CHAPTER XXVI.
Movements After the Battle of June 17—Battle of the Mine—A List of Killed and Wounded—Various Movements of the Regiment—Death of Major Chipman—Battle of Blick’s House—Poplar Grove Church—A Reconnoissance—Colonel Barnes Leaves the Army.
On the day following the 17th of June, the regiment, with the other troops of the First Division, retired a short distance to the rear to rest, and overcome as much as possible the bewildering and disorganizing influences of the battle. It was usual to grant this poor privilege to troops that had been severely engaged, the amount of rest given them depending upon the severity of their losses and the strength of the reserve forces, or, in other words, the means of the commanding general to supply their places at the front with fresh troops. The extended nature of our lines in front of Petersburg, and the activity of the enemy, required the presence of a vast army there, and the strength of our army at that time did not afford a large reserve, hence the regiment enjoyed but a brief respite from duty.
During the night of the 20th, the division moved forward to the front line, relieving a division of the Second Corps.
June 21. Same place, skirmishing.
June 22. The enemy made a sortie on the division skirmish line, but were repulsed.
June 23. Severe skirmishing in the night; the weather very warm and oppressive.
June 24. Same place; the Brigade moved to the extreme front line.
June 25. Severe skirmishing all night; the regiment was in line of battle till near daylight.
June 26 and 27. Same place.
June 28. This day the regiment was ordered to deploy near General Ledlie’s headquarters, and advance through the woods to drive up stragglers. About three hundred of these faithless soldiers were found hiding in the forest, fifty of whom were arrested by our men, the rest making their escape. The Tenth Corps advanced their picket line at night, which caused considerable skirmishing, but after awhile everything became quiet; the regiment moved to the rear during the night.
July 1. The enemy threw several mortar-shell directly into the regimental camp, but no one was injured.
July 2. The regiment had orders to move to the vicinity of brigade headquarters, to act as provost guard of the division. Major Charles Chipman was detached from the regiment and assigned to the command of the Fourteenth New York Heavy Artillery. This was a large regiment, then acting as infantry; its Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, and three Majors were absent, the first two officers by reason of wounds. It was regarded as a great compliment to Major Chipman, that he should have been selected from among the many able officers of the corps and division to take the command of this excellent regiment; but it was a well-deserved mark of respect. The men were kept busy nearly all day throwing up a line of works to protect them from the enemy’s bullets; the weather was extremely warm, and the earth hard and difficult to work with the shovel.
July 3. The men were kept at work on the entrenchments nearly all day, which was equally as warm as the preceding one. During the day a patrol was sent out from the regiment, and arrested seventy Federal soldiers, who were found without proper passes; toward night the enemy opened a severe artillery and musketry fire upon our whole line, making it dangerous for a man to show his head above the breastworks.
July 4. A part of the regiment were at work shovelling, while a detail was made for patrol duty; eighty-nine more stragglers were apprehended and sent back to their respective regiments. The enemy seemed to be engaged in observing the anniversary of American Independence, and allowed our army to do the same. The officers of the Twenty-ninth had a modest little celebration of the day on their own account.
We have given enough of the daily experiences of the soldiers on the front line to enable the general reader to understand the nature of the life which troops thus situated, led. But we have another purpose in occasionally adopting the diary form of narrative. These dates form so many initial points in the history of the regiment, and lead its members on to the recollection of a great variety of incidents, not of sufficient importance to chronicle, but of peculiar importance to them personally.
On the 21st, there were some indications of a battle; the Second Brigade, of which the Twenty-ninth was a member, was ordered up during the night to the support of General Willcox’s division. On the following day, the Brigade, Colonel Barnes in temporary command, was reviewed, and highly complimented. General William F. Bartlett arrived and assumed command of the First Brigade, and Colonel Marshall of the Fourteenth New York (H. A. Vols.) having also reported for duty, was assigned to the command of the Second Brigade. The regiment was transferred to the First Brigade.
July 24. The regiment again went to the front line.
July 26. Ordered to the rear.
July 27. Orders were received to be in readiness to move at any moment.
July 28. The entire First Brigade moved to the front line.
