth.

To profit from sudden opportunities, a general must be constantly with his advanced guard in an offensive movement. When this combat commenced, Beresford was with the main body, and baron Trip, a staff-officer, deceived by appearances, informed him, that the thirteenth had been cut off. Hence the marshal, anxious to save his cavalry, which he knew could not be reinforced, would not follow up the first blow, truly observing that the loss of one regiment was enough. But the regiment was not lost, and, the country being open and plain, the enemy’s force and the exact posture of affairs were easy to be discerned. The thirteenth were reprimanded, perhaps justly, for having pursued so eagerly without orders, yet the unsparing admiration of the whole army consoled them.

Campo Mayor was thus recovered so suddenly, that the French left eight hundred rations of bread in the magazines; and they also evacuated Albuquerque and Valencia d’Alcantara, being infinitely dismayed by the appearance of so powerful an army in the south: indeed, so secretly and promptly had lord Wellington assembled it, that its existence was only known to the French general by the blow at Campo Mayor. But, to profit from such able dispositions, it was necessary to be as rapid in execution, giving the enemy no time to recover from his first surprise; and this was the more essential, because the breach in Badajos was not closed, nor the trenches obliterated, nor the exhausted magazines and stores replenished. Soult had carried away six battalions and a regiment of cavalry, four hundred men were thrown into Olivenza, three thousand into Badajos; thus, with the losses sustained during the operations, Mortier’s numbers were reduced to less than ten thousand men: he could not therefore have maintained the line of the Guadiana and collected provisions also, and Beresford should have instantly marched upon Merida, driven back the fifth corps, and opened a fresh communication by Jerumenha with Elvas; the fall of Badajos would then have been inevitable. The confusion occasioned by the sudden appearance of the army at Campo Mayor and the charge of the thirteenth dragoons guaranteed the success of this march; the English general might even have passed the river at Merida before Mortier could have ascertained his object.

Beresford, neglecting this happy opportunity, put his troops into quarters round Elvas, induced thereto by the fatigue and wants of the soldiers; especially those of the fourth division, who had been marching incessantly since the 6th of the month, and were bare-footed and exhausted.

He had been instructed, by lord Wellington, to throw a bridge over the Guadiana at Jerumenha; to push back the fifth corps; and to invest Olivenza and Badajos. The Portuguese government had undertaken not only to provide the means for these operations, but had actually reported that they were collected at Elvas and Jerumenha; that is to say, that provisions, shoes, battering guns, ammunition, and transport were there; that the Guadiana abounded in serviceable craft; that twenty large boats, formerly belonging to Cuesta, which had been brought away from Badajos before the siege, were at Elvas; and that all other necessaries would be sent from Lisbon. It now appeared that no magazines of provisions or stores had been formed; that very little transport was provided; that only five of Cuesta’s boats had been brought from Badajos; that there was no serviceable craft on the river, and that some small pontoons, sent from Lisbon, were unfit to bear the force of the current, or to sustain the passage of guns. The country, also, was so deficient in provisions, that the garrison-stores of Elvas were taken to feed the army.

All these circumstances combined to point out Merida as the true line of operations; moreover, plenty of food was to be had on the left bank of the Guadiana, and the measures necessary to remedy the evil state of affairs on the right bank, did not require the presence of an army to protect them. The great distress of the fourth division for shoes, alone offered any serious obstacle; but, under the circumstances, it would not have been too much to expect a momentary effort from such an excellent division, or, it might without danger even have been left behind.

Marshal Beresford preferred halting until he could procure the means of passing at Jerumenha; an error which may be considered as the first and principal cause of those long and bloody operations which afterwards detained lord Wellington nearly two years on the frontiers of Portugal. For, during Beresford’s delay, general Phillipon, one of the ablest governors that ever defended a fortress, levelled the trenches, restored the glacis, and stopped the breach; meanwhile Latour Maubourg, who had succeeded Mortier in command of the troops, covered the country with foraging parties and filled the magazines.

Captain Squires, of the engineers, now undertook to bridge the Guadiana under Jerumenha, by fixing trestle-piers on each side in the shallows, and connecting them with the five Spanish boats; wherefore, a squadron of cavalry was secretly passed over, by a ford, to protect the workmen from surprise. The 3d of April, the bridge being finished, the troops assembled during the night in the woods near Jerumenha, being to cross at daylight; but the river suddenly swelling, swept away the trestles, rendered the ford impassable, and stopped the operations. No more materials could be immediately procured, and the Spanish boats were converted into flying bridges for the cavalry and artillery, while Squires constructed a slight narrow bridge for infantry with the pontoons and with casks taken from the neighbouring villages. To cover this operation a battalion was added to the squadron already on the left bank, and the army commenced passing the 5th of April; but it was late in the night of the 6th, ere the whole had crossed and taken up their position, which was on a strong range of hills, covered by a swampy rivulet.

