BOOK II.
OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENCE.
CHAPTER I.
Of two principal Processes by which Science is constructed.
Aphorism I.
THE two processes by which Science is constructed are the Explication of Conceptions, and the Colligation of Facts.
TO the subject of the present and next Book all that has preceded is subordinate and preparatory. In former works we have treated of the History of Scientific Discoveries and of the History of Scientific Ideas. We have now to attempt to describe the manner in which discoveries are made, and in which Ideas give rise to knowledge. It has already been stated that Knowledge requires us to possess both Facts and Ideas;—that every step in our knowledge consists in applying the Ideas and Conceptions furnished by our minds to the Facts which observation and experiment offer to us. When our Conceptions are clear and distinct, when our Facts are certain and sufficiently numerous, and when the Conceptions, being suited to the nature of the 28 Facts, are applied to them so as to produce an exact and universal accordance, we attain knowledge of a precise and comprehensive kind, which we may term Science. And we apply this term to our knowledge still more decidedly when, Facts being thus included in exact and general Propositions, such Propositions are, in the same manner, included with equal rigour in Propositions of a higher degree of Generality; and these again in others of a still wider nature, so as to form a large and systematic whole.
But after thus stating, in a general way, the nature of science, and the elements of which it consists, we have been examining with a more close and extensive scrutiny, some of those elements; and we must now return to our main subject, and apply to it the results of our long investigation. We have been exploring the realm of Ideas; we have been passing in review the difficulties in which the workings of our own minds involve us when we would make our conceptions consistent with themselves: and we have endeavoured to get a sight of the true solutions of these difficulties. We have now to inquire how the results of these long and laborious efforts of thought find their due place in the formation of our Knowledge. What do we gain by these attempts to make our notions distinct and consistent; and in what manner is the gain of which we thus become possessed, carried to the general treasure-house of our permanent and indestructible knowledge? After all this battling in the world of ideas, all this struggling with the shadowy and changing forms of intellectual perplexity, how do we secure to ourselves the fruits of our warfare, and assure ourselves that we have really pushed forwards the frontier of the empire of Science? It is by such an appropriation, that the task which we have had in our hands during the two previous works, (the History of the Inductive Sciences and the History of Scientific Ideas,) must acquire its real value and true place in our design.
In order to do this, we must reconsider, in a more definite and precise shape, the doctrine which has already been laid down;—that our Knowledge consists 29 in applying Ideas to Facts; and that the conditions of real knowledge are that the ideas be distinct and appropriate, and exactly applied to clear and certain facts. The steps by which our knowledge is advanced are those by which one or the other of these two processes is rendered more complete;—by which Conceptions are made more clear in themselves, or by which the Conceptions more strictly bind together the Facts. These two processes may be considered as together constituting the whole formation of our knowledge; and the principles which have been established in the History of Scientific Ideas bear principally upon the former of these two operations;—upon the business of elevating our conceptions to the highest possible point of precision and generality. But these two portions of the progress of knowledge are so clearly connected with each other, that we shall deal with them in immediate succession. And having now to consider these operations in a more exact and formal manner than it was before possible to do, we shall designate them by certain constant and technical phrases. We shall speak of the two processes by which we arrive at science, as the Explication of Conceptions and the Colligation of Facts: we shall show how the discussions in which we have been engaged have been necessary in order to promote the former of these offices; and we shall endeavour to point out modes, maxims, and principles by which the second of the two tasks may also be furthered.
CHAPTER II.
Of the Explication of Conceptions.
Aphorism II.
The Explication of Conceptions, as requisite for the progress of science, has been effected by means of discussions and controversies among scientists; often by debates concerning definitions; these controversies have frequently led to the establishment of a Definition; but along with the Definition, a corresponding Proposition has always been expressed or implied. The essential requisite for the advance of science is the clearness of the Conception, not the establishment of a Definition. The construction of an exact Definition is often very difficult. The requisite conditions of clear Conceptions may often be expressed by Axioms as well as by Definitions.
Aphorism III.
Conceptions, for purposes of science, must be appropriate as well as clear: that is, they must be modifications of that Fundamental Idea, by which the phenomena can really be interpreted. This maxim may warn us from errour, though it may not lead to discovery. Discovery depends upon the previous cultivation or natural clearness of the appropriate Idea, and therefore no discovery is the work of accident.
Sect. I.—Historical Progress of the Explication of Conceptions.
1. WE have given the appellation of Ideas to certain comprehensive forms of thought,—as space, number, cause, composition, resemblance,—which we apply to the phenomena which we contemplate. But the special modifications of these ideas which are 31 exemplified in particular facts, we have termed Conceptions; as a circle, a square number, an accelerating force, a neutral combination of elements, a genus. Such Conceptions involve in themselves certain necessary and universal relations derived from the Ideas just enumerated; and these relations are an indispensable portion of the texture of our knowledge. But to determine the contents and limits of this portion of our knowledge, requires an examination of the Ideas and Conceptions from which it proceeds. The Conceptions must be, as it were, carefully unfolded, so as to bring into clear view the elements of truth with which they are marked from their ideal origin. This is one of the processes by which our knowledge is extended and made more exact; and this I shall describe as the Explication of Conceptions.
In the several Books of the History of Ideas we have discussed a great many of the Fundamental Ideas of the most important existing sciences. We have, in those Books, abundant exemplifications of the process now under our consideration. We shall here add a few general remarks, suggested by the survey which we have thus made.
2. Such discussions as those in which we have been engaged concerning our fundamental Ideas, have been the course by which, historically speaking, those Conceptions which the existing sciences involve have been rendered so clear as to be fit elements of exact knowledge. Thus, the disputes concerning the various kinds and measures of Force were an important part of the progress of the science of Mechanics. The struggles by which philosophers attained a right general conception of plane, of circular, of elliptical Polarization, were some of the most difficult steps in the modern discoveries of Optics. A Conception of the Atomic Constitution of bodies, such as shall include what we know, and assume nothing more, is even now a matter of conflict among Chemists. The debates by which, in recent times, the Conceptions of Species and Genera have been rendered more exact, have improved the science of Botany: the imperfection of the science of 32 Mineralogy arises in a great measure from the circumstance, that in that subject, the Conception of a Species is not yet fixed. In Physiology, what a vast advance would that philosopher make, who should establish a precise, tenable, and consistent Conception of Life!
Thus discussions and speculations concerning the import of very abstract and general terms and notions, may be, and in reality have been, far from useless and barren. Such discussions arose from the desire of men to impress their opinions on others, but they had the effect of making the opinions much more clear and distinct. In trying to make others understand them, they learnt to understand themselves. Their speculations were begun in twilight, and ended in the full brilliance of day. It was not easily and at once, without expenditure of labour or time, that men arrived at those notions which now form the elements of our knowledge; on the contrary, we have, in the history of science, seen how hard, discoverers, and the forerunners of discoverers, have had to struggle with the indistinctness and obscurity of the intellect, before they could advance to the critical point at which truth became clearly visible. And so long as, in this advance, some speculators were more forward than others, there was a natural and inevitable ground of difference of opinion, of argumentation, of wrangling. But the tendency of all such controversy is to diffuse truth and to dispel errour. Truth is consistent, and can bear the tug of war; Errour is incoherent, and falls to pieces in the struggle. True Conceptions can endure the sun, and become clearer as a fuller light is obtained; confused and inconsistent notions vanish like visionary spectres at the break of a brighter day. And thus all the controversies concerning such Conceptions as science involves, have ever ended in the establishment of the side on which the truth was found.
3. Indeed, so complete has been the victory of truth in most of these instances, that at present we can hardly imagine the struggle to have been necessary. The very essence of these triumphs is that they lead us to regard the views we reject as not only false, 33 but inconceivable. And hence we are led rather to look back upon the vanquished with contempt than upon the victors with gratitude. We now despise those who, in the Copernican controversy, could not conceive the apparent motion of the sun on the heliocentric hypothesis;—or those who, in opposition to Galileo, thought that a uniform force might be that which generated a velocity proportional to the space;—or those who held there was something absurd in Newton’s doctrine of the different refrangibility of differently coloured rays;—or those who imagined that when elements combine, their sensible qualities must be manifest in the compound;—or those who were reluctant to give up the distinction of vegetables into herbs, shrubs, and trees. We cannot help thinking that men must have been singularly dull of comprehension, to find a difficulty in admitting what is to us so plain and simple. We have a latent persuasion that we in their place should have been wiser and more clear-sighted;—that we should have taken the right side, and given our assent at once to the truth.
4. Yet in reality, such a persuasion is a mere delusion. The persons who, in such instances as the above, were on the losing side, were very far, in most cases, from being persons more prejudiced, or stupid, or narrow-minded, than the greater part of mankind now are; and the cause for which they fought was far from being a manifestly bad one, till it had been so decided by the result of the war. It is the peculiar character of scientific contests, that what is only an epigram with regard to other warfare is a truth in this;—They who are defeated are really in the wrong. But they may, nevertheless, be men of great subtilty, sagacity, and genius; and we nourish a very foolish self-complacency when we suppose that we are their superiors. That this is so, is proved by recollecting that many of those who have made very great discoveries have laboured under the imperfection of thought which was the obstacle to the next step in knowledge. Though Kepler detected with great acuteness the Numerical Laws of the solar system, he laboured in 34 vain to conceive the very simplest of the Laws of Motion by which the paths of the planets are governed. Though Priestley made some important steps in chemistry, he could not bring his mind to admit the doctrine of a general Principle of Oxidation. How many ingenious men in the last century rejected the Newtonian Attraction as an impossible chimera! How many more, equally intelligent, have, in the same manner, in our own time, rejected, I do not now mean as false, but as inconceivable, the doctrine of Luminiferous Undulations! To err in this way is the lot, not only of men in general, but of men of great endowments, and very sincere love of truth.
5. And those who liberate themselves from such perplexities, and who thus go on in advance of their age in such matters, owe their superiority in no small degree to such discussions and controversies as those to which we now refer. In such controversies, the Conceptions in question are turned in all directions, examined on all sides; the strength and the weakness of the maxims which men apply to them are fully tested; the light of the brightest minds is diffused to other minds. Inconsistency is unfolded into self-contradiction; axioms are built up into a system of necessary truths; and ready exemplifications are accumulated of that which is to be proved or disproved, concerning the ideas which are the basis of the controversy.
The History of Mechanics from the time of Kepler to that of Lagrange, is perhaps the best exemplification of the mode in which the progress of a science depends upon such disputes and speculations as give clearness and generality to its elementary conceptions. This, it is to be recollected, is the kind of progress of which we are now speaking; and this is the principal feature in the portion of scientific history which we have mentioned. For almost all that was to be done by reference to observation, was executed by Galileo and his disciples. What remained was the task of generalization and simplification. And this was promoted in no small degree by the various controversies which took place within that period concerning 35 mechanical conceptions:—as, for example, the question concerning the measure of the Force of Percussion;—the war of the Vis Viva;—the controversy of the Center of Oscillation;—of the independence of Statics and Dynamics;—of the principle of Least Action;—of the evidence of the Laws of Motion;—and of the number of Laws really distinct. None of these discussions was without its influence in giving generality and clearness to the mechanical ideas of mathematicians: and therefore, though remote from general apprehension, and dealing with very abstract notions, they were of eminent use in the perfecting the science of Mechanics. Similar controversies concerning fundamental notions, those, for example, which Galileo himself had to maintain, were no less useful in the formation of the science of Hydrostatics. And the like struggles and conflicts, whether they take the form of controversies between several persons, or only operate in the efforts and fluctuations of the discoverer’s mind, are always requisite, before the conceptions acquire that clearness which makes them flt to appear in the enunciation of scientific truth. This, then, was one object of the History of Ideas;—to bring under the reader’s notice the main elements of the controversies which have thus had so important a share in the formation of the existing body of science, and the decisions on the controverted points to which the mature examination of the subject has led; and thus to give an abundant exhibition of that step which we term the Explication of Conceptions.
Sect. II.—Use of Definitions.
6. The result of such controversies as we have been speaking of, often appears to be summed up in a Definition; and the controversy itself has often assumed the form of a battle of definitions. For example, the inquiry concerning the Laws of Falling Bodies led to the question whether the proper Definition of a uniform force is, that it generates a velocity proportional to the space from rest, or to the time. The controversy of the Vis Viva was, what was the 36 proper Definition of the measure of force. A principal question in the classification of minerals is, what is the Definition of a mineral species. Physiologists have endeavoured to throw light on their subject, by Defining organization, or some similar term.
7. It is very important for us to observe, that these controversies have never been questions of insulated and arbitrary Definitions, as men seem often tempted to suppose them to have been. In all cases there is a tacit assumption of some Proposition which is to be expressed by means of the Definition, and which gives it its importance. The dispute concerning the Definition thus acquires a real value, and becomes a question concerning true and false. Thus in the discussion of the question, What is a Uniform Force? it was taken for granted that ‘gravity is a uniform force:’—in the debate of the Vis Viva, it was assumed that ‘in the mutual action of bodies the whole effect of the force is unchanged:’—in the zoological definition of Species, (that it consists of individuals which have, or may have, sprung from the same parents,) it is presumed that ‘individuals so related resemble each other more than those which are excluded by such a definition;’ or perhaps, that ‘species so defined have permanent and definite differences.’ A definition of Organization, or of any other term, which was not employed to express some principle, would be of no value.
The establishment, therefore, of a right Definition of a Term may be a useful step in the Explication of our Conceptions; but this will be the case then only when we have under our consideration some Proposition in which the Term is employed. For then the question really is, how the Conception shall be understood and defined in order that the Proposition may be true.
8. The establishment of a Proposition requires an attention to observed Facts, and can never be rightly derived from our Conceptions alone. We must hereafter consider the necessity which exists that the Facts should be rightly bound together, as well as that our Conceptions should be clearly employed, in order to 37 lead us to real knowledge. But we may observe here that, in such cases at least as we are now considering, the two processes are co-ordinate. To unfold our Conceptions by the means of Definitions, has never been serviceable to science, except when it has been associated with an immediate use of the Definitions. The endeavour to define a uniform Force was combined with the assertion that ‘gravity is a uniform force:’ the attempt to define Accelerating Force was immediately followed by the doctrine that ‘accelerating forces may be compounded:’ the process of defining Momentum was connected with the principle that ‘momenta gained and lost are equal:’ naturalists would have given in vain the Definition of Species which we have quoted, if they had not also given the ‘characters’ of species so separated. Definition and Proposition are the two handles of the instrument by which we apprehend truth; the former is of no use without the latter. Definition may be the best mode of explaining our Conception, but that which alone makes it worth while to explain it in any mode, is the opportunity of using it in the expression of Truth. When a Definition is propounded to us as a useful step in knowledge, we are always entitled to ask what Principle it serves to enunciate. If there be no answer to this inquiry, we define and give clearness to our conceptions in vain. While we labour at such a task, we do but light up a vacant room;—we sharpen a knife with which we have nothing to cut;—we take exact aim, while we load our artillery with blank cartridge;—we apply strict rules of grammar to sentences which have no meaning.
