CHAPTER VI.
THIRD INVASION OF PORTUGAL.
Massena’s command, extended from the banks of the Tagus to the Bay of Biscay, from Almeida to Burgos, and the number of his troops present under arms exceeded one hundred and ten thousand men. From these must be deducted thirteen thousand in the Asturias and province of Santander, four thousand in the government of Valladolid, eight thousand under Serras at Zamora and Benevente, and lastly, the reserve of Bayonne under general Drouet, nineteen thousand strong, which, organized as a ninth corps had only entered Spain in August, being replaced at Bayonne by a fresh reserve under general Caffarelli. Thus, the active army of invasion did not much exceed seventy thousand; and as every man, combatant or non-combatant, is borne on the strength of a French army, not more than fifty-five thousand infantry and about eight thousand horsemen were with the eagles. The ninth corps had however orders to follow the traces of the prince of Esling, and the void thus left at Burgos and Valladolid was supplied by sixteen thousand of the young guard.
This arrangement shows how absurdly Napoleon has been called a rash warrior, and one never thinking of retreat. No man ever made bolder marches, but no man ever secured his base with more care. Here he would not suffer any advance to fresh conquests until his line of communication had been strengthened with three additional fortresses,—namely, Astorga, Ciudad, and Almeida; and while he employed sixty-five thousand men in the invasion of Portugal, he kept more than eighty thousand in reserve. Thus, even the total loss of the army destined to make what is technically termed “a point” upon Lisbon, would, as a mere military disaster, have scarcely shaken his hold of Spain.
Massena’s instructions were to convert, Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, into places of arms for the conquest of Portugal, and to move on both sides of the Tagus against Lisbon in the beginning of September. Either thinking his force too weak to act upon two lines at the same time, or trusting to the co-operation of Soult’s army from Andalusia, he relinquished the Alemtejo, looking only to the northern bank of the Tagus; and hence, as the experience of Junot’s march in 1807, warned him off the Sobreira mountains, his views were confined to the three roads of Belmonte, Celerico, and Viseu.
The strength of the positions about the Alva was known to him, as were also the measures taken to impede a descent from Covilhao to Espinhal; but Alorna, Pamplona, and the other Portuguese in the French camp, with a singular ignorance, Note by General Pelet.asserted that the road by Viseu and Coimbra was easy, and that no important position covered the latter town. Wherefore the French general resolved suddenly to assemble all his forces, distribute thirteen days’ bread to the soldiers, and pour in one solid mass down the right bank of the Mondego, not doubting to reach Coimbra before general Hill could join lord Wellington.
In pursuance of this project the three corps were directed to concentrate on the 16th of September; Reynier’s at Guarda; Ney’s, and the heavy cavalry, at Maçal da Chao, and Junot’s at Pinhel. By this disposition all three roads were alike menaced; and the allies being kept in suspense as to the ultimate object, Massena hoped to gain one march, a great thing, seeing that from Coimbra he was not more than a hundred miles, whereas Hill’s distance from that town was longer. But, to cover the real object with more care, and to keep Hill as long as possible at Sarzedas, the French general caused Guarda to be siezed on the 12th, by a detachment, which withdrew again immediately, as if it were only a continuation of the former feints; and meanwhile Reynier, having first ascertained that Mortier was at Monasterio, threatening Estremadura, suddenly destroyed the boat-bridge at Alcantara, and marched towards Sabugal.
On the 13th the allies re-established their post at Guarda; but on the 15th, it was again driven away by a considerable mass of the enemy, and retired up the side of the Estrella. At the same time the cavalry in front of Celerico was forced back in the centre, and the post at Trancoso chased towards Mongualde on the left. Lord Wellington then felt assured that the invasion was at last in serious progress; and having ascertained, beyond a doubt, that the troops in Guarda were of Reynier’s corps, despatched his final orders for Hill and Leith to concentrate on the Alva.
