CHAPTER VI.
The English general having now achieved the1812. April. second part of his project, was desirous to fight a great battle in Andalusia, which would have been the crown of this extraordinary winter campaign; but the misconduct of others would not suffer him to do this. At Ciudad Rodrigo, the Spanish engineers had entirely ceased the repairs of the works; Carlos d’España besides neglecting to provision that place, had by his oppressive conduct alarmed all the people of the vicinity, and created a dangerous spirit of discontent in the garrison; Almeida was insecure, and Marmont’s army was already between the Agueda and the Coa.
It was essential to place those fortresses in safety, ere the march into Andalusia could take place; but the English general knowing that the danger in Beira was not very imminent, lingered a few days, hoping that Soult, in his anger at the loss of Badajos, would risk a blow on this side of the Morena; and he was certain, that the French general could not stop more than a few days, because of the secondary armies whose operations were then in progress.
Soult was indeed deeply affected by the loss of Badajos, but he was surrounded by enemies and the contest was too unequal. He had quitted Seville the 1st of April with twelve regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and one battery of artillery. His march was by Lora del Rio and Constantino upon Llerena; and, to impose upon the allies, general Gazan moved by the road of Monasterio with the remainder of the artillery and the baggage, escorted by Barois’ division of infantry, and some cavalry. But this column turned into the cross roads, at Santa de Guillena, and so reached Constantino, whence they followed the main body, and thus the whole army was concentrated at Llerena on the 6th. This circuitous march had been determined by the situation of Drouet and Daricau, who having been before driven into the mountains by the Cordova roads, could not rally upon the side of Monasterio; now however they advanced to Fuentes de Ovejuña, and the allies fell back to Albuera and Talavera Real.
On the 7th the French reached Villafranca and their cavalry entered Villalba and Fuente del Maestro. The 8th they were in march to fight, when the horsemen sent by Phillipon from Badajos, during the assault, brought the news of its fall; at the same moment their general was apprized, by his spies, that Marmont by whom he expected to be joined was in the north and could not assist him. He immediately fell back to Llerena, for the allies could then bring forty-five thousand men into action, and the French army though strongly constituted and the best troops in Spain did not exceed twenty-four thousand.
Soult had now little time to deliberate, for Penne Villemur and Morillo, issuing out of Portugal with four thousand men, had crossed the Lower Guadiana, and seized San Lucar de Mayor on the 4th. This place was ten miles from Seville, which was only garrisoned by a Spanish Swiss battalion in Joseph’s service, aided by “Escopeteros” and by the sick and convalescent men; the commandant Rignoux had therefore, after a skirmish, shut himself up in fortified convents. The 6th the Spaniards had occupied the heights in front of the Triana bridge, and the 7th attacked the French entrenchments, hoping to raise a popular commotion. But a worse danger was gathering on the other side, for Ballesteros, after the defeat of Maransin, at Cartama, had advanced with eleven thousand men intending to fall on Seville from the left of the Guadalquivir.
To distract the attention of the French, and to keep Laval from detaching troops to Seville, the Spanish general had sent Copons with four thousand men by Itar to Junquera, which is on the Malaga side of the Ronda; meanwhile he himself entered Los Barios with the rest of his army and thus threatened at once Grenada and the lines of Chiclana. At the same time all the smaller partidas of the Ronda were let loose in different directions, to cut the communications, to seize the small French magazines, and to collect the Spanish soldiers, who, at different periods, had quitted their colours and retired to their homes.
Copons remained at Junquera, but Ballesteros with three divisions commanded by Cruz Murgeon, the marquis de Las Cuevas, and the prince of Anglona, marched to Utrera as soon as Soult had departed from Seville; thus the communication of that city with Cadiz on one side, and with Malaga and Grenada on the other, was cut off. The situation of the French was very critical, and they wanted ammunition, because a large convoy, coming from Madrid, with an escort of twelve hundred men, was stopped in the Morena by the Partidas from the Ronda and from Murcia.
On the 6th the Spanish cavalry was within a few miles of Seville, when false information adroitly given by a Spaniard in the French interest, led Ballesteros to believe that Soult was close at hand, whereupon he immediately returned to the Ronda; the next day Penne Villemur having received notice from lord Wellington that the French would soon return, also retired to Gibraleon.
