CHAPTER VIII.

1813. June. The basin into which the king had now poured all his troops, his parcs, convoys, and encumbrances of every kind, was about eight miles broad by ten in length, Vittoria being at the further end. The river Zadora, narrow and with rugged banks, after passing very near that town, runs towards the Ebro with many windings and divides the basin unequally, the largest portion being on the right bank. A traveller coming from Miranda by the royal Madrid road, would enter the basin by the pass of Puebla, through which the Zadora flows between two very high and rough mountain ridges, the one on his right hand being called the heights of Puebla, that on his left hand the heights of Morillas. The road leads up the left bank of the river, and on emerging from the pass, on the left hand at the distance of about six miles would be seen the village of Subijana de Morillas, furnishing that opening into the basin which Reille defended while the other armies passed the defile of Puebla. The spires of Vittoria would appear about eight miles distant, and from that town the road to Logroño goes off on the right hand, the road to Bilbao by Murgia and Orduña on the left hand crossing the Zadora at a bridge near the village of Ariaga; further on, the roads to Estella and to Pampeluna branch off on the right, a road to Durango on the left, and between them the royal causeway leads over the great Arlaban ridge into the mountains of Guipuscoa by the formidable defiles of Salinas. But of all these roads, though several were practicable for guns, especially that to Pampeluna, the royal causeway alone could suffice for the retreat of such an encumbered army. And as the allies were behind the hills forming the basin on the right bank of the Zadora, their line being parallel to the great causeway, it followed that by prolonging their left they would infallibly cut off the French from that route.

Joseph felt the danger and his first thought was to march by Salinas to Durango, with a view to cover his communications with France, and to rally Foy’s troops and the garrisons of Guipuscoa and Biscay. But in that rough country, neither his artillery nor his cavalry, on which he greatly depended, though the cavalry and artillery of the allies were scarcely less powerful, could act or subsist, and he would have to send them into France; and if pressed by Wellington in front and surrounded by all the bands in a mountainous region, favourable for those irregulars, he could not long remain in Spain. It was then proposed if forced from the basin of Vittoria, to retire by Salvatierra to Pampeluna and bring Suchet’s army up to Zaragoza; but Joseph feared thus to lose the great communication with France, because the Spanish regular army, aided by all the bands, could seize Tolosa while Wellington operated against him on the side of Navarre. It was replied that troops detached from the army of the north and from that of Portugal might oppose them; still the king hesitated, for though the road to Pampeluna was called practicable for wheels, it required something more for the enormous mass of guns and carriages of all kinds now heaped around Vittoria.

One large convoy had already marched on the 19th by the royal causeway for France, another, still larger was to move on the 21st under escort of Maucune’s division; the fighting men in front of the enemy were thus diminished and yet the plain was still covered with artillery parcs and equipages of all kinds, and Joseph shut up in the basin of Vittoria, vacillating and infirm of purpose, continued to waste time in vain conjectures about his adversary’s movements. Hence on the 19th nothing was done, but the 20th some infantry and cavalry of the army of Portugal passed the Zadora to feel for the allies towards Murguia, and being encountered by Longa’s Spaniards at the distance of six miles, after some successful skirmishing recrossed the Zadora with the loss of twenty men. On the 21st at three o’clock in the morning Maucune’s division, more than three thousand good soldiers, marched with the second convoy, and the king took up a new line of battle.

Reille’s army reinforced by a Franco-Spanish brigade of infantry, and by Digeon’s division of dragoons from the army of the south, now formed the extreme right, having to defend the passage of the Zadora, where the Bilbao and Durango roads crossed it by the bridges of Gamara Mayor and Ariaga. The French division defended the bridge; the Franco-Spanish brigade was pushed forward toSee [plan 8.] Durana on the royal road, and was supported by a French battalion and a brigade of light horsemen; Digeon’s dragoons and a second brigade of light cavalry were in reserve behind the Zadora, near Zuazo de Alava and Hermandad. The centre of the king’s army, distant six or eight miles from Gamara, following the course of the Zadora, was on another front, because the stream, turning suddenly to the left round the heights of Margarita descends to the defile of Puebla, nearly at right angles with its previous course. Here covered by the river and on an easy open range of heights, for the basin of Vittoria is broken by a variety of ground, Gazan’s right extended from the royal road to an isolated hill in front of the village of Margarita. His centre was astride the royal road, in front of the village of Arinez; his left occupied more rugged ground, being placed behind Subijana de Alava on the roots of the Puebla mountain facing the defile of that name, and to cover this wing a brigade under general Maransin was posted on the Puebla mountain. D’Erlon’s army was in second line. The principal mass of the cavalry with many guns, and the king’s guards formed a reserve, behind the centre, about the village of Gomecha, and fifty pieces of artillery were massed in the front, pointing to the bridges of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, Villodas, and Nanclares.

While the king was making conjectures, Wellington was making various dispositions for the different operations which might occur. He knew that the Andalusian reserve would be at Burgos in a few days, and thinking that Joseph would not fight on the Zadora, detached Giron with the Gallicians on the 19th to seize Orduña. Graham’s corps was at first destined to follow Giron but finally penetrated through difficult mountain ways to Murguia, thus cutting the enemy off from Bilbao and menacing his communications with France. However the rear of the army had been so much scattered in the previous marches that Wellington halted on the 20th to rally his columns, and taking that opportunity to examine the position of the French armies, observed that they seemed steadfast to fight; whereupon immediately changing his own dispositions, he gave Graham fresh orders and hastily recalled Giron from Orduña.

