History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 6

by William Francis Patrick Napier

CHAPTER II.

Lord William Bentinck arrived without troops, for,1813. June. having removed the queen from Sicily, he feared internal dissension and Napoleon had directed Murat to invade the island with twenty thousand men, the Toulon squadron being to act in concert. Sir Edward Pellew admitted that the latter might easily gain twenty-four hours’ start of his fleet, and lord William judged that ten thousand invaders would suffice to conquer. Murat however, opened a secret negociation, and thus, that monarch, Bernadotte, and the emperor Francis endeavoured to destroy a hero connected with them by marriage and to whom they all owed their crowns either by gift or clemency!

This early defection of Murat is certain, and his[Appendix, No. 1.] declaration that he had instructions to invade Sicily was corroborated by a rumour, rife in the French camps before the battle of Vittoria, that the Toulon fleet had sailed and the descent actually made. Nevertheless there is some obscurity about the matter. The negociation was never completed, Murat left Italy to command Napoleon’s cavalry and at the battle of Dresden contributed much to the success of that day. Now it is conceivable that he should mask his plans by joining the grand army, and that his fiery spirit should in the battle forget everything except victory. But to disobey Napoleon’s orders as to the invasion of Sicily and dare to face that monarch immediately after, was so unlikely as to indicate rather a paper demonstration to alarm lord Wellington than a real attack. And it would seem from the short observation of the latter in answer to lord William Bentinck’s detailed communication on this subject, namely “Sicily is in no danger,” that he viewed it so, or thought it put forward by Murat to give more value to his defection. However it sufficed to hinder reinforcements going to Murray.

Lord William Bentinck on landing was informed that Suchet was at Tortoza with from eight to twelve thousand men, Maurice Mathieu with seven thousand at Cambrils. To drive the latter back and re-invest Taragona was easy, and the place would have fallen because the garrison had exhausted all their powder in the first siege; but this lord William did not know, and to renew the attack vigorously was impossible, because all the howitzers and platforms and fascines had been lost, and the animals and general equipment of the army were too much deteriorated by continual embarkations, and disembarkations, to keep the field in Catalonia. Wherefore he resolved to return to Alicant, not without hope still to fulfil Wellington’s instructions by landing at Valencia between Suchet and Harispe. The re-embarkation was unmolested, the fort of Balaguer was destroyed, and one regiment of Whittingham’s division, destined to reinforce Copons’ army, being detached to effect a landing northward of Barcelona, the fleet put to sea; but misfortune continued to pursue this unhappy armament. A violent tempest impeded the voyage, fourteen sail of transports struck upon the sands off the mouth of the Ebro, and the army was not entirely disembarked at Alicant before the 27th. Meanwhile marshal Suchet, seeing the English fleet under sail and taught by the destruction of the fort of Balaguer, that the allies had relinquished operations in Lower Catalonia, marched with such extraordinary diligence as to reach Valencia in forty-eight hours after quitting Tortoza, thus frustrating lord William’s project of landing at Valencia.

During his absence Harispe had again proved the weakness of the Spanish armies, and demonstrated the sagacity and prudence of lord Wellington. That great man’s warning about defeat was distinctly addressed to the Spanish generals, because the chief object of the operations was not to defeat Suchet but to keep him from aiding the French armies in the north. Pitched battles were therefore to be avoided their issue being always doubtful, and the presence of a numerous and increasing force on the front and flank of the French was more sure to obtain the end in view. But all Spanish generals desired to fight great battles, soothing their national pride by attributing defeats to want of cavalry. It was at first doubtful if Murray could transport his horsemen to Taragona, and if left behind they would have been under Elio and Del Parque, whereby those officers would have been encouraged to fight. Hence the English general’s menacing intimation. And he also considered that as the army of Del Parque had been for three years in continued activity under Ballesteros without being actually dispersed, it must be more capable than Elio’s in the dodging warfare suitable for Spaniards. Moreover Elio was best acquainted with the country between the Xucar and Alicant. Wherefore Del Parque was directed to turn the enemy’s right flank by Requeña, Elio to menace the front, which, adverting to the support and protection furnished by Alicant and the mountains behind Castalla, was the least dangerous operation.

But to trust Spanish generals was to trust the winds and the clouds. General Elio persuaded the duke Del Parque to adopt the front attack, took the flank line himself, and detached general Mijares to fall upon Requeña. And though Suchet had weakened his line on the 2d of June, Del Parque was not ready until the 9th, thus giving the French a week for the relief of Taragona, and for the arrival of Severoli at Liria.

At this time Harispe had about eight thousand men of all arms in front of the Xucar. The Spaniards, including Roche’s and Mijares’ divisions and Whittingham’s cavalry, were twenty-five thousand strong; and the Empecinado, Villa Campa, and the Frayle, Nebot, waited in the Cuenca and Albaracyn mountains to operate on the French rear. Notwithstanding this disproportion, the contest was short, and for the Spaniards, disastrous. They advanced in three columns. Elio, by the pass of Almanza; Del Parque by Villena and Fuente de la Higuera menacing Moxente; Roche and the prince of Anglona from Alcoy, by Onteniente and the pass of Albayda, menacing San Felippe de Xativa and turning Moxente.

Harispe abandoned those camps on the 11th, and took the line of the Xucar, occupying the entrenchments in front of his bridges at Alcira and Barca del Rey, near Alberique; and during this retrograde movement general Mesclop, commanding the rear-guard, being pressed by the Spanish horsemen, wheeled round and drove them in great confusion upon the infantry.