Ballesteros soon discovered the deceit, when, instead of returning to Seville, he on the 9th assaulted the small castle of Zahara in the hills, and being repulsed with considerable loss, made a circuit north of Ronda, by Albodonales, Alcala de Pruna, to Casarbonela, where he was rejoined by Copons. The division of Cuevas then marched against Ossuna, which being only garrisoned by “Escopeteros,” was expected to fall at once; but after two days combat and the loss of two hundred killed and wounded, the three thousand patriots retired, baffled by a hundred and fifty of their own countrymen fighting for the invaders.
When Cuevas returned, Ballesteros marched in three columns, by roads leading from Casarbonela and Antequera, to attack general Rey, who was posted with eighteen hundred men near Allora, on the Guadaljore river. The centre column was first engaged without any advantage, but when Rey saw the flank columns coming on, he retired behind the Guadalmedina river, close to Malaga, having lost a colonel and two hundred men in passing the Guadaljore.
After this action Ballesteros returned to the Ronda, for Soult was now truly at hand, and his horsemen were already in the plains. He had sent Digeon’s cavalry on the 9th to Cordoba, to chase the Partidas, and had ordered Drouet’s division to take post at Fuente Obejuna; then directing Peyreymont’s cavalry upon Usagre, he had come himself by forced marches to Seville, which he reached the 11th, hoping to surprise the Spaniards; but the stratagem, which had saved Seville on the 6th also saved Ballesteros, for general Conroux was coming up on the other side from the Guadalete and the Spaniards would have been enclosed but for their timely retreat. And scarcely had Soult quitted Llerena when the French met with a disaster near Usagre, which though a strong position had always proved a very dangerous advanced post on both sides.
Sir Stapleton Cotton, while following the trail of the enemy, on the evening of the 10th, had received intelligence that Peyreymont’s cavalry was between Villa Garcia and Usagre, and he immediately conceived hopes of cutting it off. To effect this Anson’s brigade, then commanded by colonel Frederic Ponsonby, moved during the night from Villa Franca upon Usagre, and at the same time Le Marchant’s brigade marched from Los Santos upon Benvenida to intercept the retreat on Llerena. Ponsonby’s advanced guard having commenced the action too soon, the French fell back, before Le Marchant could intercept them, but as some heights, skirting the Llerena road, prevented them from seeing that general, they again drew up in order of battle behind the junction of the Benvenida road.
The hostile bodies were nearly equal in numbers, about nineteen hundred sabres on each side, but sir Stapleton soon decided the action; for ably seizing the accidental advantage of ground he kept the enemy’s attention engaged by skirmishing with Ponsonby’s squadrons, while Le Marchant secretly passing at the back of the heights, sent the fifth dragoon guards against their flank, and the next moment Ponsonby charged their front. Thus assailed the French gave way in disorder, and being pursued for four miles left several officers and a hundred and twenty-eight men prisoners, and many were killed in the field. The loss of the British was only fifty-six men and officers, of which forty-five were of the fifth dragoon guards.
The beaten troops found refuge with Drouet’s infantry which had not yet left Llerena; but after this action, that general fell back with all his troops behind the Guadalquivir, for Soult was then preparing to fight the allies at Seville.
The duke of Dalmatia was well aware of Wellington’s intention to invade Andalusia. He knew exactly the amount and disposition of his forces, and was resolved to meet him coming out of the Morena, with all the French army united; neither did he doubt the final issue, although the failure of the last harvest and the non-arrival of convoys since February had lessened his resources. Wellington’s plan was however deferred. He had levelled his trenches, and brought two Portuguese regiments of infantry from Abrantes and Elvas to form a temporary garrison of Badajos, until some Spaniards, who had been landed at Ayamonte in March, could arrive; then giving over the charge of the repairs to general Hill, who remained with two divisions of infantry and three brigades of cavalry in Estremadura, he marched himself upon Beira, which Marmont was now ravaging with great cruelty.