If, on the other hand, we have under our consideration a proposition probably established, every step which we can make in giving distinctness and exactness to the Terms which this proposition involves, is an important step towards scientific truth. In such cases, any improvement in our Definition is a real advance in the explication of our Conception. The clearness of our impressions casts a light upon the Ideas which we contemplate and convey to others. 38
9. But though Definition may be subservient to a right explication of our conceptions, it is not essential to that process. It is absolutely necessary to every advance in our knowledge, that those by whom such advances are made should possess clearly the conceptions which they employ: but it is by no means necessary that they should unfold these conceptions in the words of a formal Definition. It is easily seen, by examining the course of Galileo’s discoveries, that he had a distinct conception of the Moving Force which urges bodies downwards upon an inclined plane, while he still hesitated whether to call it Momentum, Energy, Impetus, or Force, and did not venture to offer a Definition of the thing which was the subject of his thoughts. The Conception of Polarization was clear in the minds of many optical speculators, from the time of Huyghens and Newton to that of Young and Fresnel. This Conception we have defined to be ‘Opposite properties depending upon opposite positions;’ but this notion was, by the discoverers, though constantly assumed and expressed by means of superfluous hypotheses, never clothed in definite language. And in the mean time, it was the custom, among subordinate writers on the same subjects, to say, that the term Polarization had no definite meaning, and was merely an expression of our ignorance. The Definition which was offered by Haüy and others of a Mineralogical Species;—‘The same elements combined in the same proportions, with the same fundamental form;’—was false, inasmuch as it was incapable of being rigorously applied to any one case; but this defect did not prevent the philosophers who propounded such a Definition from making many valuable additions to mineralogical knowledge, in the way of identifying some species and distinguishing others. The right Conception which they possessed in their minds prevented their being misled by their own very erroneous Definition. The want of any precise Definitions of Strata, and Formations, and Epochs, among geologists, has not prevented the discussions which they have carried on upon such subjects from being highly serviceable 39 in the promotion of geological knowledge. For however much the apparent vagueness of these terms might leave their arguments open to cavil, there was a general understanding prevalent among the most intelligent cultivators of the science, as to what was meant in such expressions; and this common understanding sufficed to determine what evidence should be considered conclusive and what inconclusive, in these inquiries. And thus the distinctness of Conception, which is a real requisite of scientific progress, existed in the minds of the inquirers, although Definitions, which are a partial and accidental evidence of this distinctness, had not yet been hit upon. The Idea had been developed in men’s minds, although a clothing of words had not been contrived for it, nor, perhaps, the necessity of such a vehicle felt: and thus that essential condition of the progress of knowledge, of which we are here speaking, existed; while it was left to the succeeding speculators to put this unwritten Rule in the form of a verbal Statute.
10. Men are often prone to consider it as a thoughtless omission of an essential circumstance, and as a neglect which involves some blame, when knowledge thus assumes a form in which Definitions, or rather Conceptions, are implied but are not expressed. But in such a judgment, they assume that to be a matter of choice requiring attention only, which is in fact as difficult and precarious as any other portion of the task of discovery. To define, so that our Definition shall have any scientific value, requires no small portion of that sagacity by which truth is detected. As we have already said, Definitions and Propositions are co-ordinate in their use and in their origin. In many cases, perhaps in most, the Proposition which contains a scientific truth, is apprehended with confidence, but with some vagueness and vacillation, before it is put in a positive, distinct, and definite form.—It is thus known to be true, before it can be enunciated in terms each of which is rigorously defined. The business of Definition is part of the business of discovery. When it has been clearly seen what ought to be our Definition, it 40 must be pretty well known what truth we have to state. The Definition, as well as the discovery, supposes a decided step in our knowledge to have been made. The writers on Logic in the middle ages, made Definition the last stage in the progress of knowledge; and in this arrangement at least, the history of science, and the philosophy derived from the history, confirm their speculative views. If the Explication of our Conceptions ever assume the form of a Definition, this will come to pass, not as an arbitrary process, or as a matter of course, but as the mark of one of those happy efforts of sagacity to which all the successive advances of our knowledge are owing.
Sect. III.—Use of Axioms.
11. Our Conceptions, then, even when they become so clear as the progress of knowledge requires, are not adequately expressed, or necessarily expressed at all, by means of Definitions. We may ask, then, whether there is any other mode of expression in which we may look for the evidence and exposition of that peculiar exactness of thought which the formation of Science demands. And in answer to this inquiry, we may refer to the discussions respecting many of the Fundamental Ideas of the sciences contained in our History of such Ideas. It has there been seen that these Ideas involve many elementary truths which enter into the texture of our knowledge, introducing into it connexions and relations of the most important kind, although these elementary truths cannot be deduced from any verbal definition of the idea. It has been seen that these elementary truths may often be enunciated by means of Axioms, stated in addition to, or in preference to, Definitions. For example, the Idea of Cause, which forms the basis of the science of Mechanics, makes its appearance in our elementary mechanical reasonings, not as a Definition, but by means of the Axioms that ‘Causes are measured by their effects,’ and that ‘Reaction is equal and opposite to action.’ Such axioms, tacitly assumed or 41 occasionally stated, as maxims of acknowledged validity, belong to all the Ideas which form the foundations of the sciences, and are constantly employed in the reasoning and speculations of those who think clearly on such subjects. It may often be a task of some difficulty to detect and enunciate in words the Principles which are thus, perhaps silently and unconsciously, taken for granted by those who have a share in the establishment of scientific truth: but inasmuch as these Principles are an essential element in our knowledge, it is very important to our present purpose to separate them from the associated materials, and to trace them to their origin. This accordingly I attempted to do, with regard to a considerable number of the most prominent of such Ideas, in the History. The reader will there find many of these Ideas resolved into Axioms and Principles by means of which their effect upon the elementary reasonings of the various sciences may be expressed. That Work is intended to form, in some measure, a representation of the Ideal Side of our physical knowledge;—a Table of those contents of our Conceptions which are not received directly from facts;—an exhibition of Rules to which we know that truth must conform.
Sect. IV.—Clear and appropriate Ideas.
12. In order, however, that we may see the necessary cogency of these rules, we must possess, clearly and steadily, the Ideas from which the rules flow. In order to perceive the necessary relations of the Circles of the Sphere, we must possess clearly the Idea of Solid Space:—in order that we may see the demonstration of the composition of forces, we must have the Idea of Cause moulded into a distinct Conception of Statical Force. This is that Clearness of Ideas which we stipulate for in any one’s mind, as the first essential condition of his making any new step in the discovery of truth. And we now see what answer we are able to give, if we are asked for a Criterion of this Clearness of 42 Idea. The Criterion is, that the person shall see the necessity of the Axioms belonging to each Idea;—shall accept them in such a manner as to perceive the cogency of the reasonings founded upon them. Thus, a person has a clear Idea of Space who follows the reasonings of geometry and fully apprehends their conclusiveness. The Explication of Conceptions, which we are speaking of as an essential part of real knowledge, is the process by which we bring the Clearness of our Ideas to bear upon the Formation of our knowledge. And this is done, as we have now seen, not always, nor generally, nor principally, by laying down a Definition of the Conception; but by acquiring such a possession of it in our minds as enables, indeed compels us, to admit, along with the Conception, all the Axioms and Principles which it necessarily implies, and by which it produces its effect upon our reasonings.
13. But in order that we may make any real advance in the discovery of truth, our Ideas must not only be clear, they must also be appropriate. Each science has for its basis a different class of Ideas; and the steps which constitute the progress of one science can never be made by employing the Ideas of another kind of science. No genuine advance could ever be obtained in Mechanics by applying to the subject the Ideas of Space and Time merely:—no advance in Chemistry, by the use of mere Mechanical Conceptions:—no discovery in Physiology, by referring facts to mere Chemical and Mechanical Principles. Mechanics must involve the Conception of Force;—Chemistry, the Conception of Elementary Composition;—Physiology, the Conception of Vital Powers. Each science must advance by means of its appropriate Conceptions. Each has its own field, which extends as far as its principles can be applied. I have already noted the separation of several of these fields by the divisions of the Books of the History of Ideas. The Mechanical, the Secondary Mechanical, the Chemical, the Classificatory, the Biological Sciences form so many great Provinces in the Kingdom of knowledge, each in a great measure possessing its own peculiar fundamental principles. Every attempt to build up a 43 new science by the application of principles which belong to an old one, will lead to frivolous and barren speculations.
This truth has been exemplified in all the instances in which subtle speculative men have failed in their attempts to frame new sciences, and especially in the essays of the ancient schools of philosophy in Greece, as has already been stated in the History of Science. Aristotle and his followers endeavoured in vain to account for the mechanical relation of forces in the lever by applying the inappropriate geometrical conceptions of the properties of the circle:—they speculated to no purpose about the elementary composition of bodies, because they assumed the inappropriate conception of likeness between the elements and the compound, instead of the genuine notion of elements merely determining the qualities of the compound. And in like manner, in modern times, we have seen, in the history of the fundamental ideas of the physiological sciences, how all the inappropriate mechanical and chemical and other ideas which were applied in succession to the subject failed in bringing into view any genuine physiological truth.
14. That the real cause of the failure in the instances above mentioned lay in the Conceptions, is plain. It was not ignorance of the facts which in these cases prevented the discovery of the truth. Aristotle was as well acquainted with the fact of the proportion of the weights which balance on a Lever as Archimedes was, although Archimedes alone gave the true mechanical reason for the proportion.
With regard to the doctrine of the Four Elements indeed, the inapplicability of the conception of composition of qualities, required, perhaps, to be proved by some reference to facts. But this conception was devised at first, and accepted by succeeding times, in a blind and gratuitous manner, which could hardly have happened if men had been awake to the necessary condition of our knowledge;—that the conceptions which we introduce into our doctrines are not arbitrary or accidental notions, but certain peculiar modes of 44 apprehension strictly determined by the subject of our speculations.
15. It may, however, be said that this injunction that we are to employ appropriate Conceptions only in the formation of our knowledge, cannot be of practical use, because we can only determine what Ideas are appropriate, by finding that they truly combine the facts. And this is to a certain extent true. Scientific discovery must ever depend upon some happy thought, of which we cannot trace the origin;—some fortunate cast of intellect, rising above all rules. No maxims can be given which inevitably lead to discovery. No precepts will elevate a man of ordinary endowments to the level of a man of genius: nor will an inquirer of truly inventive mind need to come to the teacher of inductive philosophy to learn how to exercise the faculties which nature has given him. Such persons as Kepler or Fresnel, or Brewster, will have their powers of discovering truth little augmented by any injunctions respecting Distinct and Appropriate Ideas; and such men may very naturally question the utility of rules altogether.
16. But yet the opinions which such persons may entertain, will not lead us to doubt concerning the value of the attempts to analyse and methodize the process of discovery. Who would attend to Kepler if he had maintained that the speculations of Francis Bacon were worthless? Notwithstanding what has been said, we may venture to assert that the Maxim which points out the necessity of Ideas appropriate as well as clear, for the purpose of discovering truth, is not without its use. It may, at least, have a value as a caution or prohibition, and may thus turn us away from labours certain to be fruitless. We have already seen, in the History of Ideas, that this maxim, if duly attended to, would have at once condemned, as wrongly directed, the speculations of physiologists of the mathematical, mechanical, chemical, and vital-fluid schools; since the Ideas which the teachers of these schools introduce, cannot suffice for the purposes of physiology, which seeks truths respecting the vital powers. Again, 45 it is clear from similar considerations that no definition of a mineralogical species by chemical characters alone can answer the end of science, since we seek to make mineralogy, not an analytical but a classificatory science[1]. Even before the appropriate conception is matured in men’s minds so that they see clearly what it is, they may still have light enough to see what it is not.
[1] This agrees with what M. Necker has well observed in his Règne Mineral, that those who have treated mineralogy as a merely chemical science, have substituted the analysis of substances for the classification of individuals. See History of Ideas, b. viii. chap. iii.
17. Another result of this view of the necessity of appropriate Ideas, combined with a survey of the history of science is, that though for the most part, as we shall see, the progress of science consists in accumulating and combining Facts rather than in debating concerning Definitions; there are still certain periods when the discussion of Definitions may be the most useful mode of cultivating some special branch of science. This discussion is of course always to be conducted by the light of facts; and, as has already been said, along with the settlement of every good Definition will occur the corresponding establishment of some Proposition. But still at particular periods, the want of a Definition, or of the clear conceptions which Definition supposes, may be peculiarly felt. A good and tenable Definition of Species in Mineralogy would at present be perhaps the most important step which the science could make. A just conception of the nature of Life, (and if expressed by means of a Definition, so much the better,) can hardly fail to give its possessor an immense advantage in the speculations which now come under the considerations of physiologists. And controversies respecting Definitions, in these cases, and such as these, may be very far from idle and unprofitable.
Thus the knowledge that Clear and Appropriate Ideas are requisite for discovery, although it does not lead to any very precise precepts, or supersede the value of natural sagacity and inventiveness, may still 46 be of use to us in our pursuit after truth. It may show us what course of research is, in each stage of science, recommended by the general analogy of the history of knowledge; and it may both save us from hopeless and barren paths of speculation, and make us advance with more courage and confidence, to know that we are looking for discoveries in the manner in which they have always hitherto been made.
Sect. V.—Accidental Discoveries.
18. Another consequence follows from the views presented in this Chapter, and it is the last I shall at present mention. No scientific discovery can, with any justice, be considered due to accident. In whatever manner facts may be presented to the notice of a discoverer, they can never become the materials of exact knowledge, except they find his mind already provided with precise and suitable conceptions by which they may be analysed and connected. Indeed, as we have already seen, facts cannot be observed as Facts, except in virtue of the Conceptions which the observer[2] himself unconsciously supplies; and they are not Facts of Observation for any purpose of Discovery, except these familiar and unconscious acts of thought be themselves of a just and precise kind. But supposing the Facts to be adequately observed, they can never be combined into any new Truth, except by means of some new Conceptions, clear and appropriate, such as I have endeavoured to characterize. When the observer’s mind is prepared with such instruments, a very few facts, or it may be a single one, may bring the process of discovery into action. But in such cases, this previous condition of the intellect, and not the single fact, is really the main and peculiar cause of the success. The fact is merely the occasion by which the engine of discovery is brought into play sooner or later. It is, as I have elsewhere said, only the spark which discharges a gun already loaded and pointed; and there 47 is little propriety in speaking of such an accident as the cause why the bullet hits the mark. If it were true that the fall of an apple was the occasion of Newton’s pursuing the train of thought which led to the doctrine of universal gravitation, the habits and constitution of Newton’s intellect, and not the apple, were the real source of this great event in the progress of knowledge. The common love of the marvellous, and the vulgar desire to bring down the greatest achievements of genius to our own level, may lead men to ascribe such results to any casual circumstances which accompany them; but no one who fairly considers the real nature of great discoveries, and the intellectual processes which they involve, can seriously hold the opinion of their being the effect of accident.
