CHAPTER I.
STATE OF THE WAR IN SPAIN.
Northern Provinces. The invasion of Gallicia,1811. which had been arrested by the arrival of the allies on the Coa, would have been a most serious calamity. Abadia, a weak man, with troops, distressed for provisions and clothing, was on bad terms with the chief of his staff Moscosa, whom he feared, and on worse terms with the junta. The great road to Coruña[Appendix, No. V.] Section 1. was open, and although general Walker, seeing the danger, advised that Ferrol, which was indefensible, should be dismantled, and the guns, amounting to fifteen hundred, with the timber and vessels of war in the harbour, transferred to Coruña, neither that nor any other useful measure was executed.
Before this, overtures had been made to the Spanish government, to take Spanish troops into British pay after the manner of the Portuguese; but the regency remembering the prodigality of Canning demanded three millions yearly, besides arms and clothing, without which they said the Spaniards could make no efficient exertions! To introduce British officers into the service on any other terms was not possible, because the Spanish military were indignant at what they termed the degradation of such a proposal. The Perceval faction finding it thus, and wanting greatness of mind to support Wellington, on a scale commensurate with his talents, then turned their attention to the encouragement of the Partidas, as being less expensive, and affording an example to the continental nations of popular and protracted resistance to France.
Sir Howard Douglas, who succeeded general Walker as military agent, (these officers must not be confounded with the military agents originally sent out, and whose mischievous proceedings I have had occasion to notice,) was directed to encourage those bodies by increased supplies, and to combine their movements better with each other and with the British squadron in the Bay of Biscay. Lord Wellington at the desire of government, sentSir H. Douglas’s Correspondence, MSS. to the guerilla chiefs, military presents, with a letter acknowledging the importance of their services, and this was not mere compliment, for he had indeed derived great advantages from their exertions, and thought he had derived more, because he only knew of their exploits by hearsay. When he afterwards advanced into Spain and saw them closely, he was forced to acknowledge that the guerillas, although active and willing, and although their operations in general occasioned the utmost annoyance to the enemy, were so little disciplined that they could do nothing against the French troops unless the latter were very inferior in numbers. If the French took post in a house or church of which they only barricadoed the entrance, both regular troops and guerillas were so ill equipped as military bodies, that their enemy could remain in security until relieved. In like manner Napoleon reprimanding his generals for suffering the Partidas to gain any head, observed, that when cut off from communication with the English ships they were a nullity!
Douglas arrived just as Dorsenne’s retreat enabledSir H. Douglas’s Correspondence, MSS. Abadia to resume his position on the frontier, but the army was in a miserable state; the wet season was setting in upon men, destitute of even the necessaries of life, although the province abounded in cattle and goods, which could be easily procured, because money, although plentiful, was generally hoarded, and commodities were therefore cheap, and could be obtained in lieu of taxes at the market-price. An extraordinary increase of the customs, arising from the trade of Santander and Bilbao being transferred to Coruña by the war, also offered a valuable resource; the harbour was filled with colonial goods, and as the appetites of men generally stifle patriotism, and baffle power, a licensed commerce was carried on with the enemy’s ports in Biscay; yet without judgment as related to the war, for the return was iron, to re-export to the colonies, whereas by an internal traffic of the same kind, clothes and grain for the troops might have been had from Castile and Leon. But confusion and corruption every where prevailed, the exigences of the war were always the last things cared for, and the starving soldiers committed a thousand excesses with impunity, for where there is no food or pay, there can be no discipline.
The people were oppressed with imposts, legal and illegal, and yet the defalcation in the revenue was great, and the monopoly of tobacco the principal financial resource, was injured by the smuggling arising from the unsettled nature of the times. The annual charge on the province was about £1,300,000, the actual receipts were less than £500,000, and the junta endeavoured to supply the deficiency by an extraordinary contribution from all property, save that of day-labourers, which they expected would produce sixty millions of reals (£750,000). But a corrupt and vexatious collection of this tax tormented the people without filling the treasury; the clergy, and the richer classes, were, as in Portugal, favoured, and it yielded, in six months, less than a seventh part.
From this state of affairs two inferences may be safely drawn:—1º. That England and not Gallicia had hitherto supported the war here, as in other parts of the Peninsula. 2º. That as England had in 1808-9 paid to Gallicia three millions of hard dollars, and given other succours sufficient for double the number of troops employed, the deficiency of the revenue had been amply compensated, and the causes of distress must be sought for in the proceedings of the authorities, and in the anomalous nature of the war itself. The successive juntas, apprehensive of offending the people, were always inert in the civil administration, and either too corrupt, or too incapable, to apply the succours from England, justly or wisely. The junta of this period was, like its predecessors, factious and intriguing; it was hostile to the junta of Leon, unfriendly to that of Asturias, jealous and contemptuous of the military leaders; in return these last abhorred the junta, and were tormented with factions of their own. The regular officers hated the guerillas, and endeavoured to get the controul of the succours granted, by England, to the latter; and as they necessarily lived by plundering their own countrymen, they strenuously opposed the arming of the peasants, partly from fear lest the latter should resist this license, partly because the republican, and anti-English spirit, which was growing up in the cortes had also reached this quarter.
