History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 6

by William Francis Patrick Napier

CHAPTER I.

WAR IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE.

While Pampeluna held out, Soult laboured to1813. November. complete his works of defence, especially the entrenched camp of St. Jean Pied de Port, that he might be free to change the theatre of war to Aragon. He pretended to entertain this project as late as November; but he must have secretly renounced all hope before that period, because the snows of an early and severe winter had rendered even the passes of the Lower Pyrenees impracticable in October. Meanwhile his political difficulties were not less than lord Wellington’s, all his efforts to draw forth the resources of France were met with apathy, or secret hostility, and there was no money in the military chest to answer the common daily expenses. A junta of the leading merchants in Bayonne voluntarily provided for the most pressing necessities of the troops, but their means were limited and Soult vainly urged the merchants of Bordeaux and Toulouse to follow the patriotic example. It required therefore all his firmness of character to support the crisis; and if the English naval force had been sufficient to intercept the coasting vessels between Bordeaux and Bayonne, the French army must have retired beyond the Adour. As it was, the greatest part of the field artillery and all the cavalry were sent so far to the rear for forage, that they could not be counted a part of the fighting troops; and the infantry, in addition to their immense labours, were forced to carry their own provisions from the navigable points of the rivers to the top of the mountains.

Soult was strongly affected. “Tell the emperor,” he wrote to the minister of war, “tell him when you make your next report that on the very soil of France, this is the situation of the army destined to defend the southern provinces from invasion; tell him also that the unheard-of contradictions and obstacles I meet with shall not make me fail in my duty.”

The French troops suffered much, but the privations of the allies were perhaps greater, for being on higher mountains, more extended, more dependent upon the sea, their distress was in proportion to their distance from the coast. A much shorter line had been indeed gained for the supply of the centre, and a bridge was laid down at Andarlassa which gave access to the roots of the Bayonette mountain, yet the troops were fed with difficulty; and so scantily, that lord Wellington in amends reduced the usual stoppage of pay, and invoked the army by its military honour to sustain with firmness the unavoidable pressure. The effect was striking. The murmurs, loud in the camps before, were hushed instantly, although the soldiers knew that some commissaries leaguing with the speculators upon the coast, secretly loaded the provision mules with condiments and other luxuries, to sell on the mountains at enormous profit. The desertion was however great, more than twelve hundred men went over to the enemy in less than four months; and they were all Germans, Englishmen or Spaniards, for the Portuguese who abandoned their colours invariably went back to their own country.

This difficulty of feeding the Anglo-Portuguese, the extreme distress of the Spaniards and the certainty that they would plunder in France and so raise the people in arms, together with the uneasy state of the political affairs in the Peninsula, rendered lord Wellington very averse to further offensive operations while Napoleon so tenaciously maintained his positions on the Elbe against the allied sovereigns. It was impossible to make a formidable and sustained invasion of France with the Anglo-Portuguese alone, and he had neither money nor means of transport to feed the Spaniards, even if policy warranted such a measure. The nature of the country also forbad a decisive victory, and hence an advance was attended with the risk of returning to Spain again during the winter, when a retreat would be dangerous and dishonouring. But on the 20th of October a letter from the governor of Pampeluna was intercepted, and lord Fitzroy Somerset, observing that the compliment of ceremony at the beginning was also in numerals, ingeniously followed the cue and made out the whole. It announced that the place could not hold out more than a week, and as intelligence of Napoleon’s disasters in Germany became known at the same time, lord Wellington was induced to yield once more to the wishes of the allied sovereigns and the English ministers, who were earnest that he should invade France.

His intent was to attack Soult’s entrenched camp on the 29th, thinking Pampeluna would fall before that period. In this he was mistaken; and bad weather stopped his movements, for in the passes above Roncesvalles the troops were knee-deep in snow. The preparations however continued and strict precautions were taken to baffle the enemy’s emissaries. Soult was nevertheless perfectly informed by the deserters of the original design and the cause of the delay; and he likewise obtained from a serjeant-major of artillery who losing his road was taken on the 29th, certain letters and orders indicating an attack in the direction of the bridge of Amotz, between D’Erlon’s right and Clauzel’s left. Some French peasants also who had been allowed to pass the allied outposts declared they had been closely questioned about that bridge and the roads leading to it. The defences there were therefore augmented with new redoubts and abbatis, and Soult having thus as he judged, sufficiently provided for its safety, and being in no pain for his right, nor for Clauzel’s position, covered as the latter was by the smaller Rhune, turned his attention towards Foy’s corps.

That general had been posted at Bidarray, half way between St. Jean Pied de Port and Cambo, to watch certain roads, which leading to the Nive from Val Baigorry by St. Martin d’Arosa, and from the Bastan by Yspegui and the Gorospil mountain, gave Soult anxiety for his left; but now expecting the principal attack at the bridge of Amotz, and not by these roads, nor by St. Jean Pied de Port, as he at first supposed and as lord Wellington had at one time designed, he resolved to use Foy’s division offensively. In this view on the 3d of November he instructed him if St. Jean Pied de Port should be only slightly attacked, to draw all the troops he could possibly spare from its defence to Bidarray, and when the allies assailed D’Erlon, he was to seize the Gorospil mountain and fall upon their right as they descended from the Puerto de Maya. If on the other hand he was himself assailed by those lines, he was to call in all his detached troops from St. Jean Pied de Port, repass the Nive by the bridge of Bidarray, make the best defence possible behind that river, and open a communication with Pierre Soult and Trielhard, whose divisions of cavalry were at St. Palais and Orthes.

On the 6th Foy, thinking the Gorospil difficult to pass, proposed to seize the Col de Yspegui from the side of St. Jean Pied de Port, and so descend into the Bastan. Soult however preferred Bidarray as a safer point and more united with the main body of the army; but he gave Foy a discretionary power to march along the left of the Nive upon Itzatzu and Espelette, if he judged it fitting to reinforce D’Erlon’s left rather than to attack the enemy.

Having thus arranged his regular defence, the French general directed the prefect of the Lower Pyrenees to post the organized national guards at the issues of all the valleys about St. Jean Pied de Port, but to keep the mass of the people quiet until the allies penetrating into the country should at once provoke and offer facilities for an irregular warfare.