That marshal had been anxious to unite with Soult in Estremadura, but the emperor’s orders were imperative, that he should make a diversion for Badajos by an irruption into Portugal. On the 14th of March he ascertained that none of Wellington’s divisions were left on the Agueda, and on the 27th he was ready to move. Bonet, reinforced by Carier’s brigade, was then on the Orbijo, in observation of the Gallicians; Ferrier’s division was at Valladolid, and Foy’s in the valley of the Tagus; but the other five divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry, had passed the mountains and concentrated on the Tormes, carrying with them fifteen days provisions, scaling-ladders, and the materials for a bridge. Both Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo were therefore in manifest peril, and Almeida which contained the allies’ battering train was still very[Appendix, No. VIII.] Section 1. incompletely fortified. Hence on the first rumour of Marmont’s movement, lord Wellington had thrown in two militia regiments, with a strong detachment of British artillery-men; the garrison was therefore three thousand six hundred strong, and the governor, colonel Le Mesurier, laboured hard to complete the defences.
Of the northern militia, which had been called out before the allies quitted the Coa, six thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry were under Silveira, three thousand infantry under Trant, the same number under John Wilson, and two thousand five hundred under Lecor. But the law was, that persons liable to serve should be enrolled by classes in rotation, and therefore the present men, with the exception of Silveira’s, were raw peasants totally unskilled in the use of arms. All these officers save Lecor, whose post was at Castello Branco, had been for some time in movement, and Trant and Wilson were on the 22d at Lamego, where general Bacellar, who commanded the province, fixed his head-quarters. Silveira had the same destination, but his march was slow, and his object rather to draw the wonder of his countrymen; for in his unquenchable vanity he always affected to act as an independent general.
When Trant was assured that Marmont’s direction would be on Ciudad, and not Oporto, he advanced from Lamego followed by Wilson, intending to take post on the Lower Coa. While in march he received Le Mesurier’s despatches, which induced him to make a forced march with one brigade to the Cabeça Negro mountain, behind the bridge of Almeida. His design was to break down the restored part of that structure, and so prevent the enemy from penetrating to Pinhel, where there was a magazine; and his march was well-timed, for two French divisions were then driving Carlos d’España over the plain beyond the Coa. It appeared that Marmont having come close to Ciudad Rodrigo on the 30th, the Spaniards and Victor Alter fell back from the Yeltes before him; and the latter, who had six hundred excellent German cavalry, immediately crossed the Agueda, and neither comprehending the spirit of lord Wellington’s orders, nor the real situation of affairs, retreated at once to Castello Branco, four long marches from Ciudad, thus leaving all the country open to the enemy’s marauding parties. Carlos d’España, who had eight hundred infantry, also retreated across the plain of the Cima de Coa to Fort Conception, but on the 3d the French, having laid their bridge at the ford of Caridad, passed the Agueda and drove him from thence, and he reached the Cabeça Negro in retreat with only two hundred men, at the very moment Trant arrived.
The latter seeing no French cavalry on the plain, and, being desirous of concerting his operations with Le Mesurier, immediately threw some skirmishers into the vineyards on the right of the road beyond the bridge, then escorted by some guides whom he had dressed in red uniform, he galloped to the glacis of the fortress, communicated with the governor, received from him a troop of English cavalry which happened to be in the place and returned at dusk. The Cabeça Negro was immediately covered with bivouac fires, and in the evening Le Mesurier sallied from the fortress, and drove back the enemy’s light troops. Two divisions of infantry had come against Almeida, with orders to storm it, but these vigorous actions disturbed them; the attempt was not made, and the general commanding excused himself to Marmont, on the ground that the sudden appearance of Trant, indicated the vicinity of British troops. In this false notion he marched the next morning up the Coa towards Alfayates, where Marmont met him with two other divisions, and eight squadrons of cavalry, having left one division to blockade Ciudad.
Trant now sent back the horsemen to Le Mesurier and marched to Guarda to cover the magazines and hospital at Celerico. Here he was joined by Wilson, and here he ought also to have been joined by Silveira; but that general instead of crossing the Douro on the 5th, and marching up to Guarda, only crossed it on the 14th, and then halted at Lamego. Thus, instead of twelve thousand infantry, and four hundred cavalry, who had seen some service, there were scarcely six thousand raw peasants, in a position, strong, if the occupying force had been numerous enough to hold the ridge of Porcas and other heights behind it, but a very dangerous post for a small force, because it could be turned by the right and left, and the line of retreat to the Mondego was not favourable. Neither had Trant any horsemen to scout, for Bacellar, a weak old man, who had never seen an enemy, was now at Celerico, and retained the only squadron of dragoons in the vicinity for his own guard.