On the 16th, Reynier descended from Guarda to the plains bordering the Mondego; and being there joined by the sixth corps and Montbrun’s horsemen, the whole passed the river, and, pushing through Celerico, drove back the cavalry posts of the allies to the village of Cortiço; but there the first German hussars turning, overthrew the leading squadrons, and made some prisoners. Near Cortiço, the road branching off to the bridge of Fornos and to Gouvea; a French brigade took the latter to cover the march of the main body which made for Fornos. But this feint was closely watched; for there is a custom, peculiar to the British army, of sending mounted officers, singly to observe the enemy’s motions; and, such is their habit, that they will penetrate through the midst of his cantonments, cross the line of his movement, and hover, just out of musket-shot, for whole days, on the skirts of his columns, until they obtain a clear notion of the numbers and the true direction of the march. Colonel Waters, one of these exploring officers, being close on the left of Reynier’s troops during this day, reported their movements, and in the evening, leading some of the German cavalry behind the enemy, took several prisoners and the baggage of a general.
The French operations were decisive. Lord Wellington directed the first, third, and fourth divisions upon the Alva, withdrew his heavy cavalry from the front, and placed the light division at St. Romao, in the Estrella, to cover the head-quarters, which were transferred, that night, to Cea.
The 17th, the whole of the second and sixth corps were observed to pass the bridge of Fornos, and the advanced guard entered Mongualde; but the eighth corps still kept the road leading towards Oporto, for ten thousand militia of the northern provinces, forming the brigades of Trant, Wilson, and Miller, were collected upon the Douro to harass the enemy’s right flank and rear, and Trant, with about three thousand, was already at Moimenta de Beira, in the defiles leading through the hills to Lamego. The country between the Coa and Coimbra, on both sides of the Mondego, had been before laid waste, the mills were destroyed, the ordenança were in arms, and the helpless population hidden amongst the highest mountains.
On the 18th, the French advanced guard reached the deserted city of Viseu. Pack’s Portuguese brigade immediately passed the Mondego at Fosdao, and took post beyond the Criz; and general Pakenham, with a brigade of the first division, entered Coimbra, to protect it from the enemy’s scouting parties. On the 19th, captain Somers Cocks, a very gallant and zealous officer, commanding the cavalry post which had been driven from Guarda, came down from the Estrella, and following the enemy through Celerico, ascertained that neither sick men nor stores were left behind: hence it was evident that Massena, relinquishing his communications, had thrown his cavalry, infantry, artillery, parcs, baggage and hospital waggons, in one mass, upon the worst road in Portugal. The allies were now in motion also to cross the Mondego, when a false report, that the enemy was again on the left bank, arrested the general movement. The next day, however, the third, fourth, and light divisions, and the British cavalry passed the river at Pena Cova, Olivarez, and other places, and were distributed; the light division at Mortagao supporting Pack; the third and fourth in the villages between the Sierra de Busaco and Mortagao; and the horse on a plain in front of the latter place, connecting the light division with Pack’s brigade.
But the eighth corps still pointed towards the valley of the Vouga; and it was doubtful whether Massena would not that way gain the main road from Oporto to Coimbra; wherefore general Spencer, with the first division, marched upon Milheada, and Trant was directed to join him by a march through San Pedro de Sul to Sardao. Meanwhile Leith arrived on the Alva, and general Hill was only one march behind; for having discovered Reynier’s movements on the 12th, and, at the same time, getting intelligence that all the French boats on the Tagus had been destroyed, he, with a ready decision, anticipating lord Wellington’s orders, directed his artillery by Thomar, and putting his troops in motion that evening, reached Espisnal on the 20th, and was there joined by general Lecor, who, with equal vigour and judgement, had brought the Portuguese brigade, by long marches, from Fundao. On the 21st, Hill arrived on the Alva, and pushed his cavalry in observation beyond that river. Thus the two corps of the allied army were united on the same day that the main body of the enemy entered Viseu; and, although the French horsemen were on the Criz, the bridges had been destroyed by Pack; and the project of surprising Coimbra was baffled.
Neither had Massena failed to experience other evil consequences from his false movement. He had been obliged to repair the road from day to day for his artillery; and it was still twenty miles from Viseu on the 19th. Trant, aware of this, formed the hardy project of destroying it; and quitting Moimenta de Beira in the night, with a squadron of cavalry, two thousand militia, and five guns, on the 20th, surprised a patrole of ten men, from whom he learnt that the convoy was at hand, and that Montbrun’s cavalry was close in the rear. The defiles were, however, narrow, and, Trant charging the head of the escort, took a hundred prisoners and some baggage. The convoy then fell back, and the militia followed; the ways being so narrow that Montbrun could never come up to the front. At this time, a resolute attack would have thrown all into confusion, but the militia were unmanageable; and the enemy, having at last rallied a few men, and repulsed the Portuguese cavalry, with a loss of twelve troopers, the whole got into disorder, and Trant, seeing nothing more was to be effected, returned to Moimenta de Beira, and from thence marched to Lamego with his prisoners. The French, ignorant of the number and quality of their assailants, still fell back, and did not finally reach Viseu until the 23d; by which, Massena lost two most important days.