During this time, Latour Maubourg was so entirely occupied in securing and provisioning Badajos, that his foragers were extended fifty miles to the rear, and he took no notice whatever of Beresford’s proceedings; an error savouring rather of the Spanish than of the French method of making war: for it is evident that a moveable column of five thousand infantry, with guns and cavalry, could have easily cut off the small detachment of the British on the left bank, and thus have completely frustrated the operations. The allied troops, being most numerous, should have been carried over in the boats, and entrenched on the other side in sufficient force to resist any attack before the construction of the bridge was attempted: it is not easy to say which general acted with most imprudence; Latour Maubourg in neglecting, or Beresford in unnecessarily tempting fortune.

When the British were in possession of the left bank, the French general awaking, collected three thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and four guns at Olivenza, whence he marched, at daylight on the 7th, to oppose a passage which had been completed the day before. He, however, surprised a squadron of the thirteenth, which was in front, and then came so close up to the main body as to exchange shots; yet he was permitted to retire unmolested, in the face of more than twenty thousand men!

During these proceedings, the fifth Spanish army re-occupied Valencia d’Alcantara and Albuquerque; having cavalry posts at La Rocca and Montijo. Ballasteros also entered Fregenal, and Castaños, who was appointed to command in Gallicia as well as Estremadura, arrived at Elvas. This general was in friendly intercourse with Beresford, but had a grudge against Blake. At first, he pretended to the chief command, as the elder captain-general; but Blake demanded a like authority over Beresford, who was not disposed to admit the claim. Now Castaños, having little liking for a command under such difficult circumstances, and being desirous to thwart Blake, and fearful lest Beresford should, under these circumstances, refuse to pass the Guadiana, arranged, that he who brought the greatest force in the field should be generalissimo. Thus the youngest officer commanded in chief.

Beresford, being joined by Madden’s cavalry, and having traced out entrenchments capable of covering several thousand men, ordered his bridges to be reconstructed in a more substantial manner; brought up a Portuguese regiment of militia to labour at the works; left a strong detachment of British infantry and some Portuguese horse for their protection, and advanced with the remainder of the army. Hereupon Latour Maubourg retired upon Albuera, and Beresford summoned Olivenza on the 9th, apparently expecting no defence; but the governor having rejected the summons, the army encamped round the place, and major A. Dickson was despatched to Elvas to prepare battering-guns for the siege. The communication was now opened with Ballasteros at Fregenal, and Castaños having carried Morillo’s division of infantry and Penne Villamur’s cavalry from Montijo to Merida, pushed a part on to Almendralejos. Latour Maubourg then retired to Llerena; and, on the 11th, Beresford, leaving general Cole with the fourth division, Madden’s cavalry, and a brigade of nine pounders to besiege Olivenza, took post himself at Albuera; communicating, by his left, with Almendralejos, and spreading his cavalry in front, so as to cut off all communication with Badajos. The army now lived on the resources of the country; and a brigade was sent to Talavera Real to collect supplies.

The 14th, six twenty-four pounders reached Olivenza, and, being placed in a battery constructed on the abandoned horn-work formerly noticed, played with such success that the breach became practicable before the morning of the 15th. Some riflemen posted in the vineyards kept down the fire of the place, and the garrison, consisting of three hundred and eighty men, with fifteen guns, surrendered at discretion. Cole was immediately directed upon Zafra by the road of Almendral; and Beresford, who had recalled the brigade from Talavera, was already in movement for the same place by the royal causeway. This movement was to drive Latour Maubourg over the Morena, and cut off general Maransin. The latter general had been in pursuit of Ballasteros ever since the retreat of Zayas, and having defeated him at Fregenal on the 12th, was following up his victory towards Salvatierra: an alcalde, however, gave him notice of the allies approach, and he retreated in safety. Meanwhile two French regiments of cavalry, advancing from Llerena to collect contributions, had reached Usagre, where meeting with the British cavalry, they were suddenly charged by the thirteenth dragoons, and followed for six miles so vigorously that three hundred were killed or taken, without the loss of a man on the part of the pursuers.