This post Trant and Wilson held, with six thousand militia and six guns, from the 9th to the 14th, keeping the enemy’s marauders in check; and they were also prepared to move by the high ridge of the Estrella to Abrantes, if the French should menace that fortress, which was not unlikely. For Marmont had pushed forward on Sabugal, and Victor Alten, abandoning Castello Branco, while the French were still at Memoa, fifty miles distant from him, had crossed the Tagus at Vilha Velha, and it is said had even some thoughts of burning the bridge. The French parties then traversed the Lower Beira in every direction, plundering and murdering in such a shameful manner, that the whole population fled before them. However, general Lecor, a good soldier, stood fast with the militia at Castello Branco; he checked the French cavalry detachments, removed the hospitals and some of the stores, and when menaced by a strong force of infantry on the 12th, destroyed the rest of the magazines, and fell back to Sarnadas, only one short march on the road to Vilha Velha; and the next day when the French retired, he followed and harassed their rear.
Marmont’s divisions being now spread over the country in search of supplies, Trant formed the very daring design of surprising the French marshal himself in his quarters at Sabugal. Bacellar’s procrastinations fortunately delayed the execution of this project, which was undoubtedly too hazardous an enterprise to undertake with such troops; for the distance was twenty miles, and it was a keen observation of lord Wellington’s, when Trant adverted to the magnitude of the object, to say that, “In war nothing is so bad as failure and defeat.” This would undoubtedly have been the case here; for in the night of the 13th, that on which Trant would have made the attempt, Marmont having formed the design of surprising Trant,Marmont’s Official Reports, MSS. had led two brigades of infantry and four hundred cavalry up the mountain. He cut off the outposts, and was actually entering the streets at day-break, with his horsemen, when the alarm was beaten at Trant’s quarters by one drummer; this being taken up at hazard, by all the other drummers inGeneral Trant’s papers, MSS. different parts of the town, caused the French marshal to fall back at the moment, when a brisk charge would have placed every thing at his mercy, for the beating of the first drum was accidental, and no troops were under arms.
The militia immediately took post outside Guarda, but they had only one day’s provisions, and the French cavalry could turn their flank and gain Celerico in their rear, while the infantry attacked their front; the guns were therefore moved off under cover of the town, and the regiments, withdrawing in succession, retreated over three or four miles of open ground and in good order, although the enemy’s cavalry hovered close on the flank, and the infantry followed at a short distance. Further on, however, there was a wooded declivity, leading to the Mondego, and here, while the head of the troops was passing the river below, forty dragoons, sent up by Bacellar, the evening before, were pressed by the French, and galloped through the rear-guard of eight hundred infantry; these last seeing the enemy dismount to fire their carabines, and finding that the wet had damaged their own powder, fled also, and the French followed with hue and cry.
All the officers behaved firmly, and the Mondego was finally passed, yet in confusion and with the loss of two hundred prisoners; and Marmont might now have crossed the river, on the flank of the militia, and galloped into Celerico where there was nothing to defend the magazines; instead of which he halted and permitted the disorderly rabble to gain that place. Such however was his compassion, that when he found they were really nothing but poor undisciplined peasants he would not suffer his cavalry to cut them down and no man was killed during the whole action, although the French horsemen were actually in the midst of the fugitives. Bacellar having destroyed a quantity of powder at Celerico retreated with Trant’s people the next day towards Lamego; Wilson remained at Celerico, and when the enemy had driven in his outposts, he ordered the magazines to be destroyed, but the order was only partly executed when the French retired, and on the 17th the militia reoccupied Guarda.
