History of scientific ideas

by William Whewell

PREFACE TO THIS EDITION.

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THE Chapters now offered to the Reader were formerly published as a portion of The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, founded upon their History: but the nature and subject of these Chapters are more exactly described by the present title, The History of Scientific Ideas. For this part of the work is mainly historical, and was, in fact, collected from the body of scientific literature, at the same time that the History of the Inductive Sciences was so collected. The present work contains the history of Science so far as it depends on Ideas; the former work contains the same history so far as it is derived from Observation. The leading features in that were Theories inferred from Facts; the leading features of this are Discussions of Theories tending to make them consistent with the conditions of human thought.

The Ideas of which the History is here given are mainly the following:
Space, Time, Number, Motion, Cause, Force, Matter, Medium, Intensity, Scale, Polarity, Element, Affinity, Substance, Atom, Symmetry, Likeness, Natural Classes, Species, Life, Function, Vital Forces, Final [vi] Causes, Historical Causation, Catastrophe and Uniformity, First Cause.

The controversies to which the exact fixation of these Ideas and their properties have given occasion form a large and essential part of the History of Science: but they also form an important part of the Philosophy of Science, for no Philosophy of Science can be complete which does not solve the difficulties, antitheses, and paradoxes on which such controversies have turned. I have given a survey of such controversies, generally carried from their earliest origin to their latest aspect; and have stated what appeared to me the best solution of each problem. This has necessarily involved me in much thorny metaphysics; but such metaphysics is a necessary part of the progress of Science. The human mind deriving its knowledge of Truth from the observation of nature, cannot evade the task of determining at every step how Truth is consistent with itself. This is the Metaphysics of Progressive Knowledge, and this is the matter of this present History.

Of the remaining part of what was formerly published as the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, an additional part, described in the Introduction to the present work, will shortly be published.

Trinity Lodge,

May 24, 1858.

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Erratum, p. 157, l. 11 from top, for sciences read science.

CONTENTS
OF
THE FIRST VOLUME.