On the 9th, being still uneasy about the San Martin d’Arosa and Gorospil roads, he brought up his brother’s cavalry from St. Palais to the heights above Cambo, and the next day the long-expected storm burst.

Allured by some fine weather on the 6th and 7th of November, lord Wellington had moved sir Rowland Hill’s troops from the Roncesvalles to the Bastan with a view to attack Soult, leaving Mina on the position of Altobiscar and in the Alduides. The other corps had also received their orders, and the battle was to commence on the 8th, but general Freyre suddenly declared, that unable to subsist on the mountains he must withdraw a part of his troops. This was a scheme to obtain provisions from the English magazines, and it was successful, for the projected attack could not be made without his aid. Forty thousand rations of flour with a formal intimation that if he did not co-operate the whole army must retire again into Spain, contented Freyre for the moment; but the extravagant abuses of the Spanish commissariat were plainly exposed when the chief of the staff declared that the flour would only suffice for two days, although there were less than ten thousand soldiers in the field. Spain therefore furnished at the rate of two rations for every fighting man and yet her troops were starving!

When this difficulty was surmounted heavy rain caused the attack to be again deferred, but on the 10th ninety thousand combatants of all[Appendix, 7], No. 3. arms and ranks above seventy-four thousand being Anglo-Portuguese, descended to the battle, and with them went ninety-five pieces of artillery, which under the command of colonel Dickson were all with inconceivable vigour and activity thrown into action. Nor in this host do I reckon four thousand five hundred cavalry, nor the Spaniards of the blockading division which remained in reserve. On the other hand the French numbers were now increased by the new levy of conscripts, but many had deserted again into the interior, and the fighting men did not exceed seventy-nine thousand including the garrisons. Six thousand of these were cavalry, and[Appendix, No. 8.] as Foy’s operations were extraneous to the line of defence scarcely sixty thousand infantry and artillery were opposed to the allies.

Lord Wellington seeing that the right of Soult’s line could not be forced without great loss, resolved to hold it in check while he turned it by forcing the centre and left, pushing down the Nivelle to San Pé. In this view the second and sixth British division, Hamilton’s Portuguese, Morillo’s Spaniards, four of Mina’s battalions, and Grant’s brigade of light cavalry, in all twenty-six thousand fighting men and officers with nine guns, were collected under general Hill in the Bastan to attack D’Erlon. The position of Roncesvalles was meanwhile occupied by the remainder of Mina’s troops supported by the blockading force under Carlos D’España.

The third fourth and seventh divisions, andWellington’s Order of Movements, MSS. Giron’s Andalusians, the whole under the command of marshal Beresford, were disposed about Zagaramurdi, the Puerto de Echallar, and the lower parts of those slopes of the greater Rhune which descended upon Sarre. On the left of this body the light division and Longa’s Spaniards, both under Charles Alten, were disposed on those slopes of the greater Rhune which led down towards Ascain. Victor Alten’s brigade of light cavalry and three British batteries, were placed on the road to Sarre, and six mountain-guns followed Giron’s and Charles Alten’s troops. Thus thirty-six thousand fighting men and officers, with twenty-four guns, were concentrated in this quarter to attack Clauzel.

General Freyre’s Spaniards, about nine thousand strong, with six guns, were disposed on Alten’s left,Plan 6. at the fort of Calvary and towards Jollimont, ready to fall upon any troops which might be detached from the camp of Serres by the bridge of Ascain, to support Clauzel.

General Hope having the first and fifth divisions, Wilson’s, Bradford’s, and lord Aylmer’s brigades of infantry, Vandeleur’s brigade of light dragoons, and the heavy German cavalry, in all about nineteen thousand men and officers with fifty-four guns, was opposed to Soult’s right wing; and the naval squadron hovering on Hope’s left flank was to aid the land operations.

On the French side each lieutenant-general had a special position to defend. D’Erlon’s first line, its left resting on the fortified rocks of Mondarin which could not be turned, run from thence along the Choupera and Atchuleguy mountains by the forge of Urdax to the Nivelle. This range was strongly entrenched and occupied by one of Abbé’s and one of D’Armagnac’s brigades, Espelette being behind the former and Ainhoa behind the latter. The second line or main position was several miles distant on a broad ridge, behind Ainhoa, and it was occupied by the remaining brigades of the two divisions. The left did not extend beyond the centre of the first line, but the right reaching to the bridge of Amotz stretched with a wider flank, because the Nivelle flowing in a slanting direction towards the French gave greater space as their positions receded. Three great redoubts were constructed in a line on this ridge, and a fourth had been commenced close to the bridge.

On the right of D’Erlon’s second line, that is to say beyond the bridge of Amotz, Clauzel’s position extended to Ascain, also along a strong range of heights fortified with many redoubts trenches and abbatis, and as the Nivelle after passing Amotz swept in a curve completely round the range to Ascain, both flanks rested alike upon that river, having communication by the bridges of Amotz and Ascain on the right and left, and a retreat by the bridges of San Pé and Harastagui which were in rear of the centre. Two of Clauzel’s divisions reinforced by one of D’Erlon’s under general Maransin were here posted. In front of the left were the redoubts of St. Barbe and Grenada covering the village and ridge of Sarre. In front of the right was the smaller Rhune which was fortified and occupied by a brigade of Maransin’s division. A new redoubt with abbatis was also commenced to cover the approaches to the bridge of Amotz.

On the right of this line beyond the bridge of Ascain, Daricau’s division belonging to Clauzel’s corps, and the Italian brigade of San Pol drawn from Villatte’s reserve, were posted to hold the entrenched camp of Serres and to connect Clauzel’s position with Villatte’s, which was as I have before said on a ridge crossing the gorges of Olette and Jollimont. The French right wing under Reille, strongly fortified on the lower ground and partially covered by inundations, was nearly impregnable.

Soult’s weakest point of general defence was certainly the opening between the Rhune mountains and the Nivelle. Gradually narrowing as it approached the bridge of Amotz this space was the most open, the least fortified, and the Nivelle being fordable above that bridge could not hamper the allies’ movements. Wherefore a powerful force acting in this direction could pass by D’Erlon’s first line and breaking in upon the main position, between the right of that general’s second line and Clauzel’s left, turn both by the same attack.