On the 15th Mijares took the fort of Requeña, thus turning the line of the Xucar, and securing the defiles of Cabrillas through which the Cuenca road leads to Valencia. Villa Campa immediately joined him thereby preventing Severoli from uniting with Harispe, and meanwhile Del Parque, after razing the French works at Moxente and San Felippe, advanced towards Alcira in two columns, the one moving by the road of Cargagente, the other by the road of Gandia. General Habert overthrew the first with one shock, took five hundred prisoners, and marched to attack the other, but it was already routed by general Gudin. After this contest Del Parque and Harispe maintained their respective positions, while Elio joined Mijares at Requeña. Villa Campa then descended to Chiva, and Harispe’s position was becoming critical, when on the 23d the head of Suchet’s column coming from the Ebro entered Valencia, and on the 24th Del Parque resumed the position of Castalla.

Thus in despite of Wellington’s precautions every thing turned contrary to his designs. Elio had operated by the flank, Del Parque by the front, and the latter was defeated because he attacked the enemy in an entrenched position. Murray had failed entirely. His precipitancy at Taragona and his delays at Balaguer were alike hurtful, and would have caused the destruction of one or both of the Spanish armies but for the battle of Vittoria. For Suchet, having first detached general Musnier to recover the fort of Requeña and drive back Villa Campa, had assembled the bulk of his forces in his old positions, of San Felippe and Moxente, before the return of the Anglo-Sicilian troops; and as Elio, unable to subsist at Utiel, had then returned towards his former quarters, the French marshal was upon the point of striking a fatal blow against him, or Del Parque, or both, when the news of Wellington’s victory averted the danger.

Here the firmness, the activity and coolness of Suchet, may be contrasted with the infirmity of purpose displayed by Murray. Slow in attack, precipitate in retreat, the English commander always mistimed his movements; the French marshal doubled his force by rapidity. The latter was isolated by the operations of lord Wellington; his communication with Aragon was interrupted, and that province placed in imminent danger; the communication between Valencia and Catalonia was exposed to the attacks of the Anglo-Sicilian army and the fleet; nearly thirty thousand Spaniards menaced him on the Xucar in front; Villa Campa, the Frayle and the Empecinado could bring ten thousand men on his right flank; yet he did not hesitate to leave Harispe with only seven or eight thousand men to oppose the Spaniards, while with the remainder of his army he relieved Taragona and yet returned in time to save Valencia.

Such was the state of affairs when lord William Bentinck brought the Anglo-Sicilian troops once more to Alicant. His first care was to re-organize the means of transport for the commissariat and artillery, but this was a matter of difficulty. Sir John Murray, with a mischievous economy, and strange disregard of that part of Wellington’s instructions, which proscribed active field operations in Valencia if he should be forced to return from Catalonia, had discharged six hundred mules, and two hundred country carts, that is to say five-sixths of the whole field equipment, before he sailed for Taragona. The army was thus crippled, while Suchet gathered strong in front, and Musnier’s division retaking Requeña forced the Spaniards to retire from that quarter. Lord William urged Del Parque to advance meanwhile from Castalla, but he had not means of carrying even one day’s biscuit, and at the same time Elio pressed by famine went off towards Cuenca. It was not until the 1st of July that the Anglo-Sicilian troops could even advance towards Alcoy.

Lord William Bentinck commanded the SpanishJuly. armies as well as his own, and letters passed between him and lord Wellington relative to further operations. The latter, keeping to his original views, advised a renewed attack on Taragona or on Tortoza, if the ordnance still in possession of the army would admit of such a measure; but supposing this could not be, he recommended a general advance to seize the open country of Valencia, the British keeping close to the sea and in constant communication with the fleet.

Lord William’s views were different. He found the Spanish soldiers robust and active, but their regimental officers bad, and their organization generally so deficient that they could not stand against even a small French force, as proved by their recent defeat at Alcira. The generals however pleased him at first, especially Del Parque, that is, like all Spaniards, they had fair words at command, and lord William Bentinck without scanning very nicely their deeds, thought he could safely undertake a grand stragetic operation in conjunction with them.

To force the line of the Xucar he deemed unadvisable, inasmuch as there were only two carriage roads, both of which led to Suchet’s entrenched bridges; and though the river was fordable the enemy’s bank was so favourable for defence as to render the passage by force dangerous. The Anglo-SiciliansLord William Bentinck’s Correspondence, MSS. were unaccustomed to great tactical movements, the Spaniards altogether incapable of them. Wherefore, relinquishing an attack in front, lord William proposed to move the allied armies in one mass and turn the enemy’s right flank either by Utiel and Requeña, or, by a wider march, to reach Cuenca and from thence gaining the Madrid road to Zaragoza, communicate with Wellington’s army and operate down the Ebro. In either case it was necessary to cross the Albaracyn mountains and there were no carriage roads, save those of Utiel and Cuenca. But the passes near Utiel were strongly fortified by the French, and a movement on that line would necessarily lead to an attack upon Suchet which was to be avoided. The line of Cuenca was preferable though longer, and being in the harvest season provisions he said would not fail. The allies would thus force Suchet to cross the Ebro, or attack him in a chosen position where Wellington could reinforce them if necessary, and in the event of a defeat they could retire for shelter upon his army.