On the 16th general Cole arrived from Olivenza, and the whole army being thus concentrated about Zafra, Latour Maubourg retired on the 18th to Guadalcanal; the Spanish cavalry then occupied Llerena, and the resources of Estremadura were wholly at the service of the allies. During these operations, general Charles Alten, coming from Lisbon with a brigade of German light infantry, reached Olivenza, and lord Wellington also arrived at Elvas, where Beresford, after drawing his infantry nearer to Badajos, went to meet him. The presence of the general-in-chief was very agreeable to the troops; they had seen, with surprise, great masses put in motion without any adequate results, and thought the operations had been slow, without being prudent. The whole army was over the Guadiana on the 7th, and, including the Spaniards from Montijo, Beresford commanded at least twenty-five thousand men, whereas Latour Maubourg never had more than ten thousand, many of whom were dispersed foraging, far and wide: yet the French general had maintained himself in Estremadura for ten days; and during this time, no corps being employed to constrain the garrison of Badajos, the governor continued to bring in timber and other materials for the defence, at his pleasure.

Lord Wellington arrived the 21st. The 22d, he forded the Guadiana just below the mouth of the Caya with Madden’s cavalry and Alten’s Germans, pushing close up to Badajos. A convoy, escorted by some infantry and cavalry, was coming in from the country, and an effort was made to cut it off; but the governor sallied, the allies lost a hundred men, and the convoy reached the town.

Lord Wellington, now considering that Soult would certainly endeavour to disturb the siege with a considerable force, demanded the assent of the Spanish generals to the following plan of combined operations, before he would commence the investment of the place. 1º. That Blake, marching up from Ayamonte, should take post at Xeres de los Cavalleros. 2º. That Ballasteros should occupy Burquillo on his left. 3º. That the cavalry of the fifth army, stationed at Llerena, should observe the road of Guadalcanal, and communicate through Zafra, by the right, with Ballasteros. These dispositions were to watch the passes of the Morena. 4º. That Castaños should furnish three battalions for the siege, and keep the rest of his corps at Merida, to support the Spanish cavalry. 5º. That the British army should be in second line, and, in the event of a battle, Albuera, centrically situated with respect to the roads leading from Andalusia to Badajos, should be the point of concentration for all the allied forces.

In consequence of the neglect of the Portuguese government, the whole of the battering-train and stores for the siege were necessarily taken from the ramparts and magazines of Elvas; the utmost prudence was therefore required to secure the safety of these guns, lest that fortress, half dismantled, should be exposed to a siege. Hence, as the Guadiana, by rising ten feet, had again carried away the bridge at Jerumenha on the 24th, lord Wellington directed the line of communication with Portugal to be re-established by Merida, until settled weather would admit of fresh arrangements.

Howbeit, political difficulties intervening obliged him to delay the siege. The troops under Mendizabel had committed many excesses in Portugal; the disputes between them and the inhabitants were pushed so far, that the Spanish general pillaged the town of Fernando; while the Portuguese government, in reprisal, meant to seize Olivenza, which had formerly belonged to them. The Spanish Regency publicly disavowed Mendizabel’s conduct, and Mr. Stuart’s strenuous representations deterred the Portuguese from plunging the two countries into a war; but this affair, joined to the natural slowness and arrogance of the Spaniards, prevented both Castaños and Blake from giving an immediate assent to the English general’s plans: meanwhile, intelligence reached the latter that Massena was again in force on the Agueda; wherefore, reluctantly directing Beresford to postpone the siege until the Spanish generals should give in their assent, or Appendix, [No. II.] Section 10.until the fall of Almeida should enable a British reinforcement to arrive, he repaired with the utmost speed to the Agueda.

OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH.

During his absence, the blockade of Almeida had been closely pressed, while the army was so disposed as to cut off all communication. The allied forces were, however, distressed for provisions, and great part of their corn came from the side of Ledesma; being smuggled by the peasants through the French posts, and passed over the Agueda by ropes, which were easily hidden amongst the deep chasms of that river, near its confluence with the Douro.

Massena was, however, intent upon relieving the place. His retreat upon Salamanca had been to restore the organization and equipments of his army, which he could not do at Ciudad Rodrigo, without consuming the stores of that fortress. His cantonments extended from San Felices by Ledesma to Toro, his cavalry was in bad condition, his artillery nearly unhorsed: but from Bessieres he expected, with reason, aid, both of men and provisions, and in that expectation was prepared to renew the campaign immediately. Discord, that bane of military operations, interfered. Bessieres had neglected and continued to neglect the army of Portugal; symptoms of hostilities with Russia were so apparent, even at this period, that he looked rather to that quarter than to what was passing before him; his opinion that a war in the north was inevitable was so openly expressed as to reach the English army; and meanwhile, Massena vainly demanded the aid, which was necessary to save the only acquisition of his campaign.

