CHAPTER VI.
POLITICAL STATE OF PORTUGAL.
1812. The internal condition of this country was not improved. The government, composed of civilians, was unable, as well as unwilling to stimulate the branches of administration connected with military affairs, and the complaints of the army, reaching the Brazils, drew reprimands from the prince; but instead of meeting the evil with suitable laws, he only increased Beresford’s authority, which was already sufficiently great. Thus while the foreigner’s power augmented, the native authorities were degraded in the eyes of the people; and as their influence to do good dwindled, their ill-will increased, and their power of mischief was not lessened, because they still formed the intermediate link between the military commander and the subordinate authorities. Hence what with the passive patriotism of the people, the abuses of the government, and the double dealing at the Brazils, the extraordinary energy of lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart was counterbalanced.
The latter had foreseen that the regent’s concessions at the time of Borel’s arrest would produce but a momentary effect in Portugal, and all the intrigues at Rio Janeiro revived when lord Wellesley disgusted with Perceval’s incapacity, had quitted the British cabinet. But previous to that event, Mr. Sydenham, whose mission to Portugal has been noticed, had so strongly represented the evil effects of lord Strangford’s conduct, that lord Wellesley would have immediately dismissed him, if Mr. Sydenham, who was offered the situation, had not refused to profit from the effects of his own report. It was then judged proper to send lord Louvaine with the rank of ambassador, and he was to touch at Lisbon and consult with lord Wellington whether to press the prince’s return to Portugal, or insist upon a change in the regency; meanwhile a confidential agent, despatched direct to Rio Janeiro, was to keep lord Strangford in the strict line of his instructions until the ambassador arrived.
But lord Louvaine was on bad terms with his uncle, the duke of Northumberland, a zealous friend to lord Strangford; and for a government, conducted on the principle of corruption, the discontent of a nobleman, possessing powerful parliamentary influence, was necessarily of more consequence than the success of the war in the Peninsula. Ere a fit successor to lord Strangford could be found, the prince regent of Portugal acceded to lord Wellington’s demands, and it was then judged expedient to await the effect of this change of policy. Meanwhile the dissensions, which led to the change of ministry arose, and occupied the attention of the English cabinet to the exclusion of all other affairs. Thus lord Strangford’s career was for some time uncontrolled, yet after several severe rebukes from lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, it was at last arrested, by a conviction that his tenure of place depended upon their will.
However, prior to this salutary check on the Brazilian intrigues, lord Wellesley had so far intimidated the prince regent of Portugal, that besides assenting to the reforms, he despatched Mr. DeLemos from Rio Janeiro, furnished with authority for Beresford to act despotically in all things connected with the administration of the army. Moreover lord Wellington was empowered to dismiss Principal Souza from the regency; and lord Castlereagh, following up his predecessor’s policy on this head, insisted that all the obnoxious members of the regency should be set aside and others appointed. And these blows at the power of the Souza faction, were accompanied by the death of Linhares, the head of the family, an event which paralyzed the court of Rio Janeiro for a considerable time; nevertheless the Souzas were still so strong, that Domingo Souza, now Count of Funchal, was appointed prime minister, although he retained his situation as ambassador to the English court, and continued to reside in London.
Lord Wellington, whose long experience of Indian intrigues rendered him the fittest person possible to deal with the exactions, and political cunning of a people who so much resemble Asiatics, now opposed the removal of the obnoxious members from the regency. He would not even dismiss the Principal Souza; for with a refined policy he argued, that the opposition to his measures arose, as much from the national, as from the individual character of the Portuguese authorities, several of whom were under the displeasure of their own court, and consequently dependent upon the British power, for support against their enemies. There were amongst them also, persons of great ability, and hence no beneficial change could be expected, because the influence already gained would be lost with new men. The latter would have the same faults, with less talent, and less dependence on the British power, and the dismissed ministers would become active enemies. The patriarch would go to Oporto, where his power to do mischief would be greatly increased, and Principal Souza would then be made patriarch. It was indeed very desirable to drive this man, whose absurdity was so great as to create a suspicion of insanity, from the regency, but he could neither be persuaded, nor forced, to quit Portugal. His dismissal had been extorted from the prince by the power of the British government, he would therefore maintain his secret influence over the civil administration, he would be considered a martyr to foreign influence, which would increase his popularity, and his power would be augmented by the sanctity of his character as patriarch. Very little advantage could then be derived from a change, and any reform would be attributed to the English influence, against which the numerous interests, involved in the preservation of abuses, would instantly combine with active enmity.