The long expected battle was now at hand, and on neither side were the numbers and courage of the troops of mean account. The allies had lost about two hundred killed and wounded in the previous operations, and the sixth division, six thousand five hundred strong, was left at Medina de Pomar; hence only sixty thousand Anglo-Portuguese sabres and bayonets, with ninety pieces of cannon, were actually in the field, but the Spanish auxiliaries were above twenty thousand, and the whole army, including serjeants and artillery-men, exceeded eighty thousand combatants. For the French side, as the regular muster-roll of their troops was lost with the battle, an approximation to their strength must suffice. The number killed and taken in different combats, from the Esla and Tormes to the Zadora, was about two thousand men, and some five thousand had marched to France with the two convoys. On the other hand Sarrut’s division, the garrison of Vittoria, and the many smaller posts relinquished by the army of the north, had increased the king’s forces, and hence, by a comparison with former returns, it would appear, that in the gross, about seventy thousand men were present. Wherefore deducting the officers, the artillery-men, sappers, miners, and non-combatants, which are always borne on the French muster-rolls, the sabres and bayonets would scarcely reach sixty thousand, but in the number and size of their guns the French had the advantage.

The defects of the king’s position were apparent both in the general arrangement and in the details. His best line of retreat was on the prolongation of his right flank, which being at Gamara Mayor, close to Vittoria, was too distant to be supported by the main body of the army; and yet the safety of the latter depended upon the preservation of Reille’s position. Instead of having the rear clear, and the field of battle free, many thousand carriages and impediments of all kinds were heaped about Vittoria, blocking all the roads, and creating confusion amongst the artillery parcs. Maransin’s brigade placed on the heights above Puebla was isolated and too weak to hold that ground. The centre indeed occupied an easy range of hills, its front was open, with a slope to the river, and powerful batteries seemed to bar all access by the bridges; nevertheless many of the guns being pushed with an advanced post into a deep loop of the Zadora, were within musket-shot of a wood on the right bank, which was steep and rugged, so that the allies found good cover close to the river.

There were seven bridges within the scheme of the operations, namely, the bridge of La Puebla on the French left beyond the defile; the bridge of Nanclares, facing Subijana de Alava and the French end of the defile of Puebla; then three bridges which, placed around the deep loop of the river before mentioned, opened altogether upon the right of the French centre, that of Mendoza being highest up the stream, that of Vellodas lowest down the stream, and that of Tres Puentes in the centre; lastly the bridges of Gamara Mayor and Ariaga on the Upper Zadora, opposite Vittoria, which were guarded by Reille, completed the number, and none of the seven were either broken or entrenched.

Wellington having well observed these things formed his army for three distinct battles.

Sir Thomas Graham moving from Murguia, by the Bilbao road, was to fall on Reille, and if possible to force the passage of the river at Gamara Mayor and Ariaga; by this movement the French would be completely turned and the greatest part of their forces shut up between the Puebla mountains on one side and the Zadora on the other. The first and fifth Anglo-Portuguese divisions, Bradford’s and Pack’s independent Portuguese brigades, Longa’s Spanish division, and Anson’s and Bock’s cavalry, in all near twenty thousand men with eighteen pieces of cannon, were destined for this attack, and Giron’s Gallicians, recalled from Orduña, came up by a forced march in support.

Sir Rowland Hill was to attack the enemy’s left, and his corps, also about twenty thousand strong, was composed of Morillo’s Spaniards, Sylveira’s Portuguese, and the second British division together with some cavalry and guns. It was collected on the southern slope of the ridge of Morillas, between the Bayas and the Lower Zadora, pointing to the village of Puebla, and was destined to force the passage of the river at that point, to assail the French troops on the heights beyond, to thread the defile of La Puebla and to enter the basin of Vittoria, thus turning and menacing all the French left and securing the passage of the Zadora at the bridge of Nanclares.

The centre attack, directed by Wellington in person, consisted of the third, fourth, seventh, and light divisions of infantry, the great mass of the artillery, the heavy cavalry and D’Urban’s Portuguese horsemen, in all nearly thirty thousand combatants. They were encamped along the Bayas from Subijana Morillas to Ulivarre, and had only to march across the ridges which formed the basin of Vittoria on that side, to come down to their different points of attack on the Zadora, that is to say, the bridges of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, Villodas and Nanclares. But so rugged was the country and the communications between the different columns so difficult, that no exact concert could be expected and each general of division was in some degree master of his movements.

BATTLE OF VITTORIA.

At day-break on the 21st the weather being rainy, with a thick vapour, the troops moved from their camps on the Bayas, and the centre of the army, advancing by columns from the right and left of the line, passed the ridges in front, and entering the basin of Vittoria slowly approached the Zadora. The left-hand column pointed to Mendoza, the right-hand column skirted the ridge of Morillas on the other side of which Hill was marching, and that general, having seized the village of Puebla about ten o’clock, commenced passing the river there. Morillo’s Spaniards led and their first brigade moving on a bye way assailed the mountain to the right of the great road; the ascent was so steep that the soldiers appeared to climb rather than to walk up, and the second Spanish brigade, being to connect the first with the British troops below, ascended only half-way; little or no opposition was made until the first brigade was near the summit when a sharp skirmishing commenced, and Morillo was wounded but would not quit the field; his second brigade joined him, and the French, feeling the importance of the height, reinforced Maransin with a fresh regiment. Then Hill succoured Morillo with the seventy-first regiment, and a battalion of light infantry, both under colonel Cadogan, yet the fight was doubtful, for though the British secured the summit, and gained ground along the side of the mountain, Cadogan, a brave officer and of high promise, fell, and Gazan calling Villatte’s division from behind Ariñez, sent it to the succour of his side; and so strongly did these troops fight that the battle remained stationary, the allies being scarcely able to hold their ground. Hill however again sent fresh troops to their assistance, and with the remainder of his corps passing the Zadora, threaded the long defile of Puebla and fiercely issuing forth on the other side won the village of Subijana de Alava in front of Gazan’s line; he thus connected his own right with the troops on the mountain, and maintained this forward position in despite of the enemy’s vigorous efforts to dislodge him.