A convoy of provisions had entered Ciudad Rodrigo on the 13th of April; on the 16th a reinforcement and a second convoy also succeeded in gaining that fortress, although general Spencer crossed the Agueda, with eight thousand men, to intercept them; a rear-guard of two hundred men was indeed, overtaken; but, although surrounded by the cavalry in an open plain, they made their way into the place.

Towards the end of the month, the new organization, decreed by Napoleon, was put in execution. Two divisions of the ninth corps joined Massena; and Drouet was preparing to march with the remaining eleven thousand infantry and cavalry, to reinforce and take the command of the fifth corps; when Massena, having collected all his own detachments, and received a promise of assistance from Bessieres, prevailed upon him to defer his march until an effort had been made to relieve Almeida. With this view the French army was put in motion towards the frontier of Portugal. The light division immediately resumed its former positions, the left at Gallegos and Marialva, the right at Espeja; the cavalry were dispersed, partly towards the sources of the Azava, and partly behind Gallegos, and, while in this situation, colonel O’Meara and eighty men of the Irish brigade were taken by Julian Sanchez; the affair having been, it was said, preconcerted, to enable the former to quit the French service.

On the 23d, two thousand French infantry and a squadron of cavalry marching out of Ciudad Rodrigo, made a sudden effort to seize the bridge of Marialva; but the passage was bravely maintained by captain Dobbs, with only a company of the fifty-second and some riflemen.

On the 25th, Massena reached Ciudad Rodrigo; and the 27th, his advanced guards felt all the line of the light division from Espeja to Marialva. Lord Wellington arrived on the 28th, and immediately concentrated the main body of the allies behind the Dos Casas river. The Azava being swollen and difficult to ford, the enemy continued to feel the line of the outposts; but, on the 2d of May, the waters having subsided, the whole French army was observed coming out of Ciudad Rodrigo, wherefore, the light division, after a slight skirmish of horse at Gallegos, commenced a retrograde movement, from that place and from Espeja, upon Fuentes Onoro. The country immediately in rear of those villages was wooded as far as the Dos Casas, but an open plain between the two lines of march offered the enemy’s powerful cavalry an opportunity of cutting off the retreat. As the French appeared regardless of this advantage, the division remained in the woods bordering the right and left of the plain until the middle of the night, when the march was renewed, and the Dos Casas was crossed at Fuentes Onoro. This beautiful village had escaped all injury during the previous warfare, although occupied alternately, for above a year, by both sides. Every family in it was well known to the light division, it was therefore a subject of deep regret to find that the preceding troops had pillaged it, leaving only the shells of houses where, three days before, a friendly population had been living in comfort. This wanton act, was so warmly felt by the whole army, that eight thousand dollars were afterwards collected by general subscription for the poor inhabitants; yet the injury sunk deeper than the atonement.

Lord Wellington had determined not to risk much to maintain his blockade, and he was well aware that Massena, reinforced by the army of the north and by the ninth corps, could bring down superior numbers. Nevertheless, when the moment arrived, trusting to the valour of his troops and the ascendancy which they had acquired over the enemy during the pursuit from Santarem, he resolved to abide a battle; but not to seek one, because his force, reduced to thirty-two thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry in bad condition, and forty-two guns, was unable, seeing the superiority of the French horse, to oppose the enemy’s march.

The allies occupied a fine table-land, lying between the Turones and the Dos Casas, the left at Fort Conception; the centre opposite to the village of Alameda; the right at Fuentes Onoro; the whole distance being five miles. The Dos Casas, flowing in a deep ravine, protected the front of this line, and the French general could not, with any prudence, venture to march, by his own right, against Almeida, lest the allies, crossing the ravine at the villages of Alameda and Fuentes Onoro, should fall on his flank, and drive him into the Agueda. Hence, to cover the blockade, which was maintained by Pack’s brigade and an English regiment, it was sufficient to leave the fifth division near Fort Conception, and the sixth division opposite Alameda. The first and third were then concentrated on a gentle rise, about a cannon-shot behind Fuentes Onoro, where the steppe of land which the army occupied turned back, and ended on the Turones, becoming rocky and difficult as it approached that river.