Lord Wellington thus designed his battle. General Hill, leaving Minas four battalions on the Gorospil mountain facing the rocks of Mondarin, moved in the night by the different passes of the Puerto de Maya, Morillo’s Spaniards being to menace the French on the Choupera and Atchuleguy mountains, the second division to attack Ainhoa and Urdax. The sixth division and Hamilton’s Portuguese were to assault the works covering the bridge of Amotz, either on the right or left bank of the Nivelle according to circumstances. Thus the action of twenty-six thousand men was combined against D’Erlon’s position, and on their left Beresford’s corps was assembled. The third division under general Colville, descending from Zagaramurdi, was to move against the unfinished redoubts and entrenchments covering the approaches to the bridge of Amotz on the left bank of the Nivelle, thus turning D’Erlon’s right at the moment when it was attacked in front by Hill’s corps. On the left of the third division, the seventh, descending from the mouth of the Echallar pass, was to storm the Grenada redoubt, and then passing the village of Sarre assail Clauzel’s main position abreast with the attack of the third division. On the left of the seventh, the fourth division, assembling on the lower slopes of the greater Rhune, was to descend upon the redoubt of San Barbe, and then moving through Sarre also to assail Clauzel’s main position abreast with the seventh division. On the left of the fourth division, Giron’s Spaniards, gathered higher up on the flank of the great Rhune, were to move abreast with the others leaving Sarre on their right. They were to drive the enemy from the lower slopes of the smaller Rhune and then in concert with the rest attack Clauzel’s main position. In this way Hill’s and Beresford’s corps, forming a mass of more than forty thousand infantry were to be thrust, on both sides of the bridge of Amotz, between Clauzel and D’Erlon to break their line of battle.

Charles Alten with the light division and Longa’s Spaniards, furnishing together about eight thousand men, was likewise to attack Clauzel’s line on the left of Giron, while Freyre’s Gallicians approached the bridge of Ascain to prevent reinforcements coming from the camp of Serres. But ere Alten could assail Clauzel’s right the smaller Rhune which covered it was to be stormed. This mountain outwork was a hog’s-back ridge rising abruptly out of table-land and parallel with the greater Rhune. It was inaccessible along its front, which was precipitous and from fifty to two hundred feet high; but on the enemy’s left these rocks gradually decreased, descending by a long slope to the valley of Sarre, and about two-thirds of the way down the thirty-fourth French regiment was placed, with an advanced post on some isolated crags situated in the hollow between the two Rhunes. On the enemy’s right the hog’s-back sunk by degrees into the plain or platform. It was however covered at that point by a marsh scarcely passable, and the attacking troops were therefore first to move up against the perpendicular rocks in front, and then to file to their left under fire, between the marsh and the lower crags, until they gained an accessible point from whence they could fight their way along the narrow ridge of the hog’s-back But the bristles of the latter were huge perpendicular crags connected with walls of loose stones so as to form several small forts or castles communicating with each other by narrow foot-ways, and rising one above another until the culminant point was attained. The table-land beyond this ridge was extensive and terminated in a very deep ravine on every side, save a narrow space on the right of the marsh, where the enemy had drawn a traverse of loose stones, running perpendicularly from behind the hog’s-back and ending in a star fort which overhung the edge of the ravine.

This rampart and fort, and the hog’s-back itself, were defended by Barbot’s brigade of Maransin’s division, and the line of retreat was towards a low narrow neck of land, which bridging the deep ravine linked the Rhune to Clauzel’s main position: a reserve was placed here, partly to sustain the thirty-fourth French regiment posted on the slope of the mountain towards Sarre, partly to protect the neck of land on the side of that village. As this neck was the only approach to the French position in that part, to storm the smaller Rhune was a necessary preliminary to the general battle, wherefore Alten, filing his troops after dark on the 9th from the Hermitage, the Commissary mountain, and the Puerto de Vera, collected them at midnight on that slope of the greater Rhune which descended towards Ascain. The main body of the light division, turning the marsh by the left, was to assail the stone traverse and lap over the star fort by the ravine beyond; Longa, stretching still farther on the left, was to turn the smaller Rhune altogether; and the forty-third regiment supported by the seventeenth Portuguese was to assail the hog’s-back. One battalion of riflemen and the mountain-guns were however left on the summit of the greater Rhune, with orders to assail the craggy post between the Rhunes and connect Alten’s attack with that of Giron’s Spaniards. All these troops gained their respective stations so secretly that the enemy had no suspicion of their presence, although for several hours the columns were lying within half musket-shot of the works. Towards morning indeed five or six guns, fired in a hurried manner from the low ground near the sea, broke the stillness, but the French on the Rhune remained quiet, and the British troops awaited the rising of the sun when three guns fired from the Atchubia mountain were to give the signal of attack.

BATTLE OF THE NIVELLE.

The day broke with great splendour, and as the first ray of light played on the summit of the lofty Atchubia the signal-guns were fired in rapid succession from its summit. The soldiers instantly leaped up, and the French beheld with astonishment several columns rushing forward from the flank of the great Rhune. Running to their defences with much tumult they opened a few pieces, which were answered from the top of the greater Rhune by the mountain-artillery, and at the same moment two companies of the forty-third were detached to cross the marsh if possible, and keep down the enemy’s fire from the lower part of the hog’s-back. The action being thus commenced the remainder of the regiment, formed partly in line partly in a column of reserve, turned the marsh by the right and advanced against the high rocks. From these crags the French shot fast and thickly, but the quick even movement of the British line deceived their aim, and the soldiers, running forward very swiftly though the ground was rough, turned suddenly between the rocks and the marsh, and were immediately joined by the two companies which had passed that obstacle notwithstanding its depth. Then all together jumped into the lower works, but the men exhausted by their exertions, for they had passed over half a mile of very difficult ground with a wonderful speed, remained for a few minutes inactive within half pistol-shot of the first stone castle from whence came a sharp and biting musketry. When they had recovered breath they arose and with a stern shout commenced the assault.