Wellington, better acquainted with Spanish warfare, and the nature of Spanish co-operation, told him, provisions would fail on the march to Cuenca, even in harvest time, and without money he would get nothing; moreover by separating himself from the fleet, he would be unable to return suddenly to Sicily if that island should be really exposed to any imminent danger.

While these letters were being exchanged the Anglo-Sicilians marched towards Villena on Del Parque’s left, and Suchet was preparing to attack when intelligence of the battle of Vittoria, reaching both parties, totally changed the aspect of affairs. The French general instantly abandoned Valencia, and lord William entered that city.

Suchet knew that Clauzel was at Zaragoza, and desirous of maintaining himself there to secure a point of junction for the army of Aragon with the king’s army, if the latter should re-enter Spain. It was possible therefore, by abandoning all the fortresses in Valencia and some of those in Catalonia, to have concentrated more than thirty thousand men with which to join Clauzel, and the latter having carried off several small garrisons during his retreat, had fifteen thousand. Lord Wellington’s position would then have been critical, since forty-five thousand good troops, having many supporting fortresses, would have menaced his right flank at the moment when his front was assailed by a new general and a powerful army. But if this junction with Clauzel invited Suchet on the one hand, on the other, with a view of influencing the general negociations during the armistice in Germany, it was important to appear strong in Spain. On such occasions men generally endeavour to reconcile both objects and obtain neither. Suchet resolved to march upon Zaragoza and at the same time retain his grasp upon Valencia by keeping large garrisons in the fortresses. This reduced his field force, a great error, it was so proved by the result. But if the war in the north of Spain and in Germany had taken a different turn, his foresight and prudence would have been applauded.

The army of Aragon now counted thirty-two thousand effective men. Four thousand were in Zaragoza, two thousand in Mequinenza, Venasque, Monzons, Ayerbe, Jaca, and some smaller posts. Twenty-six thousand remained. Of these one hundred and ten were left in Denia, with provisions for eight months; twelve hundred and fifty in Saguntum, where there were immense stores, eight months’ provisions for the garrison, and two months’ subsistenceSuchet’s Memoirs. for the whole army; four hundred with provisions for a year, were in Peniscola, and in Morella one hundred and twenty with magazines for six months. Into Tortoza, where there was a large artillery parc, Suchet threw a garrison of nearly five thousand men and then destroying the bridges on the Xucar, marched from Valencia on the 5th of July, taking the coast road for Tortoza.

The inhabitants, grateful for the discipline he had maintained, were even friendly, and while the main body thus moved, Musnier retreated from Requeña across the mountains towards Caspe, the point of concentration for the whole army: but ere it could reach that point, Clauzel’s flight to Jaca, unnecessary for he was only pursued from Tudela by Mina, became known, and the effect was fatal. All the Partidas immediately united and menaced Zaragoza, whereupon Suchet ordered Paris to retire upon Caspe, and pressed forward himself to Favara. Musnier, meanwhile, reached the former town, having on the march picked up Severoli’s brigade and the garrisons of Teruel and Alcanitz. Thus on the 12th the whole army was in military communication but extended along the Ebro from Tortoza to Caspe. Mina had, however, seized the Monte Torrero on the 8th, and general Paris evacuated Zaragoza in the night of the 9th, leaving five hundred men in the castle with much ordnance. Encumbered with a great train of carriages he got entangled in the defiles of Alcubiere, and being attacked lost many men and all his baggage and artillery. Instead of joining Suchet he fled to Huesca, where he rallied the garrison of Ayerbe and then made for Jaca, reaching it on the 14th at the moment when Clauzel, after another ineffectual attempt to join the king, had returned to that place. Duran then invested the castle of Zaragoza, and the fort of Daroca. The first surrendered on the 30th, but Daroca did not fall until the 11th of August.

This sudden and total loss of Aragon made Suchet think it no longer possible to fix a base in that province, nor to rally Clauzel’s troops on his own. He could not remain on the right bank of the Ebro, neither could he feed his army permanently in the sterile country about Tortoza while Aragon was in possession of the enemy. Moreover, the allies having the command of the sea, might land troops, and seize the passes of the hills behind him, wherefore fixing upon the fertile country about Taragona for his position, he passed the Ebro at Tortoza, Mora, and Mequinenza, on the 14th and 15th, detaching Isidore Lamarque to fetch off the garrisons of Belchite, Fuentes, Pina, and Bujarola, and bring the whole to Lerida. Meanwhile the bulk of the army moving on the road from Tortoza to Taragona, although cannonaded by the English fleet, reached Taragona with little hurt and the walls were mined for destruction, but the place was still held with a view to field operations.

The general state of the war seems to have been too little considered by Suchet at this time, or he would have made a more vigorous effort to establish himself in Aragon. Had he persisted to march on Zaragoza he would have raised the siege of the castle, perchance have given a blow to Mina whose orders were to retire upon Tudela where Wellington designed to offer battle; but Suchet might have avoided this, and to have appeared upon Wellington’s flank were it only for a fortnight, would, as shall be hereafter shewn, have changed the aspect of the campaign. Suchet’s previous rapidity and excellent arrangements had left the allies in Valencia far behind, they could not have gathered in force soon enough to meddle with him, and their pursuit now to be described, was not so cautiously conducted but that he might have turned and defeated them.

