A.D. 1811.

The Peninsular sieges in which the English were concerned are principally useful as lessons to statesmen, and consequently to the people who support these statesmen. The siege of Badajos failed, although a Wellington superintended it; but, as Sir William Napier justly says, “it was not strange that it did fail; for the British government sent an engineer corps into the field so ill-provided, that all the officers’ bravery and zeal could not render it efficient. The very tools used, especially those from the storekeeper-general’s department, were unfit for work; the captured French cutting instruments were eagerly sought for in preference; and when the soldiers’ lives and the honour of England’s arms were at stake, English cutlery would not bear comparison with French.” This account has been published many years; all whose business it was to read it and profit by the lesson have had ample time; and yet, in what respect does it differ from the same culpable error—we were going to say, but must substitute criminal jobbery—with regard to the war munitions of the Crimea?

Though ardently wishing for the capture of Badajos, Wellington knew he had not that great necessary in all sieges, time, to effect it regularly. If he laid siege to it in form, the French would be able to bring assistance that would render his endeavours nugatory; he could not command more than twenty days; with bad guns, deficient stores, and no regular corps of sappers and miners; as General Picton wittily and keenly observed, “Lord Wellington sued Badajos in formâ pauperis.” Reckoning all the deficiencies, regular approaches could not be ventured upon, and attacks upon the castle and Fort Cristoval were adopted instead; and these were to take place at the same time. A battering-train was very quickly got ready, consisting of thirty twenty-four-pounders, four sixteen-pounders, and twelve eight and ten-inch howitzers converted into mortars by being placed on trucks; these, with six iron Portuguese guns, made fifty-two pieces; and of British and Portuguese gunners there were collected six hundred. But even these were inefficient; for many of the guns were nearly useless from age; the gunners were inexperienced, and there was no time to teach them their craft.

On the 24th of May, Haston’s division, consisting of five thousand men, invested San Cristoval.

Phillipon, who, under the direction of Soult, governed in the town, took every precaution necessary; and the townsmen joined their efforts to those of the garrison to forward the works of defence.

Ground being broken for a false attack upon Pardileras on the 29th, the next night a parallel of eleven hundred yards was sunk against the castle, without the workmen being observed by the enemy; the same night another parallel, of four hundred and fifty yards from San Cristoval, and seven hundred from the bridge-head, was opened; one breaching and two counter mines were raised on this line, to prevent sallies by the bridge from the fort.

The attack against the castle proceeded favourably, but the soil and the situation rendered that of Cristoval slow and attended with loss: it was not finished before the night of the 1st of June. It was much impeded by some well-directed mortars from the garrison, which, strange to say, were stopped by Phillipon, from the mistaken idea that he was throwing their fire away.

On the night of the 2nd, however, the battery against San Cristoval began, and after the guns and men had got into practice, much mischief was done to the castle. On the 4th, the garrison added the fire of several guns to their artillery, and some of the besiegers’ were silenced.

The contest was kept up with tolerable spirit till two breaches were made in San Cristoval; and one of them appearing practicable, an assault was ordered, assisted by a diversion in another quarter.

The stormers reached the glacis and descended the ditch without being discovered; but they found the obstacles insurmountable, and the forlorn hope was about to retire before committing themselves to serious injury, when the main body, annoyed by a flank fire from the town, followed them into the ditch with their ladders. But the ladders proved too short, and the defence from within was so firm, that immediate retreat was necessary, and that attended with considerable loss.

The errors in this attack are subjects of military discussion; but we have not space to enter into them. The French acted with great skill and activity in clearing away ruins, presenting every obstacle that could be thought of, natural as well as scientific, and by the judicious disposition of well-armed men. Succours being at hand, a second attack was thought advisable, if any hopes could be entertained of the capture of the place. This time, things were better managed; but on the other side, Phillipon made adequate preparations to meet them.

But this attack proved no more fortunate than the former. It was led with infinite spirit by Major M’Geechy, who fell early. The French seem to have laughed at the affair, as they jeeringly called to the men in the ditch to come on. But barrels of powder rolled down among them, with the addition of shells and musketry, proved worse than their jeers. All went wrong: the troops quarrelled for the ladders, though not many of them could be reared; confusion ensued; and the enemy naturally took advantage of it: those who ascended the ladders were met with the bayonet; the ladders themselves were overturned; and a murderous fire was poured upon the unfortunate mass in the ditch. Soult’s approach rendered further attempts impossible; and the siege was converted into a blockade.

Sir William Napier’s remarks are very severe upon this siege. In addition to what we have before quoted, he says: “This siege, in which four hundred men and officers fell, violated all rules. The working parties were too weak, the guns and stores too few, the points of attack ill-chosen; the defences were untouched by counter-fire, and the breaching-batteries were too distant for the bad guns; howitzers on trucks were poor substitutes for mortars, and the sap was not practised. Lastly, the assaults were made before the glacis had been crowned and a musketry-fire established against the breach.”