CHAPTER II.
CAMPAIGN OF 1812.
1812. June. On the 13th of June, the periodic rains having ceased, and the field magazines being completed, Wellington passed the Agueda and marched towards the Tormes in four columns, one of which was composed of the Spanish troops. The 16th he reached the Valmusa stream, within six miles of Salamanca, and drove a French detachment across the Tormes. All the bridges, save that of Salamanca which was defended by the forts, had been destroyed, and there was a garrison in the castle of Alba de Tormes, but the 17th the allies passed the river above and below the town, by the deep fords of Santa Marta and Los Cantos, and general Henry Clinton invested the forts the same day with the sixth division. Marmont, with two divisions, and some cavalry, retired to Fuente el Sauco, on the road of Toro, followed by an advanced guard of the allies; SalamancaSee [Plan, No. 2.] instantly became a scene of rejoicing, the houses were illuminated, and the people shouting, singing, and weeping for joy, gave Wellington their welcome while his army took a position on the mountain of San Cristoval about five miles in advance.
SIEGE OF THE FORTS AT SALAMANCA.
Jones’s Sieges. Four eighteen-pounders had followed the army from Almeida, three twenty-four pound howitzers were furnished by the field-artillery, and the battering train used by Hill at Almaraz, had passed the bridge of Alcantara the 11th. These were theWellington’s despatches, MSS. means of offence, but the strength of the forts had been under-rated; they contained eight hundred men, and it was said that thirteen convents and twenty-two colleges had been destroyed in their construction. San Vincente, so called from the large convent it enclosed, was the key-fort. Situated on a perpendicular cliff overhanging the Tormes, and irregular in form, but well flanked, it was separated by a deep ravine from the other forts, which were called St. Cajetano and La Merced. These were also on high ground, smaller than San Vincente, and of a square form, but with bomb-proofs, and deep ditches, having perpendicular scarps and counterscarps.
In the night of the 17th colonel Burgoyne, the engineer directing the siege, commenced a battery, for eight guns, at the distance of two hundred and fifty yards from the main wall of Vincente, and as the ruins of the destroyed convents rendered it impossible to excavate, earth was brought from a distance; but the moon was up, the night short, the enemy’s fire of musketry heavy, the workmen of the sixth division were inexperienced, and at day-break the battery was still imperfect. Meanwhile an attempt had been made to attach the miner secretly to the counterscarp, and when the vigilance of a trained dog baffled this design, the enemy’s picquet was driven in, and the attempt openly made, yet it was rendered vain by a plunging fire from the top of the convent.
On the 18th eight hundred Germans, placed in the ruins, mastered all the enemy’s fire save that from loop-holes, and colonel May, who directed the artillery service, then placed two field-pieces on a neighbouring convent, called San Bernardo, overlooking the fort, however these guns could not silence the French artillery.
In the night, the first battery was armed, covering for two field-pieces as a counter-battery was raised a little to its right, and a second breaching battery for two howitzers, was constructed on the Cajetano side of the ravine.
At day-break on the 19th seven guns opened, and at nine o’clock the wall of the convent was cut away to the level of the counterscarp. The second breaching battery, which saw lower down the scarp, then commenced its fire; but the iron howitzers proved unmeet battering ordnance, and the enemy’s musketry being entirely directed on this point, because the first battery, to save ammunition, had ceased firing, brought down a captain and more than twenty gunners. The howitzers did not injure the wall, ammunition was scarce, and as the enemy could easily cut off the breach in the night, the fire ceased.
The 20th at mid-day, colonel Dickson arrived with the iron howitzers from Elvas, and the second battery being then reinforced with additional pieces, revived its fire, against a re-entering angle of the convent a little beyond the former breach. The wall here was soon broken through, and in an instant a huge cantle of the convent, with its roof, went to the ground, crushing many of the garrison and laying bare the inside of the building: carcasses were immediately thrown into the opening, to burn the convent, but the enemy undauntedly maintained their ground and extinguished the flames. A lieutenant and fifteen gunners were lost this day, on the side of the besiegers, and the ammunition being nearly gone, the attack was suspended until fresh stores could come up from Almeida.