The defenders were as numerous as the assailants, and for six weeks they had been labouring on their well-contrived castles; but strong and valiant in arms must the soldiers have been who stood in that hour before the veterans of the forty-third. One French grenadier officer only dared to sustain the rush. Standing alone on the high wall of the first castle and flinging large stones with both his hands, a noble figure, he fought to the last and fell, while his men shrinking on each side sought safety among the rocks on his flanks. Close and confused then was the action, man met man at every turn, but with a rattling fire of musketry, sometimes struggling in the intricate narrow paths sometimes climbing the loose stone walls, the British soldiers won their desperate way until they had carried the second castle, called by the French the place of arms, and the magpie’s nest, because of a lofty pillar of rock which rose above it and on which a few marksmen were perched. From these points the defenders were driven into their last castle, which being higher and larger than the others and covered by a natural ditch or cleft in the rocks, fifteen feet deep, was called the Donjon. Here they made a stand, and the assailants, having advanced so far as to look into the rear of the rampart and star fort on the table-land below, suspended the vehement throng of their attack for a while, partly to gather a head for storming the Donjon, partly to fire on the enemy beneath them, who were now warmly engaged with the two battalions of riflemen, the Portuguese Caçadores, and the seventeenth Portuguese. This last regiment was to have followed the forty-third but seeing how rapidly and surely the latter were carrying the rocks, had moved at once against the traverse on the other side of the marsh; and very soon the French defending the rampart, being thus pressed in front, and warned by the direction of the fire that they were turned on the ridge above, seeing also the fifty-second, forming the extreme left of the division, now emerging from the deep ravine beyond the star fort on the other flank, abandoned their works. Then the forty-third gathering a strong head stormed the Donjon. Some leaped with a shout down the deep cleft in the rock, others turned it by the narrow paths on each flank, and the enemy abandoned the loose walls at the moment they were being scaled. Thus in twenty minutes six hundred old soldiers were hustled out of this labyrinth; yet not so easily but that the victors lost eleven officers and sixty-seven men.

The whole mountain was now cleared of the French, for the riflemen dropping perpendicularly down from the greater Rhune upon the post of crags in the hollow between the Rhunes seized it with small loss; but they were ill-seconded by Giron’s Spaniards and were hardly handled by the thirty-fourth French regiment, which maintaining its post on the slope, covered the flight of the confused crowd which came rushing down the mountain behind them towards the neck of land leading to the main position. At that point they all rallied and seemed inclined to renew the action, but after some hesitation continued their retreat. This favourable moment for a decisive stroke had been looked for by the commander of the forty-third, but the officer entrusted with the reserve companies of the regiment had thrown them needlessly into the fight, thus rendering it impossible to collect a body strong enough to assail such a heavy mass.

The contest at the stone rampart and star fort, being shortened by the rapid success on the hog’s-back, was not very severe, but general Kempt, always conspicuous for his valour, was severely wounded, nevertheless he did not quit the field and soon reformed his brigade on the platform he had thus so gallantly won. Meanwhile the fifty-second having turned the position by the ravine was now approaching the enemy’s line of retreat, when general Alten, following his instructions, halted the division partly in the ravine itself to the left of the neck, partly on the table-land, and during this action Longa’s Spaniards having got near Ascain were in connection with Freyre’s Gallicians. In this position with the enemy now and then cannonading Longa’s people and the troops in the ravine, Alten awaited the progress of the army on his right, for the columns there had a long way to march and it was essential to regulate the movements.

The signal-guns from the Atchubia which sent the light division against the Rhune, had also put the fourth and seventh divisions in movement against the redoubts of San Barbe and Grenada. Eighteen guns were immediately placed in battery against the former, and while they poured their stream of shot the troops advanced with scaling ladders and the skirmishers of the fourth division got into the rear of the work, whereupon the French leaped out and fled. Ross’s battery of horse artillery galloping to a rising ground in rear of the Grenada fort drove the enemy from there also, and then the fourth and seventh divisions carried the village of Sarre and the position beyond it and advanced to the attack of Clauzel’s main position.

It was now eight o’clock and from the smaller Rhune a splendid spectacle of war opened upon the view. On one hand the ships of war slowly sailing to and fro were exchanging shots with the fort of Socoa; Hope menacing all the French lines in the low ground sent the sound of a hundred pieces of artillery bellowing up the rocks, and they were answered by nearly as many from the tops of the mountains. On the other hand the summit of the great Atchubia was just lighted by the rising sun, and fifty thousand men rushing down its enormous slopes with ringing shouts, seemed to chase the receding shadows into the deep valley. The plains of France so long overlooked from the towering crags of the Pyrenees were to be the prize of battle, and the half-famished soldiers in their fury, broke through the iron barrier erected by Soult as if it were but a screen of reeds.

The principal action was on a space of seven or eight miles, but the skirts of battle spread wide, and in no point had the combinations failed. Far on the right general Hill after a long and difficult night march had got within reach of the enemy a little before seven o’clock. Opposing Morillo’s and Mina’s Spaniards to Abbé’s troops on the Mondarain and Atchuleguy rocks, he directed the second division against D’Armagnac’s brigade and brushed it back from the forge of Urdax and the village of Ainhoa. Meanwhile the aid of the sixth division and Hamilton’s Portuguese being demanded by him, they passed the Nivelle lower down and bent their march along the right bank towards the bridge of Amotz. Thus while Mina’s battalion and Morillo’s division kept Abbé in check on the mountains, the three Anglo-Portuguese divisions, marching left flank in advance, approached D’Erlon’s second position, but the country being very rugged it was eleven o’clock before they got within cannon-shot of the French redoubts. Each of these contained five hundred men, and they were placed along the summit of a high ridge which being thickly clothed with bushes, and covered by a deep ravine was very difficult to attack. However general Clinton, leading the sixth division on the extreme left, turned this ravine and drove the enemy from the works covering the approaches to the bridge, after which wheeling to his right he advanced against the nearest redoubt, and the garrison not daring to await the assault abandoned it. Then the Portuguese division passing the ravine and marching on the right of the sixth menaced the second redoubt, and the second division in like manner approached the third redoubt. D’Armagnac’s troops now set fire to their hutted camp and retreated to Helbacen de Borda behind San Pé, pursued by the sixth division. Abbé’s second brigade forming the French left was separated by a ravine from D’Armagnac’s ground, but he also after some hesitation retreated towards Espelette and Cambo, where his other brigade, which had meanwhile fallen back from the Mondarain before Morillo, rejoined him.