While these events were passing in the valley of Mondego, a small expedition from Cadiz again landed at Moguer, to aid Copons in collecting provisions on the Tinto. It was, however, quickly obliged to re-embark; and Copons was defeated by general Remond, with the loss of three hundred men on the 15th. Meanwhile, Romana attacked the French posts near Monasterio, pushing his cavalry towards Seville. Soult sent the fifth corps against him, and he retired; but was beaten at Los Santos on the same day that Copons had been defeated on the Tinto. The pursuit was continued to Fuente del Maestre; and the whole army was like to disperse in flight, when Madden’s Portuguese cavalry came up, and, charging the pursuers with signal gallantry, overthrew the leading squadrons, recovered some prisoners, and gained time for the Spaniards to rally. Nevertheless, the French entered Zafra, and Romana retreated, by Almendralejo and Merida to Montijo, on the 18th, throwing a garrison into Olivenza, and three battalions into Badajos. Being, however, sensible that the latter place was in no condition to resist a serious attack, he directed the Junta to repair to Valencia d’Alcantara, and took refuge himself at Elvas.
Lord Wellington’s anticipations were thus realized and the Alemtejo laid open. Fortunately for the allies, Sebastiani was at this moment near Carthagena in pursuit of the Murcian army, and a fresh insurrection breaking out in the mountains of Grenada the castles of Motril and Almunecar were taken; Copons also advanced to the Tinto, and all these calls upon Soult taking place at one time, he was unable to bring quite twelve thousand men to Zafra; a number inadequate to the invasion of the Alemtejo, the more especially that several regiments withdrawn from Cadiz, and others coming from England had reached Lisbon about this period, and formed a reserve for the allies, of more than five thousand British troops. Wherefore the French returned to Ronquillo, the Spaniards again advanced to Xeres de los Cavalleros, and Araceña, and this dangerous crisis glided gently away. But, to understand this, it is necessary to shew how encreasing political embarrassments had thwarted the original plan of the English general.
The first vexatious interference of the Souza faction had been checked, but the loss of Almeida furnished a favourable opportunity to renew their clamorous Appendix, [No. II.]hostility to the military proceedings. Falsely asserting, that the provisions of that fortress had been carried away by the English commissaries; and as falsely pretending that lord Wellington had promised to raise the siege, this party hypocritically assumed, that his expressions of sorrow for its fall were indications of an intention to remove by a splendid victory the public despondency. They vehemently insisted, also, on a defence of the frontier, inveighed against the destruction of the mills, and endeavoured Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.to force their own friends of the fidalgo faction even on to the staff of marshal Beresford, that they might the more readily embarrass the operations. Meanwhile, neglecting or delaying the measures agreed upon for laying waste the country, they protected the minor authorities when disobedient, refrained from punishing delinquents, and took every occasion to mislead the public mind at the very moment when the enemy commenced the invasion. Nor was there wanting either accident or indiscretion to encrease the growing confusion.
When Almeida fell, an officer of the guards writing to a friend at Oporto, indiscreetly asserted, that Massena was advancing in front with a hundred thousand French, and that eighty thousand more were moving in rear of the allies upon Lisbon. This letter being immediately made public, created such a panic amongst the English merchants, that one and all applied for ships to carry their families and property away, and there arose such a tumult that Trant was obliged to quit his command for the purpose of suppressing the commotion. To dry this source of mischief lord Wellington issued proclamations; and, in the orders of the day, declared that he would not seek to ascertain the author of this and similar letters, being assured that the feelings and sense of the officers would prevent any repetition.
To the regency he addressed himself in a more peremptory and severe manner, reproving them for the false colouring given to his communications, and informing them that he would never “permit public clamour and panic to induce him to change, in the smallest degree, a system and plan of operation which he had adopted after mature consideration, and which daily experience proved to be the only one likely to produce a good end.” But this remonstrance only increased the virulence of his opponents; and such was their conduct, that, before lord Wellington reached Busaco, he was obliged to tell them, “their miserable intrigues must cease or he would advise his own government to withdraw the British army.”
