LECTURE VII

Note 1, page 278.—Introduction to Hume, 1874, p. 151.

Note 2, page 279.—Ibid., pp. 16, 21, 36, et passim.

Note 3, page 279.—See, inter alia, the chapter on the 'Stream of Thought' in my own Psychologies; H. Cornelius, Psychologie, 1897, chaps, i and iii; G.H. Luquet, Idées Générales de Psychologie, 1906, passim.

Note 4, page 280.—Compare, as to all this, an article by the present writer, entitled 'A world of pure experience,' in the Journal of Philosophy, New York, vol. i, pp. 533, 561 (1905).

Note 5, page 280.—Green's attempt to discredit sensations by reminding us of their 'dumbness,' in that they do not come already named, as concepts may be said to do, only shows how intellectualism is dominated by verbality. The unnamed appears in Green as synonymous with the unreal.

Note 6, page 283.—Philosophy of Reflection, i, 248 ff.

Note 7, page 284.—Most of this paragraph is extracted from an address of mine before the American Psychological Association, printed in the Psychological Review, vol. ii, p. 105. I take pleasure in the fact that already in 1895 I was so far advanced towards my present bergsonian position.

Note 8, page 289.—The conscious self of the moment, the central self, is probably determined to this privileged position by its functional connexion with the body's imminent or present acts. It is the present acting self. Tho the more that surrounds it may be 'subconscious' to us, yet if in its 'collective capacity' it also exerts an active function, it may be conscious in a wider way, conscious, as it were, over our heads.

On the relations of consciousness to action see Bergson's Matière et Mémoire, passim, especially chap. i. Compare also the hints in Münsterberg's Grundzüge der Psychologie, chap, xv; those in my own Principles of Psychology, vol. ii, pp. 581-592; and those in W. McDougall's Physiological Psychology, chap. vii.

Note 9, page 295.—Compare Zend-Avesta, 2d edition, vol. i, pp. 165 ff., 181, 206, 244 ff., etc.; Die Tagesansicht, etc., chap, v, § 6; and chap. xv.