[2] B. i. of this vol. Aphorism [III.]
19. Such accidents never happen to common men. Thousands of men, even of the most inquiring and speculative men, had seen bodies fall; but who, except Newton, ever followed the accident to such consequences? And in fact, how little of his train of thought was contained in, or even directly suggested by, the fall of the apple! If the apple fall, said the discoverer, ‘why should not the moon, the planets, the satellites, fall?’ But how much previous thought,—what a steady conception of the universality of the laws of motion gathered from other sources,—were requisite, that the inquirer should see any connexion in these cases! Was it by accident that he saw in the apple an image of the moon, and of every body in the solar system?
20. The same observations may be made with regard to the other cases which are sometimes adduced as examples of accidental discovery. It has been said, ‘By the accidental placing of a rhomb of calcareous spar upon a book or line Bartholinus discovered the property of the Double Refraction of light.’ But Bartholinus could have seen no such consequence in the accident if he had not previously had a clear conception of single refraction. A lady, in describing an optical experiment which had been shown her, said of her teacher, ‘He told me to increase and diminish 48 the angle of refraction, and at last I found that he only meant me to move my head up and down.’ At any rate, till the lady had acquired the notions which the technical terms convey, she could not have made Bartholinus’s discovery by means of his accident. ‘By accidentally combining two rhombs in different positions,’ it is added, ‘Huyghens discovered the Polarization of Light.’ Supposing that this experiment had been made without design, what Huyghens really observed was, that the images appeared and disappeared alternately as he turned one of the rhombs round. But was it an easy or an obvious business to analyze this curious alternation into the circumstances of the rays of light having sides, as Newton expressed it, and into the additional hypotheses which are implied in the term ‘polarization’? Those will be able to answer this question, who have found how far from easy it is to understand clearly what is meant by ‘polarization’ in this case, now that the property is fully established. Huyghens’s success depended on his clearness of thought, for this enabled him to perform the intellectual analysis, which never would have occurred to most men, however often they had ‘accidentally combined two rhombs in different positions.’ ‘By accidentally looking through a prism of the same substance, and turning it round, Malus discovered the polarization of light by reflection.’ Malus saw that, in some positions of the prism, the light reflected from the windows of the Louvre thus seen through the prism, became dim. A common man would have supposed this dimness the result of accident; but Malus’s mind was differently constituted and disciplined. He considered the position of the window, and of the prism; repeated the experiment over and over; and in virtue of the eminently distinct conceptions of space which he possessed, resolved the phenomena into its geometrical conditions. A believer in accident would not have sought them; a person of less clear ideas would not have found them. A person must have a strange confidence in the virtue of chance, and the worthlessness of intellect, who can say that 49 ‘in all these fundamental discoveries appropriate ideas had no share,’ and that the discoveries ‘might have been made by the most ordinary observers.’
21. I have now, I trust, shown in various ways, how the Explication of Conceptions, including in this term their clear development from Fundamental Ideas in the discoverer’s mind, as well as their precise expression in the form of Definitions or Axioms, when that can be done, is an essential part in the establishment of all exact and general physical truths. In doing this, I have endeavoured to explain in what sense the possession of clear and appropriate ideas is a main requisite for every step in scientific discovery. That it is far from being the only step, I shall soon have to show; and if any obscurity remain on the subject treated of in the present chapter, it will, I hope, be removed when we have examined the other elements which enter into the constitution of our knowledge.
CHAPTER III.
Of Facts as the Materials of Science.
Aphorism IV.
Facts are the materials of science, but all Facts involve Ideas. Since in observing Facts, we cannot exclude Ideas, we must, for the purposes of science, take care that the Ideas are clear and rigorously applied.
Aphorism V.
The last Aphorism leads to such Rules as the following:—That Facts, for the purposes of material science, must involve Conceptions of the Intellect only, and not Emotions:—That Facts must be observed with reference to our most exact conceptions, Number, Place, Figure, Motion:—That they must also be observed with reference to any other exact conceptions which the phenomena suggest, as Force, in mechanical phenomena, Concord, in musical.
Aphorism VI.
The resolution of complex Facts into precise and measured partial Facts, we call the Decomposition of Facts. This process is requisite for the progress of science, but does not necessarily lead to progress.
1. WE have now to examine how Science is built up by the combination of Facts. In doing this, we suppose that we have already attained a supply of definite and certain Facts, free from obscurity and doubt. We must, therefore, first consider under what conditions Facts can assume this character.
When we inquire what Facts are to be made the materials of Science, perhaps the answer which we 51 should most commonly receive would be, that they must be True Facts, as distinguished from any mere inferences or opinions of our own. We should probably be told that we must be careful in such a case to consider as Facts, only what we really observe;—that we must assert only what we see; and believe nothing except upon the testimony of our senses.
But such maxims are far from being easy to apply, as a little examination will convince us.
2. It has been explained, in preceding works, that all perception of external objects and occurrences involves an active as well as a passive process of the mind;—includes not only Sensations, but also Ideas by which Sensations are bound together, and have a unity given to them. From this it follows, that there is a difficulty in separating in our perceptions what we receive from without, and what we ourselves contribute from within;—what we perceive, and what we infer. In many cases, this difficulty is obvious to all: as, for example, when we witness the performances of a juggler or a ventriloquist. In these instances, we imagine ourselves to see and to hear what certainly we do not see and hear. The performer takes advantage of the habits by which our minds supply interruptions and infer connexions; and by giving us fallacious indications, he leads us to perceive as an actual fact, what does not happen at all. In these cases, it is evident that we ourselves assist in making the fact; for we make one which does not really exist. In other cases, though the fact which we perceive be true, we can easily see that a large portion of the perception is our own act; as when, from the sight of a bird of prey we infer a carcase, or when we read a half-obliterated inscription. In the latter case, the mind supplies the meaning, and perhaps half the letters; yet we do not hesitate to say that we actually read the inscription. Thus, in many cases, our own inferences and interpretations enter into our facts. But this happens in many instances in which it is at first sight less obvious. When any one has seen an oak-tree blown down by a strong gust of wind, he does not think of the occurrence 52 any otherwise than as a Fact of which he is assured by his senses. Yet by what sense does he perceive the Force which he thus supposes the wind to exert? By what sense does he distinguish an Oak-tree from all other trees? It is clear upon reflexion, that in such a case, his own mind supplies the conception of extraneous impulse and pressure, by which he thus interprets the motions observed, and the distinction of different kinds of trees, according to which he thus names the one under his notice. The Idea of Force, and the idea of definite Resemblances and Differences, are thus combined with the impressions on our senses, and form an undistinguished portion of that which we consider as the Fact. And it is evident that we can in no other way perceive Force, than by seeing motion; and cannot give a Name to any object, without not only seeing a difference of single objects, but supposing a difference of classes of objects. When we speak as if we saw impulse and attraction, things and classes, we really see only objects of various forms and colours, more or less numerous, variously combined. But do we really perceive so much as this? When we see the form, the size, the number, the motion of objects, are these really mere impressions on our senses, unmodified by any contribution or operation of the mind itself? A very little attention will suffice to convince us that this is not the case. When we see a windmill turning, it may happen, as we have elsewhere noticed[3], that we mistake the direction in which the sails turn: when we look at certain diagrams, they may appear either convex or concave: when we see the moon first in the horizon and afterwards high up in the sky, we judge her to be much larger in the former than in the latter position, although to the eye she subtends the same angle. And in these cases and the like, it has been seen that the errour and confusion which we thus incur arise from the mixture of acts of the mind itself with impressions on the senses. But such acts are, as we have also seen, inseparable portions of the process 53 of perception. A certain activity of the mind is involved, not only in seeing objects erroneously, but in seeing them at all. With regard to solid objects, this is generally acknowledged. When we seem to see an edifice occupying space in all dimensions, we really see only a representation of it as it appears referred by perspective to a surface. The inference of the solid form is an operation of our own, alike when we look at a reality and when we look at a picture. But we may go further. Is plane Figure really a mere Sensation? If we look at a decagon, do we see at once that it has ten sides, or is it not necessary for us to count them: and is not counting an act of the mind? All objects are seen in space; all objects are seen as one or many: but are not the Idea of Space and the Idea of Number requisite in order that we may thus apprehend what we see? That these Ideas of Space and Number involve a connexion derived from the mind, and not from the senses, appears, as we have already seen, from this, that those Ideas afford us the materials of universal and necessary truths:—such truths as the senses cannot possibly supply. And thus, even the perception of such facts as the size, shape, and number of objects, cannot be said to be impressions of sense, distinct from all acts of mind, and cannot be expected to be free from errour on the ground of their being mere observed Facts.
[3] History of Ideas, B. ii. c. vi. s. 6.
Thus the difficulty which we have been illustrating, of distinguishing Facts from inferences and from interpretations of facts, is not only great, but amounts to an impossibility. The separation at which we aimed in the outset of this discussion, and which was supposed to be necessary in order to obtain a firm groundwork for science, is found to be unattainable. We cannot obtain a sure basis of Facts, by rejecting all inferences and judgments of our own, for such inferences and judgments form an unavoidable element in all Facts. We cannot exclude our Ideas from our Perceptions, for our Perceptions involve our Ideas.
3. But still, it cannot be doubted that in selecting the Facts which are to form the foundation of Science, 54 we must reduce them to their most simple and certain form; and must reject everything from which doubt or errour may arise. Now since this, it appears, cannot be done, by rejecting the Ideas which all Facts involve, in what manner are we to conform to the obvious maxim, that the Facts which form the basis of Science must be perfectly definite and certain?
The analysis of facts into Ideas and Sensations, which we have so often referred to, suggests the answer to this inquiry. We are not able, nor need we endeavour, to exclude Ideas from our Facts; but we may be able to discern, with perfect distinctness, the Ideas which we include. We cannot observe any phenomena without applying to them such Ideas as Space and Number, Cause and Resemblance, and usually, several others; but we may avoid applying these Ideas in a wavering or obscure manner, and confounding Ideas with one another. We cannot read any of the inscriptions which nature presents to us, without interpreting them by means of some language which we ourselves are accustomed to speak; but we may make it our business to acquaint ourselves perfectly with the language which we thus employ, and to interpret it according to the rigorous rules of grammar and analogy.
This maxim, that when Facts are employed as the basis of Science, we must distinguish clearly the Ideas which they involve, and must apply these in a distinct and rigorous manner, will be found to be a more precise guide than we might perhaps at first expect. We may notice one or two Rules which flow from it.
4. In the first place. Facts, when used as the materials of physical Science, must be referred to Conceptions of the Intellect only, all emotions of fear, admiration, and the like, being rejected or subdued. Thus, the observations of phenomena which are related as portents and prodigies, striking terrour and boding evil, are of no value for purposes of science. The tales of armies seen warring in the sky, the sound of arms heard from the clouds, fiery dragons, chariots, swords seen in the air, may refer to meteorological phenomena; but the records of phenomena observed in the 55 state of mind which these descriptions imply can be of no scientific value. We cannot make the poets our observers.
Armorum sonitum toto Germania cœlo
Audiit; insolitis tremuerunt motibus Alpes.
Vox quoque per lucos vulgo exaudita silentes
Ingens; et simulacra modis pallentia miris
Visa sub obscurum noctis: pecudesque locutæ.
The mixture of fancy and emotion with the observation of facts has often disfigured them to an extent which is too familiar to all to need illustration. We have an example of this result, in the manner in which Comets are described in the treatises of the middle ages. In such works, these bodies are regularly distributed into several classes, accordingly as they assume the form of a sword, of a spear, of a cross, and so on. When such resemblances had become matters of interest, the impressions of the senses were governed, not by the rigorous conceptions of form and colour, but by these assumed images; and under these circumstances, we can attach little value to the statement of what was seen.
In all such phenomena, the reference of the objects to the exact Ideas of Space, Number, Position, Motion, and the like, is the first step of Science: and accordingly, this reference was established at an early period in those sciences which made an early progress, as, for instance, Astronomy. Yet even in astronomy there appears to have been a period when the predominant conceptions of men in regarding the heavens and the stars pointed to mythical story and supernatural influence, rather than to mere relations of space, time, and motion: and of this primeval condition of those who gazed at the stars, we seem to have remnants in the Constellations, in the mythological Names of the Planets, and in the early prevalence of Astrology. It was only at a later period, when men had begun to measure the places, or at least to count the revolutions of the stars, that Astronomy had its birth.
5. And thus we are led to another Rule:—that in collecting Facts which are to be made the basis of 56 Science, the Facts are to be observed, as far as possible, with reference to place, figure, number, motion, and the like Conceptions; which, depending upon the Ideas of Space and Time, are the most universal, exact, and simple of our conceptions. It was by early attention to these relations in the case of the heavenly bodies, that the ancients formed the science of Astronomy: it was by not making precise observations of this kind in the case of terrestrial bodies, that they failed in framing a science of the Mechanics of Motion. They succeeded in Optics as far as they made observations of this nature; but when they ceased to trace the geometrical paths of rays in the actual experiment, they ceased to go forwards in the knowledge of this subject.
6. But we may state a further Rule:—that though these relations of Time and Space are highly important in almost all Facts, we are not to confine ourselves to these: but are to consider the phenomena with reference to other Conceptions also: it being always understood that these conceptions are to be made as exact and rigorous as those of geometry and number. Thus the science of Harmonics arose from considering sounds with reference to Concords and Discords; the science of Mechanics arose from not only observing motions as they take place in Time and Space, but further, referring them to Force as their Cause. And in like manner, other sciences depend upon other Ideas, which, as I have endeavoured to show, are not less fundamental than those of Time and Space; and like them, capable of leading to rigorous consequences.
7. Thus the Facts which we assume as the basis of Science are to be freed from all the mists which imagination and passion throw round them; and to be separated into those elementary Facts which exhibit simple and evident relations of Time, or Space, or Cause, or some other Ideas equally clear. We resolve the complex appearances which nature offers to us, and the mixed and manifold modes of looking at these appearances which rise in our thoughts, into limited, definite, and clearly-understood portions. This process we may term the Decomposition of Facts. It is the 57 beginning of exact knowledge,—the first step in the formation of all Science. This Decomposition of Facts into Elementary Facts, clearly understood and surely ascertained, must precede all discovery of the laws of nature.