The 9th of July, four days after the French abandoned Valencia, lord William Bentinck entered that city and made it his place of arms instead of Alicant. On the 16th, marching by the coast road, in communication with the fleet and masking Peniscola, a fortress now of little importance, he followed the enemy; but Suchet had on that day completed the passage of the Ebro, he might have been close to Zaragoza, and Del Parque’s army was still near Alicant in a very disorderly condition. And though Elio and Roche were at Valencia, the occupation of that town, and the blockades of Denia and Murviedro, proved more than a sufficient task for them: the garrison of the latter place received provisions continually, and were so confident as to assemble in order of battle on the glacis when the allies marched past.

The 20th lord William entered Vinaros and remained there until the 26th. Suchet might then have been at Tudela or Sanguessa, and it shall be shewn that Wellington could not have met him at the former place as he designed.

During this period various reports were received. “The French had vainly endeavoured to regain France by Zaragoza.” “Taragona was destroyed.” “The evacuation of Spain was certain.” “A large detachment had already quitted Catalonia.” The English general, who had little time to spare from the pressure of Sicilian affairs, became eager to advance. He threw a flying bridge over the Ebro at Amposta, and having before embarked Clinton’s division with a view to seize the Col de Balaguer, resolved to follow Suchet with the remainder of his army, which now included Whittingham’s cavalry. A detachment from Tortoza menaced his bridge on the 25th, but the troops were reinforced and the passage of the Ebro completed on the 27th. The next day Villa Campa arrived with four thousand men and meanwhile the Col de Balaguer was secured.

On the 29th the cavalry being in march was threatened by infantry from Tortoza, near the Col de Alba, but the movements generally were unopposed, and the army got possession of the mountains beyond the Ebro.

Suchet was at this time inspecting the defences of Lerida and Mequinenza, and his escort was necessarily large because Copons was hanging on his flanks in the mountains about Manresa; but his position about Villa Franca was exceedingly strong. Taragona and Tortoza covered the front; Barcelona, the rear; the communication with Decaen was secure, and on the right flank stood Lerida, to which the small forts of Mequinenza and Monzon served as outposts.

The Anglo-Sicilian troops reinforced with Whittingham’s cavalry did not exceed ten thousand effective men, of which one division was on board ship from the 22d to the 26th. Elio and Roche were at Valencia in a destitute condition. Del Parque’s army thirteen thousand strong, including Whittingham’s infantry, was several marches in the rear, it was paid from the British subsidy but very ill-provided and the duke himself disinclined to obedience. Villa Campa did not join until the 28th, and Copons was in the mountains above Vich. Lord William therefore remained with ten thousand men and a large train of carriages, for ten days without any position of battle behind him nearer than the hills about Saguntum. His bridge over the Ebro was thrown within ten miles of Tortoza where there was a garrison of five thousand men, detachments from which could approach unperceived through the rugged mountains near the fortress; and Suchet’s well-organised experienced army was within two marches. That marshal however, expecting a sharp warfare, was visiting his fortresses in person, and his troops quartered for the facility of feeding were unprepared to strike a sudden blow; moreover, judging his enemy’s strength in offence what it might have been rather than what it was, he awaited the arrival of Decaen’s force from Upper Catalonia before he offered battle.

But Decaen was himself pressed. The great English fleet menacing Rosas and Palamos had encouraged a partial insurrection of the Somatenes, which was supported by the divisions of Eroles, Manso, and Villamiel. Several minor combats took place on the side of Besala and Olot, Eroles invested Bañolas, and though beaten there in a sharp action by Lamarque on the 23d of June the insurrection spread. To quell it Decaen combined a double operation from the side of Gerona upon Vich, which was generally the Catalan head-quarters. Designing to attack by the south himself, he sent Maximilian Lamarque, with fifteen hundred French troops and some Miguelets, by the mountain paths of San Felice de Pallarols and Amias. On the 8th of July that officer gained the heights of Salud, seized the road from Olot and descended from the north upon Roda and Manlieu, in the expectation of seeing Decaen attacking from the other side. He perceived below him a heavy body in march, and at the same time heard the sound of cannon and musquetry about Vich. Concluding this was Decaen he advanced confidently against the troops in his front, although very numerous, thinking they were in retreat, but they fought him until dark without advantage on either side.

In the night an officer came with intelligence, that Decaen’s attack had been relinquished in consequence of Suchet’s orders to move to the Llobregat, and it then appeared that a previous despatch had been intercepted, that the whole Catalan force to the amount of six or seven thousand combatants was upon Lamarque’s hands, and the firing heard at Vich was a rejoicing for lord Wellington’s victories in Navarre. A retreat was imperative. The Spaniards followed at daylight, and Lamarque getting entangled in difficult ground near Salud was forced to deliver battle. The fight lasted many hours, all his ammunition was expended, he lost four hundred men and was upon the point of destruction, when general Beurmann came to his succour with four fresh battalions, and the Catalans were finally defeated with great loss. After this vigorous action Decaen marched to join Suchet, and the Catalans, moving by the mountains in separate divisions, approached lord William Bentinck.