During the progress of this siege, the general aspect of affairs had materially changed on both sides. Lord Wellington had been deceived as to the strength of the forts, and intercepted returns of the armies of the south and of Portugal now shewed to him, that they also were far stronger than he had expected; at the same time he heard of Ballesteros’s defeat at Bornos, and of Slade’s unfortunate cavalry action of Llera. He had calculated that Bonet would not quit the Asturias, and that general was in full march for Leon, Caffarelli also was preparing to reinforce Marmont, and thus the brilliant prospect of the campaign was suddenly clouded. But on the other hand Bonet had unexpectedly relinquished the Asturias after six days’ occupation; three thousand Gallicians were in that province and in communication with the seventh army, and the maritime expedition under Popham had sailed for the coast of Biscay.
Neither was the king’s situation agreeable. The Partidas intercepted his despatches so surely, that it was the 19th ere Marmont’s letter announcing Wellington’s advance, and saying that Hill also was in march for the north reached Madrid. Soult detained Drouet, Suchet refused to send more than one brigade towards Madrid, and Caffarelli, disturbed that Palombini should march upon the capital instead of Burgos, kept back the divisions promised to Marmont. Something was however gained in vigour, for the king, no longer depending upon the assistance of the distant armies, gave orders to blow up Mirabete and abandon La Mancha on one side, and the forts of Somosierra and Buitrago on the other, with a view to unite the army of the centre.
A detachment of eight hundred men under colonel Noizet, employed to destroy Buitrago, was attacked on his return by the Empecinado with three thousand, but Noizet, an able officer, defeated him and reached Madrid with little loss. Palombini’s march was then hastened, and imperative orders directed Soult to send ten thousand men to Toledo. The garrison of Segovia was reinforced to preserve one of the communications with Marmont, that marshal was informed of Hill’s true position, and the king advised him to give battle to Wellington, for he supposed the latter to have only eighteen thousand English troops; but he had twenty-four thousand, and had yet left Hill so strong that he desired him to fight Drouet if occasion required.
Meanwhile Marmont, who had remained in person at Fuente el Sauco, united there, on the 20th, four divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, furnishing about twenty-five thousand men of all arms, with which he marched to the succour of the forts. His approach over an open country was descried at a considerable distance, and a brigade of the fifth division was immediately called off from the siege, the battering train was sent across the Tormes, and the army, which was in bivouac on the Salamanca side of St. Christoval, formed in order of battle on the top. This position of Christoval was about four miles long, and rather concave, the ascent in front steep, and tangled with hollow roads and stone enclosures, belonging to the villages, but the summit was broad, even, and covered with ripe corn; the right was flanked by the Upper Tormes, and the left dipped into the country bordering the Lower Tormes, for in passing Salamanca, that river makes a sweep round the back of the position. The infantry, the heavy cavalry, and the guns crowned the summit of the mountain, but the light cavalry fell back from the front to the low country on the left, where there was a small stream and a marshy flat. The villages of Villares and Monte Rubio were behind the left of the position; the village of Cabrerizos marked the extreme right, though the hill still trended up the river. The villages of Christoval, Castillanos, and Moresco, were nearly in a line, along the foot of the heights in front, the last was somewhat within the allies’ ground, and nothing could be stronger than the position, which completely commanded all the country for many miles; but the heat was excessive and there was neither shade, nor fuel to cook with, nor water nearer than the Tormes.
About five o’clock in the evening the enemy’s horsemen approached, pointing towards the left of the position, as if to turn it by the Lower Tormes, whereupon the British light cavalry made a short forward movement and a partial charge took place; but the French opened six guns, and the British retired to their own ground near Monte Rubio and Villares. The light division which was held in reserve, immediately closed towards the left of the position until the French cavalry halted and thenSee [Plan, No. 3.] returned to the centre. Meanwhile the main body of the enemy bore, in one dark volume, against the right, and halting at the very foot of the position, sent a flight of shells on to the lofty summit; nor did this fire cease until after dark, when the French general, after driving back all the outposts, obtained possession of Moresco, and established himself behind that village and Castellanos within gun-shot of the allies.