Meanwhile Wellington had brought the fourth and light divisions, the heavy cavalry, the hussars and D’Urban’s Portuguese horsemen, from Subijana Morillas, and Montevite, down by Olabarre to the Zadora. The fourth division was placed opposite the bridge of Nanclares, the light division opposite the bridge of Villodas, both well covered by rugged ground and woods; and the light division was so close to the water, that their skirmishers could with ease have killed the French gunners of the advanced post in the loop of the river at Villodas. The weather had cleared up, and when Hill’s battle began, the riflemen of the light division, spreading along the bank, exchanged a biting fire with the enemy’s skirmishers, but no serious effort was made, because the third and seventh divisions, meeting with rough ground, had not reached their point of attack; and it would have been imprudent to push the fourth division and the cavalry over the bridge of Nanclares, and thus crowd a great body of troops in front of the Puebla defile before the other divisions were ready to attack the right and centre of the enemy.

While thus waiting, a Spanish peasant told Wellington that the bridge of Tres Puentes on the left of the light division, was unguarded, and offered to guide the troops over it. Kempt’s brigade of the light division was instantly directed towards this point, and being concealed by some rocks from the French, and well led by the brave peasant, they passed the narrow bridge at a running pace, mounted a steep curving rise of ground, and halted close under the crest on the enemy’s side of the river, being then actually behind the king’s advanced post, and within a few hundred yards of his line of battle. Some French cavalry immediately approached and two round shots were fired by the enemy, one of which killed the poor peasant to whose courage and intelligence the allies were so much indebted; but as no movement of attack was made, Kempt called the fifteenth hussars over the river, and they came at a gallop, crossing the narrow bridge one by one, horseman after horseman, and still the French remained torpid, shewing that there was an army there but no general.

It was now one o’clock, Hill’s assault on the village of Subijana de Alava was developed, and a curling smoke, faintly seen far up the Zadora on the enemy’s extreme right, being followed by the dull sound of distant guns shewed that Graham’s attack had also commenced. Then the king finding both his flanks in danger caused his reserve about Gomecha to file off towards Vittoria, and gave Gazan orders to retire by successive masses with the army of the south. But at that moment the third and seventh divisions having reached their ground were seen moving rapidly down to the bridge of Mendoza, the enemy’s artillery opened upon them, a body of cavalry drew near the bridge, and the French light troops which were very strong there commenced a vigorous musketry. Some British guns replied to the French cannon from the opposite bank, and the value of Kempt’s forward position was instantly made manifest; for colonel Andrew Barnard springing forward, led the riflemen of the light division, in the most daring manner, between the French cavalry and the river, taking their light troops and gunners in flank, and engaging them so closely that the English artillery-men, thinking his darkly clothed troops were enemies, played upon both alike.

This singular attack enabled a brigade of the third division to pass the bridge of Mendoza without opposition; the other brigade forded the river higher up, and the seventh division and Vandeleur’s brigade of the light division followed. The French advanced post immediately abandoned the ground in front of Villodas, and the battle which had before somewhat slackened revived with extreme violence. Hill pressed the enemy harder, the fourth division passed the bridge of Nanclares, the smoke and sound of Graham’s attack became more distinct, and the banks of the Zadora presented a continuous line of fire. However the French, weakened in the centre by the draft made of Villatte’s division and having their confidence shaken by the king’s order to retreat, were in evident perplexity, and no regular retrograde movement could be made, the allies were too close.

The seventh division, and Colville’s brigade of the third division which had forded the river, formed the left of the British, and they were immediately engaged with the French right in front of Margarita and Hermandad. Almost at the same time lord Wellington, seeing the hill in front of Arinez nearly denuded of troops by the withdrawal of Villatte’s troops, carried Picton and the rest of the third division in close columns of regiments at a running pace diagonally across the front of both armies towards that central point; this attack was headed by Barnard’s riflemen, and followed by the remainder of Kempt’s brigade and the hussars, but the other brigade of the light division acted in support of the seventh division. At the same time general Cole advanced with the fourth division from the bridge of Nanclares, and the heavy cavalry, a splendid body, also passing the river, galloped up, squadron after squadron, into the plain ground between Cole’s right and Hill’s left.

The French thus caught in the midst of their dispositions for retreat, threw out a prodigious number of skirmishers, and fifty pieces of artillery played with astonishing activity. To answer this fire Wellington brought over several brigades of British guns, and both sides were shrouded by a dense cloud of smoke and dust, under cover of which the French retired by degrees to the second range of heights, in front of Gomecha, on which their reserve had been posted, but they still held the village of Arinez on the main road. Picton’s troops headed by the riflemen, plunged into that village amidst a heavy fire of muskets and artillery, and in an instant three guns were captured; but the post was important, fresh French troops came down, and for some time the smoke and dust and clamour, the flashing of the fire-arms, and the shouts and cries of the combatants, mixed with the thundering of the guns, were terrible, yet finally the British troops issued forth victorious on the other side. During this conflict the seventh division, reinforced by Vandeleur’s brigade of the light division, was heavily raked by a battery at the village of Margarita, until the fifty-second regiment, led by colonel Gibbs, with an impetuous charge drove the French guns away and carried the village, and at the same time the eighty-seventh under colonel Gough won the village of Hermandad. Then the whole advanced fighting on the left of Picton’s attack, and on the right hand of that general the fourth division also made way, though more slowly because of the rugged ground.