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		PAGE
Preface		[v]
PART I.
OF IDEAS.
Introduction		[3]
BOOK I.
OF IDEAS IN GENERAL.
Chap. I.  Of the FundamentalAntithesis of Philosophy		[23]
Sect. [1].	Thoughts and Things	—
[2].	Necessary and Experiential Truths	[25]
[3].	Deduction and Induction	[27]
[4].	Theories and Facts	[29]
[5].	Ideas and Sensations	[30]
[6].	Reflexion and Sensation	[33]
[7].	Subjective and Objective	[35]
[8].	Matter and Form	[38]
[9].	Man the Interpreter of Nature	[41]
[10].	The Fundamental Antithesis is inseparable	[43]
[11].	Successive Generalization	[49]
[viii]
Chap. II.  Of Technical Terms		[54]
Art. [1].	Examples.
[2].	Useof Terms.
Chap. III.  Of NecessaryTruths		[57]
Art. [1].	The two Elements of Knowledge,
[2].	Shown by necessary Truths.
[3].	Examples of necessary Truths in numbers.
[4].	Theopposite cannot be distinctly conceived.
[5].	Other Examples.
[6].	Universal Truths.
Chap. IV.  Of Experience		[65]
Art. [1].	Experience cannot prove necessaryTruths,
[2].	Except when aided by Ideas.
Chap. V.  Of the Grounds ofNecessary Truths		[69]
Art. [1].	These Grounds are Fundamental Ideas.
[2].	These are to be reviewed.
[3].	Definitions and Axioms.
[4].	Syllogism,
[5].	Produces no new Truths.
[6].	Axioms needed.
[7].	Axioms depend on Ideas:
[8].	Sodo Definitions.
[9].	Ideanot completely expressed.
Chap. VI.  The Fundamental Ideasare not derived from Experience		[76]
Art. [1].	No connexion observed.
[2].	Faculties implied in observation.
[3].	Weare to examine our Faculties.
Chap. VII.  Of the Philosophy ofthe Sciences		[81]
Sciences arranged according toIdeas.
[ix]
BOOK II.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PURESCIENCES.
Chap. I.  Of the Pure Sciences		[88]
Art. [1].	Geometry, Arithmetic, Algebra,
[2].	Arenot Inductive Sciences:
[3].	AreMathematical Sciences.
[4].	Mixed Mathematics.
[5].	Space, Time, Number.
Chap. II.  Of the Idea ofSpace		[91]
Art. [1].	Space is an Idea,
[2].	Notderived from Experience,
[3].	AsGeometrical Truth shows.
[4].	Space is a Form of Experience.
[5].	Thephrase not essential.
Chap. III.  Of some Peculiaritiesof the Idea of Space		[95]
Art. [1].	Space is not an Abstract Notion.
[2].	Space is infinite.
[3].	Space is real.
[4].	Space is a Form of Intuition.
[5].	Figure.
[6].	ThreeDimensions.
Chap. IV.  Of the Definitions andAxioms which relate to Space		[98]
Art. [1].	Geometry.
[2].	Definitions.
[3].	Axioms.
[4].	NotHypotheses.
[5].	Axioms necessary.
[6].	Straight Lines.
[7].	Planes.
[8].	ElementaryGeometry.
Chap. V.  Of some Objectionswhich have been made to the Doctrines stated in the previousChapter		[107]
Art. [1].	How is Geometry hypothetical?
[2].	Whatwas Stewart's view?
[x]
[3].	'Legitimate filiations' of Definitions.
[4].	Is aDefinition a complete explanation?
[5].	Aresome Axioms Definitions?
[6].	Axiom concerning Circles.
[7].	CanAxioms become truisms?
[8].	Useof such.
Chap. VI.  Of the Perception ofSpace		[117]
Art. [1].	Which Senses apprehend Space?
[2].	Perception of solid figure.
[3].	Isan interpretation.
[4].	Maybe analysed.
[5].	Outline.
[6].	Reversedconvexity.
[7].	Dowe perceive Space by Touch?
[8].	Brown’s Opinion.
[9].	TheMuscular Sense.
[10].	Bell’s Opinion.
[11].	Perception includes Activity.
[12].	Perception of the Skyey Dome.
[13].	Reid’s Idomenians.
[14].	Motion of the Eye.
[15].	Searching Motion.
[16].	Sensible Spot.
[17].	Expressions implying Motion.
Chap. VII.  Of the Idea of Time		[131]
Art. [1].	Time an Idea not derived fromExperience.
[2].	Timeis a Form of Experience.