The allies having thus passed the Ebro several officers of both nations conceived the siege of Tortoza would be the best operation. Nearly forty thousand men, that is to say, Villa Campa’s, Copons’, Del Parque’s, Whittingham’s, some of Elio’s forces and the Anglo-Sicilians, could be united for the siege, and the defiles of the mountains on the left bank of the Ebro would enable them to resist Suchet’s attempts to succour the place on that side, and force him to move by the circuitous route of Lerida. Wellington also leaned towards this operation, but lord William Bentinck resolved to push at once for Taragona, and even looked to an attack upon Barcelona; certainly a rash proceeding, inasmuch as Suchet awaited his approach with an army every way superior. It does not however follow that to besiege Tortoza would have been advisable, for though the battering train, much larger than Murray’s losses gave reason at first to expect, was equal to the reduction of the place, the formal siege of such a fortress was a great undertaking. The vicinity was unhealthy and it would have been difficult to feed the Spanish troops. They were quite inexperienced in sieges, this was sure to be long, not sure to be successful, and Suchet seeing the allies engaged in such a difficult operation might have marched at once to Aragon.

It would seem lord William Bentinck was at this time misled, partly by the reports of the Catalans, partly by lord Wellington’s great successes, into a belief that the French were going to abandon Catalonia. His mind also ran upon Italian affairs, and he did not perceive that Suchet judiciously posted and able to draw reinforcements from Decaen was in fact much stronger than all the allies united. The two armies of Aragon and Catalonia, numberedImperial Muster-rolls. sixty-seven thousand men. Of these, about twenty-seven thousand, including Paris’ division then at Jaca, were in garrison, five thousand were sick, the remainder in the field. In Catalonia the allies were not principals, they were accessories. They were to keep Suchet from operating on the flank of the allies in Navarre and their defeat would have been a great disaster. So entirely was this lord Wellington’s view, that the duke Del Parque’s army was to make forced marches on Tudela if Suchet should either move himself or detach largely towards Aragon. Lord William after passing the Ebro could have secured the defiles of the mountains with his own and Villa Campa’s troops, that is to say, with twenty thousand men including Whittingham’s division. He could have insulted the garrison of Tortoza, and commenced the making of gabions and fascines, which would have placed Suchet in doubt as to his ulterior objects while he awaited the junction of del Parque’s, Copons’, and the rest of Elio’s troops. Thus forty thousand men, three thousand being cavalry and attended by a fleet, could have descended into the Campo, still leaving a detachment to watch Tortoza. If Suchet then came to the succour of Taragona the allies superior in numbers could have fought in a position chosen beforehand. Still it is very doubtful if all these corps would, or could have kept together.

Lord William Bentinck’s operations were headlong. He had prepared platforms and fascines for a siege in the island of Yvica, and on the 30th quitting the mountains suddenly invested Taragona with less than six thousand men, occupying ground three hundred yards nearer to the walls the first day than Murray had ever done. He thus prevented the garrison from abandoning the place, if, as was supposed, they had that intention; yet the fortress could not be besieged because of Suchet’s vicinity and the dissemination of the allies. The 31st the bridge at Amposta was accidentally broken, three hundred bullocks were drowned, and the head of Del Parque’s army, being on the left of the Ebro, fell back a day’s march. However Whittingham’s division and the cavalry came up, and on the 3rd, the bridge being restored, Del Parque also joined the investing army. Copons then promised to bring up his Catalans, Sarzfield’s division now belonging to the second army arrived, and Elio had been ordered to reinforce it with three additional battalions while Villa Campa observed Tortoza. Meanwhile lord William seeing that Suchet’s troops were scattered and the marshal himself at Barcelona, thought of surprizing his posts and seizing the mountain line of the Llobregat; but Elio sent no battalions, Copons, jealous of some communications between the English general and Eroles, was slow, the garrison of Tortoza burned the bridge at Amposta, and Suchet taking alarm suddenly returned from Barcelona and concentrated his army.

Up to this time the Spaniards giving copious but false information to lord William, and no information at all to Suchet, had induced a series of faults on both sides balancing each other, a circumstance not uncommon in war, which demands all the faculties of the greatest minds. The Englishman thinking his enemy retreating had pressed rashly forward. The Frenchman deeming from the other’s boldness the whole of the allies were at hand, thought himself too weak, and awaited the arrival of Decaen, whose junction was retarded as we have seen by the combined operations of the Catalan army and the English fleet.

In this state of affairs Suchet heard of new andAugust. important successes gained in Navarre by lord Wellington, one of his Italian battalions was at the same time cut off at San Sadurni by Manso, and lord William Bentinck took a position of battle beyond the Gaya. His left, composed of Whittingham’s division, occupied Braffin, the Col de Liebra, and Col de Christina, his right covered the great coast-road. These were the only carriage ways by which the enemy could approach, but they were ten miles apart, Copons held aloof, and Whittingham thought himself too weak to defend the passes alone; hence, when Suchet, reinforced by Decaen with eight thousand sabres and bayonets, finally advanced, lord William who had landed neither guns nor stores decided to refuse battle. For such a resolute officer, this must have been a painful decision. He had now nearly thirty thousand fighting men, including a thousand marines which had been landed to join the advanced guard at Altafalla; he had assumed the offensive, invested Taragona where the military honour of England had suffered twice before, in fine provoked the action which he now declined. But Suchet had equal numbers of a better quality; the banks of the Gaya were rugged to pass in retreat if the fight should be lost; much must have been left to the general officers at different points; Del Parque’s was an uneasy coadjutor, and if any part was forced the whole line would have been irretrievably lost. His reluctance was however manifest, for though he expected the enemy on the 9th he did not send his field artillery and baggage to the rear until the 11th, the day on which Decaen reached Villa Franca.