When Picton and Kempt’s brigades had carried the village of Arinez and gained the main road, the French troops near Subijana de Alava were turned, and being hard-pressed on their front, and on their left flank by the troops on the summit of the mountain, fell back for two miles in a disordered mass, striving to regain the great line of retreat to Vittoria. It was thought that some cavalry launched against them at the moment would have totally disorganized the whole French battle and secured several thousand prisoners, but this was not done, the confused multitude shooting ahead of the advancing British lines recovered order, and as the ground was exceedingly diversified, being in some places wooded, in others open, here covered with high corn, there broken by ditches vineyards and hamlets, the action for six miles resolved itself into a running fight and cannonade, the dust and smoke and tumult of which filled all the basin, passing onwards towards Vittoria.

Many guns were taken as the army advanced, and at six o’clock the French reached the last defensible height, one mile in front of Vittoria. Behind them was the plain in which the city stood, and beyond the city, thousands of carriages and animals and non-combatants, men women and children, were crowding together, in all the madness of terror, and as the English shot went booming over head the vast crowd started and swerved with a convulsive movement, while a dull and horrid sound of distress arose; but there was no hope, no stay for army or multitude. It was the wreck of a nation. However the courage of the French soldier was not yet quelled, Reille on whom every thing now depended, maintained his post on the Upper Zadora, and the armies of the south and centre drawing up on their last heights, between the villages of Ali and Armentia, made their muskets flash like lightning, while more than eighty pieces of artillery, massed together, pealed with such a horrid uproar, that the hills laboured and shook, and streamed with fire and smoke, amidst which the dark figures of the French gunners were seen, bounding with a frantic energy.

This terrible cannonade and musketry kept the allies in check, and scarcely could the third division, which was still the foremost and bore the brunt of this storm, maintain its advanced position. Again the battle became stationary, and the French generals had commenced drawing off their infantry in succession from the right wing, when suddenly the fourth division rushing forward carried the hill on the French left, and the heights were at once abandoned. It was at this very moment that Joseph, finding the royal road so completely blocked by carriages that the artillery could not pass, indicated the road of Salvatierra as the line of retreat, and the army went off in a confused yet compact body on that side, leaving Vittoria on its left. The British infantry followed hard, and the light cavalry galloped through the town to intercept the new line of retreat, which was through a marsh, but this road also was choked with carriages and fugitive people, while on each side there were deep drains. Thus all became disorder and mischief, the guns were left on the edge of the marsh, the artillery-men and drivers fled with the horses, and, breaking through the miserable multitude, the vanquished troops went off by Metauco towards Salvatierra; however their cavalry still covered the retreat with some vigour, and many of those generous horsemen were seen taking up children and women to carry off from the dreadful scene.

The result of the last attack had placed Reille, of whose battle it is now time to treat, in great danger. His advanced troops under Sarrut had been placed at the village of Aranguis, and they also occupied some heights on their right which covered both the bridges of Ariaga and Gamara Mayor, but they had been driven from both the village and the height a little after twelve o’clock, by general Oswald, who commanded the head of Graham’s column, consisting of the fifth division, Longa’s Spaniards, and Pack’s Portuguese. Longa then seized Gamara Menor on the Durango road, while another detachment gained the royal road still further on the left, and forced the Franco-Spaniards to retire from Durana. Thus the first blow on this side had deprived the king of his best line of retreat and confined him to the road of Pampeluna. However Sarrut recrossed the river in good order and a new disposition was made by Reille. One of Sarrut’s brigades defended the bridge of Ariaga and the village of Abechuco beyond it; the other was in reserve, equally supporting Sarrut and La Martiniere who defended the bridge of Gamara Mayor and the village of that name beyond the river. Digeon’s dragoons were formed behind the village of Ariaga, and Reille’s own dragoons being called up from Hermandad and Zuazo, took post behind the bridge of Gamara; a brigade of light cavalry was placed on the extreme right to sustain the Franco-Spanish troops, which were now on the Upper Zadora in front of Betonio, and the remainder of the light cavalry under general Curto was on the French left extending down the Zadora between Ariaga and Govea.

Oswald commenced the attack at Gamara with some guns and Robinson’s brigade of the fifth division. Longa’s Spaniards were to have led and at an early hour when Gamara was feebly occupied, but they did not stir, and the village was meanwhile reinforced. However Robinson’s brigade being formed in three columns made the assault at a running pace. At first the fire of artillery and musketry was so heavy that the British troops stopped and commenced firing also, and the three columns got intermixed, yet encouraged by their officers, and especially by the example of general Robinson an inexperienced man but of a high and daring spirit, they renewed the charge, broke through the village and even crossed the bridge. One gun was captured, and the passage seemed to be won, when Reille suddenly turned twelve pieces upon the village, and La Martiniere rallying his division under cover of this cannonade, retook the bridge; it was with difficulty the allied troops could even hold the village until they were reinforced. Then a second British brigade came down, and, the royals leading, the bridge was again carried, but again these new troops were driven back in the same manner as the others had been. Thus the bridge remained forbidden ground. Graham had meanwhile attacked the village of Abechuco which covered the bridge of Ariaga, and it was carried at once by colonel Halkett’s Germans, who were supported by Bradford’s Portuguese and by the fire of twelve guns; yet here as at Gamara the French maintained the bridge, and at both places the troops on each side remained stationary under a reciprocal fire of artillery and small arms.