[3].	Number.
[4].	Is Time derived fromMotion?
Chap. VIII.  Of somePeculiarities in the Idea of Time		[134]
Art. [1].	Time is not an Abstract Notion.
[2].	Timeis infinite.
[3].	Timeis a Form of Intuition.
[4].	Timeis of one Dimension,
[5].	Andno more.
[6].	Rhythm.
[7].	Alternation.
[8].	Arithmetic.
[xi]
Chap. IX.  Of the Axioms whichrelate to Number		[138]
Art. [1].	Grounds of Arithmetic.
[2].	Intuition.
[3].	Arithmetical Axioms,
[4].	AreConditions of Numerical Reasoning
[5].	Inall Arithmetical Operations.
[6].	Higher Numbers.
Chap. X.  Of the Perception ofTime and Number		[141]
Art. [1].	Memory.
[2].	Sense ofSuccessiveness
[3].	Implies Activity.
[4].	Number also does so.
[5].	Andapprehension of Rhythm.
Note to Chapter X.		[145]
Chap. XI.  Of MathematicalReasoning		[147]
Art. [1].	Discursive Reasoning.
[2].	Technical Terms of Reasoning.
[3].	Geometrical Analysis and Synthesis.
Chap. XII.  Of the Foundations ofthe Higher Mathematics		[151]
Art. [1].	The Idea of a Limit.
[2].	Theuse of General Symbols.
[3].	Connexion of Symbols and Analysis.
Chap. XIII.  The Doctrine ofMotion		[156]
Art. [1].	Pure Mechanism.
[2].	Formal Astronomy.
Chap. XIV.  Of the Application ofMathematics to the Inductive Sciences		[159]
Art. [1].	The Ideas of Space and Number are clear from thefirst.
[2].	Their application in Astronomy.
[3].	Conic Sections, &c.
[4].	Arabian Numerals.
[5].	Newton’s Lemmas.
[6].	Tides.
[7].	Mechanics.
[8].	Optics.
[9].	Conclusion.
[xii]
BOOK III.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MECHANICALSCIENCES.
Chap. I.  Ofthe Mechanical Sciences		[171]
Chap. II.  Of the Idea of Cause		[173]
Art. [1].	Not derived from Observation,
[2].	Asappears by its use.
[3].	Cause cannot be observed.
[4].	IsCause only constant succession?
[5].	Other reasons.
Chap. III.  Modern Opinionsrespecting the Idea of Cause		[178]
Art. [1].	Hume’s Doctrine.
[2].	Stewart and Brown.
[3].	Kant.
[4].	Relation of Kant andBrown.
[5].	Axioms flow from the Idea.
[6].	TheIdea implies activity in the Mind.
Chap. IV.  Of the Axioms whichrelate to the Idea of Cause		[184]
Art. [1].	Causes are Abstract Conceptions.
[2].	First Axiom.
[3].	Second Axiom.
[4].	Limitation of the Second Axiom.
[5].	Third Axiom.
[6].	Extent of the Third Axiom.
Chap. V.  Of the Origin of ourConceptions of Force and Matter		[205]
Art. [1].	Force.
[2].	Matter.
[3].	Solidity.
[4].	Inertia.
[5].	Application.
[xiii]
Chap. VI.  Of the Establishmentof the Principles of Statics		[212]
Art. [1].	Object of the Chapter.
[2].	Statics and Dynamics.
[3].	Equilibrium.
[4].	Measure of Statical Forces.
[5].	TheCenter of Gravity.
[6].	Oblique Forces.
[7].	Force acts at any point of its Direction.
[8].	TheParallelogram of Forces
[9].	Is anecessary Truth.
[10].	Center of Gravity descends.
[11].	Stevinus's Proof.
[12].	Principle of Virtual Velocities.
[13].	Fluids press equally.
[14].	Foundation of this Axiom.
Chap. VII.  Of the Establishmentof the Principles of Dynamics		[235]
Art. [1].	History.
[2].	TheFirst Law of Motion.
[3].	Gravity is a Uniform Force.
[4].	TheSecond Law of Motion.
[5].	TheThird Law of Motion.
[6].	Action and Reaction in Moving Bodies.
[7].	D’Alembert’s Principle.
[8].	Connexion of Statics and Dynamics.
[9].	Mechanical Principles grow more evident.
[10].	Controversy of the Measure of Force.
Chap. VIII.  Of the Paradox ofUniversal Propositions obtained from Experience		[263]
Art. [1].	Experience cannot establish necessaryTruths;
[2].	Butcan interpret Axioms.
[3].	Gives us the Matter of Truths.
[4].	Exemplifies Truths.