This short campaign of the militia I have treated at length, because it produced an undue effect at the time, and because it shews how trifling accidents will mar the greatest combinations; for here the English general’s extensive arrangements for the protection of Beira were utterly disconcerted by the slow advance of Silveira on the one side, and the rapid retreat of general Alten on the other. Again, the French deceived by some red uniforms and by some bivouac fires, on the Cabeça Negro, had relinquished the attack of Almeida to run after a few thousand undisciplined militia men, who were yet saved by the accidental beating of a drum; and it is curious to find a marshal of France personally acting as a partizan, and yet effecting nothing against these miserable troops.
The disaster on the Mondego spread consternation as far as Coimbra, and the most alarming reports reached lord Wellington, whose operations it is now time to notice. When Soult’s retreat from Llerena was ascertained, the allied army had marched towards the Tagus, and on the 11th lord Wellington, hearing of Alten’s retreat, sent him orders to recross that river without delay and return to Castello Branco. The 16th the advanced guard of the army also reached that town, and the same day a militia officer flying from Coimbra in the general panic, came to head-quarters and reported that the enemy was master of that town; but the next hour, brought general Wilson’s report from Guarda, and the unfortunate wretch whose fears had led him to give the false information, was tried and shot by order of Beresford.
At this time the French army, in number about twenty-eight thousand, was concentrated, with the exception of Brennier’s division which remained near Ciudad Rodrigo, between Sabugal and the ridge of hills overlooking Penamacor. Marmont was inclined to fight, for he had heard of a convoy of provisions which lord Wellington had some days before sent by the way of Almeida to Ciudad, and intended to cut it off; but the convoy having reached Almeida was safe, and the French general’s own position was very critical. Almeida and the militia at Guarda were on his right flank, Ciudad Rodrigo was on his rear, and immediately behind him the Coa and the Agueda rivers were both swelled by heavy rains which fell from the 13th to the 19th, and the flood had broken the bridge near Caridad. There remained only the Puente de Villar on the Upper Agueda for retreat, and the roads leading to it were bad and narrow; the march from thence to Tamames was also circuitous and exposed to the attack of the allies, who could move on the chord through Ciudad Rodrigo. Marmont’s retreat must therefore have been effected through the pass of Perales upon Coria, and the English general conceiving good hopes of falling on him before he could cross the Coa, moved forward to Pedrogoa; but the rear of the army was not yet across the Tagus, and a sufficient body of troops for the attack could not be collected before the 21st. On that day, however, the Agueda having subsided, the French restored their bridge, the last of their divisions crossed it on the 24th, and Marmont thus terminated his operations without loss. After this he again spread his troops over the plains of Leon, where some of his smaller posts had indeed been harassed by Julian Sanchez, but where the Gallician army had done nothing.
The Portuguese militia were immediately disbanded, and the English general made the greatest exertions to revictual Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, intending when that was effected to leave Picton with a corps upon the Agueda, and march himself against Andalusia, following his original design. The first division, which had only reached Castello Branco, returned to Castello de Vide, and as Foy’s division had meanwhile reoccupied Truxillo, Hill advanced to observe him, and the fifth Spanish army returned to Estremadura. But the difficulty of supplying the fortresses was very great. The incursion of Marmont had destroyed all the intermediate magazines, and dispersed the means of transport on the lines of communication; the Portuguese government would not remedy the inconvenience either there, or on the other frontier, and Elvas and Badajos were suffering from the same cause as Ciudad and Almeida.
In this dilemma lord Wellington adopted, from necessity, a very unmilitary and dangerous remedy. For having declared to the members of the Portuguese government, that on their heads he would throw the responsibility of losing Badajos and Elvas, if they did not immediately victual both, a threat which had its due effect, he employed the whole of the carriages and mules attached to the army to bring up stores to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; meanwhile he quartered his troops near the points of water-carriage, that is to say, on the Mondego, the Douro, and the Tagus. Thus the army was spread from the Morena to the Tagus, from the Tagus to the Douro, from the Douro to the Mondego, on a line little less than four hundred miles long, and in the face of three hostile armies, the farthest of which was but a few marches from the outposts. It was however scarcely possible for the French to assemble again in masses, before the ripening of the coming harvest; and on the other hand, even the above measure was insufficient to gain time; the expedition against Andalusia was therefore abandoned, and the fifth great epoch of the war terminated.