FIRST COMBAT OF FUENTES ONORO.

The French came up in three columns abreast, the cavalry, the sixth corps, and Drouet’s division against Fuentes Onoro; but the eighth and second corps against Alameda and Fort Conception, seeming to menace the left of the position; wherefore, the light division, after passing the Dos Casas, reinforced the sixth division. General Loison however, without waiting for Massena’s orders, fell upon Fuentes Onoro, which was occupied by five battalions of chosen troops, detached from the first and third divisions.

Most of the houses of this village were quite in the bottom of the ravine, but an old chapel and some buildings on a craggy eminence, overhung one end. The low parts were vigorously defended; yet the violence of the attack was so great, and the cannonade so heavy, that the British abandoned the streets, and could scarcely maintain the upper ground about the chapel. Colonel Williams, the commanding officer, fell badly wounded, and the fight was becoming very dangerous, when the twenty-fourth, the seventy-first, and the seventy-ninth regiments, coming down from the main position, charged so roughly, that the French were forced back, and, after a severe contest, finally driven over the stream of the Dos Casas. During the night the detachments were withdrawn; but the twenty-fourth, the seventy-first, and seventy-ninth regiments were left in the village, where two hundred and sixty of the allies and somewhat more of the French had fallen.

On the 4th Massena arrived, and, being joined by Bessieres with twelve hundred cavalry and a battery of the imperial guard, examined all the line, and made dispositions for the next day. His design was to hold the left of the allies in check with the second corps, but to turn the right with the remainder of the army.

Forty thousand infantry, and five thousand horse, with thirty pieces of artillery, were under arms, and they had shewn in the action of the 3d that their courage was not abated; it was, therefore, a very audacious resolution in the English general to receive battle on such dangerous ground. His position, as far as Fuentes Onoro, was indeed strong and free for the use of all arms, and it covered his communication by the bridge of Castello Bom; but, on his right flank, the plain was continued in a second steppe to Nava d’Aver, where a considerable hill overlooking all the country, commanded the roads leading to the bridges of Seceiras and Sabugal. The enemy could, therefore, by a direct march from Ciudad Rodrigo, place his army at once in line of battle upon the right flank of the allies, and attack them while entangled between the Dos Casas, the Turones, the Coa, and the fortress of Almeida; and the bridge of Castello Bom only would have been open for retreat. To prevent this stroke, and to cover his communications with Sabugal and Seceiras, lord Wellington, yielding to general Spencer’s earnest suggestions, stretched his right wing out to Nava d’Aver, the hill of which he caused Julian Sanchez to occupy, supporting him by the seventh division, under general Houston. Thus the line of battle was above seven miles in length, besides the circuit of blockade. The Dos Casas, indeed, still covered the front; but above Fuentes Onoro, the ravine became gradually obliterated, resolving itself into a swampy wood, which extended to Poço Velho, a village half way between Fuentes and Nava d’Aver. The left wing of the seventh division occupied this wood and the village of Poço Velho, but the right wing was refused.

BATTLE OF FUENTES ONORO.

It was Massena’s intention to have made his dispositions in the night, in such a manner as to commence the attack at day-break on the 5th; but a delay of two hours occurring, the whole of his movements were plainly descried. The eighth corps withdrawn from Alameda, and supported by all the French cavalry, was seen marching above the village of Poço Velho, and at the same time the sixth corps and Drouet’s division took ground to their own left, but still keeping a division in front of Fuentes. At this sight the light division and the English horse hastened to the support of general Houston; while the first and third divisions made a movement parallel to that of the sixth corps. The latter, however, drove the left wing of the seventh division, consisting of Portuguese and British, from the village of Poço Velho with loss, and was gaining ground in the wood also, when the riflemen of the light division arriving at that point, restored the fight. The French cavalry, then passing Poço Velho, commenced forming in order of battle on the plain, between the wood and the hill of Nava d’Aver. Julian Sanchez immediately retired across the Turones, partly in fear, but more in anger, at the death of his lieutenant, who, having foolishly ridden close up to the enemy, making many violent gestures, was mistaken for a French officer, and shot by a soldier of the guards, before the action commenced.