[5].	Cannot shake Axioms.
[6].	Isthis applicable in other cases?
Chap. IX.  Of the Establishmentof the Law of Universal Gravitation		[272]
Art. [1].	General course of the History.
[xiv]
[2].	Particulars as to the Law.
[3].	Asto the Gravity of Matter.
[4].	Universality of the Law.
[5].	IsGravity an essential quality?
[6].	Newton’s Rule of Philosophizing.
[7].	Hypotheses respecting Gravity.
[8].	DoBodies act at a distance?
Chap. X.  Of the generalDiffusion of clear Mechanical Ideas		[279]
Art. [1].	Nature of the Process
[2].	Among the Ancients.
[3].	Kepler, &c.
[4].	Lord Monboddo, &c.
[5].	Schelling, &c.
[6].	Common usage.
[7].	Effect of Phrases.
[8].	Contempt of Predecessors.
[9].	Less detail hereafter.
[10].	Mechanico-Chemical Sciences.
[11].	Secondary Mechanical Sciences.
BOOK IV.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SECONDARYMECHANICAL SCIENCES.
Chap. I.  Of the Idea of a Mediumas commonly employed		[293]
Art. [1].	Of Primary and Secondary Qualities.
[2].	TheIdea of Externality.
[3].	Sensation by a Medium.
[4].	Process of Perception of Secondary Qualities.
Chap. II.  On Peculiarities inthe Perceptions of the Different Senses		[302]
Art. [1].	Difference of Senses.
Sect. I.	Prerogatives of Sight.
Art. [2].	Position.
[3].	Distance.
[xv]
Sect. II.	Prerogatives of Hearing.
Art. [4].	Musical Intervals.
[5].	Chords.
[6].	Rhythm.
Sect. III.	TheParadoxes of Vision.
Art. [7].	First Paradox.
[8].	Second Paradox.
[9].	Thesame for near Objects.
[10].	Objections answered.
Sect. IV.	ThePerception of Visible Figures.
Art. [11].	Brown’s Opinion.
Chap. III.  Successive Attemptsat the Scientific Application of the Idea of a Medium		[322]
Art. [1].	Introduction.
[2].	Sound.
[3].	Light.
[4].	Heat.
Chap.IV.  Of the Measure of Secondary Qualities		[333]
Sect. I.	Scales ofQualities in General.
Art. [1].	Intensity.
[2].	Quantity and Quality.
Sect. II.	TheMusical Scale.
Art. [3].	MusicalRelations.
[4].	Musical Standard.
Sect. III.	Scalesof Colour.
Art. [5].	The Prismatic Scale.
[6].	Newton’s Scale.
[7].	Scales of Impure Colours.
[8].	Chromatometer.
Sect. IV.	Scales ofLight.
Art. [9].	Photometer.
[10].	Cyanometer.
Sect. V.	Scales ofHeat.
Art. [11].	Thermometers.
[12].	Their progress.
[13].	Fixed Points.
[14].	Concordance of Thermometers.
[15].	Natural Measure.
[16].	Law of Cooling.
[xvi]
[17].	Theory of Exchanges.
[18].	Air Thermometer.
[19].	Theory of Heat.
[20].	Other Instruments.
Sect. VI.	Scales ofother Quantities.
Art. [21].	Tastes and Smells.
[22].	Quality of Sounds.
[23].	Articulate Sounds.
[24].	Transition.
BOOK V.
OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THEMECHANICO-CHEMICAL SCIENCES.
Chap. I.  Attempts at theScientific Application of the Idea of Polarity		[359]
Art. [1].	Introduction of the Idea.
[2].	Magnetism.
[3].	Electricity.
[4].	Voltaic Electricity.
[5].	Light.
[6].	Crystallization.
[7].	Chemical Affinity.
[8].	General Remarks.
[9].	Likerepels like.
Chap. II.  Of the Connexion ofPolarities		[371]
Art. [1].	Different Polar Phenomena from oneCause.
[2].	Connexion of Magnetic and Electric Polarity.
[3].	Ampère’s Theory.
[4].	Faraday’s views.
[5].	Connexion of Electrical and Chemical Polarity.
[6].	Davy’s and Faraday’s views
[7].	Depend upon Ideas as well as Experiments.
[8].	Faraday’s Anticipations.
[9].	Connexion of Chemical and Crystalline Polarities.
[10].	Connexion of Crystalline and Optical Polarities.
[11].	Connexion of Polarities in general.
[12].	Schelling’s Speculations.
[13].	Hegel’s vague notions.
[14].	Ideas must guide Experiment.