On the other hand, the government of Portugal had never yet laid the real nature of the war fairly before the people. The latter had been deceived, flattered, cajoled, their prowess in the field extolled beyond reason, and the enemy spoken of contemptuously; but the resources of the nation, which essentially consisted neither in its armies, nor in its revenue, nor in its boasting, but in the sacrificing of all interests to the prosecution of the contest, had never been vigorously used to meet the emergencies of the war. The regency had neither appealed to the patriotism of the population nor yet enforced sacrifices, by measures, which were absolutely necessary, because as the English general honestly observed, no people would ever voluntarily bear such enormous, though necessary burthens; strong laws and heavy penalties could alone insure obedience. The Portuguese government relied upon England, and her subsidies, and resisted all measures which could render their natural resources more available. Their subordinates on the same principle executed corruptly and vexatiously, or evaded, the military regulations, and the chief supporters of all this mischief were the Principal and his faction.
Thus dragged by opposing forces, and environed with difficulties, Wellington took a middle course. That is, he strove by reproaches and by redoubled activity, to stimulate the patriotism of the authorities; he desired the British ministers at Lisbon, and at Rio Janeiro, to paint the dangerous state of Portugal in vivid colours, and to urge the prince regent in the strongest manner, to enforce the reform of those gross abuses, which in the taxes, in the customs, in the general expenditure, and in the execution of orders by the inferior magistrates, were withering the strength of the nation. At the same time, amidst the turmoil of his duties in the field, sometimes actually from the field of battle itself, he transmitted memoirs upon the nature of these different evils, and the remedies for them; memoirs which will attest to the latest posterity the greatness and vigour of his capacity.
These efforts, aided by the suspension of the subsidy, produced partial reforms, yet the natural weakness of character and obstinacy of the prince regent, were insurmountable obstacles to any general or permanent cure; the first defect rendered him the tool of the court intriguers, and the second was to be warily dealt with, lest some dogged conduct should oblige Wellington to put his often repeated threat, of abandoning the country, into execution. The success of the contest was in fact of more importance to England, than to Portugal, and this occult knot could neither be untied nor cut; the difficulty could with appliances be lessened, but might not be swept away; hence the British general involved in ceaseless disputes, and suffering hourly mortifications, the least of which would have broken the spirit of an ordinary man, had to struggle as he could to victory.
Viewing the contest as one of life or death to Portugal, he desired to make the whole political economy of the state a simple provision for the war, and when thwarted, his reproaches were as bitter as they were just; nevertheless, the men to whom they were addressed, were not devoid of merit. In after times, while complaining that he could find no persons of talent in Spain, he admitted that amongst the Portuguese, Redondo possessed both probity and ability, that Nogueira was a statesman of capacity equal to the discussion of great questions, and that no sovereign in Europe had a better public servant than Forjas. Even the restless Principal disinterestedly prosecuted measures, for forcing the clergy to pay their just share of the imposts. But greatness of mind, on great occasions, is a rare quality. Most of the Portuguese considered the sacrifices demanded, a sharper ill than submission, and it was impossible to unite entire obedience to the will of the British authorities, with an energetic, original spirit, in the native government. The Souza faction was always violent and foolish; the milder opposition of the three gentlemen, above mentioned, was excusable. Lord Wellington, a foreigner, was serving his own country, pleasing his own government, and forwarding his own fortune, final success was sure to send him to England, resplendent with glory, and beyond the reach of Portuguese ill-will. The native authorities had no such prospects. Their exertions brought little of personal fame, they were disliked by their own prince, hated by his favourites, and they feared to excite the enmity of the people, by a vigour, which, being unpleasing to their sovereign, would inevitably draw evil upon themselves; from the French if the invasion succeeded, from their own court if the independence of the country should be ultimately obtained.