Reille, though considerably inferior in numbers, continued to interdict the passage of the river, until the tumult of Wellington’s battle, coming up the Zadora, reached Vittoria itself, and a part of the British horsemen rode out of that city upon Sarrut’s rear. Digeon’s dragoons kept this cavalry in check for the moment, and some time before, Reille, seeing the retrograde movement of the king, had formed a reserve of infantry under general Fririon at Betonia which now proved his safety. For Sarrut was killed at the bridge of Ariaga, and general Menne the next in command, could scarcely draw off his troops while Digeon’s dragoons held the British cavalry at point, but with the aid of Fririon’s reserve Reille covered the movement and rallied all his troops at Betonio. He had now to make head on several sides, because the allies were coming down from Ariaga from Durana and from Vittoria, yet he fought his way to Metauco on the Salvatierra road covering the general retreat with some degree of order. Vehemently and closely did the British pursue, and neither the resolute demeanour of the French cavalry, which was covered on the flanks by some light troops and made several vigorous charges, nor the night, which now fell, could stop their victorious career until the flying masses of the enemy had cleared all obstacles, and passing Metauco got beyond the reach of further injury. Thus ended the battle of Vittoria; the French escaped indeed with comparatively little loss of men, but to use Gazan’s words, “they lost all their equipages, all their guns, all their treasure, all their stores, all their papers, so that no man could prove how much pay was due to him; generals and subordinate officers alike were reduced to the clothes on their backs, and most of them were barefooted.”

Never was an army more hardly used by its commander, for the soldiers were not half beaten, and never was a victory more complete. The trophies were innumerable. The French carried off but two pieces of artillery from the battle. Jourdan’s baton of command, a stand of colours, one hundred and forty-three brass pieces, one hundred of which had been used in the fight, all the parcs and dépôts from Madrid, Valladolid, and Burgos, carriages, ammunition, treasure, every thing fell into the hands of the victors. The loss in men did not however exceed six thousand, exclusive of some hundreds of prisoners; the loss of the allies was nearly as great, the gross numbers being five thousand one hundred and seventy-six, killed wounded and missing. Of these one thousand and forty-nine were Portuguese and five hundred and fifty-three were Spanish; hence the loss of the English was more than double that of the Portuguese and Spaniards together, and yet both fought well, and especially the Portuguese, but British troops are the soldiers of battle. Marshal Jourdan’s baton was taken by the eighty-seventh regiment, and the spoil was immense; but to such extent was plunder carried principally by the followers and non-combatants, for with some exceptions the fighting troops may be said to have marched upon gold and silver without stooping to pick it up, that of five millions and a half of dollars indicated by the French accounts to be in the money-chests, not one dollar came to the public, and Wellington sent fifteen officers with power to stop and examine all loaded animals passing the Ebro and the Duero in hopes to recover the sums so shamefully carried off. Neither was this disgraceful conduct confined to ignorant and vulgar people. Some officers were seen mixed up with the mob and contending for the disgraceful gain.

On the 22d the allies followed the retreating enemy, and Giron and Longa entered Guipuscoa, by the royal road, in pursuit of the convoy which had moved under Maucune on the morning of the battle; the heavy cavalry and D’Urban’s Portuguese remained at Vittoria, and general Pakenham with the sixth division came up from Medina Pomar; the remainder of the army pursued Joseph towards Pampeluna, for he had continued his retreat up the Borundia and Araquil valleys all night. The weather was rainy, the roads heavy, and the French rear-guard having neither time nor materials to destroy the bridges set fire to the villages behind them to delay the pursuit. At five o’clock in the morning of the 22d Reille had rallied his two divisions and all his cavalry in front of Salvatierra, where he halted until he was assured that all the French had passed, and then continued his march to Huerta in the valley of Araquil, thirty miles from the field of battle. Joseph was that day at Yrursun, a town, situated behind one of the sources of the Arga, and from which roads branched off to Pampeluna on one side, and to Tolosa and St. Esteban on the other. At this place he remained all the 23d sending orders to different points on the French frontier to prepare provisions and succours for his suffering army, and he directed Reille to proceed rapidly by St. Estevan to the Bidassoa with the infantry, six hundred select cavalry, the artillery-men and horses of the army of Portugal; meanwhile Gazan’s and D’Erlon’s army marched upon Pampeluna intending to cross the frontier at St. Jean Pied de Port. Joseph reached Pampeluna the 24th, but the army bivouacked on the glacis of the fortress, and in such a state of destitution and insubordination that the governor would not suffer them to enter the town. The magazines were indeed reduced very low by Mina’s longJones’s Sieges. blockade, and some writers assert that it was even proposed to blow up the works and abandon the place; however by great exertions additional provisions were obtained from the vicinity, the garrison was encreased to three thousand men, and the army marched towards France leaving a rear-guard at a strong pass about two leagues off.

The 23d Wellington having detached Graham’s corps to Guipuscoa by the pass of Adrian, left the fifth division at Salvatierra, and pursued the king with the rest of the army.

On the 24th the light division and Victor Alten’s cavalry came up with the French rear-guard; two battalions of the riflemen immediately pushed the infantry back though the pass, and then Ross’s horse artillery galloping forward, killed several men and dismounted one of the only two pieces of cannon carried off from Vittoria.

The 25th the enemy covered by the fortress of Pampeluna went up the valley of Roncevalles. He was followed by the light division which turned the town as far as Vilalba, and he was harassed by the Spanish irregular troops now swarming on every side.

Meanwhile Foy and Clauzel were placed in very difficult positions. The former had reached Bergara the 21st, and the garrison of Bilbao and the Italian division of St. Paul, formerly Palombini’s, had reached Durango; the first convoy from Vittoria was that day at Bergara, and Maucune was with the second at Montdragon. The 22d the garrison of Castro went off to Santona; the same day the fugitives from the battle spread such an alarm through the country that the forts of Arlaban, Montdragon, and Salinas, which commanded the passes into Guipuscoa were abandoned, and Longa and Giron penetrated them without hindrance.