CONTENTS
OF
THE SECOND VOLUME.

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		PAGE
BOOK VI.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHEMISTRY.
Chap. I.  Attempts to conceiveElementary Composition		[3]
Art. [1].	Fundamental Ideas of Chemistry.
[2].	Elements.
[3].	DoCompounds resemble their Elements?
[4].	TheThree Principles.
[5].	AModern Errour.
[6].	AreCompounds determined by the Figure of Elements?
[7].	Crystalline Form depends on Figure of Elements.
[8].	AreCompounds determined by Mechanical Attraction ofElements?
[9].	Newton’s followers.
[10].	Imperfection of their Hypotheses.
Chap. II.  Establishment andDevelopment of the Idea of Chemical Affinity		[15]
Art. [1].	Early Chemists.
[2].	Chemical Affinity.
[3].	Affinity or Attraction?
[4].	Affinity preferable.
[5].	Analysis is possible.
[vi]
[6].	Affinity is Elective.
[7].	Controversy on this.
[8].	Affinity is Definite.
[9].	Arethese Principles necessarily true?
[10].	Composition determines Properties.
[11].	Comparison on this subject.
[12].	Composition determines Crystalline Form.
Chap. III.  Of the Idea ofSubstance		[29]
Art. [1].	Indestructibility of Substance.
[2].	TheIdea of Substance.
[3].	Locke’s Denial of Substance.
[4].	Isall Substance heavy?
Note on Sir W. Hamilton’s objections		[37]
Chap. IV.  Application of theIdea of Substance in Chemistry		[39]
Art. [1].	A Body is Equal to its Elements.
[2].	Lavoisier.
[3].	Arethere Imponderable Elements?
[4].	Faraday’s views.
[5].	Composition of Water.
[6].	Heatin Chemistry.
Chap. V.  The Atomic Theory		[48]
Art. [1].	The Theory on Chemical Grounds.
[2].	Hypothesis of Atoms.
[3].	ItsChemical Difficulties.
[4].	Grounds of the Atomic Doctrine.
[5].	Ancient Atomists.
[6].	Francis Bacon.
[7].	Modern Atomists.
[8].	Arguments for and against.
[9].	Boscovich’s Theory.
[10].	Molecular Hypothesis.
[11].	Poisson’s Inference.
[12].	Wollaston’s Argument.
[13].	Properties are Permanent.
[vii]
BOOK VII.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORPHOLOGY,INCLUDING CRYSTALLOGRAPHY.
Chap. I.  Explication of the Ideaof Symmetry		[67]
Art. [1].	Symmetry, what.
[2].	Kinds of Symmetry.
[3].	Examples in Nature.
[4].	Vegetables and Animals.
[5].	Symmetry a Fundamental Idea.
[6].	Result of Symmetry.
Chap. II.  Application of theIdea of Symmetry to Crystals		[75]
Art. [1].	‘Fundamental Forms.’
[2].	Their use.
[3].	‘Systems of Crystallization.’
[4].	Cleavage.
[5].	Other Properties.
Chap. III.  Speculations foundedupon the Symmetry of Crystals		[80]
Art. [1].	Integrant Molecules.
[2].	Difficulties of the Theory.
[3].	Merit of the Theory.
[4].	Wollaston’s Hypothesis.
[5].	Maxim for such Hypotheses.
[6].	Dalton’s Hypothesis.
[7].	Ampère’s Hypothesis.
[8].	Difficulty of such Hypotheses.
[9].	Isomorphism.
[viii]
BOOK VIII.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE CLASSIFICATORYSCIENCES.
Chap. I.  TheIdea of Likeness as Governing the Use of Common Names		[95]
Art. [1].	Object of the Chapter.
[2].	Unity of the Individual.
[3].	Condition of Unity.
[4].	Kinds.
[5].	Not made byDefinitions.
[6].	Condition of the Use of Terms.
[7].	Terms may have different Uses.
[8].	Gradation of Kinds.
[9].	Characters of Kinds.
[10].	Difficulty of Definitions.
[11].	‘The Five Words.’
Chap. II. The Methods of NaturalHistory, as regulated by the Idea of Likeness		[108]
Sect. I.	Natural History inGeneral.
Art. [1].	Idea of Likeness in Natural History.
[2].	Condition of its Use.
Sect. II.	Terminology.
Art. [3].	Meaning of the word.
Sect. III.	The Planof the System.
Art. [4].	Its Meaning.
[5].	Latent Reference to Natural Affinity.
[6].	Natural Classes.
[7].	Artificial Classes.
[8].	AreGenera Natural?
[9].	Natural History and Mathematics.
[10].	Natural Groups given by Type, not by Definition.
[11].	Physiography.
[12].	Artificial and Natural Systems.
[ix]
Sect. IV.	Methodsof framing Natural Systems.
Art. [13].	Method of Blind Trial.
[14].	Method of General Comparison.
Sect. V.	Gradationof Groups.
Art. [15].	Series of Subdivisions.
[16].	What is a Species?
[17].	The words ‘Species’ and ‘Genus.’
[18].	Varieties. Races.
Sect. VI.	Nomenclature.
