CHAPTER XL
ADOWAH AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The dolorous history of the defeat at Adowah, the decisive event in the decline of Italy, is an epitome of all the tendencies and weaknesses of the Italian nation; and, as I was more or less intimately informed of all the causes of it, the intrigues and treachery which made it possible, and as no Italian who knows the story will, for very shame, tell it, I will leave the record of what I learned and what I believe to be the indisputable facts.
When Lord Salisbury came to power in 1895, he renewed a compact with Italy and Austria which had been made when Crispi was in office in his first premiership, about 1888, for a common action in all questions concerning the Turkish Empire; and on the occasion of the Armenian massacres he called for the execution of its provisions, sending the English fleet to Turkish waters and making a requisition on Austria and Italy for the support of their fleets. Crispi, who saw in the measure the longed-for opportunity of action in league with England, ordered the fleet to follow that of England, and prepared the mobilization of an army corps to coöperate by land. He had already revived the ancient hostility of France by the rejection of an offer of the French government, made at his accession to office, of all desirable friendly offices, a treaty of commerce, financial facilities, etc., if he would withdraw from the understanding with England as to Mediterranean questions. The entry into the plans of England for the Armenian question, which were diametrically opposed to those of Russia, provoked the active enmity of that power, with which Italy had until then been on friendly terms. Thenceforward Russia united her influence with that of France in creating difficulties for Italy in Abyssinia as the punishment of Crispi, and at the same time the means of paralyzing one of the members of the Triple Alliance. Lord Salisbury, vacillating, as is his way, and under persuasion of the powers opposed to his action, consented to delay and negotiate, thus giving the Sultan time to prepare the defenses of the Dardanelles, making the coup de main, possible at first, then impossible, and necessitating serious naval operations, which were likely to involve considerable losses if the pressure at Constantinople were to be successful.
The abandonment of the inconsiderate scheme, initiated in obedience to a religious agitation and far too daring for a statesman of Lord Salisbury's nervelessness, having drawn Italy into such difficulties as the result of her obedience to his call, the least that Crispi could expect was that he would be supported by all the moral if not by the military power of England, whose influence in Abyssinia was very great. During the government of Lord Rosebery that influence had been distinctly exercised in favor of Italy, in opposition to that of France, and, when Crispi asked for the privilege of landing troops at Zeila, the English port for Abyssinia, in case of war, it had been accorded, giving Italy the advantage of a menace on the rear of all the positions of Menelek, which had in the early stages of the trouble been efficient. The Italian government had no intention of sending an expedition through Zeila to attack Harrar in any contingency foreseen, but the possibility of such a movement compelled Menelek to keep a strong force in Harrar and prevented the concentration which ultimately proved so disastrous at Adowah. The French government protested against the concession, but the English ministry refused to recognize the right of France to protest. Lord Salisbury withdrew the privilege, enabling the French agents to convince Menelek that England was hostile to Italy, and thus decided the question of peace or war between Abyssinia and Italy.
That the occupation of Abyssinia had been a folly had always been the opinion of Crispi, who, in the outset, opposed it in a speech which proved a prophecy of all the disasters which followed; and on his return to power I very strongly, in one of the two cases in which I attempted to exercise any influence on him, urged him to withdraw from Africa, but the old man's patriotic pride was too intense for him to consent to an abandonment of an undertaking in which Italian blood had been shed. "The flag cannot retreat," he said, and in fact public opinion was at that moment so strongly in favor of the maintenance of the colony that no ministry could have carried a proposal to abandon it. It has been the habit of the Italians since the disaster to throw the blame for it on Crispi, but I, who was always opposed to the undertaking, can testify that at the outbreak of war, and especially after the brilliant if slight victories won by the Italian troops in Africa, Crispi would have been defeated in the Chamber if he had proposed withdrawing. In the Chamber there was only the extreme Left which opposed the war policy, and the order of the day which was accepted by the government as the war programme was presented by the Marquis di Rudiní, then head of the opposition, and carried by an enormous majority. As I was present at the sitting of the Chamber at which the vote was taken I do not speak uncertainly.
Baratieri had been recalled to Rome on the suspicion that he was intending to extend the conquest unduly, and I met him at a breakfast arranged by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to enable me to discuss the subject with the general. He then made the most unqualified declarations that he was opposed to all extension of operations, and that he did not ask for a man or a lira more than had been accorded to him by Crispi. Baratieri was a Garibaldian general, a daring and brilliant commander of a brigade at most, without a proper military education, but with some experience. He was a political general, however, a partisan of Zanardelli, who had been the most insistent rival of Crispi at the formation of a ministry in 1893, and he had been Zanardelli's candidate for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, his nomination having been protested against by Austria on the well understood ground that he was an Irredentist, that is, in favor of taking the Tyrol from Austria. In the battle of Coatit, which inaugurated the hostilities, he had shown brilliant qualities as a partisan commander and had become very popular, so that to remove him, as Crispi had intended when he was recalled to Rome, was very difficult, the more as he protested his strict adherence to the defensive policy imposed on him by the ministry; but on his return it soon became evident that he cherished more ambitious plans than he had owned up to when in Rome, and Crispi soon saw that his recall was necessary. But Baratieri had now the support, not only of the common public favor, but of the entire court circle, which saw in him a convenient weapon against Crispi, and of the military party, and, through these, of the King, who refused to assent to the recall of the general when Crispi finally demanded it.