Montbrun occupied himself with this weak partida for an hour; but when the Guerilla chief had fallen back, the French general turned the right of the seventh division, and charged the British cavalry, which had moved up to its support. The combat was unequal; for, by an abuse too common, so many men had been drawn from the ranks as orderlies to general officers, and for other purposes, that not more than a thousand troopers were in the field. After one shock, in which the enemy were partially checked and the French colonel Lamotte taken fighting hand to hand, by general Charles Stewart, the cavalry withdrew behind the light division. Houston’s people, being thus entirely exposed, were charged strongly, and captain Ramsay’s horse-artillery was cut off and surrounded. The light division instantly threw itself into squares, but the main body of the French horsemen were upon the seventh division, ere a like formation could be effected: nevertheless the troops stood firm, and, although some were cut down, the chasseurs Brittaniques, taking advantage of a loose wall, received the attack with such a fire that the enemy recoiled. Immediately after this, a great commotion was observed amongst the French squadrons; men and officers closed in confusion towards one point where a thick dust was rising, and where loud cries and the sparkling of blades and flashing of pistols, indicated some extraordinary occurrence. Suddenly the multitude was violently agitated, an English shout arose, the mass was rent asunder, and Norman Ramsay burst forth at the head of his battery, his horses breathing fire and stretching like greyhounds along the plain, his guns bounding like things of no weight, and the mounted gunners in close and compact order protecting the rear. But while this brilliant action was passing in one part, the enemy were making progress in the wood, and the English divisions being separated and the right wing turned, it was abundantly evident that the battle would soon be lost, if the original position was not immediately regained.

In this posture of affairs lord Wellington directed the seventh division to cross the Turones and move down the left bank to Frenada, the light division to retire over the plain, the cavalry to cover the rear. He also withdrew the first and third divisions, placing them and the Portuguese in line on the steppe, before described as running perpendicular to the ravine of Fuentes Onoro.

General Crawfurd, who had resumed the command of the light division, first covered the passage of the seventh division over the Turones, and then retired slowly over the plain in squares, having the British cavalry principally on his right flank. He was followed by the enemy’s horse, which continually outflanked him, and near the wood surprised and sabred an advanced post of the guards, making colonel Hill and fourteen men prisoners, but then continuing their charge against the forty-second regiment, the French were repulsed. Many times Montbrun made as if he would storm the light division squares, but the latter were too formidable to be meddled with; yet, in all this war, there was not a more dangerous hour for England. The whole of that vast plain as far as the Turones was covered with a confused multitude, amidst which the squares appeared but as specks, for there was a great concourse, composed of commissariat followers of the camp, servants, baggage, led horses, and peasants attracted by curiosity, and finally, the broken piquets and parties coming out of the woods. The seventh division was separated from the army by the Turones, five thousand French cavalry, with fifteen pieces of artillery, were close at hand impatient to charge; the infantry of the eighth corps was in order of battle behind the horsemen; the wood was filled with the skirmishers of the sixth corps, and if the latter body, pivoting upon Fuentes, had issued forth, while Drouet’s divisions fell on that village, while the eighth corps attacked the light division, and while the whole of the cavalry made a general charge; the loose multitude encumbering the plain would have been driven violently in upon the first division, in such a manner as to have intercepted the latter’s fire and broken their ranks.

No such effort was made; Montbrun’s horsemen merely hovered about Crawfurd’s squares, the plain was soon cleared, the cavalry took post behind the centre, and the light division formed a reserve to the right of the first division, sending the riflemen amongst the rocks to connect it with the seventh division, which had arrived at Frenada and was there joined by Julian Sanchez.

At sight of this new front, so deeply lined with troops, the French stopped short, and commenced a heavy cannonade, which did great execution from the closeness of the allied masses; but twelve British guns replied with vigour and the violence of the enemy’s fire abated; their cavalry then drew out of range, and a body of French infantry attempting to glide down the ravine of the Turones was repulsed by the riflemen and the light companies of the guards. But all this time a fierce battle was going on at Fuentes Onoro. Massena had directed Drouet to carry this village at the very moment when Montbrun’s cavalry should turn the right wing; it was, however, two hours later ere the attack commenced. The three British regiments made a desperate resistance, but overmatched in number, and little accustomed to the desultory fighting of light troops, they were pierced and divided; two companies of the seventy-ninth were taken, colonel Cameron was mortally wounded, and the lower part of the town was carried; the upper part was, however, stiffly held, and the rolling of the musketry was incessant.