The French general dreading the fire of the fleet endeavoured by false attacks on the coast road to draw the allies from the defiles beyond Braffin, towards which he finally carried his whole army, and those defiles were indeed abandoned, not as his Memoirs state because of these demonstrations, but because lord William had previously determined to retreat. On the 16th finding the passes unguarded, he poured through and advanced upon Valls thus turning the allies, but he had lost time and the latter were in full retreat towards the mountains, the left wing by Reus, the right wing by Cambrills. The march of the former was covered by lord Frederick Bentinck who leading the British and German cavalry defeated the fourth French hussars with a loss of forty or fifty men; and it is said that either general Habert or Harispe was taken but escaped in the confusion.

The Anglo-Sicilians and Whittingham’s division now entrenched themselves near the Col de Balaguer, and Del Parque marched with his own and Sarzfield’s troops to invest Tortoza, but the garrison fell upon his rear while passing the Ebro and some loss was sustained. Meanwhile Suchet, more swayed by the remembrance of Castalla than by his recent success, would not again prove the courage of the British troops on a mountain position. Contrary to the wishes of his army he returned to Taragona and destroyed the ancient walls, which from the extreme hardness of the Roman cement proved a tedious and difficult matter: then resuming his old positions about Villa Franca and on the Llobregat he sent Decaen to Upper Catalonia. This terminated lord William Bentinck’s first effort and the general result was favourable. He had risked much on insufficient grounds, yet his enemy made no profit and lost Taragona with its fertile Campo, Tortoza was invested, and Suchet was kept away from Navarre.

It is strange that this renowned French general suffered his large force to be thus paralyzed at such a crisis. Above twenty-seven thousand of his soldiers if we include the isolated division of ParisImperial Muster-rolls, MSS. were shut up in garrison, but thirty-two thousand remained with which he marched to and fro in Catalonia while the war was being decided in Navarre. Had he moved to that province by Aragon before the end of July lord Wellington would have been overpowered. What was to be feared? That lord William Bentinck would follow, or attack one of his fortresses? If the French were successful in Navarre the loss of a fortress in Catalonia would have been a trifle, it was not certain that any would have fallen, and lord William could not abandon the coast. Suchet pleaded danger to France if he abandoned Catalonia; but to invade France, guarded as she was by her great military reputation, and to do so by land, leaving behind the fortresses of Valencia and Catalonia the latter barring all the carriage roads was chimerical. Success in Navarre would have made an invasion by sea pass as a partizan descent, and moreover France, wanting Suchet’s troops to defend her in Navarre, was ultimately invaded by Wellington and in a far more formidable manner. This question shall however be treated more largely in another place, it is sufficient to observe here, that Clarke the minister of war, a man without genius or attachment to the emperor’s cause, discouraged any great combined plan of action, and Napoleon absorbed by his own immense operations did not interpose.

Lord William now intent upon the siege of Tortoza wished lord Wellington to attack Mequinenza with a detachment of his army; but this the situation of affairs in Navarre and Guipuscoa did not admit of, and he soon discovered that to assail Tortoza was an undertaking beyond his own means. Elio when desired to gather provisions and assist in the operations demanded three weeks for preparation; all the Spanish troops were in want, Roche’s division, blockading Murviedro, although so close to Valencia was on half rations; and the siege of Tortoza was necessarily relinquished, because no great or sustained operation could be conducted in concert with such generals and such armies. Suchet’s fear of them was an illustration of Napoleon’s maxim, that war is an affair of discrimination. It is more essential to know the quality than the quantity of enemies.

It was difficult for lord William Bentinck to apply his mind vigorously to the campaign he was conducting, because fresh changes injurious to the British policy in Sicily called him to that island, and his thoughts were running upon the invasion of Italy; but as the Spaniards, deceived by the movements of escorts and convoys, reported that Suchet had marched with twelve thousand men to join Soult, he once more fixed his head-quarters at Taragona, and, following lord Wellington’s instructions, detached Del Parque’s troops by forced marches upon Tudela.

On the 5th of September the army entered VillaSeptember. Franca, and the 12th, detachments of Calabrese, Swiss, German, and British infantry, a squadron of cavalry and one battery, in all about twelve hundred men under colonel Adam, occupied the heights of Ordal. At this place, ten miles in advance of Villa Franca, being joined by three of Sarzfield’s battalions and a Spanish squadron they took a position; but it now appeared that very few French troops had been detached; that Suchet had concentrated his whole force on the Llobregat; and that his army was very superior in numbers, because the allies, reduced by the loss of Del Parque’s troops, had also left Whittingham’s division at Reus and Valls to procure food. Sarzfield’s division was feeding on the British supplies, and lord William again looked to a retreat, yet thinking the enemy disinclined to advance desired to preserve his forward position as long as possible.

He had only two lines of operation to watch. The one menacing his front from Molino del Rey by the main road, which colonel Adam blocked by his position at Ordal; the other from Martorel, by San Sadurni, menacing his left; but on this route, a difficult one, he had pushed the Catalans under Eroles and Manso reinforcing them with some Calabrese; there was indeed a third line by Avionet on his right, but it was little better than a goat-path. He had designed to place his main body close up to the Ordal on the evening of the 12th, yet from some slight cause delayed it until the next day. Meanwhile he viewed the country in advance of that defile without discovering an enemy. His confidential emissaries assured him the French were not going to advance, and he returned, satisfied that Adam’s detachment was safe, and so expressed himself to that officer. A report of a contrary tendency was indeed made by colonel Reeves of the twenty-seventh, on the authority of a Spanish woman who had before proved her accuracy and ability as a spy; she was now however disbelieved, and this incredulity was unfortunate. For Suchet thus braved, and his communication with Lerida threatened by Manso on the side of Martorel, was already in march to attack Ordal with the army of Aragon, while Decaen and Maurice Mathieu, moving with the army of Catalonia from Martorel by San Sardurni, turned the left of the allies.