It was the progress of the battle on the left of the Nive that rendered D’Erlon’s defence so feeble. After the fall of the St. Barbe and Grenada redoubts Conroux’s right and centre endeavoured to defend the village and heights of Sarre; but while the fourth and seventh divisions, aided by the ninety-fourth regiment detached from the third division, attacked and carried those points, the third division being on their right and less opposed pushed rapidly towards the bridge of Amotz, forming in conjunction with the sixth division the narrow end of the wedge into which Beresford’s and Hill’s corps were now thrown. The French were thus driven from all their new unfinished works covering the approaches to that bridge on both sides of the Nivelle, and Conroux’s division, spreading from Sarre to Amotz, was broken by superior numbers at every point. That general indeed vigorously defended the old works around the bridge itself, but he soon fell mortally wounded, his troops were again broken, and the third division seized the bridge and established itself on the heights between that structure and the redoubt of Louis the XIV. which having been also lately commenced was unfinished. This happened about eleven o’clock and D’Erlon fearing to be cut off from St. Pé yielded as we have seen at once to the attack of the sixth division, and at the same time the remainder of Conroux’s troops fell back in disorder from Sarre, closely pursued by the fourth and seventh divisions, which were immediately established on the left of the third. Thus the communication between Clauzel and D’Erlon was cut, the left flank of one and the right flank of the other broken, and a direct communication between Hill and Beresford secured by the same blow.

D’Erlon abandoned his position, but Clauzel stood firm with Taupin’s and Maransin’s divisions. The latter now completed by the return of Barbot’s brigade from the smaller Rhune, occupied the redoubt of Louis the XIV. and supported with eight field-pieces attempted to cover the flight of Conroux’s troops. The guns opened briskly but they were silenced by Ross’s battery of horse artillery, the only one which had surmounted the difficulties of the ground after passing Sarre, the infantry were then assailed, in front by the fourth and seventh divisions, in flank by the third division, the redoubt of Louis XIV. was stormed, the garrison bayonetted, Conroux’s men continued to fly, Maransin’s after a stiff combat were cast headlong into the ravines behind their position, and Maransin himself was taken but escaped in the confusion. Giron’s Spaniards now came up on the left of the fourth division, somewhat late however, and after having abandoned the riflemen on the lower slopes of the smaller Rhune.

On the French side Taupin’s division and a large body of conscripts forming Clauzel’s right wing still remained to fight. The left rested on a large work called the signal redoubt, which had no artillery but overlooked the whole position; the right was covered by two redoubts overhanging a ravine which separated them from the camp of Serres, and some works in the ravine itself protected the communication by the bridge of Ascain. Behind the signal redoubt, on a ridge crossing the road to San Pé and along which Maransin and Conroux’s beaten divisions were now flying in disorder, there was another work called the redoubt of Harastaguia, and Clauzel thinking he might still dispute the victory, if his reserve division, posted in the camp of Serres, could come to his aid, drew the thirty-first French regiment from Taupin, and posted it in front of this redoubt of Harastaguia. His object was to rally Maransin’s and Conroux’s troops there and so form a new line, the left on the Harastaguia, the right on the signal redoubt, into which last he threw six hundred of the eighty-eighth regiment. In this position having a retreat by the bridge of Ascain he resolved to renew the battle, but his plan failed at the moment of conception, because Taupin could not stand before the light division which was now again in full action.

About half-past nine, general Alten, seeing the whole of the columns on his right, as far as the eye could reach, well engaged with the enemy, had crossed the low neck of land in his front. It was first passed by the fifty-second regiment with a rapid pace and a very narrow front, under a destructive cannonade and fire of musketry from the entrenchments which covered the side of the opposite mountain; a road coming from Ascain by the ravine led up the position, and as the fifty-second pushed their attack along it the enemy abandoned his entrenchments on each side, and forsook even his crowning works above. This formidable regiment was followed by the remainder of Alten’s troops, and Taupin, though his division was weak from its losses on the 7th of October and now still further diminished by the absence of the thirty-first regiment, awaited the assault above, being supported by the conscripts drawn up in his rear. But at this time Longa, having turned the smaller Rhune, approached Ascain, and being joined by part of Freyre’s troops their skirmishers opened a distantClauzel’s Official Report to Soult, MSS. musketry against the works covering that bridge on Taupin’s right; a panic immediately seized the French, the seventieth regiment abandoned the twoTaupin’s Official Report, MSS. redoubts above, and the conscripts were withdrawn. Clauzel ordered Taupin to retake the forts but this only added to the disorder, the seventieth regiment instead of facing about disbanded entirely and were not reassembled until next day. There remained only four regiments unbroken, one, the eighty-eighth, was in the signal redoubt, two under Taupin in person kept together in rear of the works on the right, and the thirty-first covered the fort of Harastaguia now the only line of retreat.

In this emergency, Clauzel, anxious to bring off the eighty-eighth regiment, ordered Taupin to charge on one side of the signal redoubt, intending to do the same himself on the other at the head of the thirty-first regiment; but the latter was now vigorously attacked by the Portuguese of the seventh division, and the fourth division was rapidly interposing between that regiment and the signal redoubt. Moreover Alten previous to this had directed the forty-third, preceded by Barnard’s riflemen, to turn at the distance of musquet shot the right flank of the signal redoubt, wherefore Taupin instead of charging, was himself charged in front by the riflemen, and being menaced at the same time in flank by the fourth division, retreated, closely pursued by Barnard until that intrepid officer fell dangerously wounded. During this struggle the seventh division broke the thirty-first, the rout was complete; the French fled to the different bridges over the Nivelle and the signal redoubt was left to its fate.

