CHAPTER IV.
OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA AND ESTREMADURA.
1812. April. A short time previous to Hill’s enterprize against Almaraz, Soult, after driving Ballesteros from the Ronda, and restoring the communication with Grenada, sent three thousand men into the Niebla; partly to interrupt the march of some Spaniards coming from Cadiz to garrison Badajos, partly to menace Penne Villemur and Morillo, who still lingered on the Odiel against the wishes of Wellington. The French arguments were more effectual. Those generals immediately filed along the frontier of Portugal towards Estremadura, they were hastily followed by the Spanish troops sent from Cadiz, and the militia of the Algarves were called out, to defend the Portuguese frontier. Soult then remained on the defensive, for he expected the advance of lord Wellington, which the approach of so many troops, the seeming reluctance of the Spaniards to quit the Niebla, the landing of fresh men from Cadiz at Ayamonte, and the false rumours purposely set afloat by the British general seemed to render certain. Nor did the surprize of Almaraz, which he thought to be aimed at the army of the south and not against the army of Portugal, alter his views.
The great advantage which lord Wellington had gained by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos was now very clearly illustrated; for, as he could at will advance either against the north or the south or the centre, the French generals in each quarter expected him, and they were anxious that the others should regulate their movements accordingly. None would help the other, and the secret plans of all were paralyzed until it was seen on which side the thunderbolt would fall. This was of most consequence in the south, for Soult’s plans were vast, dangerous, and ripe for execution.
May. After the fall of Badajos he judged it unwise to persevere in pushing a head of troops, into Estremadura, while his rear and flanks were exposed to attacks from Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Murcia; but it was essential, he thought, to crush Ballesteros before his forces should be increased, and this was not to be effected, while that general could flee to Gibraltar on the one side, and Tarifa on the other. Whereupon Soult had resolved first to reduce Tarifa, with a view to the ruin of Ballesteros, and then to lay siege to Carthagena and Alicant, and he only awaited the development of Wellington’s menacing demonstrations against Andalusia to commence his own operations. Great and difficult his plan was, yet profoundly calculated to effect his main object, which was to establish his base so firmly in Andalusia that, maugre the forces in Cadiz and the Isla, he might safely enter upon and follow up regular offensive operations in Estremadura and against Portugal, instead of the partial uncertain expeditions hitherto adopted. In fine, he designed to make lord Wellington feel that there was a powerful army within a few marches of Lisbon.
Thinking that Carthagena and Tarifa, and even Alicant must fall, with the aid of Suchet, which he expected, or that the siege of the first would bring down Hill’s corps, and all the disposable Spanish troops to save it, he desired that the army of Portugal, and the army of the centre, should operate so as to keep lord Wellington employed north of the Tagus. He could then by himself carry on the sieges he contemplated, and yet leave a force under Drouet on the edge of Estremadura, strong enough to oblige Hill to operate in the direction of Carthagena instead of Seville. And if this should happen as he expected, he proposed suddenly to concentrate all his finely organized and experienced troops, force on a general battle, and, if victorious, the preparations being made before hand, to follow up the blow by a rapid march upon Portugal, and so enter Lisbon; or by bringing Wellington in all haste to the defence of that capital, confine the war, while Napoleon was in Russia, to a corner of the Peninsula.
This great project was strictly in the spirit of the emperor’s instructions. For that consummate commander had desired his lieutenants to make lord Wellington feel that his enemies were not passively defensive. He had urged them to press the allies close on each flank, and he had endeavoured to make Marmont understand that, although there was no object to be attained by entering the north-east of Portugal, and fighting a general battle on ground favourable to lord Wellington, it was contrary to all military principles, to withdraw several days’ march from the allies’ outposts, and by such a timid defensive system, to give the English general the power of choosing when and where to strike. Now the loss of Badajos, and the difficulty of maintaining a defensive war against the increasing forces of the allies in the south of Andalusia, rendered it extremely onerous for Soult to press Wellington’s flank in Estremadura; and it was therefore a profound modification of the emperor’s views, to urge the king and Marmont to active operation in the north, while he besieged Tarifa and Carthagena, keeping his army in mass ready for a sudden stroke in the field, if fortune brought the occasion, and if otherwise, sure of fixing a solid base for future operations against Portugal.