Foy who had only one battalion of his division in hand, immediately rallied the fugitive garrisons, and marching upon Montdragon, made some prisoners and acquired exact intelligence of the battle. Then he ordered the convoy to move day and night, towards France; the troops at Durango to march upon Bergara, and the troops from all the other posts to unite at Tolosa, to which place the artillery, baggage, and sick men were now hastening from every side; and to cover their concentration Foy, reinforcing himself with Maucune’s troops, gave battle to Giron and Longa, though three times his numbers, at Montdragon; the Spaniards had the advantage and the French fell back, yet slowly and fighting, to Bergara, but they lost two hundred and fifty men and six guns.

On the 23d Foy marched to Villa Real de Guipuscoa, and that evening the head of Graham’s column having crossed the Mutiol mountain by the pass of Adrian, descended upon Segura. It was then as near to Tolosa as Foy was, and the latter’s situation became critical; yet such were the difficulties of passing the mountain, that it was late on the 24th ere Graham, who had then only collected Anson’s light cavalry, two Portuguese brigades of infantry, and Halket’s Germans, could move towards Villa Franca. The Italians and Maucune’s divisions which composed the French rear, were just entering Villa Franca as Graham came in sight, and to cover that town they took post at the village of Veasaya on the right bank of the Orio river. Halket’s Germans, aided by Pack’s Portuguese, immediately drove Maucune’s people from the villageGraham’s despatch. with the loss of two hundred men, and Bradford’s brigade having engaged the Italians on the French right,General Boyer’s official Journal, MSS. killed or wounded eighty, yet the Italians claimed the advantage; and the whole position was so strong, that Graham had recourse to flank operations, whereupon Foy retired to Tolosa. Giron and Longa now came up by the great road, and Mendizabel, having quitted the blockade of Santona, arrived at Aspeytia on the Deba.

The 25th Foy again offered battle in front of Tolosa, but Graham turned his left with Longa’s division and Mendizabel turned his right from Aspeytia; while they were in march, colonel Williams, with the grenadiers of the first regiment and three companies of Pack’s Portuguese, dislodged him from an advantageous hill in front, and the fight was then purposely prolonged by skirmishing, until six o’clock in the evening, when the Spaniards having reached their destination on the flanks, a general attack was made on all sides. The French being cannonaded on the causeway, and strongly pushed by the infantry in front, while Longa with equal vigour drove their left from the heights, were soon forced beyond Tolosa on the flanks; but that town was strongly entrenched as a field-post and they maintained it until Graham brought up his guns and bursting one of the gates opened a passage for his troops; nevertheless Foy profiting from the darkness made his retreat good with a loss of only four hundred men killed and wounded, and some prisoners who were taken by Mendizabel and Longa. These actions were very severe; the loss of the Spaniards was not known, but the Anglo-Portuguese had more than four hundred killed and wounded in the two days’ operations, and Graham himself was hurt.

The 26th and 27th the allies halted to hear of lord Wellington’s progress, the enemy’s convoys entered France in safety, and Foy occupied a position between Tolosa and Ernani behind the Anezo. His force was now encreased by the successive arrival of the smaller garrisons to sixteen thousand bayonets, four hundred sabres, and ten pieces of artillery, and the 28th he threw a garrison of two thousand six hundred good troops into St. Sebastian and passed the Urumia. The 29th he passed the Oyarsun, and halted the 30th, leaving a small garrison at Passages, which however surrendered the next day to Longa.

On the 1st of July the garrison of Gueteria escaped by sea to St. Sebastian, and Foy passed the Bidassoa, his rear-guard fighting with Giron’s Gallicians; but Reille’s troops were now at Vera and Viriatu, they had received ammunition and artillery from Bayonne, and thus twenty-five thousand men of the army of Portugal occupied a defensive line from Vera to the bridge of Behobie, the approaches to which last were defended by a block-house. Graham immediately invested St. Sebastian, and Giron concentrating the fire of his own artillery and that of a British battery upon the block-house of Behobie obliged the French to blow it up and destroy the bridge.

While these events were passing in Guipuscoa, Clauzel was in more imminent danger. On the evening of the 22d he had approached the field of battle at the head of fourteen thousand men, by a way which falls into the Estella road, at Aracete and not far from Salvatierra. Pakenham with the sixth division was then at Vittoria, and the French general, learning the state of affairs soon retired to Logroño, where he halted until the evening of the 25th. This delay was like to have proved fatal, for on that day, Wellington who before thought he was at Tudela, discovered his real position, and leaving general Hill with the second division to form the siege of Pampeluna, marched himself by Tafalla with two brigades of light cavalry and the third, fourth, seventh, and light divisions of infantry. The fifth and sixth divisions and the heavy cavalry and D’Urban’s Portuguese marched at the same time from Salvatierra and Vittoria upon Logroño; and Mina also, who had now collected all his scattered battalions near Estella, and was there joined by Julian Sanchez’ cavalry, followed hard on Clauzel’s rear.

July. The French general moving by Calahorra, reached Tudela on the evening of the 27th, and thinking that by this forced march of sixty miles in forty hours with scarcely a halt, he had outstripped all pursuers, would have made for France by Olite and Tafalla. Wellington was already in possession of those places expecting him, but an alcalde gave Clauzel notice of the danger, whereupon recrossing the Ebro he marched upon Zaragoza in all haste, and arriving the 1st of July, took post on the Gallego, gave out that he would there wait until Suchet, or the king, if the latter retook the offensive, should come up. Wellington immediately made a flank movement to his own left as far as Caseda, and could still with an exertion have intercepted Clauzel by the route of Jacca, but he feared to drive him back upon Suchet and contented himself with letting Mina press the French general. That chief acted with great ability; for he took three hundred prisoners, and having every where declared that the whole allied army were close at hand in pursuit he imposed upon Clauzel, who, being thus deceived, destroyed some of his artillery and heavy baggage, and leaving the rest at Zaragoza retired to Jacca.