This formidable work barred the way of the light division, but it was of no value to the defence when the forts on its flanks were abandoned. Colborne approached it in front with the fifty-second regiment, Giron’s Spaniards menaced it on Colborne’s right, the fourth division was passing to its rear, and Kempt’s brigade was as we have seen turning it on the left. Colborne whose military judgment was seldom at fault, halted under the brow of the conical hill on which the work was situated, but some of Giron’s Spaniards making a vaunting though feeble demonstration of attacking it on his right were beaten back, and at that moment a staff-officer without warrant, for general Alten on the spot assured the Author of this History that he sent no such order, rode up and directed Colborne to advance. It was not a moment for remonstrance and his troops covered by the steepness of the hill reached the flat top which was about forty yards across to the redoubt; then they made their rush, but a wide ditch, thirty feet deep well fraised and pallisaded, stopped them short, and the fire of the enemy stretched all the foremost men dead. The intrepid Colborne, escaping miraculously for he was always at the head and on horseback, immediately led the regiment under cover of the brow to another point, and thinking to take the French unawares made another rush, yet with the same result. At three different places did he rise to the surface in this manner, and each time the French fire swept away the head of his column. Resorting then to persuasion he held out a white handkerchief and summoned the commandant, pointing out to him how his work was surrounded and how hopeless his defence, whereupon the garrison yielded having had only one man killed, whereas on the British side there fell two hundred soldiers of a regiment never surpassed in arms since arms were first borne by men.

During this affair Clauzel’s divisions had crossed the Nivelle in great disorder, Maransin’s and Conroux’s troops near San Pé, the thirty-first regiment at Harastaguia, Taupin between that place and the bridge of Serres. They were pursued by the third and seventh divisions, and the skirmishers of the former crossing by Amotz and a bridge above San Pé entered that place while the French were in the act of passing the river below. It was now past two o’clock, Conroux’s troops pushed on to Helbacen de Borda, a fortified position on the road from San Pé to Bayonne, where they were joined by Taupin and by D’Erlon with D’Armagnac’s division, but Clauzel rallied Maransin’s men and took post on some heights immediately above San Pé. Meanwhile Soult had hurried from St. Jean de Luz to the camp of Serres with all his reserve artillery and spare troops to menace the allies’ left flank by Ascain, and Wellington thereupon halted the fourth and light divisions, and Giron’s Spaniards, on the reverse slopes of Clauzel’s original position, facing the camp of Serres, waiting until the sixth division, then following D’Armagnac’s retreat on the right of the Nivelle, was well advanced. When he was assured of Clinton’s progress he crossed the Nivelle with the third and seventh divisions and drove Maransin from his new position after a hard struggle, in which general Inglis was wounded and the fifty-first and sixty-eighth regiments handled very roughly. This ended the battle in the centre, for darkness was coming on and the troops were exhausted, especially the sixth division which had been marching or fighting for twenty-four hours. However three divisions were firmly established in rear of Soult’s right wing of whose operations it is now time to treat.

In front of Reille’s entrenchments were two advanced positions, the camp of the Sans Culottes on the right, the Bons Secours in the centre covering Urogne. The first had been attacked and carried early in the morning by the fifth division, which advanced to the inundation covering the heights of Bordegain and Ciboure. The second after a short cannonade was taken by Halket’s Germans and the guards, and immediately afterwards the eighty-fifth regiment, of lord Aylmer’s brigade, drove a French battalion out of Urogne. The first division, being on the right, then menaced the camp of Belchena, and the German skirmishers passed a small stream covering this part of the line, but they were driven back by the enemy whose musketry and cannonade were brisk along the whole front. Meanwhile Freyre, advancing in two columns from Jollimont and the Calvaire on the right of the first division, placed eight guns in battery against the Nassau redoubt, a large work constructed on the ridge occupied by Villate to cover the approaches to Ascain. The Spaniards were here opposed by their own countrymen under Casa Palacio who commanded the remains of Joseph’s Spanish guards, and during the fight general Freyre’s skirmishers on the right united with Longa’s men. Thus a kind of false battle was maintained along the whole line to the sea until nightfall, with equal loss of men but great advantage to the allies, because it entirely occupied Reille’s two divisions and Villatte’s reserve, and prevented the troops in the camp of Serres from passing by the bridge of Ascain to aid Clauzel, who was thus overpowered. When that event happened and lord Wellington had passed the Nivelle at San Pé, Daricau and the Italian brigade withdrew from Serres, and Villatte’s reserve occupied it, whereupon Freyre and Longa entered the town of Ascain. Villatte however held the camp above until Reille had withdrawn into St. Jean de Luz and destroyed all the bridges on the Lower Nivelle; when that was effected the whole retired and at daybreak reached the heights of Bidart on the road to Bayonne.

During the night the allies halted on the position they had gained in the centre, but an accidental conflagration catching a wood completely separated the picquets towards Ascain from the main body, and spreading far and wide over the heath lighted up all the hills, a blazing sign of war to France.

On the 11th the army advanced in order of battle. Sir John Hope on the left, forded the river above St. Jean de Luz with his infantry, and marched on Bidart. Marshal Beresford in the centre moved by the roads leading upon Arbonne. General Hill, communicating by his right with Morillo who was on the rocks of Mondarain, brought his left forward into communication with Beresford, and with his centre took possession of Suraide and Espelette facing towards Cambo. The time required to restore the bridges for the artillery at Ciboure, and the change of front on the right rendered these movements slow, and gave the duke of Dalmatia time to rally his army upon a third line of fortified camps which he had previously commenced, the right resting on the coast at Bidart, the centre at Helbacen Borda, the left at Ustaritz on the Nive. This front was about eight miles, but the works were only slightly advanced and Soult dreading a second battle on so wide a field drew back his centre and left to Arbonne and Arauntz, broke down the bridges on the Nive at Ustaritz, and at two o’clock a slight skirmish, commenced by the allies in the centre, closed the day’s proceedings. The next morning the French retired to the ridge of Beyris, having their right in advance at Anglet and their left in the entrenched camp of Bayonne near Marac. During this movement a dense fog arrested the allies, but when the day cleared sir John Hope took post at Bidart on the left, and Beresford occupied Ahetze, Arbonne, and the hill of San Barbe, in the centre. General Hill endeavoured to pass the fords and restore the broken bridges of Ustaritz and he also made a demonstration against the works at Cambo, but the rain which fell heavily in the mountains on the 11th rendered the fords impassable and both points were defended successfully by Foy whose operations had been distinct from the rest.