But thus much conceded, for the sake of justice, it is yet to be affirmed, with truth, that the conduct of the Portuguese and Brazilian governments was always unwise, often base. Notwithstanding the prince’s concessions, it was scarcely possible to remedy any abuses. The Lisbon government substituting evasive for active opposition, baffled Wellington and Stuart, by proposing inadequate laws, or by suffering the execution of effectual measures to be neglected with impunity; and the treaty of commerce with England always supplied them a source of dispute, partly from its natural difficulties, partly from their own bad faith. The general’s labours were thus multiplied not abated by his new powers, and in measuring these labours, it is to be noted, so entirely did Portugal depend upon England, that Wellington instead of drawing provisions for his army from the country, in a manner fed the whole nation, and was often forced to keep the army magazines low, that the people might live. This is proved by the importation of rice, flour, beef, and pork from America, which increased, each year of the war, in a surprising manner, the price keeping pace with the quantity, while the importation of dried fish, the ordinary food of the Portuguese, decreased.
Pitkin’s Statistic Tables. In 1808 the supply of flour and wheat, from New York, was sixty thousand barrels. In 1811 six hundred thousand; in 1813, between seven and eight hundred thousand. Ireland, England, Egypt, Barbary, Sicily, the Brazils, parts of Spain, and even France, also contributed to the consumption, which greatly exceeded the natural means of Portugal; English treasure therefore either directly or indirectly, furnished the nation as well as the armies.
The peace revenue of Portugal, including the Brazils, the colonies, and the islands, even in the most flourishing periods, had never exceeded thirty-six millions of cruzada novas; but in 1811, although Portugal alone raised twenty-five millions, this sum, added to the British subsidy, fell very short of the actual expenditure; yet economy was opposed by the local government, the prince was continually creating useless offices for his favourites, and encouraging law-suits and appeals to Rio Janeiro. The troops and fortresses were neglected, although the military branches of expense amounted to more than three-fourths of the whole receipts; and though Mr. Stuart engaged that England either by treaty or tribute would keep the Algerines quiet, he could not obtain the suppression of the Portuguese navy, which always fled from the barbarians. It was not until the middle of the year 1812, when admiral Berkeley, whose proceedings had at times produced considerable inconvenience, was recalled, that Mr. Stuart, with the aid of admiral Martin, who succeeded Berkeley, without a seat in the regency, effected this naval reform.
The government, rather than adopt the measures suggested by Wellington, such as keeping up the credit of the paper-money, by regular payments of the interest, the fair and general collection of the “Decima,” and the repression of abuses in the custom-house, in the arsenal, and in the militia, always more costly than the line, projected the issuing of fresh paper, and endeavoured, by unworthy stock-jobbing schemes, to evade instead of meeting the difficulties of the times. To check their folly the general withheld the subsidy, and refused to receive their depreciated paper into the military chest; but neither did this vigorous proceeding produce more than a momentary return to honesty, and meanwhile, the working people were so cruelly oppressed that they would not labour for the public, except under the direction of British officers. Force alone could overcome their repugnance and force was employed, not to forward the defence of the country, but to meet particular interests and to support abuses. Such also was the general baseness of the Fidalgos, that even the charitable aid of money, received from England, was shamefully and greedily claimed by the rich, who insisted, that it was a donation to all and to be equally divided.
Confusion and injustice prevailed every where, and Wellington’s energies were squandered on vexatious details; at one time he was remonstrating against the oppression of the working people, and devising remedies for local abuses; at another superintending the application of the English charities, and arranging the measures necessary to revive agriculture in the devastated districts; at all times endeavouring to reform the general administration, and in no case was he supported. Never during the war did he find an appeal to the patriotism of the Portuguese government answered frankly; never did he propose a measure which was accepted without difficulties. This opposition was at times carried to such a ridiculous extent, that when some Portuguese nobles in the French service took refuge with the curate Merino, and desired from their own government, a promise of safety, to which they were really entitled, the regency refused to give that assurance; nor would they publish an amnesty, which the English general desired for the sake of justice and from policy also, because valuable information as to the French army, could have been thus obtained. The authorities would neither say yes! nor no! and when general Pamplona applied to Wellington personally for some assurance, the latter could only answer that in like cases Mascarheñas had been hanged and Sabugal rewarded!
To force a change in the whole spirit, and action of the government, seemed to some, the only remedy for the distemperature of the time; but this might have produced anarchy, and would have given countenance to the democratic spirit, contrary to the general policy of the British government. Wellington therefore desired rather to have the prince regent at Lisbon, or the Azores, whence his authority might, under the influence of England, be more directly used to enforce salutary regulations; he however considered it essential that Carlotta, whose intrigues were incessant, should not be with him, and, she on the other hand, laboured to come back without the prince, who was prevented from moving, by continued disturbances in the Brazils. Mr. Stuart, then despairing of good, proposed the establishment of a military government at once, but Wellington would not agree, although the mischief afloat clogged every wheel of the military machine.