8. But though this step is necessary, it is not infallibly sufficient. It by no means follows that when we have thus decomposed Facts into Elementary Truths of observation, we shall soon be able to combine these, so as to obtain Truths of a higher and more speculative kind. We have examples which show us how far this is from being a necessary consequence of the former step. Observations of the weather, made and recorded for many years, have not led to any general truths, forming a science of Meteorology: and although great numerical precision has been given to such observations by means of barometers, thermometers, and other instruments, still, no general laws regulating the cycles of change of such phenomena have yet been discovered. In like manner the faces of crystals, and the sides of the polygons which these crystals form, were counted, and thus numerical facts were obtained, perfectly true and definite, but still of no value for purposes of science. And when it was discovered what Element of the form of crystals it was important to observe and measure, namely, the Angle made by two faces with each other, this discovery was a step of a higher order, and did not belong to that department, of mere exact observation of manifest Facts, with which we are here concerned.
9. When the Complex Facts which nature offers to us are thus decomposed into Simple Facts, the decomposition, in general, leads to the introduction of Terms and Phrases, more or less technical, by which these Simple Facts are described. When Astronomy was thus made a science of measurement, the things measured were soon described as Hours, and Days, and Cycles, Altitude and Declination, Phases and Aspects. In the same manner, in Music, the concords had names assigned them, as Diapente, Diatessaron, Diapason; in studying Optics, the Rays of light were spoken of as 58 having their course altered by Reflexion and Refraction; and when useful observations began to be made in Mechanics, the observers spoke of Force, Pressure, Momentum, Inertia, and the like.
10. When we take phenomena in which the leading Idea is Resemblance, and resolve them into precise component Facts, we obtain some kind of Classification; as, for instance, when we lay down certain Rules by which particular trees, or particular animals are to be known. This is the earliest form of Natural History; and the Classification which it involves is that which corresponds, nearly or exactly, with the usual Names of the objects thus classified.
11. Thus the first attempts to render observation certain and exact, lead to a decomposition of the obvious facts into Elementary Facts, connected by the Ideas of Space, Time, Number, Cause, Likeness, and others: and into a Classification of the Simple Facts; a classification more or less just, and marked by Names either common or technical. Elementary Facts, and Individual Objects, thus observed and classified, form the materials of Science; and any improvement in Classification or Nomenclature, or any discovery of a Connexion among the materials thus accumulated, leads us fairly within the precincts of Science. We must now, therefore, consider the manner in which Science is built up of such materials;—the process by which they are brought into their places, and the texture of the bond which unites and cements them.
CHAPTER IV.
Of the Colligation of Facts.
Aphorism VII.
Science begins with common observation of facts; but even at this stage, requires that the observations be precise. Hence the sciences which depend upon space and number were the earliest formed. After common observation, come Scientific Observation and Experiment.
Aphorism VIII.
The Conceptions by which Facts are bound together, are suggested by the sagacity of discoverers. This sagacity cannot be taught. It commonly succeeds by guessing; and this success seems to consist in framing several tentative hypotheses and selecting the right one. But a supply of appropriate hypotheses cannot be constructed by rule, nor without inventive talent.
Aphorism IX.
The truth of tentative hypotheses must be tested by their application to facts. The discoverer must be ready, carefully to try his hypotheses in this manner, and to reject them if they will not bear the test, in spite of indolence and vanity.
1. FACTS such as the last Chapter speaks of are, by means of such Conceptions as are described in the preceding Chapter, bound together so as to give rise to those general Propositions of which Science consists. Thus the Facts that the planets revolve 60 about the sun in certain periodic times and at certain distances, are included and connected in Kepler’s Law, by means of such Conceptions as the squares of numbers, the cubes of distances, and the proportionality of these quantities. Again the existence of this proportion in the motions of any two planets, forms a set of Facts which may all be combined by means of the Conception of a certain central accelerating force, as was proved by Newton. The whole of our physical knowledge consists in the establishment of such propositions; and in all such cases, Facts are bound together by the aid of suitable Conceptions. This part of the formation of our knowledge I have called the Colligation of Facts: and we may apply this term to every case in which, by an act of the intellect, we establish a precise connexion among the phenomena which are presented to our senses. The knowledge of such connexions, accumulated and systematized, is Science. On the steps by which science is thus collected from phenomena we shall proceed now to make a few remarks.
2. Science begins with Common Observation of facts, in which we are not conscious of any peculiar discipline or habit of thought exercised in observing. Thus the common perceptions of the appearances and recurrences of the celestial luminaries, were the first steps of Astronomy: the obvious cases in which bodies fall or are supported, were the beginning of Mechanics; the familiar aspects of visible things, were the origin of Optics; the usual distinctions of well-known plants, first gave rise to Botany. Facts belonging to such parts of our knowledge are noticed by us, and accumulated in our memories, in the common course of our habits, almost without our being aware that we are observing and collecting facts. Yet such facts may lead to many scientific truths; for instance, in the first stages of Astronomy (as we have shown in the History) such facts led to Methods of Intercalation and Rules of the Recurrence of Eclipses. In succeeding stages of science, more especial attention and preparation on the part of the observer, and a selection of certain 61 kinds of facts, becomes necessary; but there is an early period in the progress of knowledge at which man is a physical philosopher, without seeking to be so, or being aware that he is so.
3. But in all stages of the progress, even in that early one of which we have just spoken, it is necessary, in order that the facts may be fit materials of any knowledge, that they should be decomposed into Elementary Facts, and that these should be observed with precision. Thus, in the first infancy of astronomy, the recurrence of phases of the moon, of places of the sun’s rising and setting, of planets, of eclipses, was observed to take place at intervals of certain definite numbers of days, and in a certain exact order; and thus it was, that the observations became portions of astronomical science. In other cases, although the facts were equally numerous, and their general aspect equally familiar, they led to no science, because their exact circumstances were not apprehended. A vague and loose mode of looking at facts very easily observable, left men for a long time under the belief that a body, ten times as heavy as another, falls ten times as fast;—that objects immersed in water are always magnified, without regard to the form of the surface;—that the magnet exerts an irresistible force;—that crystal is always found associated with ice;—and the like. These and many others are examples how blind and careless men can be, even in observation of the plainest and commonest appearances; and they show us that the mere faculties of perception, although constantly exercised upon innumerable objects, may long fail in leading to any exact knowledge.
4. If we further inquire what was the favourable condition through which some special classes of facts were, from the first, fitted to become portions of science, we shall find it to have been principally this;—that these facts were considered with reference to the Ideas of Time, Number, and Space, which are Ideas possessing peculiar definiteness and precision; so that with regard to them, confusion and indistinctness are hardly possible. The interval from new moon to new 62 moon was always a particular number of days: the sun in his yearly course rose and set near to a known succession of distant objects: the moon’s path passed among the stars in a certain order:—these are observations in which mistake and obscurity are not likely to occur, if the smallest degree of attention is bestowed upon the task. To count a number is, from the first opening of man’s mental faculties, an operation which no science can render more precise. The relations of space are nearest to those of number in obvious and universal evidence. Sciences depending upon these Ideas arise with the first dawn of intellectual civilization. But few of the other Ideas which man employs in the acquisition of knowledge possess this clearness in their common use. The Idea of Resemblance may be noticed, as coming next to those of Space and Number in original precision; and the Idea of Cause, in a certain vague and general mode of application, sufficient for the purposes of common life, but not for the ends of science, exercises a very extensive influence over men’s thoughts. But the other Ideas on which science depends, with the Conceptions which arise out of them, are not unfolded till a much later period of intellectual progress; and therefore, except in such limited cases as I have noticed, the observations of common spectators and uncultivated nations, however numerous or varied, are of little or no effect in giving rise to Science.
5. Let us now suppose that, besides common everyday perception of facts, we turn our attention to some other occurrences and appearances, with a design of obtaining from them speculative knowledge. This process is more peculiarly called Observation, or, when we ourselves occasion the facts, Experiment. But the same remark which we have already made, still holds good here. These facts can be of no value, except they are resolved into those exact Conceptions which contain the essential circumstances of the case. They must be determined, not indeed necessarily, as has sometimes been said, ‘according to Number, Weight, and Measure;’ for, as we have endeavoured to show 63 in the preceding Books[4], there are many other Conceptions to which phenomena may be subordinated, quite different from these, and yet not at all less definite and precise. But in order that the facts obtained by observation and experiment may be capable of being used in furtherance of our exact and solid knowledge, they must be apprehended and analysed according to some Conceptions which, applied for this purpose, give distinct and definite results, such as can be steadily taken hold of and reasoned from; that is, the facts must be referred to Clear and Appropriate Ideas, according to the manner in which we have already explained this condition of the derivation of our knowledge. The phenomena of light, when they are such as to indicate sides in the ray, must be referred to the Conception of polarization; the phenomena of mixture, when there is an alteration of qualities as well as quantities, must be combined by a Conception of elementary composition. And thus, when mere position, and number, and resemblance, will no longer answer the purpose of enabling us to connect the facts, we call in other Ideas, in such cases more efficacious, though less obvious.
[4] Hist. of Sci. Id. Bs. v. vi. vii. viii. ix. x.
6. But how are we, in these cases, to discover such Ideas, and to judge which will be efficacious, in leading to a scientific combination of our experimental data? To this question, we must in the first place answer, that the first and great instrument by which facts, so observed with a view to the formation of exact knowledge, are combined into important and permanent truths, is that peculiar Sagacity which belongs to the genius of a Discoverer; and which, while it supplies those distinct and appropriate Conceptions which lead to its success, cannot be limited by rules, or expressed in definitions. It would be difficult or impossible to describe in words the habits of thought which led Archimedes to refer the conditions of equilibrium on the Lever to the Conception of pressure, while Aristotle could not see in them anything more than the results 64 of the strangeness of the properties of the circle;—or which impelled Pascal to explain by means of the Conception of the weight of air, the facts which his predecessors had connected by the notion of nature’s horrour of a vacuum;—or which caused Vitello and Roger Bacon to refer the magnifying power of a convex lens to the bending of the rays of light towards the perpendicular by refraction, while others conceived the effect to result from the matter of medium, with no consideration of its form. These are what are commonly spoken of as felicitous and inexplicable strokes of inventive talent; and such, no doubt, they are. No rules can ensure to us similar success in new cases; or can enable men who do not possess similar endowments, to make like advances in knowledge.
7. Yet still, we may do something in tracing the process by which such discoveries are made; and this it is here our business to do. We may observe that these, and the like discoveries, are not improperly described as happy Guesses; and that Guesses, in these as in other instances, imply various suppositions made, of which some one turns out to be the right one. We may, in such cases, conceive the discoverer as inventing and trying many conjectures, till he finds one which answers the purpose of combining the scattered facts into a single rule. The discovery of general truths from special facts is performed, commonly at least, and more commonly than at first appears, by the use of a series of Suppositions, or Hypotheses, which are looked at in quick succession, and of which the one which really leads to truth is rapidly detected, and when caught sight of, firmly held, verified, and followed to its consequences. In the minds of most discoverers, this process of invention, trial, and acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis, goes on so rapidly that we cannot trace it in its successive steps. But in some instances, we can do so; and we can also see that the other examples of discovery do not differ essentially from these. The same intellectual operations take place in other cases, although this often happens so instantaneously that we lose the trace of the 65 progression. In the discoveries made by Kepler, we have a curious and memorable exhibition of this process in its details. Thanks to his communicative disposition, we know that he made nineteen hypotheses with regard to the motion of Mars, and calculated the results of each, before he established the true doctrine, that the planet’s path is an ellipse. We know, in like manner, that Galileo made wrong suppositions respecting the laws of falling bodies, and Mariotte, concerning the motion of water in a siphon, before they hit upon the correct view of these cases.
8. But it has very often happened in the history of science, that the erroneous hypotheses which preceded the discovery of the truth have been made, not by the discoverer himself, but by his precursors; to whom he thus owed the service, often an important one in such cases, of exhausting the most tempting forms of errour. Thus the various fruitless suppositions by which Kepler endeavoured to discover the law of reflection, led the way to its real detection by Snell; Kepler’s numerous imaginations concerning the forces by which the celestial motions are produced,—his ‘physical reasonings’ as he termed them,—were a natural prelude to the truer physical reasonings of Newton. The various hypotheses by which the suspension of vapour in air had been explained, and their failure, left the field open for Dalton with his doctrine of the mechanical mixture of gases. In most cases, if we could truly analyze the operation of the thoughts of those who make, or who endeavour to make discoveries in science, we should find that many more suppositions pass through their minds than those which are expressed in words; many a possible combination of conceptions is formed and soon rejected. There is a constant invention and activity, a perpetual creating and selecting power at work, of which the last results only are exhibited to us. Trains of hypotheses are called up and pass rapidly in review; and the judgment makes its choice from the varied group.
9. It would, however, be a great mistake to suppose that the hypotheses, among which our choice thus 66 lies, are constructed by an enumeration of obvious cases, or by a wanton alteration of relations which occur in some first hypothesis. It may, indeed, sometimes happen that the proposition which is finally established is such as may be formed, by some slight alteration, from those which are justly rejected. Thus Kepler’s elliptical theory of Mars’s motions, involved relations of lines and angles much of the same nature as his previous false suppositions: and the true law of refraction so much resembles those erroneous ones which Kepler tried, that we cannot help wondering how he chanced to miss it. But it more frequently happens that new truths are brought into view by the application of new Ideas, not by new modifications of old ones. The cause of the properties of the Lever was learnt, not by introducing any new geometrical combination of lines and circles, but by referring the properties to genuine mechanical Conceptions. When the Motions of the Planets were to be explained, this was done, not by merely improving the previous notions, of cycles of time, but by introducing the new conception of epicycles in space. The doctrine of the Four Simple Elements was expelled, not by forming any new scheme of elements which should impart, according to new rules, their sensible qualities to their compounds, but by considering the elements of bodies as neutralizing each other. The Fringes of Shadows could not be explained by ascribing new properties to the single rays of light, but were reduced to law by referring them to the interference of several rays.
Since the true supposition is thus very frequently something altogether diverse from all the obvious conjectures and combinations, we see here how far we are from being able to reduce discovery to rule, or to give any precepts by which the want of real invention and sagacity shall be supplied. We may warn and encourage these faculties when they exist, but we cannot create them, or make great discoveries when they are absent.