The English general slept that night on the ground, amongst the troops, and at the first streak of light the armies were again under arms. Nevertheless, though some signals were interchanged between Marmont and the forts, both sides were quiet until towards evening, when Wellington detached the sixty-eighth regiment from the line, to drive the French from Moresco. This attack, made with vigour, succeeded, but the troops being recalled just as day-light failed, a body of French coming unperceived through the standing corn, broke into the village as the British were collecting their posts from the different avenues, and did considerable execution. In the skirmish an officer of the sixty-eighth, named Mackay, being suddenly surrounded, refused to surrender, and singly fighting against a multitude, received more wounds than the human frame was thought capable of sustaining, yet he still lives to shew his honourable scars.
On the 22d three divisions, and a brigade of cavalry joined Marmont, who having now nearly forty thousand men in hand, extended his left and seized a part of the height in advance of the allies’ right wing, from whence he could discern the whole of their order of battle, and attack their right on even terms. However general Graham advancing with the seventh division dislodged this French detachment with a sharp skirmish before it could be formidably reinforced, and that night Marmont withdrew from his dangerous position to some heights about six miles in his rear.
It was thought that the French general’s tempestuous advance to Moresco with such an inferior force, on the evening of the 20th, should have been his ruin. Lord Wellington saw clearly enough the false position of his enemy, but he argued, that if Marmont came up to fight, it was better to defend a very strong position, than to descend and combat in the plain, seeing that the inferiority of force was not such as to insure the result of the battle being decisive of the campaign; and in case of failure, a retreat across the Tormes would have been very difficult. To this may be added, that during the first evening there was some confusion amongst the allies, before the troops of the different nations could form their order of battle. Moreover, as the descent of the mountain towards the enemy was by no means easy, because of the walls and avenues, and the two villages, which covered the French front, it is probable that Marmont, who had plenty of guns and whose troops were in perfect order and extremely ready of movement, could have evaded the action, until night. This reasoning, however, will not hold good on the 21st. The allies, whose infantry was a third more and their cavalry three times as numerous and much better mounted than the French, might have been poured down by all the roads passing over the position at day-break; then Marmont turned on both flanks and followed vehemently, could never have made his retreat to the Douro through the open country; but on the 22d, when the French general had received his other divisions, the chances were no longer the same.
Marmont’s new position was skilfully chosen; one flank rested on Cabeza Vellosa, the other at Huerta, the centre was at Aldea Rubia. He thus refusedSee [Plan, No. 3.] his right and abandoned the road of Toro to the allies, but he covered the road of Tordesillas, and commanded the fort of Huerta with his left; and he could in a moment pass the Tormes, and operate by the left bank to communicate with the forts. Wellington made corresponding dispositions, closing up his left towards Moresco, and pushing the light division along the salient part of his position to Aldea Lengua, where it overhung a ford, which was however scarcely practicable at this period. General Graham with two divisions was placed at the fords of Santa Marta, and the heavy German cavalry under general Bock crossed the Tormes to watch the ford of Huerta. By this disposition the allies covered Salamanca, and could operate on either side of the Tormes on a shorter line than the French could operate.
The 23d the two armies again remained tranquil, but at break of day on the 24th some dropping pistol-shots, and now and then a shout, came faintly from the mist which covered the lower ground beyond the river; the heavy sound of artillery succeeded, and the hissing of the bullets as they cut through the thickened atmosphere, plainly told that the French were over the Tormes. After a time the fog cleared up, and the German horsemen were seen in close and beautiful order, retiring before twelve thousand French infantry, who in battle array were marching steadily onwards. At intervals, twenty guns, ranged in front, would start forwards and send their bullets whistling and tearing up the ground beneath the Germans, while scattered parties of light cavalry, scouting out, capped all the hills in succession, and peering abroad, gave signals to the main body. Wellington immediately sent Graham across the river by the fords of Santa Marta with the first and seventh divisions and Le Marchant’s brigade of English cavalry; then concentrating the rest of the army between Cabrerizos and Moresco, he awaited the progress of Marmont’s operation.