The clergy clung to the peasantry, with whom they had great influence, but the army, which had imbibed liberal words, rather than principles, was inimical to them. A press had been established at head-quarters, from whence issued political papers either original, or repeated from the libels at Cadiz, in which, the Portuguese were called slaves, for submitting to British influence; and it was openly avowed that the French yoke was preferable to that of England; the guerilla system, and the arming of the people were also attacked, and these writings were met by other political papers from the civil press at Coruña and St. Jago. The frequent changes of commanders rendered all the evils more prominent; for the local government had legal power to meddle with the military arrangements, and every change of commander produced a new difficulty. Thus the junta refused to acknowledge Abadia as their president during the absence of Castaños, he in return complained alike of their neglect and of their interference; and when they proposed to establish a general depôt at Lugo he marched a part of his army there to prevent it.
But the occult source of most of these difficulties is to be found in the inconsistent attempts of the British cabinet, to uphold, national independence with internal slavery, against foreign aggression, with an ameliorated government. The clergy who led the mass of the people, clung to the English, because they supported aristocracy and church domination; and they were also strongly for the Partidas, because these were commanded by men who sprung directly from the church itself, or from people who were attached to the church, while the regular armies being officered by the friends of the cortes, disliked the Partidas, both as interlopers and as political enemies. The English ministers, hating Napoleon, not because he was the enemy of England, but because he was the champion of equality, cared not for Spain, unless her people were enslaved. They were willing enough to use a liberal cortes to defeat Napoleon, but they also desired to put down that cortes, by the aid of the clergy, and of the bigoted part of the people: nevertheless as liberty will always have more charms than slavery, they would have missed of both objects, if the exigences of the continental system had not induced the emperor to go to Moscow, where the snow destroyed him; and if the very advocates of liberty in Spain had not in their madness, resolved to oppress the Americans. The cortes, by discovering a rabid love of power in practice, rendered their democratic doctrines suspected, and lost partizans; but lord Wellington, in support of aristocracy, used the greatest prudence in policy, and in his actions was considerate and just.
In the first conference held at Coruña, after sir1811. Sept. Howard Douglas’s arrival, the junta, as the usual preliminary, demanded more money from England; but he advised, instead, a better management of their own resources, and pointed out the military measures requisite to render the army efficient. He recommended the adoption of the line of retreat upon Orense, rather than upon Lugo and Coruña; and he endeavoured to establish a permanent depôt in the island of Arosa, on the Vigo coast, as a secure resource in the event of defeat; he also furnished the soldiers with shoes and great-coats, the hospitals with blankets, and completed the firelocks of the army to twenty-five thousand. There were however abuses, which he could not remedy, and which would seem rather to belong to the army of an Asiatic despot, than to an European force fighting for independence. Innumerable baggage animals devoured all the forage, and the personal servants and cooks, who from custom never did duty, were above[Appendix, No. I.] Section 1. five thousand! a sixth part of the whole force! When the sick men were deducted, scarcely sixteen thousand infantry and three squadrons of cavalry remained for service. Then there was so little organization or arrangement that, although young, robust, patient, and docile to the greatest degree, the troops could scarcely be moved, even from one quarter to another, as a military body; and the generals, unable to feed them on the frontier, more than once, menaced, and in December did actually retire to Lugo, leaving the province open to invasion.
Abadia at first exerted himself with activity, and appeared to enter loyally into the ameliorations proposed. He gave the command of the troops to Portasgo, repaired to Coruña himself, and organized the province in seven military governments, under as many chiefs, one for each division of the army. Every government was to raise a reserve, and to supply and clothe the corresponding division on the frontier. But in a little time this activity relaxed; he entered into various intrigues, displayed jealousy, both of the peasantry and the English, and no real improvement took place, save in that select part of the army, which the Cadiz regency had destined for South America, and had ordered him to equip from the English stores. This was done at the very moment when a French army on the frontier was again preparing to invade Gallicia, and sir Howard Douglas vehemently opposed the disloyal proceeding; the junta also were really averse to it, and Abadia pretended to be so; but he had a personal interest in the colonies and secretly forwarded the preparations. The regency, to evade Mr. Wellesley’s reproaches, promised to suspend the embarkation of these troops, but the expedition sailed from Vigo, and the organization of another, three times its strength, including all the best artillery in the province, was immediately commenced, and also sailed a few months later. This then was the state of Gallicia in the latter end of 1811. She was without magazines, hospitals, or system, whether civil or military, and torn by faction, her people were oppressed, her governors foolish, her generals bad: she had no cavalry, and the infantry were starving, although the province easily supplied cattle for the allies in Portugal. As a natural consequence, those famished soldiers were too undisciplined to descend into the plains of Leon, and were consequently of little weight in the general contest.