10. The Conceptions which a true theory requires are very often clothed in a Hypothesis which connects 67 with them several superfluous and irrelevant circumstances. Thus the Conception of the Polarization of Light was originally represented under the image of particles of light having their poles all turned in the same direction. The Laws of Heat may be made out perhaps most conveniently by conceiving Heat to be a Fluid. The Attraction of Gravitation might have been successfully applied to the explanation of facts, if Newton had throughout treated Attraction as the result of an Ether diffused through space; a supposition which he has noticed as a possibility. The doctrine of Definite and Multiple Proportions may be conveniently expressed by the hypothesis of Atoms. In such cases, the Hypothesis may serve at first to facilitate the introduction of a new Conception. Thus a pervading Ether might for a time remove a difficulty, which some persons find considerable, of imagining a body to exert force at a distance. A Particle with Poles is more easily conceived than Polarization in the abstract. And if hypotheses thus employed will really explain the facts by means of a few simple assumptions, the laws so obtained may afterwards be reduced to a simpler form than that in which they were first suggested. The general laws of Heat, of Attraction, of Polarization, of Multiple Proportions, are now certain, whatever image we may form to ourselves of their ultimate causes.
11. In order, then, to discover scientific truths, suppositions consisting either of new Conceptions, or of new Combinations of old ones, are to be made, till we find one supposition which succeeds in binding together the Facts. But how are we to find this? How is the trial to be made? What is meant by ‘success’ in these cases? To this we reply, that our inquiry must be, whether the Facts have the same relation in the Hypothesis which they have in reality;—whether the results of our suppositions agree with the phenomena which nature presents to us. For this purpose, we must both carefully observe the phenomena, and steadily trace the consequences of our assumptions, till we can 68 bring the two into comparison. The Conceptions which our hypotheses involve, being derived from certain Fundamental Ideas, afford a basis of rigorous reasoning, as we have shown in the Books of the History of those Ideas. And the results to which this reasoning leads, will be susceptible of being verified or contradicted by observation of the facts. Thus the Epicyclical Theory of the Moon, once assumed, determined what the moon’s place among the stars ought to be at any given time, and could therefore be tested by actually observing the moon’s places. The doctrine that musical strings of the same length, stretched with weights of 1, 4, 9, 16, would give the musical intervals of an octave, a fifth, a fourth, in succession, could be put to the trial by any one whose ear was capable of appreciating those intervals: and the inference which follows from this doctrine by numerical reasoning,—that there must be certain imperfections in the concords of every musical scale,—could in like manner be confirmed by trying various modes of Temperament. In like manner all received theories in science, up to the present time, have been established by taking up some supposition, and comparing it, directly or by means of its remoter consequences, with the facts it was intended to embrace. Its agreement, under certain cautions and conditions, of which we may hereafter speak, is held to be the evidence of its truth. It answers its genuine purpose, the Colligation of Facts.
12. When we have, in any subject, succeeded in one attempt of this kind, and obtained some true Bond of Unity by which the phenomena are held together, the subject is open to further prosecution; which ulterior process may, for the most part, be conducted in a more formal and technical manner. The first great outline of the subject is drawn; and the finishing of the resemblance of nature demands a more minute pencilling, but perhaps requires less of genius in the master. In the pursuance of this task, rules and precepts may be given, and features and leading circumstances pointed out, of which it may often be useful to the inquirer to be aware. 69
Before proceeding further, I shall speak of some characteristic marks which belong to such scientific processes as are now the subject of our consideration, and which may sometimes aid us in determining when the task has been rightly executed.
CHAPTER V.
Of Certain Characteristics of Scientific Induction.
Aphorism X.
The process of scientific discovery is cautious and rigorous, not by abstaining from hypotheses, but by rigorously comparing hypotheses with facts, and by resolutely rejecting all which the comparison does not confirm.
Aphorism XI.
Hypotheses may be useful, though involving much that is superfluous, and even erroneous: for they may supply the true bond of connexion of the facts; and the superfluity and errour may afterwards be pared away.
Aphorism XII.
It is a test of true theories not only to account for, but to predict phenomena.
Aphorism XIII.
Induction is a term applied to describe the process of a true Colligation of Facts by means of an exact and appropriate Conception. An Induction is also employed to denote the proposition which results from this process.
Aphorism XIV.
The Consilience of Inductions takes place when an Induction, obtained from one class of facts, coincides with an Induction, obtained from another different class. This 71 Consilience is a test of the truth of the Theory in which it occurs.
Aphorism XV.
An Induction is not the mere sum of the Facts which are colligated. The Facts are not only brought together, but seen in a new point of view. A new mental Element is superinduced; and a peculiar constitution and discipline of mind are requisite in order to make this Induction.
Aphorism XVI.
Although in Every Induction a new conception is superinduced upon the Facts; yet this once effectually done, the novelty of the conception is overlooked, and the conception is considered as a part of the fact.
Sect. I.—Invention a part of Induction.
1. THE two operations spoken of in the preceding chapters,—the Explication of the Conceptions of our own minds, and the Colligation of observed Facts by the aid of such Conceptions,—are, as we have just said, inseparably connected with each other. When united, and employed in collecting knowledge from the phenomena which the world presents to us, they constitute the mental process of Induction; which is usually and justly spoken of as the genuine source of all our real general knowledge respecting the external world. And we see, from the preceding analysis of this process into its two constituents, from what origin it derives each of its characters. It is real, because it arises from the combination of Real Facts, but it is general, because it implies the possession of General Ideas. Without the former, it would not be knowledge of the External World; without the latter, it would not be Knowledge at all. When Ideas and Facts are separated from each other, the neglect of Facts gives rise to empty speculations, idle subtleties, visionary inventions, false opinions concerning the laws of phenomena, disregard of the true aspect of nature: 72 while the want of Ideas leaves the mind overwhelmed, bewildered, and stupified by particular sensations, with no means of connecting the past with the future, the absent with the present, the example with the rule; open to the impression of all appearances, but capable of appropriating none. Ideas are the Form, facts the Material, of our structure. Knowledge does not consist in the empty mould, or in the brute mass of matter, but in the rightly-moulded substance. Induction gathers general truths from particular facts;—and in her harvest, the corn and the reaper, the solid ears and the binding band, are alike requisite. All our knowledge of nature is obtained by Induction; the term being understood according to the explanation we have now given. And our knowledge is then most complete, then most truly deserves the name of Science, when both its elements are most perfect;—when the Ideas which have been concerned in its formation have, at every step, been clear and consistent; and when they have, at every step also, been employed in binding together real and certain Facts. Of such Induction, I have already given so many examples and illustrations in the two preceding chapters, that I need not now dwell further upon the subject.
2. Induction is familiarly spoken of as the process by which we collect a General Proposition from a number of Particular Cases: and it appears to be frequently imagined that the general proposition results from a mere juxta-position of the cases, or at most, from merely conjoining and extending them. But if we consider the process more closely, as exhibited in the cases lately spoken of, we shall perceive that this is an inadequate account of the matter. The particular facts are not merely brought together, but there is a New Element added to the combination by the very act of thought by which they are combined. There is a Conception of the mind introduced in the general proposition, which did not exist in any of the observed facts. When the Greeks, after long observing the motions of the planets, saw that these motions might be rightly considered as produced by the motion of one 73 wheel revolving in the inside of another wheel, these Wheels were Creations of their minds, added to the Facts which they perceived by sense. And even if the wheels were no longer supposed to be material, but were reduced to mere geometrical spheres or circles, they were not the less products of the mind alone,—something additional to the facts observed. The same is the case in all other discoveries. The facts are known, but they are insulated and unconnected, till the discoverer supplies from his own stores a Principle of Connexion. The pearls are there, but they will not hang together till some one provides the String. The distances and periods of the planets were all so many separate facts; by Kepler’s Third Law they are connected into a single truth: but the Conceptions which this law involves were supplied by Kepler’s mind, and without these, the facts were of no avail. The planets described ellipses round the sun, in the contemplation of others as well as of Newton; but Newton conceived the deflection from the tangent in these elliptical motions in a new light,—as the effect of a Central Force following a certain law; and then it was, that such a force was discovered truly to exist.
Thus[5] in each inference made by Induction, there is introduced some General Conception, which is given, not by the phenomena, but by the mind. The conclusion is not contained in the premises, but includes them by the introduction of a New Generality. In order to obtain our inference, we travel beyond the cases which we have before us; we consider them as mere exemplifications of some Ideal Case in which the relations are complete and intelligible. We take a Standard, and measure the facts by it; and this Standard is constructed by us, not offered by Nature. We assert, for example, that a body left to itself will move on with unaltered velocity; not because our senses ever disclosed to us a body doing this, but because (taking this as our Ideal Case) we find that all 74 actual cases are intelligible and explicable by means of the Conception of Forces, causing change and motion, and exerted by surrounding bodies. In like manner, we see bodies striking each other, and thus moving and stopping, accelerating and retarding each other: but in all this, we do not perceive by our senses that abstract quantity, Momentum, which is always lost by one body as it is gained by another. This Momentum is a creation of the mind, brought in among the facts, in order to convert their apparent confusion into order, their seeming chance into certainty, their perplexing variety into simplicity. This the Conception of Momentum gained and lost does: and in like manner, in any other case in which a truth is established by Induction, some Conception is introduced, some Idea is applied, as the means of binding together the facts, and thus producing the truth.
[5] I repeat here remarks made at the end of the Mechanical Euclid, p. 178.
3. Hence in every inference by Induction, there is some Conception superinduced upon the Facts: and we may henceforth conceive this to be the peculiar import of the term Induction. I am not to be understood as asserting that the term was originally or anciently employed with this notion of its meaning; for the peculiar feature just pointed out in Induction has generally been overlooked. This appears by the accounts generally given of Induction. ‘Induction,’ says Aristotle[6], ‘is when by means of one extreme term[7] we infer the other extreme term to be true of the middle term.’ Thus, (to take such exemplifications as belong to our subject,) from knowing that Mercury, Venus, Mars, describe ellipses about the Sun, we infer that all Planets describe ellipses about the Sun. In making this inference syllogistically, we assume that the evident proposition, ‘Mercury, Venus, Mars, do what all Planets do,’ may be taken conversely, ‘All 75 Planets do what Mercury, Venus, Mars, do.’ But we may remark that, in this passage, Aristotle (as was natural in his line of discussion) turns his attention entirely to the evidence of the inference; and overlooks a step which is of far more importance to our knowledge, namely, the invention of the second extreme term. In the above instance, the particular luminaries, Mercury, Venus, Mars, are one logical Extreme; the general designation Planets is the Middle Term; but having these before us, how do we come to think of description of ellipses, which is the other Extreme of the syllogism? When we have once invented this ‘second Extreme Term,’ we may, or may not, be satisfied with the evidence of the syllogism; we may, or may not, be convinced that, so far as this property goes, the extremes are co-extensive with the middle term[8]; but the statement of the syllogism is the important step in science. We know how long Kepler laboured, how hard he fought, how many devices he tried, before he hit upon this Term, the Elliptical Motion. He rejected, as we know, many other ‘second extreme Terms,’ for example, various combinations of epicyclical constructions, because they did not represent with sufficient accuracy the special facts of observation. When he had established his premiss, that ‘Mars does describe an Ellipse about the Sun,’ he does not hesitate to guess at least that, in this respect, he might convert the other premiss, and assert that ‘All the Planets do what Mars does.’ But the main business was, the inventing and verifying the proposition respecting the Ellipse. The Invention of the Conception was the great step in the discovery; the Verification of the Proposition was the great step in the proof of the discovery. If Logic consists in pointing out the conditions of proof, the Logic of Induction must consist in showing what are the conditions of proof, in such inferences as this: but this subject must be pursued in the next chapter; I now speak principally of the act of 76 Invention, which is requisite in every inductive inference.
[6] Analyt. Prior. lib. ii. c. xxiii. Περὶ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς.
[7] The syllogism here alluded to would be this:—
Mercury, Venus, Mars, describe ellipses about the Sun;
All Planets do what Mercury, Venus, Mars, do;
Therefore all Planets describe ellipses about the Sun.
[8] Εἰ οὖν ἀντιστρέφει τὸ Γ τῷ Β καὶ μὴ ὑπερτείνει τὸ μέσον.—Aristot. Ibid.
4. Although in every inductive inference, an act of invention is requisite, the act soon slips out of notice. Although we bind together facts by superinducing upon them a new Conception, this Conception, once introduced and applied, is looked upon as inseparably connected with the facts, and necessarily implied in them. Having once had the phenomena bound together in their minds in virtue of the Conception, men can no longer easily restore them back to the detached and incoherent condition in which they were before they were thus combined. The pearls once strung, they seem to form a chain by their nature. Induction has given them a unity which it is so far from costing us an effort to preserve, that it requires an effort to imagine it dissolved. For instance, we usually represent to ourselves the Earth as round, the Earth and the Planets as revolving about the Sun, and as drawn to the Sun by a Central Force; we can hardly understand how it could cost the Greeks, and Copernicus, and Newton, so much pains and trouble to arrive at a view which to us is so familiar. These are no longer to us Conceptions caught hold of and kept hold of by a severe struggle; they are the simplest modes of conceiving the facts: they are really Facts. We are willing to own our obligation to those discoverers, but we hardly feel it: for in what other manner (we ask in our thoughts) could we represent the facts to ourselves?
Thus we see why it is that this step of which we now speak, the Invention of a new Conception in every inductive inference, is so generally overlooked that it has hardly been noticed by preceding philosophers. When once performed by the discoverer, it takes a fixed and permanent place in the understanding of every one. It is a thought which, once breathed forth, permeates all men’s minds. All fancy they nearly or quite knew it before. It oft was thought, or almost thought, though never till now expressed. Men accept it and retain it, and know it cannot be taken 77 from them, and look upon it as their own. They will not and cannot part with it, even though they may deem it trivial and obvious. It is a secret, which once uttered, cannot be recalled, even though it be despised by those to whom it is imparted. As soon as the leading term of a new theory has been pronounced and understood, all the phenomena change their aspect. There is a standard to which we cannot help referring them. We cannot fall back into the helpless and bewildered state in which we gazed at them when we possessed no principle which gave them unity. Eclipses arrive in mysterious confusion: the notion of a Cycle dispels the mystery. The Planets perform a tangled and mazy dance; but Epicycles reduce the maze to order. The Epicycles themselves run into confusion; the conception of an Ellipse makes all clear and simple. And thus from stage to stage, new elements of intelligible order are introduced. But this intelligible order is so completely adopted by the human understanding, as to seem part of its texture. Men ask Whether Eclipses follow a Cycle; Whether the Planets describe Ellipses; and they imagine that so long as they do not answer such questions rashly, they take nothing for granted. They do not recollect how much they assume in asking the question:—how far the conceptions of Cycles and of Ellipses are beyond the visible surface of the celestial phenomena:—how many ages elapsed, how much thought, how much observation, were needed, before men’s thoughts were fashioned into the words which they now so familiarly use. And thus they treat the subject, as we have seen Aristotle treating it; as if it were a question, not of invention, but of proof; not of substance, but of form: as if the main thing were not what we assert, but how we assert it. But for our purpose, it is requisite to bear in mind the feature which we have thus attempted to mark; and to recollect that, in every inference by induction, there is a Conception supplied by the mind and superinduced upon the Facts.