Bock continued his retreat in the same fine and equable order, regardless alike of the cannonade and of the light horsemen on his flanks, until the enemy’s scouts had gained a height above Calvarisa Abaxo, from whence, at the distance of three miles, they for the first time, perceived Graham’s twelve thousand men, and eighteen guns, ranged on an order of battle, perpendicular to the Tormes. From the same point also Wellington’s heavy columns were to be seen, clustering on the height above the fords of Santa Marta, and the light division was descried at Aldea Lengua, ready either to advance against the French troops left on the position of Aldea Rubia, or to pass the river to the aid of Graham. This apparition made the French general aware of his error, whereupon hastily facing about, and repassing the Tormes he resumed his former ground.
Wellington’s defensive dispositions on this occasion were very skilful, but it would appear that unwilling to stir before the forts fell, he had again refused the advantage of the moment; for it is not to be supposed that he misjudged the occasion, since the whole theatre of operation was distinctly seen from St. Christoval, and he had passed many hours in earnest observation; his faculties were indeed so fresh and vigorous, that after the day’s work he wrote a detailed memoir upon the proposal for establishing a bank in Portugal, treating that and other financial schemes in all their bearings, with a master hand. Against the weight of his authority, therefore, any criticism must be advanced.
Marmont had the easiest passage over the Tormes, namely, that by the ford of Huerta; the allies had the greatest number of passages and the shortest line of operations. Hence if Graham had been ordered vigorously to attack the French troops on the left bank, they must have been driven upon the single ford of Huerta, if not reinforced from the heights of Aldea Rubia. But the allies couldSee [Plan, No. 2.] also have been reinforced by the fords of Santa Marta and those of Cabrerizos, and even by that of Aldea Lengua, although it was not good at this early season. A partial victory would then have been achieved, or a general battle would have been brought on, when the French troops would have been disadvantageously cooped up in the loop of the Tormes and without means of escaping if defeated. Again, it is not easy to see how the French general could have avoided a serious defeat if Wellington had moved with all the troops on the right bank, against the divisions left on the hill of Aldea Rubia; for the French army would then have been separated, one part on the hither, one on the further bank of the Tormes. It was said at the time that Marmont hoped to draw the whole of the allies across the river, when he would have seized the position of Christoval, raised the siege and maintained the line of the Tormes. It may however be doubted that he expected Wellington to commit so gross an error. It is more likely that holding his own army to be the quickest of movement, his object was to separate the allies’ force in the hopes of gaining some partial advantage to enable him to communicate with his forts, which were now in great danger.
When the French retired to the heights at Aldea Rubia on the night of the 23d, the heavy guns had been already brought to the right of the Tormes, and a third battery, to breach San Cajetano, was armed with four pieces, but the line of fire being oblique, the practice, at four hundred and fifty yards, only beat down the parapet and knocked away the palisades. Time was however of vital importance, the escalade of that fort and La Merced was ordered, and the attack commenced at ten o’clock, but in half an hour failed with a loss of one hundred and twenty men and officers. The wounded were brought off the next day under truce and the enemy had all the credit of the fight, yet the death of general Bowes must ever be admired. That gallant man, whose rank might have excused his leading so small a force, being wounded early, was having his hurt dressed when he heard that the troops were yielding, and returning to the combat fell.
The siege was now perforce suspended for want of ammunition, and the guns were sent across the river, but were immediately brought back in consequence of Marmont having crossed to the left bank. Certain works were meanwhile pushed forward to cut off the communication between the forts and otherwise to straiten them, and the miner was attached to the cliff on which La Merced stood. The final success was not however influenced by these operations, and they need no further notice.
The 26th ammunition arrived from Almeida, the second and third batteries were re-armed, the field-pieces were again placed in the convent of San Bernardo, and the iron howitzers, throwing hot shot, set the convent of San Vincente on fire in several places. The garrison again extinguished the flames, and this balanced combat continued during the night, but on the morning of the 27th the fire of both batteries being redoubled, the convent of San Vincente was in a blaze, the breach of San Cajetano was improved, a fresh storming party assembled, and the white flag waved from Cajetano. A negociation ensued, but lord Wellington, judging it an artifice to gain time, gave orders for the assault; then the forts fell, for San Cajetano scarcely fired a shot, and the flames raged so violently at San Vincente that no opposition could be made.