The premier was not supported in his insistence and pressure on the King by the whole of the cabinet, and the only practical method of getting rid of Baratieri was by increasing the forces in Africa to the number at which, by the regulations, a superior officer was necessary to command. The general chosen, Baldissera, a safe and competent commander, was already in Africa, at Massowah, when Baratieri, warned of his supersession in spite of all the precautions to keep secrecy, precipitated hostilities against the distinct orders of Crispi never to attack a force superior to his own, so as to force the issue before he should be deprived of the command. A court-martial sat to try Baratieri, nominally, but its sentence simply concealed all the facts and covered the responsibility, which there was good evidence to show was morally if not technically divided between Baratieri and certain parties in the court and army cliques more desirous of overthrowing Crispi than of securing a victory. The mystery that hid all the details of the investigation that could fix the disgrace where it belonged, and allowed only unimportant transactions to appear, will never be dispelled.
Crispi was disposed to renew the struggle, for there was within a march of a day or two a larger Italian force than that which had been defeated, under a competent commander, and the losses of the Abyssinians had been so heavy that they were unable to advance, while the season of rain was so close on them that they must have retreated in a few days, even if not attacked, and if attacked in their retreat they must have abandoned all the fruits of their previous victory. But to do this it was necessary to prorogue the Chamber until the operations were concluded, and this course was opposed in the cabinet; Saracco, the Minister of Public Works, threatening to resign if a further prorogation was decreed. The public panic was such that a partial crisis would have been the signal for an outbreak of disorders on the part of the parties opposed to the African policy, headed by the extreme Left in the Chamber,—a risk which several of the ministers were indisposed to face,—and the ministry resigned without waiting to meet the Parliament.
Civic courage in Italy is so low that any grave military or civil disaster, no matter on whom should fall the responsibility, entails a change of ministry, and in this case even the King abandoned Crispi, though the chief responsibility for the disastrous result of the campaign rested on himself. Humbert always retreated before any popular commotion. He never understood that the duty of the sovereign was to lend his moral support to his ministers so long as no constitutional question was involved, or until there had been the expression of the will of the nation, deliberately formulated, and not by the accidental votes which in the Italian Chamber are oftener the result of conspiracies or panics than of any question involving a political measure. Parliamentary government in Italy is a caricature of the form, demanding for its safe working the most conservative influence of the Crown to control its action. But Humbert, by yielding to every gust of excitement in the Chamber which, even by a surprise, menaced the ministry, encouraged and developed the disorderly tendency and the strength of the subversive party which always profited by the disorders. Victor Emmanuel in a similar case quelled the anarchy by dissolving the Chamber; Humbert had never that degree of courage even when he knew that the disorder was directed against the monarchy, not merely against a ministry; and he is, more than any other person, the cause of the decline and anarchy in parliamentary government in Italy.
In the succeeding ministry the King had the unprecedented courage to refuse to accept Rudiní and his programme, but admitted his inclusion in the ministry of General Ricotti, an old and admirable soldier and military organizer, who was resolved to begin his administration by a long desired and needed reorganization of the army, reducing its numbers and increasing its efficiency. On this point the King was inflexible, for he always refused to allow the army to be reduced organically, though he never refused to accept such a diminution of the rank and file as made it utterly inefficient for an emergency, so long as the cadres and the number of officers were not diminished. He sent a message to some senators who were in his confidence to the effect that the measure of Ricotti must be defeated there, as he could not count on its being rejected by the popular assembly. The senate rejected it, and Ricotti, unsupported by his colleagues, resigned. The régime of half measures and little men returned. The accession of Victor Emmanuel III. may bring about a change, if the new King has statesmen to fall back on, but I do not see them amongst the old men. The only man competent to assume an effective reconstitution of the state is Sidney Sonnino, the Secretary of the Treasury with Crispi, but he is not a popular man, and, if he attempts to govern by the strong measures necessary, he will meet the same hostility which always assailed Crispi. Nothing less than the courage and abilities of a Cromwell could reform government in Italy, and, in the opinion of some of the wisest and most patriotic Italians I know, the task is hopeless and the decay inevitable.
Fully convinced of this myself, I could but lose that interest in the future of Italy which had always made residence there so attractive to me. Moreover, I had arrived at an age which rendered the proper performance of the duties of my position on the "Times" impossible. Accordingly, I sent in my resignation and returned to England, where in such condition of social and intellectual activity as my years and circumstances permit, I hope to end my days, no longer a participant in political affairs and content simply to live.