COMBAT OF ORDAL.

The heights occupied by colonel Adam although rugged rose gradually from a magnificent bridge, by which the main road was carried over a very deep and impracticable ravine. The second battalion of the twenty-seventh British regiment was posted on the right, the Germans and De Roll’s Swiss with the artillery, defended an old Spanish fort commanding the main road; the Spaniards were in the centre, the Calabrese on the left; and the cavalry were in reserve. A bright moonlight facilitated the movements of the French, and a little before midnight, their leading column under general Mesclop passing the bridge without let or hindrance, mounted the heights with a rapid pace and driving back the picquets gave the first alarm. The allied troops lying on their arms in order of battle were ready instantly and the fight commenced. The first effort was against the twenty-seventh, then the Germans and the Spanish battalions were vigorously assailed in succession as the French columns got free of the bridge, but the Calabrese were too far on the left to take a share in the action. The combat was fierce and obstinate. Harispe who commanded the French constantly outflanked the right of the allies, and at the same time pressed their centre, where the Spaniards fought gallantly.

Colonel Adam was wounded very early, the command devolved upon colonel Reeves, and that officer seeing his flank turned and his men falling fast, in short, finding himself engaged with a whole army on a position of which colonel Adam had lost the key by neglecting the bridge, resolved to retreat. In this view he first ordered the guns to fall back, and to cover the movement charged a column of the enemy which was pressing forward on the high road, but he was severely wounded in this attack and there was no recognized commander on the spot to succeed him. Then the affair became confused. For though the order to retreat was given the Spaniards were fighting desperately, and the twenty-seventh thought it shame to abandon them; wherefore the Germans and De Roll’s regiment still held the old fort and the guns came back. The action was thus continued with great fury. Colonel Carey now brought the Calabrese into line from the left, and menaced the right flank of the French, but he was too late; the Spaniards overwhelmed in the centre were broken, the right was completely turned, the old fort was lost, the enemy’s skirmishers got into the allies’ rear, and at three o’clock the whole dispersed, the most part in flight; the Spanish cavalry were then overthrown on the main road by the French hussars and four guns were taken in the tumult.

Captain Waldron, with the twenty-seventh reduced to eighty men, and captain Müller with about the same number of Germans and Swiss, breaking through several small parties of the enemy effected their retreat in good order by the hills on each side of the road. Colonel Carey endeavoured at first to gain the road of Sadurni on the left, but meeting with Decaen’s people on that side he retraced his steps, and crossing the field of battle in the rear of Suchet’s columns made for Villa Nueva de Sitjes. There he finally embarked without loss, save a few stragglers who fell into the hands of a flanking battalion of French infantry which had moved through the mountains by Begas and Avionet. The overthrow was complete and the prisoners were at first very numerous, but the darkness enabled many to escape, and two thousand men reached Manso and Eroles.

Suchet pursuing his march came up with lord William about eight o’clock. The latter retired skirmishing and with excellent order beyond Villa Franca, followed by the French horsemen some of which assailed his rear-guard while others edged to their right to secure the communication with Decaen. The latter was looked for by both parties with great anxiety, but he had been delayed by the resistance of Manso and Eroles in the rugged country between Martorel and San Sadurni. Suchet’s cavalry and artillery continued however to infest the rear of the retreating army until it reached a deep baranco, near the Venta de Monjos, where the passage being dangerous and the French horseman importunate, that brave and honest soldier, lord Frederick Bentinck, charged their right, and fighting hand to hand with the enemy’s general Myers wounded him and overthrew his light cavalry; they rallied upon their dragoons and advanced again, endeavouring to turn the flank, but were stopped by the fire of two guns which general Clinton opened upon them. Meanwhile the cuirassiers, on the left, pressed the Brunswick hussars and menaced the infantry yet they were finally checked by the fire of the tenth regiment. This cavalry action was vigorous, the twentieth and the Germans although few in numbers lost more than ninety men. The baranco was however safely passed and about three o’clock the army having reached Arbos the pursuit ceased. The Catalans meanwhile had retreated towards Igualada and the Anglo-Sicilians retired to Taragona.

It was now thought Suchet would make a movement to carry off the garrisons of Lerida and Tortoza, but this did not happen, and lord William went to Sicily, leaving the command of the army to sir William Clinton.

OBSERVATIONS.

1º. Lord William Bentinck committed errors, yet he has been censured without discrimination. “He advanced rashly.” “He was undecided.” “He exposed his advanced guard without support.” Such were the opinions expressed at the time. Their justness may be disputed. His first object was to retain all the French force in Catalonia; his second, to profit from Suchet’s weakness if he detached largely. He could do neither by remaining inactive on the barren hills behind Hospitalet, because the Spaniards would have dispersed for want of provisions and the siege of Tortoza was found to be impracticable. It was therefore the part of a bold and skilful general to menace his enemy, if he could be sure of retreating again without danger or dishonour. The position at Villa Franca fulfilled this condition. It was strong in itself and offensive; sir Edward Pellew’s fleet was in movement to create diversions in Upper Catalonia, and all the emissaries and Spanish correspondents concurred in declaring, though falsely, that the French general had detached twelve thousand men.