Seven hundred prisoners, thirty pieces of artillery, provisions, arms, and clothing, and a secure passage over the Tormes, were the immediate fruits of this capture, which was not the less prized, that the breaches were found to be more formidable than those at Ciudad Rodrigo. The success of a storm would have been very doubtful if the garrison could have gained time to extinguish the flames in the convent of San Vincente, and as it was the allies had ninety killed; their whole loss since the passage of the Tormes was nearly five hundred men and officers, of which one hundred and sixty men with fifty horses, fell outside Salamanca, the rest in the siege.
Marmont had allotted fifteen days as the term of resistance for these forts, but from the facility with which San Vincente caught fire, five would have been too many if ammunition had not failed. His calculation was therefore false. He would however have fought on the 23d, when his force was united, had he not on the 22d received intelligence from Caffarelli, that a powerful body of infantry, with twenty-two guns and all the cavalry of the north, were actually in march to join him. It was this which induced him to occupy the heights of Villa Rubia, on that day, to avoid aConfidential official reports, obtained from the French War-office, MSS. premature action, but on the evening of the 26th the signals, from the forts, having indicated that they could still hold out three days, Marmont, from fresh intelligence, no longer expected Caffarelli’s troops, and resolved to give battle on the 28th. The fall of the forts, which was made known to him on the evening of the 27th, changed this determination, the reasons for fighting on such disadvantageous ground no longer existed, and hence, withdrawing his garrison from the castle of Alba de Tormes, he retreated during the night towards the Duero, by the roads of Tordesillas and Toro.
Wellington ordered the works both at Alba and the forts of Salamanca to be destroyed, and following the enemy by easy marches, encamped on the Guarena the 30th. The next day he reached the Trabancos, his advanced guard being at Nava del Rey. On the 2d he passed the Zapardiel in two columns, the right marching by Medina del Campo, the left following the advanced guard towards Rueda. From this place the French rear-guard was cannonaded and driven upon the main body, which was filing over the bridge of Tordesillas. Some were killed and some made prisoners, not many, but there was great confusion, and a heavy disaster would have befallen the French if the English general had not been deceived by false information, that they had broken the bridge the night before. For as he knew by intercepted letters that Marmont intended to take a position near Tordesillas, this report made him suppose the enemy was already over the Duero, and hence he had spread his troops, and was not in sufficient force to attack during the passage of the river.
July. Marmont, who had fortified posts at Zamora andSee [Plan, No. 3.] Toro, and had broken the bridges at those places and at Puente Duero and Tudela, preserving only that of Tordesillas, now took a position on the right of the Duero. His left was at Simancas on the Pisuerga, which was unfordable, and the bridges at that place and Valladolid, were commanded by fortified posts. His centre was at Tordesillas, and very numerous, and his right was on some heights opposite to Pollos. Wellington indeed caused the third division to seize the ford at the last place which gave him a command of the river, because there was a plain between it and the enemy’s heights, but the ford itself was difficult and insufficient for passing the whole army. Head-quarters were therefore fixed at Rueda, and the forces were disposed in a compact form, the head placed in opposition to the ford of Pollos and the bridge of Tordesillas, the rear occupying Medina del Campo and other points on the Zapardiel and Trabancos rivers, ready to oppose the enemy if he should break out from the Valladolid side. Marmont’s line of defence, measured from Valladolid to Zamora, was sixty miles; from Simancas to Toro above thirty, but the actual line of occupation was not above twelve; the bend of the river gave him the chord, the allies the arc, and the fords were few and difficult. The advantage was therefore on the side of the enemy, but to understand the true position of the contending generals it is necessary to know the secondary coincident operations.
While the armies were in presence at Salamanca, Silveira had filed up the Duero, to the Esla river, menacing the French communications with Benavente. D’Urban’s horsemen had passed the Duero below Zamora on the 25th and cut off all intercourse between the French army and that place; but when Marmont fell back from Aldea Rubia, D’Urban recrossed the Duero at Fresno de la Ribera to avoid being crushed, yet immediately afterwards advanced beyond Toro to Castromonte, behind the right wing of the enemy’s new position. It was part of Wellington’s plan, that Castaños, after establishing the siege of Astorga, should come down by Benavente with the remainder of his army, and place himself in communication with Silveira. This operation, without disarranging the siege of Astorga, would have placed twelve or fifteen thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, behind the Esla, and with secure lines of retreat; consequently able to check all the enemy’s foraging parties, and reduce him to live upon his fixed magazines, which were scanty. The usual Spanish procrastination defeated this plan.