In the night of the 9th D’Erlon, mistrusting the strength of his own position, had sent that general orders to march from Bidaray to Espelette, but the messenger did not arrive in time and on the morning of the 10th about eleven o’clock Foy, following Soult’s previous instructions, drove Mina’s battalions from the Gorospil mountain; then pressing against the flank of Morillo he forced him also back fighting to the Puerto de Maya. However D’Erlon’s battle was at this period receding fast, and Foy fearing to be cut off retired with the loss of a colonel and one hundred and fifty men, having however taken a quantity of baggage and a hundred prisoners. Continuing his retreat all night he reached Cambo and Ustaritz on the 11th, just in time to relieve Abbé’s division at those posts, and on the 12th defended them against general Hill. Such were the principal circumstances of the battle of the Nivelle, whereby Soult was driven from a mountain position which he had been fortifying for three months. He lost four thousand two hundred and sixty-five men and officers including twelve or fourteen hundred prisoners, and one general was killed. His field-magazines at St. Jean de Luz and Espelette fell into the hands of the victors, and fifty-one pieces of artillery were taken, the greater part having been abandoned in the redoubts of the low country to sir John Hope. The allies had two generals, Kempt and Byng, wounded, and they lost two thousand six hundred and ninety-four men and officers.

OBSERVATIONS.

1º. Soult fared in this battle as most generals will who seek by extensive lines to supply the want of numbers or of hardiness in the troops. Against rude commanders and undisciplined soldiers lines may avail, seldom against accomplished generals, never when the assailants are the better soldiers. Cæsar at Alesia resisted the Gauls, but his lines served him not at Dyrrachium against Pompey. Crassus failed in Calabria against Spartacus, and in modern times the duke of Marlborough broke through all the French lines in Flanders. If Wellington triumphed at Torres Vedras it was perhaps because his lines were not attacked, and, it may be, Soult was seduced by that example. His works were almost as gigantic and upon the same plan, that is to say a river on one flank, the ocean on the other, and the front upon mountains covered with redoubts and partially protected by inundations. But the duke of Dalmatia had only three months to complete his system, his labours were under the gaze of his enemy, his troops, twice defeated during the execution, were inferior in confidence and numbers to the assailants. Lord Wellington’s lines at Torres Vedras had been laboured for a whole year. Massena only knew of them when they stopped his progress, and his army inferior in numbers had been repulsed in the recent battle of Busaco.

It is not meant by this to decry entrenched camps within compass, and around which an active army moves as on a pivot, delivering or avoiding battle according to circumstances. The objection applies only to those extensive covering lines by which soldiers are taught to consider themselves inferior in strength and courage to their enemies. A general is thus precluded from shewing himself at important points and at critical periods; he is unable to encourage his troops or to correct errors; his sudden resources and the combinations of genius are excluded by the necessity of adhering to the works, while the assailants may make whatever dispositions they like, menace every point and select where to break through. The defenders, seeing large masses directed against them and unable to draw confidence from a like display of numbers, become fearful, knowing there must be some weak point which is the measure of strength for the whole. The assailants fall on with that heat and vehemence which belongs to those who act voluntarily and on the offensive; each mass strives to outdo those on its right and left, and failure is only a repulse, whereas the assailed having no resource but victory look to their flanks, and are more anxious about their neighbours’ fighting than their own.

All these disadvantages were experienced at the battle of the Nivelle. D’Erlon attributed his defeat to the loss of the bridge of Amotz by Conroux’s division, and to this cause also Maransin traced his misfortunes. Taupin laid his defeat at Maransin’s door, but Clauzel on the other hand ascribed itOfficial Reports of the French generals to Soult, MSS. at once to want of firmness in the troops, although he also asserted that if Daricau’s division had come to his aid from the camp of Serres, he would have maintained his ground. Soult however traced Clauzel’s defeat to injudicious measures. That generalSoult’s Official Report to the Minister of War, MSS. he said attempted to defend the village of Sarre after the redoubts of San Barbe and Grenada were carried, whereby Conroux’s division was overwhelmed in detail and driven back in flight to Amotz. Clauzel should rather have assembled his three divisions at once in the main position which was his battleground, and there, covered by the smaller Rhune, ought to have been victorious. It was scarcely credible he observed that such entrenchments as Clauzel’s and D’Erlon’s should have been carried. For his part he relied on their strength so confidently as to think the allies must sacrifice twenty-five thousand men to force them and perhaps fail then. He had been on the right when the battle began, no reports came to him, he could judge of events only by the fire, and when he reached the camp of Serres with his reserve troops and artillery Clauzel’s works were lost! His arrival had however paralyzed the march of three divisions. This was true, yet there seems some foundation for Clauzel’s complaint, namely, that he had for five hours fought on his main position, and during that time no help had come, although the camp of Serres was close at hand, the distance from St. Jean de Luz to that place only four miles, and the attack in the low ground evidently a feint. This then was Soult’s error. He suffered sir John Hope to hold in play twenty-five thousand men in the low ground, while fifteen thousand under Clauzel lost the battle on the hills.

2º. The French army was inferior in numbers and many of the works were unfinished; and yet two strong divisions, Daricau’s and Foy’s, were quite thrown out of the fight, for the slight offensive movement made by the latter produced no effect whatever. Vigorous counter-attacks are no doubt essential to a good defence, and it was in allusion to this that Napoleon, speaking of Joseph’s position behind the Ebro in the beginning of the war, said, “if a river were as broad and rapid as the Danube it would be nothing without secure points for passing to the offensive.” The same maxim applies to lines, and Soult grandly conceived and applied this principle when he proposed the descent upon Aragon to Suchet. But he conceived it meanly and poorly when he ordered Foy to attack by the Gorospil mountain. That general’s numbers were too few, and the direction of the march false; one regiment in the field of battle at the decisive moment would have been worth three on a distant and secondary point. Foy’s retreat was inevitable if D’Erlon failed, and wanting the other’s aid he did fail. What success could Foy obtain? He might have driven Mina’s battalions over the Puerto de Maya and quite through the Bastan; he might have defeated Morillo and perhaps have taken general Hill’s baggage; yet all this would have weighed little against the allies’ success at Amotz; and the deeper he penetrated the more difficult would have been his retreat. The incursion into the Bastan by Yspegui proposed by him on the 6th, although properly rejected by Soult would probably have produced greater effects than the one executed by Gorospil on the 10th. A surprise on the 6th, Hill’s troops being then in march by brigades through the Alduides, might have brought some advantages to the French, and perhaps delayed the general attack beyond the 10th, when the heavy rains which set in on the 11th would have rendered it difficult to attack at all: Soult would thus have had time to complete his works.