It is indeed one of the tests of a sagacious general to detect false intelligence, yet the greatest are at times deceived, and all must act, if they act at all, upon what appears at the time to be true. Lord William’s advance was founded on erroneous data, but his position in front of Villa Franca was well chosen. It enabled him to feed Whittingham’s division in the fertile country about Reus and Valls, and there were short and easy communications from Villa Franca to the sea-coast. The army could only be seriously assailed on two lines. In front, by the main road, which though broad was from Molino del Rey to the heights of Ordal one continued defile. On the left by San Sardurni, a road still more rugged and difficult than the other. And the Catalans were launched on this side as their natural line of operations, because, without losing their hold of the mountains they protected the left of the allies, menacing at the same time the right of the enemy and his communications with Lerida. Half a march to the rear would bring the army to Vendrills, beyond which the enemy could not follow without getting under the fire of the ships; neither could he forestall this movement by a march through the Liebra and Cristina defiles, because the Catalans falling back on Whittingham’s division could hold him in check.

2º. Ordal and San Sadurni were the keys of the position. The last was well secured, the first not so, and there was the real error of lord William Bentinck. It was none however to push an advanced guard of three thousand five hundred men, with cavalry and artillery, to a distance of ten miles for a few hours. He had a right to expect the commander of such a force would maintain his post until supported, or at least retreat without disaster. An officer of capacity would have done so. But whoever relies upon the capacity of sir Frederick Adam either in peace or war will be disappointed.

In 1810 lord Wellington detached general Robert Craufurd with two or three thousand men to a much greater distance, not for one night but for many weeks. And that excellent officer, though close to Massena’s immense army the very cavalry of which was double his whole numbers; though he had the long line of the Agueda a fordable river to guard; though he was in an open country and continually skirmishing, never lost so much as a patrole and always remained master of his movements for his combat on the Coa was a studied and wilful error. It was no fault therefore to push colonel Adam’s detachment to Ordal, but it was a fault that lord William, having determined to follow with his whole force, should have delayed doing so for one night, or that delaying he did not send some supporting troops forward. It was a fault not to do so because there was good reason to do so, and to delay was to tempt fortune. There was good reason to do so as well to profit of the advantage of the position as to support Adam. Had lord William Bentinck been at hand with his main body when the attack on Ordal commenced, the head of Suchet’s force which was kept at bay for three hours by a detachment so ill commanded would have been driven into the ravine behind, and the victorious allies would still have had time to march against Decaen by the road along which colonel Cary endeavoured to join Manso. In fine, Suchet’s dispositions were vicious in principle and ought not to have succeeded. He operated on two distinct lines having no cross communications, and before an enemy in possession of a central position with good communications.

3º. It was another fault that lord William Bentinck disregarded the Spanish woman’s report to colonel Reeves; his observations made in front of the bridge of Ordal on the evening of the 12th accorded indeed with the reports of his own emissaries, but the safe side should always be the rule of precaution. He also, although on the spot, overlooked the unmilitary dispositions of colonel Adam on the heights of Ordal. The summit could not be defended against superior numbers with a small corps, and that officer had nevertheless extended the Calabrese so far on the left that they could take no share in the action, and yet could not retreat without great difficulty. A commander who understood his business, would have blocked up the bridge in front of the heights, and defended it by a strong detachment, supporting that detachment by others placed in succession on the heights behind, but keeping his main body always in hand, ready either to fall on the head of the enemy’s column of attack, or to rally the advanced detachments and retreat in order. There were plenty of trees and stones to block the bridge, its own parapet would have supplied materials, and the ravine was so deep and rugged, that the enemy could not have crossed it on the flanks in the dark.

It is no defence to say colonel Adam only took his ground in the evening after a march; that he expected the main body up the next morning and that lord William assured him he was safe from attack. Every officer is responsible for the security of his own troops, and the precautions prescribed by the rules of war should never be dispensed with or delayed at an outpost. Now it does not appear that colonel Adam ever placed an infantry picquet on the bridge, or sent a cavalry patrole beyond it; and I have been informed by a French soldier, one of a party sent to explore the position, that they reached the crest of the heights without opposition and returned safely, whereupon Mesclop’s brigade instantly crossed the bridge and attacked.

4º. Ordal might be called a surprize with respect to the general-in-chief, yet the troops engaged were not surprised; they were beaten and dispersed because colonel Adam was unskilful. The French general’s victory was complete; but he has in his Memoirs exaggerated his difficulties and the importance of his success, his private report to the emperor was more accurate. The Memoirs state that the English grenadiers defended certain works which commanded the ascent of the main road, and in the accompanying atlas a perspective view of well-conditioned redoubts with colours flying, is given. The reader is thus led to imagine these were regular forts of a fresh construction defended by select troops; but in the private report they are correctly designated as ancient retrenchments,[Appendix, No. 5.] being in fact the ruins of some old Spanish field-works and of no more advantage to the allies than any natural inequality of ground. Again in the Memoirs the attack of the French cavalry near Villa Franca is represented as quite successful; but the private report only says the rear was harassed by repeated charges, which is true, and moreover those charges were vigorously repulsed. The whole French loss was about three hundred men, that of the allies, heavy at Ordal, was lightened by escape of prisoners during the night and ultimately did not exceed a thousand men including Spaniards.