During this time Joseph, not being pressed, had sent the army of the south again into Spain to take possession of the valley of Bastan, which was very fertile and full of strong positions. But O’Donnel, count of Abispal, had now reduced the forts at Pancorbo, partly by capitulation, partly by force, and was marching towards Pampeluna; wherefore general Hill, without abandoning the siege of that place, moved two British and two Portuguese brigades into the valley of Bastan, and on the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th, vigorously driving Gazan from all his positions, cleared the valley with a loss of only one hundred and twenty men. The whole line of the Spanish frontier from Ronscevalles to the mouth of the Bidassoa river was thus occupied by the victorious allies, and Pampeluna and St. Sebastian were invested. Joseph’s reign was over, the crown had fallen from his head, and after years of toils, and combats which had been rather admired than understood, the English general, emerging from the chaos of the Peninsula struggle, stood on the summit of the Pyrennees a recognised conqueror. On those lofty pinnacles the clangor of his trumpets pealed clear and loud, and the splendour of his genius appeared as a flaming beacon to warring nations.

OBSERVATIONS.

1º. In this campaign of six weeks, Wellington, with one hundred thousand men, marched six hundred miles, passed six great rivers, gained one decisive battle, invested two fortresses, and drove a hundred and twenty thousand veteran troops from Spain. This immense result could not have been attained if Joseph had followed Napoleon’s instructions; Wellington could not then have turned the line of the Duero. It could not have been attained if Joseph had acted with ordinary skill after the line of the Duero was passed. Time was to him most precious, yet when contrary to his expectations he had concentrated his scattered armies behind the Carion, he made no effort to delay his enemy on that river. He judged it an unfit position, that is, unfit for a great battle; but he could have obliged Wellington to lose a day there, perhaps two or three, and behind the Upper Pisuerga he might have saved a day or two more. Reille who was with the army of Portugal on the right of the king’s line complained that he could find no officers of that army who knew the PisuergaKing’s correspondence, MSS. sufficiently to place the troops in position; the king then had cause to remember Napoleon’s dictum, namely, that “to command an army well a general must think of nothing else.” For why was the course of the Pisuerga unknown when the king’s head-quarters had been for several months within a day’s journey of it?

2º. The Carion and the Pisuerga being given up, the country about the Hormaza was occupied and the three French armies were in mass between that stream and Burgos; yet Wellington’s right wing only, that is to say, only twenty-three thousand infantry, and three brigades of cavalry, drove Reille’s troops over the Arlanzan, and the castle of Burgos was abandoned. This was on the 12th, the three French armies, not less than fifty thousand fighting men, had been in position since the 9th, and the king’s letters prove that he desired to fight in that country, which was favourable for all arms. Nothing then could be more opportune than Wellington’s advance on the 12th, because a retrograde defensive system is unsuited to French soldiers, whose impatient courage leads them always to attack, and the news of Napoleon’s victory at Bautzen had just arrived to excite their ardour. Wherefore Joseph should have retaken the offensive on the 12th at the moment when Wellington approached the Hormaza, and as the left and centre of the allies were at Villa Diego and Castroxerez, the greatest part at the former, that is to say, one march distant, the twenty-six thousand men immediately under Wellington, would probably have been forced back over the Pisuerga, and the king would have gained time for Sarrut, Foy and Clauzel to join him. Did the English general then owe his success to fortune, to his adversary’s fault rather than to his own skill? Not so. He had judged the king’s military capacity, he had seen the haste, the confusion, the trouble of the enemy, and knowing well the moral power of rapidity and boldness in such circumstances, had acted, daringly indeed, but wisely, for such daring is admirable, it is the highest part of war.

3º. The manner in which Wellington turned the line of the Ebro was a fine strategic illustration. It was by no means certain of success, yet failure would have still left great advantages. He was certain of gaining Santander and fixing a new base of operations on the coast, and he would still have had the power of continually turning the king’s right by operating between him and the coast; the errors of his adversary only gave him additional advantages which he expected, and seized with promptness. But if Joseph, instead of spreading his army from Espejo on his right to the Logroño road on his left, had kept only cavalry on the latter route and on the main road in front of Pancorbo; if he had massed his army to his right pivoting upon Miranda, or Frias, and had scoured all the roads towards the sources of the Ebro with the utmost diligence, the allies could never have passed the defiles and descended upon Vittoria. They would have marched then by Valmaceda upon Bilbao, but Joseph could by the road of Orduña have met them there, and with his force increased by Foy’s and Sarrut’s divisions and the Italians. Meanwhile Clauzel would have come down to Vittoria, and the heaped convoys could have made their way to France in safety.

4º. Having finally resolved to fight at Vittoria, the king should, on the 19th and 20th, have broken some of the bridges on the Zadora, and covered others with field-works to enable him to sally forth upon the attacking army; he should have entrenched the defile of Puebla, and occupied the heights above in strength; his position on the Lower Zadora would then have been formidable. But his greatest fault was in the choice of his line of operation. His reasons for avoiding Guipuscoa were valid, his true line was on the other side, down the Ebro. Zaragoza should have been his base, since Aragon was fertile and more friendly than any other province of Spain. It is true that by taking this new line of operations he would have abandoned Foy; but that general, reinforced with the reserve from Bayonne, would have had twenty thousand men and the fortress of St. Sebastian as a support, and Wellington must have left a strong corps of observation to watch him. The king’s army would have been immediately increased by Clauzel’s troops, and ultimately by Suchet’s, which would have given him one hundred thousand men to oppose the allied army, weakened as that would have been by the detachment left to watch Foy. And there were political reasons, to be told hereafter, for the reader must not imagine Wellington had got thus far without such trammels, which would have probably rendered this plan so efficacious as to oblige the British army to abandon Spain altogether. Then new combinations would have been made all over Europe which it is useless to speculate upon.