3º. It has been observed that a minor cause of defeat was the drawing up of the French troops in front instead of in rear of the redoubts. This may possibly have happened in some places from error and confusion, not by design, for Clauzel’s report expressly states that Maransin was directed to form in rear of the redoubts and charge the allies when they were between the works and the abbatis. It is however needless to pry closely into these matters when the true cause lies broad on the surface. Lord Wellington directed superior numbers with superior skill. The following analysis will prove this, but it must be remembered that the conscripts are not included in the enumeration of the French force: being quite undisciplined they were kept in masses behind and never engaged.

Abbé’s division, furnishing five thousand old soldiers, was posted in two lines one behind the other, and they were both paralyzed by the position of Morillo’s division and Mina’s battalions. Foy’s division was entirely occupied by the same troops. Six thousand of Wellington’s worst soldiers therefore sufficed to employ twelve thousand of Soult’s best troops during the whole day. Meanwhile Hill fell upon the decisive point where there was only D’Armagnac’s division to oppose him, that is to say, five thousand against twenty thousand. And while the battle was secured on the right of the Nivelle by this disproportion, Beresford on the other bank thrust twenty-four thousand against the ten thousand composing Conroux’s and Maransin’s divisions. Moreover as Hill and Beresford, advancing, the one from his left the other from his right, formed a wedge towards the bridge of Amotz, forty-four thousand men composing the six divisions under those generals, fell upon the fifteen thousand composing the divisions of D’Armagnac Conroux and Maransin; and these last were also attacked in detail, because part of Conroux’s troops were defeated near Sarre, and Barbot’s brigade of Maransin’s corps was beaten on the Rhune by the light division before the main position was attacked. Finally Alten with eight thousand men, having first defeated Barbot’s brigade, fell upon Taupin who had only three thousand while the rest of the French army was held in check by Freyre and Hope. Thus more than fifty thousand troops full of confidence from repeated victories were suddenly thrown upon the decisive point where there were only eighteen thousand dispirited by previous reverses to oppose them. Against such a thunderbolt there was no defence in the French works. Was it then a simple matter for Wellington so to combine his battle? The mountains on whose huge flanks he gathered his fierce soldiers, the roads he opened, the horrid crags he surmounted, the headlong steeps he descended, the wild regions through which he poured the destructive fire of more than ninety guns, these and the reputation of the French commander furnish the everlasting reply.

And yet he did not compass all that he designed. The French right escaped, because when he passed the Nivelle at San Pé he had only two divisions in hand, the sixth had not come up, three were in observation of the camp at Serres, and before he could assemble enough men to descend upon the enemy in the low ground the day had closed. The great object of the battle was therefore unattained, and it may be a question, seeing the shortness of the days and the difficulty of the roads were not unexpected obstacles, whether the combinations would not have been surer if the principal attack had been directed entirely against Clauzel’s position. Carlos D’España’s force and the remainder of Mina’s battalions could have reinforced Morillo’s division with five thousand men to occupy D’Erlon’s attention; it was not essential to defeat him, for though he attributed his retreat to Clauzel’s reverse that general did not complain that D’Erlon’s retreat endangered his position. This arrangement would have enabled the rest of Hill’s troops to reinforce Beresford and have given lord Wellington three additional divisions in hand with which to cross the Nivelle before two o’clock. Soult’s right wing could not then have escaped.

4º. In the report of the battle lord Wellington from some oversight did but scant and tardy justice to the light division. Acting alone, for Longa’s Spaniards went off towards Ascain and scarcely fired a shot, this division furnishing only four thousand seven hundred men and officers, first carried the smaller Rhune defended by Barbot’s brigade, and then beat Taupin’s division from the main position, thus driving superior numbers from the strongest works. In fine being less than one-sixth of the whole force employed against Clauzel, they defeated one-third of that general’s corps. Many brave men they lost, and of two who fell in this battle I will speak.

The first, low in rank for he was but a lieutenant, rich in honour for he bore many scars, was young of days. He was only nineteen. But he had seen more combats and sieges than he could count years. So slight in person, and of such surpassing and delicate beauty that the Spaniards often thought him a girl disguised in man’s clothing, he was yet so vigorous, so active, so brave, that the most daring and experienced veterans watched his looks on the field of battle, and implicitly following where he led, would like children obey his slightest sign in the most difficult situations. His education was incomplete, yet were his natural powers so happy, the keenest and best-furnished intellects shrunk from an encounter of wit, and every thought and aspiration was proud and noble, indicating future greatness if destiny had so willed it. Such was Edward Freer of the forty-third one of three brothers who covered with wounds have all died in the service. Assailed the night before the battle with that strange anticipation of coming death so often felt by military men, he was pierced with three balls at the first storming of the Rhune rocks, and the sternest soldiers in the regiment wept even in the middle of the fight when they heard of his fate.

On the same day and at the same hour was killed colonel Thomas Lloyd. He likewise had been a long time in the forty-third. Under him Freer had learned the rudiments of his profession, but in the course of the war promotion placed Lloyd at the head of the ninety-fourth, and it was leading that regiment he fell. In him also were combined mental and bodily powers of no ordinary kind. A graceful symmetry combined with Herculean strength, and a countenance at once frank and majestic gave the true index of his nature, for his capacity was great and commanding, and his military knowledge extensive both from experience and study. On his mirth and wit, so well known in the army, I will not dwell, save to remark, that he used the latter without offence, yet so as to increase his ascendancy over those with whom he held intercourse, for though gentle he was valiant, ambitious, and conscious of his fitness for great exploits. He like Freer was prescient of, and predicted his own fall, yet with no abatement of courage. When he received the mortal wound, a most painful one, he would not suffer himself to be moved but remained watching the battle and making observations upon the changes in it until death came. It was thus at the age of thirty, that the good the brave the generous Lloyd died. Tributes to hisWellington’s Despatches. merit have been published by lord Wellington and by one of his own poor soldiers! by the highest and by the lowest! To their testimony I add mine, letThe Eventful Life of a Sergeant. those who served on equal terms with him say whether in aught I have exceeded his deserts.