Castaños, by the help of the succours received from England, had assembled fifteen thousand men at Ponteferada, under the command of Santocildes, but he pretended that he had no battering guns until sir Howard Douglas actually pointed them out in the arsenal of Ferrol, and shewed him how to convey them to the frontier. Then Santocildes moved, though slowly, and when Bonet’s retreat from the Asturias was known, eleven thousand men invested Astorga, and four thousand others marched to Benavente, but not until Marmont had called his detachment in from that place. The Spanish battering train only reached Villa Franca del Bierzo on the 1st of July. However the Guerilla chief, Marquinez, appeared about Palencia, and the other Partidas of Castile acting on a line from Leon to Segovia, intercepted Marmont’s correspondence with the king. Thus the immense tract called the Campo de Tierras was secured for the subsistence of the Gallician army; and to the surprise of the allies, who had so often heard of the enemy’s terrible devastations that they expected to find Castile a desert, those vast plains, and undulating hills, were covered with ripe corn or fruitful vines, and the villages bore few marks of the ravages of war.
While the main body of the Gallicians was still at Ponte Ferrada, a separate division had passed along the coast road into the Asturias, and in concert with part of the seventh army had harassed Bonet’s retreat from that kingdom; the French general indeed forced his way by the eastern passes, and taking post the 30th of June at Reynosa and Aguilar del Campo, chased the neighbouring bands away, but this movement was one of the great errors of the campaign. Napoleon and WellingtonKing’s papers captured at Vittoria, MSS. felt alike the importance of holding the Asturias at this period. The one had ordered that they should be retained, the other had calculated that suchWellington’s despatches, MSS. would be the case, and the judgment of both was quickly made manifest. For the Gallicians, who would not have dared to quit the Bierzo if Bonet had menaced their province by Lugo, or by the shore line, invested Astorga the moment he quitted the Asturias. And the Partidas of the north, who had been completely depressed by Mina’s defeat, recovering courage, now moved towards the coast, where Popham’s expedition, which had sailed on the 18th of June from Coruña, soon appeared, a formidable spectacle, for there were five sail of the line, with many frigates and brigs, in all twenty ships of war.
The port of Lesquito was immediately attacked on the sea-board by this squadron, on the land side by the Pastor, and when captain Bouverie got a gun up to breach the convent the Spanish chief assaulted but was repulsed; however the garrison, two hundred and fifty strong, surrendered to the squadron the 22d, and on the two following days Bermeo and Plencia fell. The Partidas failed to appear at Guetaria, but Castro and Portagalete, in the Bilbao river, were attacked the 6th of July, in concert with Longa, and though the latter was rebuffed at Bilbao the squadron took Castro. The enemy recovered some of their posts on the 10th, and on the 19th the attempt on Guetaria being renewed, Mina and Pastor came down to co-operate, but a French column beat those chiefs, and drove the British seamen to their vessels, with the loss of thirty men and two guns.
It was the opinion of general Carrol who accompanied this expedition, that the plan of operations was ill-arranged, but the local successes merit no attention, the great object of distracting the enemy was obtained. Caffarelli heard at one and the same time, that Palombini’s division had been called to Madrid; that Bonet had abandoned the Asturias; that a Gallician division had entered that province; that a powerful English fleet, containing troops, was on the coast, and acting in concert with all the Partidas of the north; that the seventh army was menacing Burgos, and that the whole country was in commotion. Trembling for his own districts he instantly arrested the march of the divisions destined for Marmont; and although the king, who saw very clearly the real object of the maritime expedition, reiterated the orders to march upon Segovia or Cuellar, with a view to reinforce either the army of the centre or the army of Portugal, Caffarelli delayed obedience until the 13th of July, and then sent but eighteen hundred cavalry, with twenty guns.