5º. In the battle the operations of the French, with the exception of Reille’s defence of the bridges of Gamara and Ariaga, were a series of errors, the most extraordinary being the suffering Kempt’s brigade of the light division, and the hussars, to pass the bridge of Tres Puentes and establish themselves close to the king’s line of battle, and upon the flank of his advanced posts at the bridges of Mendoza and Villodas. It is quite clear from this alone that he decided upon retreating the moment Graham’s attack commenced against his right flank, and his position was therefore in his own view untenable. The fitting thing then was to have occupied the heights of Puebla strongly, but to have placed the bulk of his infantry by corps, in succession, the right refused, towards Vittoria, while his cavalry and guns watched the bridges and the mouth of the Puebla defile; in this situation he could have succoured Reille, or marched to his front, according to circumstances, and his retreat would have been secure.

6º. The enormous fault of heaping up the baggage and convoys and parcs behind Vittoria requires no comment, but the king added another and more extraordinary error, namely the remaining to the last moment undecided as to his line of retreat. Nothing but misfortunes could attend upon such bad dispositions; and that the catastrophe was not more terrible is owing entirely to an error whichSee Wellington’s despatch. Wellington and Graham seem alike to have fallen into, namely, that Reille had two divisions in reserve behind the bridges on the Upper Zadora. They knew not that Maucune’s division had marched with the convoy, and thought Clauzel had only one division of the army of Portugal with him, whereas he had two, Taupin’s and Barbout’s. Reille’s reserves were composed not of divisions but of brigades drawn from La Martiniere’s and Sarrut’s divisions, which were defending the bridges; and his whole force, including the French-Spaniards who were driven back from Durana, did not exceed ten thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred cavalry. Now Graham had, exclusive of Giron’s Gallicians, nearly twenty thousand of all arms, and it is said that the river might have been passed both above and below the points of attack; it is certain also that Longa’s delay gave the French time to occupy Gamara Mayor in force, which was not the case at first. Had the passage been won in time, very few of the French army could have escaped from the field; but the truth is Reille fought most vigorously.

7º. As the third and seventh divisions did not come to the point of attack at the time calculated upon, the battle was probably not fought after the original conception of lord Wellington; it is likely that his first project was to force the passage of the bridges, to break the right centre of the enemy from Arinez to Margarita, and then to envelope the left centre with the second, fourth, and light divisions and the cavalry, while the third and seventh divisions pursued the others. But notwithstanding the unavoidable delay, which gave the French time to commence their retreat, it is not easy to understand how Gazan’s left escaped from Subijana de Alava, seeing that when Picton broke the centre at Arinez, he was considerably nearer to Vittoria than the French left, which was cut off from the main road and assailed in front by Hill and Cole. The having no cavalry in hand to launch at this time and point of the battle has been already noticed; lord Wellington says, that the countryDespatch. was generally unfavourable for the action of that arm, and it is certain that neither side used it with much effect at any period of the battle; nevertheless there are always some suitable openings, some happy moments to make a charge, and this seems to have been one which was neglected.

8º. Picton’s sudden rush from the bridge of Tres Puentes to the village of Arinez, with one brigade, has been much praised, and certainly nothing could be more prompt and daring, but the merit of the conception belongs to the general in chief, who directed it in person. It was suggested to him by the denuded state of the hill in front of that village, and viewed as a stroke for the occasion it is to be admired. Yet it had its disadvantages. For the brigade which thus crossed a part of the front of both armies to place itself in advance, not only drew a flank fire from the enemy, but was exposed if the French cavalry had been prompt and daring, to a charge in flank; it also prevented the advance of the other troops in their proper arrangement, and thus crowded the centre for the rest of the action. However these sudden movements cannot be judged by rules, they are good or bad according to the result. This was entirely successful, and the hill thus carried was called the Englishmen’s hill, not, as some recent writers have supposed, in commemoration of a victory gained by the Black Prince, but because of a disaster which there befel a part of his army. His battle was fought between Navarrette and Najera, many leagues from Vittoria, and beyond the Ebro; but on this hill the two gallant knights sir Thomas and sir William Felton took post with two hundred companions, and being surrounded by Don Tello with six thousand, all died or were taken after a long, desperate, and heroic resistance.

9º. It has been observed by French writers, and the opinion has been also entertained by many English officers, that after the battle Wellington should have passed the frontier in mass, and marched upon Bayonne instead of chasing Clauzel and Foy on the right and left; and if, as the same authors assert, Bayonne was not in a state of defence and must have fallen, there can be little question that the criticism is just, because the fugitive French army having lost all its guns and being without musket ammunition, could not have faced its pursuers for a moment. But if Bayonne had resisted, and it was impossible for Wellington to suspect its real condition, much mischief might have accrued from such a hasty advance. Foy and Clauzel coming down upon the field of Vittoria would have driven away if they did not destroy the sixth division; they would have recovered all the trophies; the king’s army returning by Jacca into Aragon, would have reorganized itself from Suchet’s dépôts, and that marshal was actually coming up with his army from Valencia; little would then have been gained by the battle. This question can however be more profitably discussed when the great events which followed the battle of Vittoria have been described.

Vol. 5. Nº. 1.