Art. [19].	Binary Nomenclature.
Sect. VII.	Diagnosis.
Art. [20].	Characteristick and Systematick.
Chap. III.  Application of theNatural History Method to Mineralogy		[138]
Art. [1].	Mohs’s System.
[2].	His‘Characteristick.’
[3].	Mineral Species not yet well fixed.
[4].	Orders of Minerals.
[5].	Nomenclature of Minerals.
[6].	M.Necker’s ‘Règne Mineral.’
[7].	Inconvenience of taking a Chemical Basis of MineralSystems.
[8].	Relation of Natural History and Chemistry.
[9].	Whatis a Mineralogical Individual?
[10].	Awell-formed Crystal is an Individual.
[11].	Not the Integrant Molecules,
[12].	Nor the Cleavage Forms.
[13].	Compound Crystals are not Individuals.
[14].	Crystalline Forms are sufficiently complete forthis.
[15].	Including aggregate Masses.
[16].	DoArtificial Crystals belong to Mineralogy?
[17].	The Mineralogical Individual extends as far as the same CrystallineAxes extend.
[18].	Artificial Crystals do belong to Mineralogy:
[x]
[19].	Cannot be excluded.
[20].	Species to be determined by the Crystalline Power.
[21].	Secondary Derivative Forms are Varieties:
[22].	Are not Species, as M. Necker holds.
Chap. IV.  Of the Idea of NaturalAffinity		[159]
Art. [1].	The Idea of Affinity
[2].	Isnot to be made out by Arbitrary Rules.
[3].	Functions of Living things are many,
[4].	Butall lead to the same arrangement.
[5].	Thisis Cuvier’s principle:
[6].	AndDecandolle’s.
[7].	Isthis applicable to Inorganic Bodies?
[8].	Yes;by the agreement of Physical and ChemicalArrangement.
BOOK IX.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY.
Chap. 1.  Analogy of Biology withother Sciences		[169]
Art. [1].	Biology involves the Idea of Life.
[2].	ThisIdea to be historically traced.
[3].	TheIdea at first expressed by means of other Ideas.
[4].	Mystical, Mechanical, Chemical, and Vital FluidHypotheses.
Chap. II.  Successive BiologicalHypotheses		[174]
Sect. [I].	The Mystical School.
Sect. [II].	The Iatrochemical School.
Sect. [III].	The Iatromathematical School.
Sect. [IV].	The Vital Fluid School.
Sect. [V].	The Psychical School.
[xi]
Chap. III.  Attempts to Analysethe Idea of Life		[195]
Art. [1].	Definitions of Life,
[2].	ByStahl, Humboldt, Kant.
[3].	Definition of Organization by Kant.
[4].	Lifeis a System of Functions.
[5].	Bichat. Sum of Functions.
[6].	Useof Definition.
[7].	Cuvier’s view.
[8].	Classifications of Functions.
[9].	Vital, Natural, and Animal Functions.
[10].	Bichat. Organic and Animal Life.
[11].	Use of this Classification.
Chap. IV.  Attempts to form Ideasof separate Vital Forces, and first, of Assimilation andSecretion		[203]
Sect. I.	Course ofBiological Research.
Art. [1].	Observation and New Conceptions.
Sect. II.	Attemptsto form a distinct Conception of Assimilation andSecretion.
Art. [2].	The Ancients.
[3].	Buffon. Interior Mould.
[4].	Defect of this view.
[5].	Cuvier. Life a Vortex.
[6].	Defect of this view.
[7].	Schelling. Matter and Form.
[8].	Lifea constant Form of circulating Matter, &c.
Sect. III.	Attemptsto conceive the Forces of Assimilation andSecretion.
Art. [9].	Assimilation is a Vital Force.
[10].	The name ‘Assimilation.’
[11].	Several processes involved in Assimilation.
[12].	Absorption. Endosmose.
[13].	Absorption involves a Vital Force.
[14].	Secretion. Glands.
[15].	Motions of Vital Fluids.
[xii]
Sect. IV.	Attemptsto conceive the Process of Generation.
Art. [16].	‘Reproduction’ figuratively used forGeneration.
[17].	Nutrition different from
[18].	Generation.
[19].	Generations successively included.
[20].	Pre-existence of Germs.
[21].	Difficulty of this view.
[22].	Communication of Vital Forces.
[23].	Close similarity of Nutrition and Generation.
[24].	The Identity of the two Processes exemplified.
Chap. V.  Attempts to form Ideasof separate Vital Forces, continued.—Voluntary Motion.		[222]
Art. [1].	Voluntary Motion one of the animalFunctions.
[2].	Progressive knowledge ofit.
[3].	Nervous Fluid not electric.
[4].	Irritability. Glisson.
[5].	Haller.
[6].	Contractility.
[7].	Organic Sensibility and Contractility notseparable.
[8].	Improperly described by Bichat.
[9].	Brown.
[10].	Contractility a peculiarPower.