5. In collecting scientific truths by Induction, we often find (as has already been observed) a Definition 78 and a Proposition established at the same time,—introduced together, and mutually dependent on each other. The combination of the two constitutes the Inductive act; and we may consider the Definition as representing the superinduced Conception, and the Proposition as exhibiting the Colligation of Facts.
Sect. II.—Use of Hypotheses.
6. To discover a Conception of the mind which will justly represent a train of observed facts is, in some measure, a process of conjecture, as I have stated already; and as I then observed, the business of conjecture is commonly conducted by calling up before our minds several suppositions, and selecting that one which most agrees with what we know of the observed facts. Hence he who has to discover the laws of nature may have to invent many suppositions before he hits upon the right one; and among the endowments which lead to his success, we must reckon that fertility of invention which ministers to him such imaginary schemes, till at last he finds the one which conforms to the true order of nature. A facility in devising hypotheses, therefore, is so far from being a fault in the intellectual character of a discoverer, that it is, in truth, a faculty indispensable to his task. It is, for his purposes, much better that he should be too ready in contriving, too eager in pursuing systems which promise to introduce law and order among a mass of unarranged facts, than that he should be barren of such inventions and hopeless of such success. Accordingly, as we have already noticed, great discoverers have often invented hypotheses which would not answer to all the facts, as well as those which would; and have fancied themselves to have discovered laws, which a more careful examination of the facts overturned.
The tendencies of our speculative nature[9], carrying 79 us onwards in pursuit of symmetry and rule, and thus producing all true theories, perpetually show their vigour by overshooting the mark. They obtain something, by aiming at much more. They detect the order and connexion which exist, by conceiving imaginary relations of order and connexion which have no existence. Real discoveries are thus mixed with baseless assumptions; profound sagacity is combined with fanciful conjecture; not rarely, or in peculiar instances, but commonly, and in most cases; probably in all, if we could read the thoughts of discoverers as we read the books of Kepler. To try wrong guesses is, with most persons, the only way to hit upon right ones. The character of the true philosopher is, not that he never conjectures hazardously, but that his conjectures are clearly conceived, and brought into rigid contact with facts. He sees and compares distinctly the Ideas and the Things;—the relations of his notions to each other and to phenomena. Under these conditions, it is not only excusable, but necessary for him, to snatch at every semblance of general rule,—to try all promising forms of simplicity and symmetry.
[9] I here take the liberty of characterizing inventive minds in general in the same phraseology which, in the History of Science, I have employed in reference to particular examples. These expressions are what I have used in speaking of the discoveries of Copernicus.—Hist. Ind. Sc. b. v. c. ii.
Hence advances in knowledge[10] are not commonly made without the previous exercise of some boldness and license in guessing. The discovery of new truths requires, undoubtedly, minds careful and scrupulous in examining what is suggested; but it requires, no less, such as are quick and fertile in suggesting. What is Invention, except the talent of rapidly calling before us the many possibilities, and selecting the appropriate one? It is true, that when we have rejected all the inadmissible suppositions, they are often quickly forgotten; and few think it necessary to dwell on these discarded hypotheses, and on the process by which they were condemned. But all who discover truths, must have reasoned upon many errours to obtain each truth; 80 every accepted doctrine must have been one chosen out of many candidates. If many of the guesses of philosophers of bygone times now appear fanciful and absurd, because time and observation have refuted them, others, which were at the time equally gratuitous, have been conformed in a manner which makes them appear marvellously sagacious. To form hypotheses, and then to employ much labour and skill in refuting them, if they do not succeed in establishing them, is a part of the usual process of inventive minds. Such a proceeding belongs to the rule of the genius of discovery, rather than (as has often been taught in modern times) to the exception.
[10] These observations are made on occasion of Kepler’s speculations, and are illustrated by reference to his discoveries.—Hist. Ind. Sc. b. v. c. iv. sect. 1.
7. But if it be an advantage for the discoverer of truth that he be ingenious and fertile in inventing hypotheses which may connect the phenomena of nature, it is indispensably requisite that he be diligent and careful in comparing his hypotheses with the facts, and ready to abandon his invention as soon as it appears that it does not agree with the course of actual occurrences. This constant comparison of his own conceptions and supposition with observed facts under all aspects, forms the leading employment of the discoverer: this candid and simple love of truth, which makes him willing to suppress the most favourite production of his own ingenuity as soon as it appears to be at variance with realities, constitutes the first characteristic of his temper. He must have neither the blindness which cannot, nor the obstinacy which will not, perceive the discrepancy of his fancies and his facts. He must allow no indolence, or partial views, or self-complacency, or delight in seeming demonstration, to make him tenacious of the schemes which he devises, any further than they are confirmed by their accordance with nature. The framing of hypotheses is, for the inquirer after truth, not the end, but the beginning of his work. Each of his systems is invented, not that he may admire it and follow it into all its consistent consequences, but that he may make it the occasion of a course of active experiment and observation. And if the results of this process 81 contradict his fundamental assumptions, however ingenious, however symmetrical, however elegant his system may be, he rejects it without hesitation. He allows no natural yearning for the offspring of his own mind to draw him aside from the higher duty of loyalty to his sovereign, Truth: to her he not only gives his affections and his wishes, but strenuous labour and scrupulous minuteness of attention.
We may refer to what we have said of Kepler, Newton, and other eminent philosophers, for illustrations of this character. In Kepler we have remarked[11] the courage and perseverance with which he undertook and executed the task of computing his own hypotheses: and, as a still more admirable characteristic, that he never allowed the labour he had spent upon any conjecture to produce any reluctance in abandoning the hypothesis, as soon as he had evidence of its inaccuracy. And in the history of Newton’s discovery that the moon is retained in her orbit by the force of gravity, we have noticed the same moderation in maintaining the hypothesis, after it had once occurred to the author’s mind. The hypothesis required that the moon should fall from the tangent of her orbit every second through a space of sixteen feet; but according to his first calculations it appeared that in fact she only fell through a space of thirteen feet in that time. The difference seems small, the approximation encouraging, the theory plausible; a man in love with his own fancies would readily have discovered or invented some probable cause of the difference. But Newton acquiesced in it as a disproof of his conjecture, and ‘laid aside at that time any further thoughts of this matter[12].’
[11] Hist. Ind. Sc. b. v. c. iv. sect. 1.
[12] Hist. Ind. Sc. b. vii. c. ii. sect. 3.
8. It has often happened that those who have undertaken to instruct mankind have not possessed this pure love of truth and comparative indifference to the maintenance of their own inventions. Men have frequently adhered with great tenacity and vehemence to the hypotheses which they have once framed; and in their 82 affection for these, have been prone to overlook, to distort, and to misinterpret facts. In this manner, Hypotheses have so often been prejudicial to the genuine pursuit of truth, that they have fallen into a kind of obloquy; and have been considered as dangerous temptations and fallacious guides. Many warnings have been uttered against the fabrication of hypotheses, by those who profess to teach philosophy; many disclaimers of such a course by those who cultivate science.
Thus we shall find Bacon frequently discommending this habit, under the name of ‘anticipation of the mind,’ and Newton thinks it necessary to say emphatically ‘hypotheses non fingo.’ It has been constantly urged that the inductions by which sciences are formed must be cautious and rigorous; and the various imaginations which passed through Kepler’s brain, and to which he has given utterance, have been blamed or pitied, as lamentable instances of an unphilosophical frame of mind. Yet it has appeared in the preceding remarks that hypotheses rightly used are among the helps, far more than the dangers, of science;—that scientific induction is not a ‘cautious’ or a ‘rigorous’ process in the sense of abstaining from such suppositions, but in not adhering to them till they are confirmed by fact, and in carefully seeking from facts confirmation or refutation. Kepler’s distinctive character was, not that he was peculiarly given to the construction of hypotheses, but that he narrated with extraordinary copiousness and candour the course of his thoughts, his labours, and his feelings. In the minds of most persons, as we have said, the inadmissible suppositions, when rejected, are soon forgotten: and thus the trace of them vanishes from the thoughts, and the successful hypothesis alone holds its place in our memory. But in reality, many other transient suppositions must have been made by all discoverers;—hypotheses which are not afterwards asserted as true systems, but entertained for an instant;—‘tentative hypotheses,’ as they have been called. Each of these hypotheses is followed by its corresponding train of observations, from which it derives its power of leading to truth. The hypothesis is 83 like the captain, and the observations like the soldiers of an army: while he appears to command them, and in this way to work his own will, he does in fact derive all his power of conquest from their obedience, and becomes helpless and useless if they mutiny.
Since the discoverer has thus constantly to work his way onwards by means of hypotheses, false and true, it is highly important for him to possess talents and means for rapidly testing each supposition as it offers itself. In this as in other parts of the work of discovery, success has in general been mainly owing to the native ingenuity and sagacity of the discoverer’s mind. Yet some Rules tending to further this object have been delivered by eminent philosophers, and some others may perhaps be suggested. Of these we shall here notice only some of the most general, leaving for a future chapter the consideration of some more limited and detailed processes by which, in certain cases, the discovery of the laws of nature may be materially assisted.
Sect. III.—Tests of Hypotheses.
9. A maxim which it may be useful to recollect is this;—that hypotheses may often be of service to science, when they involve a certain portion of incompleteness, and even of errour. The object of such inventions is to bind together facts which without them are loose and detached; and if they do this, they may lead the way to a perception of the true rule by which the phenomena are associated together, even if they themselves somewhat misstate the matter. The imagined arrangement enables us to contemplate, as a whole, a collection of special cases which perplex and overload our minds when they are considered in succession; and if our scheme has so much of truth in it as to conjoin what is really connected, we may afterwards duly correct or limit the mechanism of this connexion. If our hypothesis renders a reason for the agreement of cases really similar, we may afterwards find this reason to be 84 false, but we shall be able to translate it into the language of truth.
A conspicuous example of such an hypothesis,—one which was of the highest value to science, though very incomplete, and as a representation of nature altogether false,—is seen in the Doctrine of epicycles by which the ancient astronomers explained the motions of the sun, moon, and planets. This doctrine connected the places and velocities of these bodies at particular times in a manner which was, in its general features, agreeable to nature. Yet this doctrine was erroneous in its assertion of the circular nature of all the celestial motions, and in making the heavenly bodies revolve round the earth. It was, however, of immense value to the progress of astronomical science; for it enabled men to express and reason upon many important truths which they discovered respecting the motion of the stars, up to the time of Kepler. Indeed we can hardly imagine that astronomy could, in its outset, have made so great a progress under any other form, as it did in consequence of being cultivated in this shape of the incomplete and false epicyclical hypothesis.
We may notice another instance of an exploded hypothesis, which is generally mentioned only to be ridiculed, and which undoubtedly is both false in the extent of its assertion, and unphilosophical in its expression; but which still, in its day, was not without merit. I mean the doctrine of Nature’s horrour of a vacuum (fuga vacui), by which the action of siphons and pumps and many other phenomena were explained, till Mersenne and Pascal taught a truer doctrine. This hypothesis was of real service; for it brought together many facts which really belong to the same class, although they are very different in their first aspect. A scientific writer of modern times[13] appears to wonder that men did not at once divine the weight of the air, from which the phenomena formerly ascribed to the fuga vacui really result. ‘Loaded, 85 compressed by the atmosphere,’ he says, ‘they did not recognize its action. In vain all nature testified that air was elastic and heavy; they shut their eyes to her testimony. The water rose in pumps and flowed in siphons at that time, as it does at this day. They could not separate the boards of a pair of bellows of which the holes were stopped; and they could not bring together the same boards without difficulty, if they were at first separated. Infants sucked the milk of their mothers; air entered rapidly into the lungs of animals at every inspiration; cupping-glasses produced tumours on the skin; and in spite of all these striking proofs of the weight and elasticity of the air, the ancient philosophers maintained resolutely that air was light, and explained all these phenomena by the horrour which they said nature had for a vacuum.’ It is curious that it should not have occurred to the author while writing this, that if these facts, so numerous and various, can all be accounted for by one principle, there is a strong presumption that the principle is not altogether baseless. And in reality is it not true that nature does abhor a vacuum, and does all she can to avoid it? No doubt this power is not unlimited; and moreover we can trace it to a mechanical cause, the pressure of the circumambient air. But the tendency, arising from this pressure, which the bodies surrounding a space void of air have to rush into it, may be expressed, in no extravagant or unintelligible manner, by saying that nature has a repugnance to a vacuum.
[13] Deluc, Modifications de l’Atmosphère, Partie 1.
That imperfect and false hypotheses, though they may thus explain some phenomena, and may be useful in the progress of science, cannot explain all phenomena;—and that we are never to rest in our labours or acquiesce in our results, till we have found some view of the subject which is consistent with all the observed facts;—will of course be understood. We shall afterwards have to speak of the other steps of such a progress.
10. Thus the hypotheses which we accept ought to explain phenomena which we have observed. But they 86 ought to do more than this: our hypotheses ought to foretel phenomena which have not yet been observed; at least all phenomena of the same kind as those which the hypothesis was invented to explain. For our assent to the hypothesis implies that it is held to be true of all particular instances. That these cases belong to past or to future times, that they have or have not already occurred, makes no difference in the applicability of the rule to them. Because the rule prevails, it includes all cases; and will determine them all, if we can only calculate its real consequences. Hence it will predict the results of new combinations, as well as explain the appearances which have occurred in old ones. And that it does this with certainty and correctness, is one mode in which the hypothesis is to be verified as right and useful.
The scientific doctrines which have at various periods been established have been verified in this manner. For example, the Epicyclical Theory of the heavens was confirmed by its predicting truly eclipses of the sun and moon, configurations of the planets, and other celestial phenomena; and by its leading to the construction of Tables by which the places of the heavenly bodies were given at every moment of time. The truth and accuracy of these predictions were a proof that the hypothesis was valuable, and, at least to a great extent, true; although, as was afterwards found, it involved a false representation of the structure of the heavens. In like manner, the discovery of the Laws of Refraction enabled mathematicians to predict, by calculation, what would be the effect of any new form or combination of transparent lenses. Newton’s hypothesis of Fits of Easy Transmission and Easy Reflection in the particles of light, although not confirmed by other kinds of facts, involved a true statement of the law of the phenomena which it was framed to include, and served to predict the forms and colours of thin plates for a wide range of given cases. The hypothesis that Light operates by Undulations and Interferences, afforded the means of predicting results under a still larger extent of conditions. In like manner in the 87 progress of chemical knowledge, the doctrine of Phlogiston supplied the means of foreseeing the consequence of many combinations of elements, even before they were tried; but the Oxygen Theory, besides affording predictions, at least equally exact, with regard to the general results of chemical operations, included all the facts concerning the relations of weight of the elements and their compounds, and enabled chemists to foresee such facts in untried cases. And the Theory of Electromagnetic Forces, as soon as it was rightly understood, enabled those who had mastered it to predict motions such as had not been before observed, which were accordingly found to take place.