It seems necessary to pause here and state certain facts closely associated with the thrilling events of which we must directly speak. In the various assaults made upon the enemy’s lines on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of June, the Ninth Corps obtained an advanced position, “beyond a deep cut in the railroad, within about one hundred and twenty-five yards of the enemy’s lines. Just in rear of that advanced position was a deep hollow,” ... where any work could be carried on without the knowledge of the enemy. In the course of a few days after this ground had been taken by the corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pleasants of the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers waited on General Potter, who commanded one of the divisions of the Ninth Corps, and suggested to him, that in his opinion a mine could be run under one of the enemy’s batteries, by which means it could be blown up, and a breach thus made in the enemy’s lines. General Potter seems to have thought favorably of the plan, and in turn suggested it to General Burnside, by whom it was fully approved.
On the 25th of June, Colonel Pleasants commenced the work of excavation, employing none but members of his own command, which then numbered about four hundred. This project was not looked upon with any favor by General Meade, and nearly every application made to headquarters for the tools and materials necessary for the carrying on of the work was wholly disregarded. Colonel Pleasants says in his testimony before the Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War, “Whenever I made application, I could not get anything, although General Burnside was very favorable to it. The most important thing was to ascertain how far I had to mine, because if I went short of or went beyond the proper place, the explosion would have no practical effect. Therefore, I wanted an accurate instrument with which to make the necessary triangulations. I had to make them on the farthest front line, where the enemy’s sharpshooters could reach me. I could not get the instrument I wanted, although there was one at army headquarters; and General Burnside had to send to Washington and get an old-fashioned theodolite, which was given to me.” Not having been supplied with wheelbarrows with which to remove the earth, he was compelled to use common cracker-boxes, with pieces of hickory nailed on them for handles. Notwithstanding all these obstacles, the worthy and energetic Colonel and his no less worthy officers and men kept at their work night and day. To remove all chance of discovery by the enemy of what was going on in his camp, Colonel Pleasants had the fresh earth brought from the mine covered with bushes and the boughs of trees. The mine was completed July 23, and consisted of one main gallery 510-9/10 feet in length, with two lateral galleries, the left being thirty-seven feet long, and the right thirty-eight feet. The two galleries ran directly under the enemy’s works, a part of which consisted of a six-gun battery, with a garrison of about two hundred men. As this work had been carried on within the lines of the Ninth Corps, General Burnside had naturally enough assumed not only the responsibility of it, but had matured plans for the explosion of the mine and the assault upon the enemy’s works, that was immediately to follow. The plan that had been adopted by Burnside, was to explode the mine just before daylight in the morning, “or at about five o’clock in the afternoon; mass the two brigades of the colored division in rear of my first line in columns of division, ‘double columns closed in mass,’ the head of each brigade resting on the front line; and as soon as the explosion has taken place, move them forward, with instructions for the division to take half distance as soon as the leading regiment of the two brigades passes through the gap in the enemy’s line by the right companies ‘on the right into line wheel,’ the left companies ‘on the right into line,’ and proceed at once down the enemy’s works as rapidly as possible; and the leading regiment of the left brigade to execute the reverse movement to the left, running up the enemy’s line; the remainder of the columns to move directly towards the crest in front as rapidly as possible, diverging in such a way as to enable them to deploy into column of regiments, the right column making as nearly as possible for Cemetery Hill; these columns to be followed by the other divisions of the corps as soon as they can be thrown in.”[51]
The reasons given for the selection of the colored division to lead the assault, were, that they had been less exposed to the hardships of the campaign than any of the white divisions, the latter having been kept on the front line ever since the commencement of the campaign. Beside this, the colored division had for several weeks been drilled with great care for this special duty.
When the time came to put into execution this novel plan of dislodging the enemy from his works, General Meade, as he had a right to do, by reason of his rank, assumed the entire direction of the movement, wholly changing several of Burnside’s plans, and directed, among other things, that one of the white divisions, instead of the colored, should lead the assault; “and the order of assault was also changed, in respect to sweeping down the enemy’s lines to the right and left of the crater by the leading regiments of the assaulting column.” These instructions were not communicated to General Burnside till the afternoon of the 29th of July, at which time General Meade issued his battle order. There were reasons equally strong for assigning each one of the three white divisions of the Ninth Corps to the important service of leading the assault; and to leave no ground of complaint, and avoid the appearance of being needlessly arbitrary, General Burnside determined to decide this question by the drawing of lots. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 29th of July, the several division commanders were summoned to headquarters for the purpose above indicated. The lot fell upon General Ledlie’s division, of which the Twenty-ninth Regiment was a member.
The mine was charged, and by the order of Meade, it was to be sprung at half-past three in the morning of the 30th; and as soon as this was done, the assaulting column was “to move rapidly upon the breach, seize the crest in the rear, and effect a lodgment there.” Major-General Ord was to support the right of this column, and Major-General Warren the left.