The duke of Dalmatia wished to have commenced his operations by the siege of Tarifa in May, when Wellington’s return to Beira had relieved him from the fear of an immediate invasion of Andalusia, but the failure of the harvest in 1811 and the continual movements during the winter, had so reduced his magazines, both of provisions and ammunition, that he could not undertake the operation until the new harvest was ripe, and fresh convoys had replenished his exhausted stores. His soldiers were already on short allowance, and famine raged amongst the people of the country. Meanwhile his agents in Morocco had so firmly re-established the French interests there, that the emperor refused all supplies to the British, and even fitted out a squadron to insure obedience to his orders. To counteract this mischief, the Gibraltar merchant, Viali, who had been employed in the early part of the war by sir Hew Dalrymple, was sent by sir Henry Wellesley with a mission to the court of Fez, which failed, and it was said from the intrigues of the notorious Charmilly who was then at Tangier, and being connected by marriage with the English consul there, unsuspected: indeed from a mean hatred to sir John Moore, there were not wanting persons in power who endeavoured still to uphold this man.
So far every thing promised well for Soult’s plans, and he earnestly demanded that all his detachments, and sufficient reinforcements, together with artillery, officers, money, and convoys of ammunition should be sent to him for the siege of Carthagena. Pending their arrival, to divert the attention of the allies, he repaired to Port St. Mary where the French had, from the circumstances of the war in Estremadura, been a long time inactive. He brought down with him a number of the Villantroy mortars, and having collected about thirty gun-boats in the Trocadero canal, commenced a serious bombardment of Cadiz on the 16th of May. While thus engaged, a sudden landing from English vessels was effected on the Grenada coast, Almeria was abandoned by the French, the people rose along the sea-line, and general Frere, advancing from Murcia, entrenched himself in the position of Venta de Bahul, on the eastern frontier of Grenada. He was indeed surprised and beaten with loss, and the insurrection on the coast was soon quelled, but these things delayed the march of the reinforcements intended for Drouet; meanwhile Hill surprised Almaraz, and Ballesteros, whose forces had subsisted during the winter and spring, upon the stores of Gibraltar, advanced against Conroux’s division then in observation at Bornos on the Guadalete.
This Spanish general caused equal anxiety to Soult and to Wellington, because his proceedings involved one of those intricate knots, by which the important parts of both their operations were fastened. Lord Wellington judged, that, while a large and increasing corps which could be aided by a disembarkation of five or six thousand men from the Isla de Leon, menaced the blockade of Cadiz and the communications between Seville and Grenada, Soult must keep a considerable body in observation, and consequently, Hill would be a match for the French in Estremadura. But the efficacy of this diversion, depended upon avoiding battles, seeing that if Ballesteros’ army was crushed, the French, reinforced in Estremadura, could drive Hill over the Tagus, which would inevitably bring Wellington himself to his succour. Soult was for the same reason as earnest to bring the Spanish general to action, as Wellington was to prevent a battle, and Ballesteros, a man of infinite arrogance, despised both. Having obtained money and supplies from Gibraltar to replace the expenditure of his former excursion against Seville, he marched with eight thousand men against Conroux, and that Frenchman, aware of his intention, induced him, by an appearance of fear, to attack an entrenched camp in a disorderly manner. On the 1st of June the battle took place, and Conroux issuing forth unexpectedly killed or took fifteen hundred Spaniards, and drove the rest to the hills, from whence they retreated to San Roque. How this victory was felt in Estremadura shall now be shewn.