Men cannot help believing that the laws laid down by discoverers must be in a great measure identical with the real laws of nature, when the discoverers thus determine effects beforehand in the same manner in which nature herself determines them when the occasion occurs. Those who can do this, must, to a considerable extent, have detected nature’s secret;—must have fixed upon the conditions to which she attends, and must have seized the rules by which she applies them. Such a coincidence of untried facts with speculative assertions cannot be the work of chance, but implies some large portion of truth in the principles on which the reasoning is founded. To trace order and law in that which has been observed, may be considered as interpreting what nature has written down for us, and will commonly prove that we understand her alphabet. But to predict what has not been observed, is to attempt ourselves to use the legislative phrases of nature; and when she responds plainly and precisely to that which we thus utter, we cannot but suppose that we have in a great measure made ourselves masters of the meaning and structure of her language. The prediction of results, even of the same kind as those which have been observed, in new cases, is a proof of real success in our inductive processes.
11. We have here spoken of the prediction of facts of the same kind as those from which our rule was collected. But the evidence in favour of our 88 induction is of a much higher and more forcible character when it enables us to explain and determine cases of a kind different from those which were contemplated in the formation of our hypothesis. The instances in which this has occurred, indeed, impress us with a conviction that the truth of our hypothesis is certain. No accident could give rise to such an extraordinary coincidence. No false supposition could, after being adjusted to one class of phenomena, exactly represent a different class, where the agreement was unforeseen and uncontemplated. That rules springing from remote and unconnected quarters should thus leap to the same point, can only arise from that being the point where truth resides.
Accordingly the cases in which inductions from classes of facts altogether different have thus jumped together, belong only to the best established theories which the history of science contains. And as I shall have occasion to refer to this peculiar feature in their evidence, I will take the liberty of describing it by a particular phrase; and will term it the Consilience of Inductions.
It is exemplified principally in some of the greatest discoveries. Thus it was found by Newton that the doctrine of the Attraction of the Sun varying according to the Inverse Square of this distance, which explained Kepler’s Third Law, of the proportionality of the cubes of the distances to the squares of the periodic times of the planets, explained also his First and Second Laws, of the elliptical motion of each planet; although no connexion of these laws had been visible before. Again, it appeared that the force of universal Gravitation, which had been inferred from the Perturbations of the moon and planets by the sun and by each other, also accounted for the fact, apparently altogether dissimilar and remote, of the Precession of the equinoxes. Here was a most striking and surprising coincidence, which gave to the theory a stamp of truth beyond the power of ingenuity to counterfeit. In like manner in Optics; the hypothesis of alternate Fits of easy Transmission and Reflection would explain 89 the colours of thin plates, and indeed was devised and adjusted for that very purpose; but it could give no account of the phenomena of the fringes of shadows. But the doctrine of Interferences, constructed at first with reference to phenomena of the nature of the Fringes, explained also the Colours of thin plates better than the supposition of the Fits invented for that very purpose. And we have in Physical Optics another example of the same kind, which is quite as striking as the explanation of Precession by inferences from the facts of Perturbation. The doctrine of Undulations propagated in a Spheroidal Form was contrived at first by Huyghens, with a view to explain the laws of Double Refraction in calc-spar; and was pursued with the same view by Fresnel. But in the course of the investigation it appeared, in a most unexpected and wonderful manner, that this same doctrine of spheroidal undulations, when it was so modified as to account for the directions of the two refracted rays, accounted also for the positions of their Planes of Polarization[14], a phenomenon which, taken by itself, it had perplexed previous mathematicians, even to represent.
[14] Hist. Ind. Sc. b. ix. c. xi. sect. 4.
The Theory of Universal Gravitation, and of the Undulatory Theory of Light, are, indeed, full of examples of this Consilience of Inductions. With regard to the latter, it has been justly asserted by Herschel, that the history of the undulatory theory was a succession of felicities[15]. And it is precisely the unexpected coincidences of results drawn from distant parts of the subject which are properly thus described. Thus the Laws of the Modification of polarization to which Fresnel was led by his general views, accounted for the Rule respecting the Angle at which light is polarized, discovered by Sir D. Brewster[16]. The conceptions of the theory pointed out peculiar Modifications of the phenomena when Newton’s rings were produced by polarised light, which modifications were 90 ascertained to take place in fact, by Arago and Airy[17]. When the beautiful phenomena of Dipolarized light were discovered by Arago and Biot, Young was able to declare that they were reducible to the general laws of Interference which he had already established[18]. And what was no less striking a confirmation of the truth of the theory, Measures of the same element deduced from various classes of facts were found to coincide. Thus the Length of a luminiferous undulation, calculated by Young from the measurement of Fringes of shadows, was found to agree very nearly with the previous calculation from the colours of Thin plates[19].
[15] See Hist. Ind. Sc. b. ix. c. xii.
[16] Ib. c. xi. sect. 4.
[17] See Hist. Ind. Sc. b. ix. c. xiii. sect. 6.
[18] Ib. c. xi. sect. 5.
[19] Ib. c. xi. sect. 2.
No example can be pointed out, in the whole history of science, so far as I am aware, in which this Consilience of Inductions has given testimony in favour of an hypothesis afterwards discovered to be false. If we take one class of facts only, knowing the law which they follow, we may construct an hypothesis, or perhaps several, which may represent them: and as new circumstances are discovered, we may often adjust the hypothesis so as to correspond to these also. But when the hypothesis, of itself and without adjustment for the purpose, gives us the rule and reason of a class of facts not contemplated in its construction, we have a criterion of its reality, which has never yet been produced in favour of falsehood.
12. In the preceding Article I have spoken of the hypothesis with which we compare our facts as being framed all at once, each of its parts being included in the original scheme. In reality, however, it often happens that the various suppositions which our system contains are added upon occasion of different researches. Thus in the Ptolemaic doctrine of the heavens, new epicycles and eccentrics were added as new inequalities of the motions of the heavenly bodies were discovered; and in the Newtonian doctrine of material rays of light, the supposition that these rays had 91 ‘fits,’ was added to explain the colours of thin plates; and the supposition that they had ‘sides’ was introduced on occasion of the phenomena of polarization. In like manner other theories have been built up of parts devised at different times.
This being the mode in which theories are often framed, we have to notice a distinction which is found to prevail in the progress of true and false theories. In the former class all the additional suppositions tend to simplicity and harmony; the new suppositions resolve themselves into the old ones, or at least require only some easy modification of the hypothesis first assumed: the system becomes more coherent as it is further extended. The elements which we require for explaining a new class of facts are already contained in our system. Different members of the theory run together, and we have thus a constant convergence to unity. In false theories, the contrary is the case. The new suppositions are something altogether additional;—not suggested by the original scheme; perhaps difficult to reconcile with it. Every such addition adds to the complexity of the hypothetical system, which at last becomes unmanageable, and is compelled to surrender its place to some simpler explanation.
Such a false theory, for example, was the ancient doctrine of eccentrics and epicycles. It explained the general succession of the Places of the Sun, Moon, and Planets; it would not have explained the proportion of their Magnitudes at different times, if these could have been accurately observed; but this the ancient astronomers were unable to do. When, however, Tycho and other astronomers came to be able to observe the planets accurately in all positions, it was found that no combination of equable circular motions would exactly represent all the observations. We may see, in Kepler’s works, the many new modifications of the epicyclical hypothesis which offered themselves to him; some of which would have agreed with the phenomena with a certain degree of accuracy, but not with so great a degree as Kepler, fortunately for the progress of science, insisted upon obtaining. After these 92 epicycles had been thus accumulated, they all disappeared and gave way to the simpler conception of an elliptical motion. In like manner, the discovery of new inequalities in the Moon’s motions encumbered her system more and more with new machinery, which was at last rejected all at once in favour of the elliptical theory. Astronomers could not but suppose themselves in a wrong path, when the prospect grew darker and more entangled at every step.
Again; the Cartesian system of Vortices might be said to explain the primary phenomena of the revolutions of planets about the sun, and satellites about planets. But the elliptical form of the orbits required new suppositions. Bernoulli ascribed this curve to the shape of the planet, operating on the stream of the vortex in a manner similar to the rudder of a boat. But then the motions of the aphelia, and of the nodes,—the perturbations,—even the action of gravity towards the earth,—could not be accounted for without new and independent suppositions. Here was none of the simplicity of truth. The theory of Gravitation, on the other hand, became more simple as the facts to be explained became more numerous. The attraction of the sun accounted for the motions of the planets; the attraction of the planets was the cause of the motion of the satellites. But this being assumed, the perturbations, and the motions of the nodes and aphelia, only made it requisite to extend the attraction of the sun to the satellites, and that of the planets to each other:—the tides, the spheroidal form of the earth, the precession, still required nothing more than that the moon and sun should attract the parts of the earth, and that these should attract each other;—so that all the suppositions resolved themselves into the single one, of the universal gravitation of all matter. It is difficult to imagine a more convincing manifestation of simplicity and unity.
Again, to take an example from another science;—the doctrine of Phlogiston brought together many facts in a very plausible manner,—combustion, acidification, and others,—and very naturally prevailed for a while. 93 But the balance came to be used in chemical operations, and the facts of weight as well as of combination were to be accounted for. On the phlogistic theory, it appeared that this could not be done without a new supposition, and that, a very strange one;—that phlogiston was an element not only not heavy, but absolutely light, so that it diminished the weight of the compounds into which it entered. Some chemists for a time adopted this extravagant view, but the wiser of them saw, in the necessity of such a supposition to the defence of the theory, an evidence that the hypothesis of an element phlogiston was erroneous. And the opposite hypothesis, which taught that oxygen was subtracted, and not phlogiston added, was accepted because it required no such novel and inadmissible assumption.
Again, we find the same evidence of truth in the progress of the Undulatory Theory of light, in the course of its application from one class of facts to another. Thus we explain Reflection and Refraction by undulations; when we come to Thin Plates, the requisite ‘fits’ are already involved in our fundamental hypothesis, for they are the length of an undulation: the phenomena of Diffraction also require such intervals; and the intervals thus required agree exactly with the others in magnitude, so that no new property is needed. Polarization for a moment appears to require some new hypothesis; yet this is hardly the case; for the direction of our vibrations is hitherto arbitrary:—we allow polarization to decide it, and we suppose the undulations to be transverse. Having done this for the sake of Polarization, we turn to the phenomena of Double Refraction, and inquire what new hypothesis they require. But the answer is, that they require none: the supposition of transverse vibrations, which we have made in order to explain Polarization, gives us also the law of Double Refraction. Truth may give rise to such a coincidence; falsehood cannot. Again, the facts of Dipolarization come into view. But they hardly require any new assumption; for the difference of optical elasticity of crystals in different directions, 94 which is already assumed in uniaxal crystals[20], is extended to biaxal exactly according to the law of symmetry; and this being done, the laws of the phenomena, curious and complex as they are, are fully explained. The phenomena of Circular Polarization by internal reflection, instead of requiring a new hypothesis, are found to be given by an interpretation of an apparently inexplicable result of an old hypothesis. The Circular Polarization of Quartz and the Double Refraction does indeed appear to require a new assumption, but still not one which at all disturbs the form of the theory; and in short, the whole history of this theory is a progress, constant and steady, often striking and startling, from one degree of evidence and consistence to another of a higher order.
[20] Hist. Ind. Sc. b. ix. c. xi. sect. 5.
In the Emission Theory, on the other hand, as in the theory of solid epicycles, we see what we may consider as the natural course of things in the career of a false theory. Such a theory may, to a certain extent, explain the phenomena which it was at first contrived to meet; but every new class of facts requires a new supposition—an addition to the machinery: and as observation goes on, these incoherent appendages accumulate, till they overwhelm and upset the original frame-work. Such has been the hypothesis of the Material Emission of light. In its original form, it explained Reflection and Refraction: but the colours of Thin Plates added to it the Fits of easy Transmission and Reflection; the phenomena of Diffraction further invested the emitted particles with complex laws of Attraction and Repulsion; Polarization gave them Sides: Double Refraction subjected them to peculiar Forces emanating from the axes of the crystal: Finally, Dipolarization loaded them with the complex and unconnected contrivance of Moveable Polarization: and even when all this had been done, additional mechanism was wanting. There is here no unexpected success, no happy coincidence, no convergence of principles from remote quarters. The philosopher builds 95 the machine, but its parts do not fit. They hold together only while he presses them. This is not the character of truth.
As another example of the application of the Maxim now under consideration, I may perhaps be allowed to refer to the judgment which, in the History of Thermotics, I have ventured to give respecting Laplace’s Theory of Gases. I have stated[21], that we cannot help forming an unfavourable judgment of this theory, by looking for that great characteristic of true theory; namely, that the hypotheses which were assumed to account for one class of facts are found to explain another class of a different nature. Thus Laplace’s first suppositions explain the connexion of Compression with Density, (the law of Boyle and Mariotte,) and the connexion of Elasticity with Heat, (the law of Dalton and Gay Lussac). But the theory requires other assumptions when we come to Latent Heat; and yet these new assumptions produce no effect upon the calculations in any application of the theory. When the hypothesis, constructed with reference to the Elasticity and Temperature, is applied to another class of facts, those of Latent Heat, we have no Simplification of the Hypothesis, and therefore no evidence of the truth of the theory.
[21] Hist. Ind. Sc. b. x. c. iv.
13. The last two sections of this chapter direct our attention to two circumstances, which tend to prove, in a manner which we may term irresistible, the truth of the theories which they characterize:—the Consilience of Inductions from different and separate classes of facts;—and the progressive Simplification of the Theory as it is extended to new cases. These two Characters are, in fact, hardly different; they are exemplified by the same cases. For if these Inductions, collected from one class of facts, supply an unexpected explanation of a new class, which is the case first spoken of, there will be no need for new machinery in the hypothesis to apply it to the newly-contemplated facts; and thus, we have a case in which the system does not become 96 more complex when its application is extended to a wider field, which was the character of true theory in its second aspect. The Consiliences of our Inductions give rise to a constant Convergence of our Theory towards Simplicity and Unity.