Had the attack been made earlier, and the whole of Drouet’s division thrown frankly into the fight, while the sixth corps moving through the wood closely turned the village, the passage must have been forced and the left of the new position outflanked; but now lord Wellington having all his reserves in hand, detached considerable masses to the support of the regiments in Fuentes. The French continued also to reinforce their troops until the whole of the sixth corps and a part of Drouet’s division were engaged, when several turns of fortune occurred. At one time the fighting was on the banks of the stream and amongst the lower houses; at another upon the rugged heights and round the chapel, and some of the enemy’s skirmishers even penetrated completely through towards the main position; but the village was never entirely abandoned by the defenders, and, in a charge of the seventy-first, seventy-ninth, and eighty-eighth regiments, led by colonel M’Kinnon against a heavy mass which had gained the chapel eminence, a great number of the French fell. In this manner the fight lasted until evening, when the lower part of the town was abandoned by both parties, the British maintaining the chapel and crags, and the French retiring a cannon shot from the stream.

Vol. 3. Plate 11.

Battle of FUENTES ONORO
5^TH MAY, 1811.

London Published by T. & W. Boone Nov^r 1830.

When the action ceased, a brigade of the light division relieved the regiments in the village; and a slight demonstration by the second corps near Fort Conception, having been repulsed by a battalion of the Lusitanian legion, both armies remained in observation. Fifteen hundred men and officers, of which three hundred were prisoners, constituted the loss of the allies; that of the enemy was estimated at the time to be near five thousand, but this exaggerated calculation was founded upon the erroneous supposition that four hundred dead were lying about Fuentes Onoro. All armies make rash estimates on such occasions. Having had charge to bury the carcasses at that point, I can affirm that, immediately about the village, not more than one hundred and thirty bodies were to be found, one-third of which were British.

During the battle, the French convoy for the supply of Almeida, being held at Gallegos, in readiness to move, lord Wellington sent Julian Sanchez from Frenada, to menace it, and to disturb the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. This produced no effect, and a more decisive battle being expected on the 6th, the light division made breast-works amongst the crags of Fuentes Onoro, while lord Wellington entrenched that part of the position, which was immediately behind this village, so that the carrying of it would have scarcely benefitted the enemy. Fuentes Onoro, strictly speaking, was not tenable; there was a wooded tongue of land on the British right, that overlooked, at half-cannon shot, all the upper as well as the lower part of the village both in flank and rear, yet was too distant from the position to be occupied by the allies: had Ney been at the head of the sixth corps, he would have quickly crowned this ridge, and then Fuentes could only have been maintained by submitting to a butchery.

On the 6th the enemy sent his wounded to the rear, making no demonstration of attack, and as the 7th passed in a like inaction, the British entrenchments were perfected. The 8th Massena withdrew his main body to the woods leading upon Espeja and Gallegos, but still maintained posts at Alameda and Fuentes. On the 10th, without being in any manner molested, he retired across the Agueda; the sixth and eight corps, and the cavalry, at Ciudad Rodrigo, the second corps by the bridge of Barba del Puerco. Bessieres also carried off the imperial guards, for Massena had been recalled to France, and Marmont assumed the command of the army of Portugal.

Both sides claimed the victory; the French, because they won the passage at Poço Velho, cleared the wood, turned our right flank, obliged the cavalry to retire, and forced lord Wellington to relinquish three miles of ground, and to change his front. The English, because the village of Fuentes so often attacked, was successfully defended, and because the principal object (the covering the blockade of Almeida) was attained.

Certain it is, that Massena at first gained great advantages. Napoleon would have made them fatal! but it is also certain that, with an overwhelming cavalry, on ground particularly suitable to that arm, the prince of Esling having, as it were, indicated all the errors of the English general’s position, stopped short at the very moment when he should have sprung forward. By some this has been attributed to negligence, by others to disgust at being superseded by Marmont; but the true reason seems to be, that discord in his army had arisen to actual insubordination. The imperial guards would not charge at his order; Junot did not second him cordially; Loison neglected his instructions; Drouet sought to spare his own divisions in the fight; and Reynier remained perfectly inactive. Thus the machinery of battle being shaken, would not work.

General Pelet censures lord Wellington for not sending his cavalry against Reynier after the second position was taken up; asserting that any danger, on that side, would have forced the French to retreat; but the criticism is unsustainable, being based on the notion that the allies had fifty thousand men in the field, whereas, including Sanchez’ Partida, they had not thirty-five thousand. It may Appendix, [No. I.] Section 8.be with more justice objected to Massena that he did not launch some of his numerous horsemen, by the bridge of Seceiras, or Sabugal, against Guarda and Celerico, to destroy the magazines, cut the communication, and capture the mules and other means of transport belonging to the allied army. The vice of the English general’s position would then have been clearly exposed, for, although the second regiment of German hussars was on the march from Lisbon, it had not passed Coimbra at this period, and could not have protected the depôts. But it can never be too often repeated that war, however adorned by splendid strokes of skill, is commonly a series of errors and accidents. All the operations, on both sides, for six weeks, furnished illustration of this truth.