Meanwhile their proceedings had been so mischievously successful, that the country between the Mondego, the Tagus, and the Lines, still contained provisions sufficient for the French during the ensuing winter, and the people were alike unprepared to expect an enemy or to attempt a removal of their property.
Lord Wellington could but choose then, between stopping the invaders on the Mondego, or wasting the country by force as he retreated. But what an act the last! His hopes depended upon the degree of moral strength he was enabled to call forth, and he would have had to retire with a mixed force before a powerful army and an eminent commander, his rear guard engaged, and his advance driving miserable multitudes before it to the capital, where nothing was prepared to save them from famine, but where the violent and powerful faction in the regency was ready to misrepresent every proceeding, and inflame the people’s minds; and this, when the court of Rio Janeiro was discontented, and the English ministers, as I shall have occasion to shew, panic-stricken by the desponding letters of some general officers about the commander-in-chief! It was evidently necessary to fight, although Massena had above sixty thousand veterans, and lord Wellington could only bring about fifty thousand men into line, more than half of which were untried soldiers.
The consequences of such a battle were not, however, to be estimated by the result on the field. The French general might indeed gain every thing by a victory; but, if defeated, his powerful cavalry and the superior composition and experience of his army would prevent it from being very injurious; or a serious check might induce him to turn his attention from Coimbra towards Oporto, contenting himself with the capture of that city, and the reduction of the northern provinces, until more formidable preparations should enable him to renew his first design. Nor could the time thus gained by the allies be as profitably employed in the defence. The French could be reinforced to any amount, whereas the English general’s resources could not be much improved, and it was very doubtful if either England or Portugal would longer endure the war, without some palpable advantage to balance the misery and the expense.
Such was the state of affairs, when the allies passed to the right bank of the Mondego with a view to fight the battle thus forced upon their general. While the French remained concentrated at Viseu, the first division, under Spencer, was held at Milheada in observation of the great road from Oporto; the light division at Mortagao watching the road from Viseu, and the remainder of the army in reserve ready to move to either side. But when the French advanced guard had repaired the bridges over the Criz, and passed that river, lord Wellington recalled the first division, and fixed upon the Sierra de Busaco for his position of battle.
This mountain, about eight miles in length, abuts to the right on the Mondego, and on the left is connected with the Sierra de Caramula by a hilly rugged country, impervious to the march of an army. A road along the crest of Busaco afforded an easy communication, and at Pena Cova, just behind the right hand extremity, a ford in the Mondego permitted the troops to pass in a few hours to the Murcella ridge, behind the Alva. The face of Busaco was steep, rough, and fit for defence. The artillery of the allies fixed on certain points, could play along the front freely, and there was some ground on the summit suitable for a small body of cavalry; but neither guns nor horsemen of the enemy had a fair field, their infantry were to contend with every difficulty, and the approach to the position was also unfavourable to an attacking army.
After passing the Criz, a table-land permitted Massena to march, in a wide order of battle, to Mortagao; but then a succession of ascending ridges led to the Sierra Busaco, which was separated from the last by a chasm, so profound, that the naked eye could hardly distinguish the movement of troops in the bottom, yet in parts so narrow that twelve-pounders could range to the salient points on the opposite side. From Mortagao four roads conducted to Coimbra. The first, unfrequented and narrow, crossed the Caramula to Boyalva, a village situated on the western slope of that sierra, and from thence led to Sardao and Milheada. The other roads, penetrating through the rough ground in front, passed over the Sierra de Busaco; one by a large convent on the right hand of the highest point of the ridge; a second on the left hand of this culminating point, by a village called St. Antonio de Cantara; and a third, which was a branch from the second, followed the Mondego to Pena Cova.
When this formidable position was chosen, some officers expressed their fears that Massena would not assail it. “But, if he does, I shall beat him,” was the reply of the English general, who was well assured that the prince would attack; for his advanced guard was already over the Criz, the second and sixth corps were in mass on the other side of that river, and it was improbable that so celebrated a commander would, at the mere sight of a strong position, make a retrograde movement, change all his dispositions, and adopt a new line of operations by the Vouga, which would be exposed also to the militia under Baccellar. Massena was, indeed, only anxious for a battle, and, being still under the influence of Alorna’s and Pamplona’s false reports, as to the nature of the country in his front, never doubted that the allies would retire before him.