A law of king Sebastian, which obliged all gentlemen holding land to take arms was now revived, but desertion, which had commenced with the first appointment of British officers, increased; and so many persons sailed away in British vessels of war, to evade military service in their own country, that an edict was published to prevent the practice. Beresford checked the desertion for a moment, by condemning deserters to hard labour, and offering rewards to the country people to deliver them up; yet griping want renewed the evil at the commencement of the campaign, and the terrible severity of condemning nineteen at once to death, did not repress it. The cavalry, which had been at all times very inefficient, was now nearly ruined, the men were become faint-hearted, the breed of horses almost extinct, and shameful peculations amongst the officers increased the mischief: one guilty colonel was broke and his uniform stripped from his shoulders in the public square at Lisbon. However these examples produced fear and astonishment rather than correction, the misery of the troops continued, and the army, although by the care of Beresford it was again augmented to more than thirty thousand men under arms, declined in moral character and spirit.
To govern armies in the field, is at all times a great and difficult matter; and in this contest the operations were so intimately connected with the civil administration of Portugal, Spain, and the Brazils, and the contest, being one of principles, so affected the policy of every nation of the civilised world, that unprecedented difficulties sprung up in the way of the general, and the ordinary frauds and embarrassments of war were greatly augmented. Napoleon’s continental system joined to his financial measures, which were quite opposed to debt and paper money, increased the pernicious effects of the English bank restriction; specie was abundant in France, but had nearly disappeared from England; it was only to be obtained from abroad, and at an incredible expense. The few markets left for British manufactures, and colonial produce, did not always make returns in the articles necessary for the war, and gold, absolutely indispensable in certain quantities, was only supplied, and this entirely from the incapacity of the English ministers, in the proportion of one-sixth of what was required, by an army which professed to pay for every thing. Hence continual efforts, on the part of the government, to force markets, hence a depreciation of value both in goods and bills; hence also a continual struggle, on the part of the general, to sustain a contest, dependant on the fluctuation of such a precarious system. Dependant also it was upon the prudence of three governments, one of which had just pushed its colonies to rebellion, when the French armies were in possession of four-fifths of the mother country; another was hourly raising up obstacles to its own defence though the enemy had just been driven from the capital; and the third was forcing a war with America, its greatest and surest market, when by commerce alone it could hope to sustain the struggle in the Peninsula.
The failure of the preceding year’s harvest all over Europe had rendered the supply of Portugal very difficult. Little grain was to be obtained in any country of the north of Europe accessible to the British, and the necessity of paying in hard money rendered even that slight resource null. Sicily and Malta were thrown for subsistence upon Africa, where colonial produce was indeed available for commerce, yet the quantity of grain to be had there, was small, and the capricious nature of the barbarians rendered the intercourse precarious. In December 1811 there was only two months’ consumption of corn in Portugal for the population, although the magazines of the army contained more than three. To America therefore it was necessary to look. Now in 1810 Mr. Stuart had given treasury bills to the house of Sampayo for the purchase of American corn; but the disputes between England and the United States, the depreciation of English bills, from the quantity in the market, together with the expiration of the American bank charter, had prevented Sampayo from completing his commission, nevertheless, although the increasing bitterness of the disputes with America discouraged a renewal of this plan, some more bills were now given to the English minister at Washington, with directions to purchase corn, and consign it to Sampayo, to resell in Portugal as before, for the benefit of the military chest. Other bills were also sent to the Brazils, to purchase rice, and all the consuls in the Mediterranean were desired to encourage the exportation of grain and the importation of colonial produce. In this manner, despite of the English ministers’ incapacity, lord Wellington found resources to feed the population, to recover some of the specie expended by the army, and to maintain the war. But as the year advanced, the Non-intercourse-Act of Congress, which had caused a serious drain of specie from Portugal, was followed by an embargo for ninety days, and then famine, which already afflicted parts of Spain, menaced Portugal.