During the night of the 29th, the division moved into position at the extreme front, so as to be ready to make a rapid and sudden movement towards the enemy’s lines. At a little before five o’clock in the morning of the 30th, the mine exploded; and the regiment was in a position to witness the whole of this memorable scene. First, there was heard a deep, prolonged rumble, like the sound of distant thunder, then the whole surface of the ground for many yards in the immediate vicinity of the galleries of the mine began suddenly to heave and swell, like the troubled waters of the sea. The Confederate line, which up to this moment had been silent, was now thoroughly aroused; and their men lining the breastworks, were seen peering over the parapets, filled with wonder and alarm at the terrible sounds that were issuing from the earth. In front of Ledlie’s division, directly under a Confederate work, the ground seemed to swell into a little hill, and presently there burst from its summit a huge volume of smoke and flame. Eight tons of powder had exploded directly under a six-gun battery of the enemy and its garrison of two hundred men. Large masses of earth, guns, caissons, tents, and human bodies filled the air. The first explosion was quickly followed by others of lesser magnitude, but it was all over in a few minutes. As soon as the explosion occurred, a heavy cannonading began on our side, which has been said by some to exceed in intensity that at Malvern Hill or Gettysburg. It will be observed from the foregoing statement, that the mine was not fired at the time designated in the order of General Meade. The match was applied promptly at the hour named, but owing to a defective fuse, the process of firing was not then accomplished; the fuse was in short pieces, spliced together, and “ceased to burn at one of the points of junction. The additional precaution had been taken to lay the fuse in a train of powder, but the powder had become damp by being so long laid, some thirty or more hours, and that also failed to ignite.” For awhile it was supposed by our officers that the experiment was destined to be a failure; but after waiting nearly an hour, Lieutenant Jacob Doubty of Company K, and Sergeant Henry Rees of Company F, Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Regiment, volunteered to enter the mine and determine by actual inspection the cause of the failure; and while in the mine, relighted the fuse, producing its final explosion at 4.42, A. M. The great bravery of this deed secured for Sergeant Rees a promotion to second lieutenant, and both were prominently mentioned in the report of the Joint Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War.
In the course of ten minutes after the final explosion, the division of General Ledlie charged. The explosion produced a crater from one hundred and fifty to two hundred feet in length, about sixty feet in width, and thirty feet deep; the bottom and sides of which were covered with a loose, light sand, furnishing scarcely a foothold, and for this reason, as well as that of the narrowness of the place, it was with great difficulty that the troops could pass through it. From these causes, as might well be supposed, the division lost its organization as soon as it entered the narrow gorge, and the confusion which ensued was soon heightened by the enemy opening fire upon them from a battery upon the right, and another upon the left, and before long from a battery directly in their front, upon Cemetery Hill. Another division was thrown forward with the same results as the first; the men taking “shelter in the crater of the mine and the lines of the enemy adjacent thereto.” The Third Division followed in the same hopeless task, and finally the Fourth (colored) Division, under a very heavy fire, passing in confusion the white troops already in the crater, and then re-forming, charging the hill in front, but without success, breaking in great disorder to the rear.
This was the state of things about four hours after the explosion; namely, 8.45, A. M. At half-past nine o’clock in the forenoon, General Burnside received orders from General Meade to immediately withdraw his troops, and informing him that he had likewise ordered the cessation of all offensive movements on the right and left. As the order could not be executed at once without exposing the troops to even greater losses than those which they had already suffered, the order to withdraw was so far modified as to allow General Burnside to exercise his judgment as to the time when it should be attempted. Here the troops remained till nearly three o’clock in the afternoon, under a galling fire, shielding themselves as best they could, but suffering intensely in the meantime from the heat of the sun and choking thirst. At about this time, Generals Hartranft and Griffin directed their men to withdraw; and almost simultaneously with this movement, the enemy again charged, capturing nearly all the wounded lying in the crater, and some who were not. Those who escaped were obliged to run a race with balls and bayonets, and many who attempted it, fell dead or wounded before reaching our entrenchments. The loss sustained by our army during that day’s operations amounted to between four and five thousand in killed, wounded, and missing. This loss included twenty-three commanders of regiments,—four killed, fifteen wounded, and four missing; and two commanders of brigades,—General William F. Bartlett, who was disabled by the destruction of his artificial leg, and Colonel E. G. Marshall, were taken prisoners.
The losses sustained by the regiment were as follows:—