Under these circumstances, sir Howard Douglas1811. Nov. had nothing to work upon, save the Guerilla leaders, whose activity he very considerably increased. His policy was to augment the number of chiefs, but to keep the force of each low, lest, growing proud of their command, they should consider themselves generals, and become useless, as indeed had already happened to Campillo, Longa, and Porlier, when they were made a part of the seventh army. Nevertheless the advantage of this policy may be doubted, for of all the numerous bands in the north, seven only were not supported entirely by robbery. Mina, Pastor, Salazar, Pinto, Amor, and the curate, whose united forces did not exceedMr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS. ten thousand men, were sustained by regular taxes, customs, convent revenues, and donations; Longa supported his from the produce of the salt-mines of Paza, but all the rest were bandits, whose extinction was one of the advantages expected from the formation of the seventh army.
It is now convenient to resume the narrative of military events.
In the Asturias, previous to Mendizabal’s arrival, and when Bonet had marched to the Orbijo, Porlier surprised Santander, and plundered some houses; but being followed by general Caucault, a very active officer, he retired again to his strong-hold of Liebana. The British cruizers, in concert with whom he acted, then destroyed several coast-batteries, and the Iris frigate having arms on board, came to the Bay of Biscay for the purpose of arranging an intercourse with the Partidas of that province. But this was the period when Reille and Caffarelli, were, as I have before noticed, chasing Mina and Longa, whom they drove from the coast, into the mountains of Leon, and thus marred the object of the Iris. Nevertheless, when Mina was reinforced by the Valencians and other fugitives from Catalonia, he returned to Navarre, and there performed very considerable exploits, which, as belonging to other combinations of the war, will be hereafter noticed.
While Caffarelli and Reille thus scoured the line of communication, Dorsenne having the invasion of Gallicia in view, relieved Bonet on the Esla, and sent him early in November, with eight thousand men to re-occupy the Asturias as a preliminary measure. The Gallicians foreseeing this, had detached Moscoso with three thousand five hundred men to reinforce San Pol, who was at Pagares, below the passes leading from Leon; and on the other hand Mendizabal uniting the bands of Porlier and other chiefs, concentrated five thousand men to the eastward on the Xalon. Eleven thousand men were therefore ready to oppose the entrance of Bonet, but with the usual improvidence of the Spaniards, the passes of Cubillas and Ventana, to the westward of Pagares, were left unguarded. By these roads, Bonet, an excellent officer, turned Moscoso, and drove him down the Lena with loss and disgrace; then turning upon Mendizabal, he chased him also in disorder from Lanes into the Liebana.
All the civil authorities immediately fled to Castropol, the Spanish magazines fell into the hands of the French, and Bonet having resumed his old positions at Oviedo, Gihon, and Grado, fortified several posts in the passes leading to Leon, raised contributions, and effectually ruined all the military resources of the Asturias. The organization of the seventh army was thus for the time crushed, and in Gallicia great mischief ensued. For the return of Moscoso’s division and the want of provisions in the Bierzo, which had obliged Abadia to retire to Lugo, while Dorsenne was menacing the frontier, had thrown that kingdom into a ferment, which was increased by the imposition of the new contributions. The people became exceedingly exasperated and so unfavourably disposed, that it was common to hear themSir H. Douglas’s Correspondence, MSS. say, “the exactions of a French army were a relief in comparison to the depredations of the Spanish troops.”
During these transactions in the north, Drouet had joined Girard at Merida, and menaced the allies in the Alemtejo, hoping thus to draw Wellington from the Coa; but the demonstration was too feeble, and the English general thought it sufficient to reinforce Hill with his own brigade from Castello Branco. These movements were undoubtedly part of a grand plan for invading Portugal, if the emperor could have arranged his affairs peaceably with Russia. For to move once more against Lisbon, by Massena’s route, was not promising, unless the northern provinces of Portugal were likewise invaded, which required the preliminary occupation of Gallicia, at least of the interior. In the south also, it was advisable to invade Alemtejo, simultaneously with Beira; and the occupation of Valencia and Murcia was necessary to protect Andalusia during the operation. The plan was vast, dangerous, and ready for execution; for though the wet season had set in, an attack on the northern parts of Portugal, and the invasion of Gallicia, were openly talked of in Dorsenne’s army, Caffarelli was to join in the expedition, and Monthion’s reserve, which was to replace Caffarelli’s on the line of communication, was already six thousand strong. Ney or Oudinot were spoken of to command the whole, and a strong division was already in march to reinforce the army of the south, arrangements which could have reference only to Napoleon’s arrival; but the Russian war soon baulked the project, and Wellington’s operations, to be hereafter noticed, obliged Dorsenne to relinquish the invasion of Gallicia, and caused Bonet once more to abandon the Asturias.
Thus, with various turns of fortune, the war was managed in the northern provinces, and no great success attended the French arms, because the English general was always at hand to remedy the faults of the Spaniards. It was not so on the eastern line of invasion. There Suchet, meeting with no opponent capable of resisting him, had continued his career of victory, and the insufficiency of the Spaniards to save their own country was made manifest; but these things shall be clearly shewn in the next chapter, which will treat of the conquest of Valencia.