Mr. Stuart knew of this embargo before the speculators did, and sent his agents orders to buy up with hard cash, at a certain price, a quantity of grain which had lately arrived at Gibraltar. He could only forestall the speculators by a few days, the cost soon rose beyond his means in specie, yet the new harvest being nearly ripe, this prompt effort sufficed for the occasion, and happily so, for the American declaration of war followed, and American privateers were to take the place of American flour-ships. But as ruin seemed to approach, Stuart’s energy redoubled. His agents seeking for grain in all parts of the world, discovered that in the Brazils a sufficient quantity might be obtained in exchange for English manufactures, to secure Portugal from absolute famine; and to protect this traffic, and to preserve that with the United States, he persuaded the regency to declare the neutrality of Portugal, and to interdict the sale of prizes within its waters. He also, at Wellington’s desire, besought the English admiralty to reinforce the squadron in the Tagus, and to keep cruisers at particular stations. Finally he pressed the financial reforms in Portugal with the utmost vigour and with some success. His efforts were, however, strangely counteracted from quarters least expected. The English consul, in the Western Isles, with incredible presumption, publicly excited the Islanders to war with America, when Mr. Stuart’s efforts were directed to prevent such a calamity; the Admiralty neglecting to station cruisers in the proper places, left the American privateers free to range along the Portuguese and African coast; and the cupidity of English merchants broke down the credit of the English commissariat paper-money, which was the chief medium of exchange on the immediate theatre of war.
This paper had arisen from a simple military regulation. Lord Wellington, on first assuming the command in 1809, found that all persons, gave their own vouchers in payment for provisions, whereupon he proclaimed, that none save commissaries should thus act; and that all local accounts should be paid within one month, in ready money, if it was in the chest, if not, with bills on the commissary-general. These bills soon became numerous, because of the scarcity of specie, yet their value did not sink, because they enabled those who had really furnished supplies, to prove their debts without the trouble of following the head-quarters; and they had an advantage over receipts, inasmuch as they distinctly pointed out the person who was to pay; they were also in accord with the customs of the country, for the people were used to receive government bills. The possessors were paid in rotation, whenever there was money; the small holders, who were the real furnishers of the army first, the speculators last, a regulation by which justice and the credit of the paper were alike consulted.
In 1812, this paper sunk twenty per cent., from the sordid practices of English mercantile houses whose agents secretly depreciated its credit and then purchased it; and in this dishonesty they were aided by some of the commissariat, notwithstanding the vigilant probity of the chief commissary. Sums, as low as ten pence, payable in Lisbon, I have myself seen in the hands of poor country people on the frontiers. By these infamous proceedings the poorer dealers were ruined or forced to raise their prices, which hurt their sales and contracted the markets to the detriment of the soldiers; and there was much danger, that the people generally, would thus discover the mode of getting cash for bills by submitting to high discounts, which would soon have rendered the contest too costly to continue. But the resources of lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart were not exhausted. They contrived to preserve the neutrality of Portugal, and by means of licenses continued to have importations of American flour, until the end of the war; a very fine stroke of policy, for this flour was paid for with English goods, and resold at a considerable profit for specie which went to the military chest. They were less successful in supporting the credit of the Portuguese government paper; bad faith, and the necessities of the native commissariat, which now caused an extraordinary issue, combined to lower its credit.
The conde de Funchal, Mr. Villiers, and Mr. Vansittart proposed a bank, and other schemes, such as a loan of one million and a half from the English treasury, which shall be treated more at length in another place. But lord Wellington ridiculing the fallacy of a government, with revenues unequal to its expenditure, borrowing from a government which was unable to find specie sufficient to sustain the war, remarked, that the money could not be realised in the Portuguese treasury, or it must be realised at the expense of a military chest, whose hollow sound already mocked the soldiers’ shout of victory. Again therefore he demanded the reform of abuses, and offered to take all the responsibility and odium upon himself, certain that the exigences of the war could be thus met, and the most vexatious imposts upon the poor abolished; neither did he fail to point out in detail the grounds of this conviction. His reasoning made as little impression upon Funchal, as it had done upon Linhares; money was no where to be had, and the general, after being forced to become a trader himself, now tolerated, for the sake of the resources it furnished, a contraband commerce, which he discovered Soult to have established with English merchants at Lisbon, exchanging the quicksilver of Almaden for colonial produce; and he was still to find in his own personal resources, the means of beating the enemy, in despite of the matchless follies of the governments he served. He did so, but complained that it was a hard task.