Thus Bonet’s movement which only brought a reinforcement of six thousand infantry to Marmont, kept away Caffarelli’s reserves, which were twelve thousand of all arms, uncovered the whole of the great French line of communication, and caused the siege of Astorga to be commenced. And while Bonet was in march by Palencia and Valladolid to the position of Tordesillas, the king heard of Marmont’s retreat from the Tormes, and that an English column menaced Arevalo; wherefore not being ready to move with the army of the centre, and fearing for Avila, he withdrew the garrison from that place, and thus lost his direct line of correspondence with the army of Portugal, because Segovia was environed by the Partidas. In this state of affairs neither Wellington nor Marmont had reason to fight upon the Duero. The latter because his position was so strong he could safely wait for Bonet’s and Caffarelli’s troops, and meanwhile the king could operate against the allies’ communications. The former because he could not attack the French, except at great disadvantage; for the fords of the Duero were little known, and that of Pollos was very deep. To pass the river there, and form within gun-shot of the enemy’s left, without other combinations, promised nothing but defeat, and the staff officers, sent to examine the course of the river, reported that the advantage of ground was entirely on the enemy’s side, except at Castro Nuño, half-way between Pollos and Toro.
While the enemy commanded the bridge at Tordesillas, no attempt to force the passage of the river could be safe, seeing that Marmont might fall on the allies’ front and rear if the operation was within his reach; and if beyond his reach, that is to say near Zamora, he could cut their communication with Ciudad Rodrigo and yet preserve his own with Caffarelli and with the king. Wellington therefore resolved to wait until the fords should become lower, or the combined operations of the Gallicians and Partidas, should oblige the enemy, either to detach men, or to dislodge altogether for want of provisions. In this view he urged Santocildes to press the siege of Astorga vigorously and to send every man he could spare down the Esla; and an intercepted letter gave hopes that Astorga would surrender on the 7th, yet this seems to have been a device to keep the Gallicians in that quarter for it was in no danger. Santocildes, expecting its fall, would not detach men, but the vicinity of D’Urban’s cavalry, which remained at Castromonte, so incommoded the French right, that Foy marched to drive them beyond the Esla. General Pakenham however crossed the ford of Pollos, with some of the third division, which quickly brought Foy back, and Marmont then endeavoured to augment the number and efficiency of his cavalry, by taking a thousand horses from the infantry officers and the sutlers.
On the 8th Bonet arrived, and the French marshal immediately extending his right to Toro, commenced repairing the bridge there. Wellington, in like manner, stretched his left to the Guarena, yet kept his centre still on the Trabancos, and his right at Rueda, with posts near Tordesillas and the ford of Pollos. In this situation the armies remained for some days. Generals Graham and Picton went to England in bad health, and the principal powder magazine at Salamanca exploded with hurt to many, but no other events worth recording occurred. The weather was very fine, the country rich, and the troops received their rations regularly; wine was so plentiful, that it was hard to keep the soldiers sober; the caves of Rueda, either natural or cut in the rock below the surface of the earth, were so immense and so well stocked, that the drunkards of two armies failed to make any very sensible diminution in the quantity. Many men of both sides perished in that labyrinth, and on both sides also, the soldiers, passing the Duero in groups, held amicable intercourse, conversing of the battles that were yet to be fought; the camps on the banks of the Duero seemed at times to belong to one army, so difficult is it to make brave men hate each other.
To the officers of the allies all looked prosperous, their only anxiety was to receive the signal of battle, their only discontent, that it was delayed; and many amongst them murmured that the French had been permitted to retreat from Christoval. Had Wellington been finally forced back to Portugal his reputation would have been grievously assailed by his own people, for the majority, peering through their misty politics, saw Paris in dim perspective, and overlooked the enormous French armies that were close at hand. Meanwhile their general’s mind was filled with care and mortification, and all cross and evil circumstances seemed to combine against him.