The loss of Almaraz had put all the French corps in movement. A division of Marmont’s army crossed the Gredos mountains, to replace Foy in the valley of the Tagus, and the latter general, passing that river by the bridge of Arzobispo moved through the mountains of Guadalupe, and succoured the garrison of Mirabete on the 26th of May. When he retired the partidas of the Guadalupe renewed the blockade, and Hill, now strongly reinforced byJune. lord Wellington, advanced to Zafra, whereupon Drouet, unable to meet him, fell back to Azagua. Hill, wishing to protect the gathering of the harvest, then detached Penne Villemur’s horsemen, from Llerena on the right flank, and general Slade, with the third dragoon guards and the royals, from Llera on the left flank; General Lallemande, having a like object, came forward with two regiments of French dragoons, on the side of Valencia de las Torres, whereupon Hill, hoping to cut him off, placed Slade’s dragoons in a wood with directions to await further orders. Slade hearing that Lallemand was so near, and no wise superior to himself in numbers, forgot his orders, advanced and drove the French cavalry with loss beyond the defile of Maquilla, a distance of eight miles; and through the pass also the British rashly galloped in pursuit, the general riding in the foremost ranks, and the supports joining tumultuously in the charge.
But in the plain beyond stood Lallemand with his reserves well in hand. He broke the disorderly English mass thus rushing on him, killed or wounded forty-eight men, pursued the rest for six miles, recovered all his own prisoners, and took more than a hundred, including two officers, from his adversary; and the like bitter results will generally attend what is called “dashing” in war, which in other words means courage without prudence. Two days after this event the Austrian Strenowitz, whose exploits have been before noticed, marched with fifty men of the same regiments, to fetch off some of the English prisoners who had been left, by the French, under a slender guard in the village of Maquilla. Eighty of the enemy met him on the march, yet by fine management he overthrew him, and losing only one man himself, killed many French, executed his mission, and returned with an officer and twenty other prisoners.
Such was the state of affairs, when the defeat of Ballesteros at Bornoz, enabled Soult to reinforce Drouet, with Barois’s division of infantry and two divisions of cavalry; they marched across the Morena, but for reasons, to be hereafter mentioned, by the royal road of St. Ollala, a line of direction which obliged Drouet to make a flank march by his left towards Llerena to form his junction with them. It was effected on the 18th, and the allies then fell back gradually towards Albuera, where being joined by four Portuguese regiments from Badajos, and by the fifth Spanish army, Hill formed a line of battle furnishing twenty thousand infantry, two thousand five hundred cavalry, and twenty-four guns.
Drouet had only twenty-one thousand men, of which three thousand were cavalry, with eighteen pieces of artillery; the allies were therefore the most numerous, but the French army was better composed, and battle seemed inevitable, for both generals had discretionary orders. However the French cavalry did not advance further than Almendralejo, and Hill who had shewn himself so daring at Aroyo Molino and Almaraz, now, with an uncommon mastery of ambition, refrained from an action which promised him unbounded fame, simply because he was uncertain whether the state of lord Wellington’s operations in Castile, then in full progress, would warrant one. His recent exploits had been so splendid that a great battle gained at this time would, with the assistance of envious malice, have placed his reputation on a level with Wellington’s. Yet he was habituated to command, and his adversary’s talents were moderate, his forbearance must therefore be taken as a proof of the purest patriotism.
July. Early in July the French cavalry entered Almendralejo and Santa Marta, cut off two hundred Spanish horsemen, and surprised a small British cavalry post; Hill who had then received fresh instructions, and was eager to fight, quickly drove them with loss from both places. Drouet immediately concentrated his forces and retired to La Granja, and was followed by the allies, but the account of the transactions in Andalusia and Estremadura must be here closed, because those which followed belong to the general combinations. And as the causes of these last movements, and their effects upon the general campaign, are of an intricate nature, to avoid confusion the explanation of them is reserved for another place: meanwhile I will endeavour to describe that political chaos, amidst which Wellington’s army appeared as the ark amongst the meeting clouds and rising waters of the deluge.