[11].	Cuvier’s view.
[12].	Elementary contractile Action.
[13].	Strength of Muscular Fibre.
[14].	Sensations become Perceptions
[15].	Bymeans of Ideas;
[16].	And lead to Muscular Actions.
[17].	Volition comes between Perception and Action.
[18].	Transition to Psychology,
[19].	Acenter is introduced.
[20].	The central consciousness may be obscure.
[21].	Reflex Muscular Action.
[22].	Instinct.
[23].	Difficulty of conceiving Instinct.
[24].	Instinct opposed to Insight.
[xiii]
Chap. VI.  Of the Idea of FinalCauses		[239]
Art. [1].	Organization. Parts are Ends andMeans.
[2].	Notmerely mutually dependent.
[3].	Notmerely mutually Cause and Effect.
[4].	Notion of End not derived from Facts.
[5].	Thisnotion has regulated Physiology.
[6].	Notion of Design comes from within.
[7].	Design not understood by Savages.
[8].	Design opposed to Morphology.
[9].	Impression of Design when fresh.
[10].	Acknowledgement of an End by adverse Physiologists.
[11].	This included in the Notion of Disease.
[12].	Itbelongs to organized Creatures only.
[13].	The term Final Cause.
[14].	Law and Design.
[15].	Final Causes and Morphology.
[16].	Expressions of physiological Ends.
[17].	The Conditions of Existence.
[18].	The asserted presumption of Teleology.
[19].	Final Causes in other subjects.
[20].	Transition to Palætiology.
BOOK X.
THE PHILOSOPHY OFPALÆTIOLOGY.
Chap. I.  Of PalætiologicalSciences in General		[257]
Art. [1].	Description of Palætiology.
[2].	ItsMembers.
[3].	Other Members.
[4].	Connexion of the whole subject.
[5].	Weshall take Material Sciences only;
[6].	Butthese are connected with others.
Chap. II.  Of the Three Membersof a Palætiological Science		[263]
Art. [1].	Divisions of such Sciences.
[2].	TheStudy of Causes.
[3].	Ætiology.
[xiv]
[4].	Phenomenology requires Classification. PhenomenalGeology.
[5].	Phenomenal Uranology.
[6].	Phenomenal Geography of Plants and Animals.
[7].	Phenomenal Glossology.
[8].	TheStudy of Phenomena leads to Theory.
[9].	Nosound Theory without Ætiology.
[10].	Causes in Palætiology.
[11].	Various kinds of Cause.
[12].	Hypothetical Order of Palætiological Causes.
[13].	Mode of Cultivating Ætiology:—In Geology:
[14].	In the Geography of Plants and Animals:
[15].	In Languages.
[16].	Construction of Theories.
[17].	No sound Palætiological Theory yet extant.
Chap. III.  Of the Doctrine ofCatastrophes and the Doctrine of Uniformity		[284]
Art. [1].	Doctrine of Catastrophes.
[2].	Doctrine of Uniformity.
[3].	IsUniformity probable a priori?
[4].	Cycle of Uniformity indefinite.
[5].	Uniformitarian Arguments are Negative only.
[6].	Uniformity in the Organic World.
[7].	Origin of the present Organic World.
[8].	Nebular Origin of the Solar System.
[9].	Origin of Languages.
[10].	No Natural Origin discoverable.
Chap. IV.  Of the Relation ofTradition to Palætiology		[297]
Art. [1].	Importance of Tradition.
[2].	Connexion of Tradition and Science.
[3].	Natural and Providential History of the World.
[4].	TheSacred Narrative.
[5].	Difficulties in interpreting the Sacred Narrative.
[6].	Such Difficulties inevitable.
[7].	Science tells us nothing concerning Creation.
[xv]
[8].	Scientific views, when familiar, do not disturb the authority ofScripture.
[9].	When should Old Interpretations be given up?
[10].	In what Spirit should the Change be accepted?
[11].	In what Spirit should the Change be urged?
[12].	Duty of Mutual forbearance.
[13].	Case of Galileo.
Chap. V.  Of the Conception of aFirst Cause		[316]
Art. [1].	The Origin of things is not naturallydiscoverable;
[2].	Yethas always been sought after.
[3].	There must be a First Cause.
[4].	This is an Axiom.
[5].	Involved in the proof of a Deity.
[6].	Themind is not satisfied without it.
[7].	TheWhole Course of Nature must have a Cause.
[8].	Necessary Existence of God.
[9].	Forms of the Proof.
[10].	Idea of a First Cause is Necessary.
[11].	Conception of a First Cause.
[12].	The First Cause in all Sciences is the same.
[13].	We are thus led to Moral Subjects.
	Conclusion of thisHistory.

THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF THE

INDUCTIVE SCIENCES.

---

INTRODUCTION.