Ney’s opposition had prevented Massena’s march upon Coria, which would have secured Badajos and Campo Mayor, and, probably, added Elvas to them. Latour Maubourg’s tardiness had like to have cost Mortier a rear guard and a battering-train. By refusing the line of Merida, Beresford enabled the French to secure Badajos. At Sabugal, the petulance of a staff-officer marred an admirable combination, and produced a dangerous combat. Drouet’s negligence placed Almeida at the mercy of the allies, and a mistaken notion of Massena’s sufferings during the retreat, induced lord Wellington to undertake two great operations at the same time, which were above his strength. In the battle of Fuentes Onoro, more errors than skill were observable on both sides, and the train of accidents did not stop there. The prize contended for presented another example of the uncertainty of war.

EVACUATION OF ALMEIDA.

General Brennier, a prisoner at Vimiero, and afterwards exchanged, was governor of this fortress. During the battle of Fuentes Onoro, his garrison, consisting of fifteen hundred men, skirmished boldly with the blockading force, and loud explosions, supposed to be signals of communication with the relieving army, were frequent in the place. When all hopes of succour vanished, a soldier, named Tillet, contrived, with extraordinary courage and presence of mind, to penetrate, although in uniform, through the posts of blockade, carrying Brennier orders to evacuate the fortress. The French general had, however, by crossing the Agueda, left Almeida to its fate; the British general placed the light division in its old position on the Azava with cavalry posts on the Lower Agueda, and desired sir William Erskine to send the fourth regiment to Barba del Puerco, while general Alexander Campbell continued the blockade with the sixth division and with general Pack’s brigade.

Campbell’s dispositions were either negligently made, or negligently executed. Erskine never transmitted the orders to the fourth regiment, and, in the mean time, Brennier, undismayed by the retreat of the French army, was preparing, like Julian Estrada, at Hostalrich, to force his way through the blockading troops. An open country and a double line of posts greatly enhanced the difficulty, yet Brennier was resolute not only to cut his own passage but to render the fortress useless to the allies. To effect this, he ruined all the principal bastions, and kept up a constant fire of his artillery in a singular manner, for always he fired several guns at one moment with very heavy charges, placing one across the muzzle of another, so that, while some shots flew towards the besiegers and a loud explosion was heard, others destroyed pieces without attracting notice.

At midnight of the 10th, all being ready, he sprung his mines, sallied forth in a compact column, broke through the piquets, and passed between the quarters of the reserves, with a nicety that proved at once his talent of observation and his coolness. General Pack following, with a few men collected on the instant, plied him with a constant fire, yet nothing could shake or retard his column, which in silence, and without returning a shot, gained the rough country leading upon Barba del Puerco. Here it halted for a moment, just as daylight broke, and Pack, who was at hand, hearing that some English dragoons were in a village, a short distance to the right, sent an officer to bring them out upon the French flank, thus occasioning a slight skirmish and consequent delay. The troops of blockade had paid little attention at first to the explosion of the mines, thinking them a repetition of Brennier’s previous practice; but Pack’s fire having roused them, the thirty-sixth regiment was close at hand, and the fourth, also, having heard the firing at Valde Mula, was rapidly gaining the right flank of the enemy. Brennier, having driven off the cavalry, was again in march; yet the British regiments, throwing off their knapsacks, followed at such a pace, that they overtook the rear of his column in the act of descending the deep chasm of Barba del Puerco, killed and wounded many, captured about three hundred, and even passed the bridge in pursuit; there however the second corps, which was in order of battle, awaiting Brennier’s approach, repulsed them with a loss of thirty or forty men. Had sir William Erskine given the fourth regiment its orders, the French column would have been lost.

Lord Wellington, stung by this event, and irritated by several previous examples of undisciplined valour, issued a remonstrance to the army. It was justly strong, and the following remarks are as applicable to some writers as to soldiers:—“The officers of the army may depend upon it that the enemy to whom they are opposed is not less prudent than powerful. Notwithstanding what has been printed in gazettes and newspapers, we have never seen small bodies, unsupported, successfully opposed to large; nor has the experience of any officer realized the stories which all have read of whole armies being driven by a handful of light infantry and dragoons.”