The mediation for the Spanish colonies had just failed at Cadiz, under such circumstances, as left no doubt that the English influence was powerless and the French influence visibly increasing in the Cortez. Soult had twenty-seven gun-boats in the Trocadero canal, shells were cast day and night into the city, and the people were alarmed; two thousand French had marched from Santa Mary to Seville, apparently to reinforce Drouet in Estremadura; Echevaria had effected nothing in the kingdom of Cordoba, and a French division was assembling at Bornos, to attack Ballesteros, whose rashness, inviting destruction, might alone put an end to the campaign in Leon and bring Wellington back to the Tagus. In the north of Spain also affairs appeared equally gloomy, Mina’s defeats, and their influence upon the other Partidas, were positively known, but the effect of Popham’s operations was unknown, or at least doubtful. Bonet’s division had certainly arrived, and the Gallicians who had done nothing at Astorga were already in want of ammunition. In Castile the activity of the Partidas instead of increasing, had diminished after Wellington crossed the Tormes, and the chiefs seemed inclined to leave the burthen of the war entirely to their allies. Nor was this feeling confined to them. It had been arranged, that new corps, especially of cavalry, should be raised, as the enemy receded in this campaign, and the necessary clothing and equipments, supplied by England, were placed at the disposal of lord Wellington, who to avoid the burthen of carriage had directed them to Coruña; yet now, when Leon and the Asturias were in a manner recovered, no man would serve voluntarily. There was great enthusiasm, in words, there had always been so, but the fighting men were not increased, and even the juramentados, many of whom deserted at this time from the king, well clothed and soldier-like men, refused to enter the English ranks.
Now also came the news that lord William Bentinck’s plans were altered, and the intercepted despatches shewed that the king had again ordered Drouet to pass the Tagus, but Soult’s resistance to this order was not known. Wellington therefore at the same moment, saw Marmont’s army increase, heard that the king’s army, reinforced by Drouet, was on the point of taking the field; that the troops from Sicily, upon whose operations he depended to keep all the army of Aragon in the eastern part of Spain, and even to turn the king’s attention that way, were to be sent to Italy; and that two millions of dollars, which he hoped to have obtained at Gibraltar, had been swept off by lord William Bentinck for this Italian expedition, which thus at once deprived him of men and money! The latter was the most serious blow, the promised remittances from England had not arrived, and as the insufficiency of land-carriage rendered it nearly impossible to feed the army even on the Duero, to venture further into Spain without money would be akin to madness. From Gallicia, where no credit was given, came the supply of meat, a stoppage there would have made the war itself stop, and no greater error had been committed by the enemy, than delaying to conquer Gallicia, which could many times have been done.
To meet the increasing exigences for money, the English general had, for one resource, obtained a credit of half a million from the Treasury to answer certain certificates, or notes of hand, which his Spanish correspondents promised to get cashed; but of this resource he was now suddenly deprived by the English ministers, who objected to the irregular form of the certificates, because he, with his usual sagacity, had adapted them to the habits of the people he was to deal with. Meanwhile his troops were four, his staff six, his muleteers nearly twelve months in arrears of pay, and he was in debt every where, and for every thing. The Portuguese government had become very clamorous for the subsidy, Mr. Stuart acknowledged that their distress was very great, and the desertion from the Portuguese army, which augmented in an alarming manner, and seemed rather to be increased than repressed by severity, sufficiently proved their misery. The personal resources of Wellington alone enabled the army to maintain its forward position, for he had, to a certain extent, carried his commercial speculations into Gallicia, as well as Portugal; and he had persuaded the Spanish authorities in Castile to give up a part of their revenue in kind to the army, receiving bills on the British embassy at Cadiz in return. But the situation of affairs may be best learned from the mouths of the generals.
“The arrears of the army are certainly getting to an alarming pitch, and if it is suffered to increase, we cannot go on: we have only here two brigades of infantry, fed by our own commissariat, and we are now reduced to one of them having barely bread for this day, and the commissary has not a farthing of money. I know not how we shall get on!”
Such were Beresford’s words on the 8th of July, and on the 15th Wellington wrote even more forcibly.
“I have never,” said he, “been in such distress as at present, and some serious misfortune must happen, if the government do not attend seriously to the subject, and supply us regularly with money. The arrears and distresses of the Portuguse government, are a joke to ours, and if our credit was not better than theirs, we should certainly starve. As it is, if we don’t find means to pay our bills for butcher’s meat there will be an end to the war at once.”
Thus stript as it were to the skin, the English general thought once more to hide his nakedness in the mountains of Portugal, when Marmont, proud of his own unripened skill, and perhaps, from the experience of San Cristoval, undervaluing his adversary’s tactics, desirous also, it was said, to gain a victory without the presence of a king, Marmont, pushed on by fate, madly broke the chain which restrained his enemy’s strength.