But, moreover, both these cases of the extension of the theory, without difficulty or new suppositions, to a wider range and to new classes of phenomena, may be conveniently considered in yet another point of view; namely, as successive steps by which we gradually ascend in our speculative views to a higher and higher point of generality. For when the theory, either by the concurrence of two indications, or by an extension without complication, has included a new range of phenomena, we have, in fact, a new induction of a more general kind, to which the inductions formerly obtained are subordinate, as particular cases to a general proposition. We have in such examples, in short, an instance of successive generalization. This is a subject of great importance, and deserving of being well illustrated; it will come under our notice in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VI.
Of the Logic of Induction.
Aphorism XVII.
The Logic of Induction consists in stating the Facts and the Inference in such a manner, that the Evidence of the Inference is manifest: just as the Logic of Deduction consists in stating the Premises and the Conclusion in such a manner that the Evidence of the Conclusion is manifest.
Aphorism XVIII.
The Logic of Deduction is exhibited by means of a certain Formula; namely, a Syllogism; and every train of deductive reasoning, to be demonstrative, must be capable of resolution into a series of such Formulæ legitimately constructed. In like manner, the Logic of Induction may be exhibited by means of certain Formulæ; and every train of inductive inference to be sound, must be capable of resolution into a scheme of such Formulæ, legitimately constructed.
Aphorism XIX.
The inductive act of thought by which several Facts are colligated into one Proposition, may be expressed by saying: The several Facts are exactly expressed as one Fact, if, and only if, we adopt the Conceptions and the Assertion of the Proposition.
Aphorism XX.
The One Fact, thus inductively obtained from several Facts, may be combined with other Facts, and colligated with them by a new act of Induction. This process may be 98 indefinitely repeated: and these successive processes are the Steps of Induction, or of Generalization, from the lowest to the highest.
Aphorism XXI.
The relation of the successive Steps of Induction may be exhibited by means of an Inductive Table, in which the several Facts are indicated, and tied together by a Bracket, and the Inductive Inference placed on the other side of the Bracket; and this arrangement repeated, so as to form a genealogical Table of each Induction, from the lowest to the highest.
Aphorism XXII.
The Logic of Induction is the Criterion of Truth inferred from Facts, as the Logic of Deduction is the Criterion of Truth deduced from necessary Principles. The Inductive Table enables us to apply such a Criterion; for we can determine whether each Induction is verified and justified by the Facts which its Bracket includes; and if each induction in particular be sound, the highest, which merely combines them all, must necessarily be sound also.
Aphorism XXIII.
The distinction of Fact and Theory is only relative. Events and phenomena, considered as Particulars which may be colligated by Induction, are Facts; considered as Generalities already obtained by colligation of other Facts, they are Theories. The same event or phenomenon is a Fact or a Theory, according as it is considered as standing on one side or the other of the Inductive Bracket.
1. THE subject to which the present chapter refers is described by phrases which are at the present day familiarly used in speaking of the progress of knowledge. We hear very frequent mention of ascending from particular to general propositions, and from these to propositions still more general;—of 99 truths included in other truths of a higher degree of generality;—of different stages of generalization;—and of the highest step of the process of discovery, to which all others are subordinate and preparatory. As these expressions, so familiar to our ears, especially since the time of Francis Bacon, denote, very significantly, processes and relations which are of great importance in the formation of science, it is necessary for us to give a clear account of them, illustrated with general exemplifications; and this we shall endeavour to do.
We have, indeed, already explained that science consists of Propositions which include the Facts from which they were collected; and other wider Propositions, collected in like manner from the former, and including them. Thus, that the stars, the moon, the sun, rise, culminate, and set, are facts included in the proposition that the heavens, carrying with them all the celestial bodies, have a diurnal revolution about the axis of the earth. Again, the observed monthly motions of the moon, and the annual motions of the sun, are included in certain propositions concerning the movements of those luminaries with respect to the stars. But all these propositions are really included in the doctrine that the earth, revolving on its axis, moves round the sun, and the moon round the earth. These movements, again, considered as facts, are explained and included in the statement of the forces which the earth exerts upon the moon, and the sun upon the earth. Again, this doctrine of the forces of these three bodies is included in the assertion, that all the bodies of the solar system, and all parts of matter, exert forces, each upon each. And we might easily show that all the leading facts in astronomy are comprehended in the same generalization. In like manner with regard to any other science, so far as its truths have been well established and fully developed, we might show that it consists of a gradation of propositions, proceeding from the most special facts to the most general theoretical assertions. We shall exhibit this gradation in some of the principal branches of science. 100
2. This gradation of truths, successively included in other truths, may be conveniently represented by Tables resembling the genealogical tables by which the derivation of descendants from a common ancestor is exhibited; except that it is proper in this case to invert the form of the Table, and to make it converge to unity downwards instead of upwards, since it has for its purpose to express, not the derivation of many from one, but the collection of one truth from many things. Two or more co-ordinate facts or propositions may be ranged side by side, and joined by some mark of connexion, (a bracket, as ⏟ or ⎵,) beneath which may be placed the more general proposition which is collected by induction from the former. Again, propositions co-ordinate with this more general one may be placed on a level with it; and the combination of these, and the result of the combination, may be indicated by brackets in the same manner; and so on, through any number of gradations. By this means the streams of knowledge from various classes of facts will constantly run together into a smaller and smaller number of channels; like the confluent rivulets of a great river, coming together from many sources, uniting their ramifications so as to form larger branches, these again uniting in a single trunk. The genealogical tree of each great portion of science, thus formed, will contain all the leading truths of the science arranged in their due co-ordination and subordination. Such Tables, constructed for the sciences of Astronomy and of Optics, will be given at the end of this chapter.
3. The union of co-ordinate propositions into a proposition of a higher order, which occurs in this Tree of Science wherever two twigs unite in one branch, is, in each case, an example of Induction. The single proposition is collected by the process of induction from its several members. But here we may observe, that the image of a mere union of the parts at each of these points, which the figure of a tree or a river presents, is very inadequate to convey the true state of the case; for in Induction, as we have seen, besides mere collection of particulars, there is always a new conception, a 101 principle of connexion and unity, supplied by the mind, and superinduced upon the particulars. There is not merely a juxta-position of materials, by which the new proposition contains all that its component parts contained; but also a formative act exerted by the understanding, so that these materials are contained in a new shape. We must remember, therefore, that our Inductive Tables, although they represent the elements and the order of these inductive steps, do not fully represent the whole signification of the process in each case.
4. The principal features of the progress of science spoken of in the last chapter are clearly exhibited in these Tables; namely, the Consilience of Inductions and the constant Tendency to Simplicity observable in true theories. Indeed in all cases in which, from propositions of considerable generality, propositions of a still higher degree are obtained, there is a convergence of inductions; and if in one of the lines which thus converge, the steps be rapidly and suddenly made in order to meet the other line, we may consider that we have an example of Consilience. Thus when Newton had collected, from Kepler’s Laws, the Central Force of the sun, and from these, combined with other facts, the Universal Force of all the heavenly bodies, he suddenly turned round to include in his generalization the Precession of the Equinoxes, which he declared to arise from the attraction of the sun and moon upon the protuberant part of the terrestrial spheroid. The apparent remoteness of this fact, in its nature, from the other facts with which he thus associated it, causes this part of his reasoning to strike us as a remarkable example of Consilience. Accordingly, in the Table of Astronomy we find that the columns which contain the facts and theories relative to the sun and planets, after exhibiting several stages of induction within themselves, are at length suddenly connected with a column till then quite distinct, containing the precession of the equinoxes. In like manner, in the Table of Optics, the columns which contain the facts and theories relative to double refraction, and those which 102 include polarization by crystals, each go separately through several stages of induction; and then these two sets of columns are suddenly connected by Fresnel’s mathematical induction, that double refraction and polarization arise from the same cause: thus exhibiting a remarkable Consilience.
5. The constant Tendency to Simplicity in the sciences of which the progress is thus represented, appears from the form of the Table itself; for the single trunk into which all the branches converge, contains in itself the substance of all the propositions by means of which this last generalization was arrived at. It is true, that this ultimate result is sometimes not so simple as in the Table it appears: for instance, the ultimate generalization of the Table exhibiting the progress of Physical Optics,—namely, that Light consists in Undulations,—must be understood as including some other hypotheses; as, that the undulations are transverse, that the ether through which they are propagated has its elasticity in crystals and other transparent bodies regulated by certain laws; and the like. Yet still, even acknowledging all the complication thus implied, the Table in question evidences clearly enough the constant advance towards unity, consistency, and simplicity, which have marked the progress of this Theory. The same is the case in the Inductive Table of Astronomy in a still greater degree.
6. These Tables naturally afford the opportunity of assigning to each of the distinct steps of which the progress of science consists, the name of the Discoverer to whom it is due. Every one of the inductive processes which the brackets of our Tables mark, directs our attention to some person by whom the induction was first distinctly made. These names I have endeavoured to put in their due places in the Tables; and the Inductive Tree of our knowledge in each science becomes, in this way, an exhibition of the claims of each discoverer to distinction, and, as it were, a Genealogical Tree of scientific nobility. It is by no means pretended that such a tree includes the 103 names of all the meritorious labourers in each department of science. Many persons are most usefully employed in collecting and verifying truths, who do not advance to any new truths. The labours of a number of such are included in each stage of our ascent. But such Tables as we have now before us will present to us the names of all the most eminent discoverers: for the main steps of which the progress of science consists, are transitions from more particular to more general truths, and must therefore be rightly given by these Tables; and those must be the greatest names in science to whom the principal events of its advance are thus due.
7. The Tables, as we have presented them, exhibit the course by which we pass from Particular to General through various gradations, and so to the most general. They display the order of discovery. But by reading them in an inverted manner, beginning at the single comprehensive truths with which the Tables end, and tracing these back into the more partial truths, and these again into special facts, they answer another purpose;—they exhibit the process of verification of discoveries once made. For each of our general propositions is true in virtue of the truth of the narrower propositions which it involves; and we cannot satisfy ourselves of its truth in any other way than by ascertaining that these its constituent elements are true. To assure ourselves that the sun attracts the planets with forces varying inversely as the square of the distance, we must analyse by geometry the motion of a body in an ellipse about the focus, so as to see that such a motion does imply such a force. We must also verify those calculations by which the observed places of each planet are stated to be included in an ellipse. These calculations involve assumptions respecting the path which the earth describes about the sun, which assumptions must again be verified by reference to observation. And thus, proceeding from step to step, we resolve the most general truths into their constituent parts; and these again into their parts; and by testing, at each step, both the reality of the asserted ingredients and the propriety 104 of the conjunction, we establish the whole system of truths, however wide and various it may be.
8. It is a very great advantage, in such a mode of exhibiting scientific truths, that it resolves the verification of the most complex and comprehensive theories, into a number of small steps, of which almost any one falls within the reach of common talents and industry. That if the particulars of any one step be true, the generalization also is true, any person with a mind properly disciplined may satisfy himself by a little study. That each of these particular propositions is true, may be ascertained, by the same kind of attention, when this proposition is resolved into its constituent and more special propositions. And thus we may proceed, till the most general truth is broken up into small and manageable portions. Of these portions, each may appear by itself narrow and easy; and yet they are so woven together, by hypothesis and conjunction, that the truth of the parts necessarily assures us of the truth of the whole. The verification is of the same nature as the verification of a large and complex statement of great sums received by a mercantile office on various accounts from many quarters. The statement is separated into certain comprehensive heads, and these into others less extensive; and these again into smaller collections of separate articles, each of which can be inquired into and reported on by separate persons. And thus at last, the mere addition of numbers performed by these various persons, and the summation of the results which they obtain, executed by other accountants, is a complete and entire security that there is no errour in the whole of the process.
9. This comparison of the process by which we verify scientific truth to the process of Book-keeping in a large commercial establishment, may appear to some persons not sufficiently dignified for the subject. But, in fact, the possibility of giving this formal and business-like aspect to the evidence of science, as involved in the process of successive generalization, is an inestimable advantage. For if no one could pronounce concerning a wide and profound theory except he who 105 could at once embrace in his mind the whole range of inference, extending from the special facts up to the most general principles, none but the greatest geniuses would be entitled to judge concerning the truth or errour of scientific discoveries. But, in reality, we seldom need to verify more than one or two steps of such discoveries at one time; and this may commonly be done (when the discoveries have been fully established and developed,) by any one who brings to the task clear conceptions and steady attention. The progress of science is gradual: the discoveries which are successively made, are also verified successively. We have never any very large collections of them on our hands at once. The doubts and uncertainties of any one who has studied science with care and perseverance are generally confined to a few points. If he can satisfy himself upon these, he has no misgivings respecting the rest of the structure; which has indeed been repeatedly verified by other persons in like manner. The fact that science is capable of being resolved into separate processes of verification, is that which renders it possible to form a great body of scientific truth, by adding together a vast number of truths, of which many men, at various times and by multiplied efforts, have satisfied themselves. The treasury of Science is constantly rich and abundant, because it accumulates the wealth which is thus gathered by so many, and reckoned over by so many more: and the dignity of Knowledge is no more lowered by the multiplicity of the tasks on which her servants are employed, and the narrow field of labour to which some confine themselves, than the rich merchant is degraded by the number of offices which it is necessary for him to maintain, and the minute articles of which he requires an exact statement from his accountants.
10. The analysis of doctrines inductively obtained, into their constituent facts, and the arrangement of them in such a form that the conclusiveness of the induction may be distinctly seen, may be termed the Logic of Induction. By Logic has generally been meant a system which teaches us so to arrange our 106 reasonings that their truth or falsehood shall be evident in their form. In deductive reasonings, in which the general principles are assumed, and the question is concerning their application and combination in particular cases, the device which thus enables us to judge whether our reasonings are conclusive is the Syllogism; and this form, along with the rules which belong to it, does in fact supply us with a criterion of deductive or demonstrative reasoning. The Inductive Table, such as it is presented in the present chapter, in like manner supplies the means of ascertaining the truth of our inductive inferences, so far as the form in which our reasoning may be stated can afford such a criterion. Of course some care is requisite in order to reduce a train of demonstration into the form of a series of syllogisms; and certainly not less thought and attention are required for resolving all the main doctrines of any great department of science into a graduated table of co-ordinate and subordinate inductions. But in each case, when this task is once executed, the evidence or want of evidence of our conclusions appears immediately in a most luminous manner. In each step of induction, our Table enumerates the particular facts, and states the general theoretical truth which includes these and which these constitute. The special act of attention by which we satisfy ourselves that the facts are so included,—that the general truth is so constituted,—then affords little room for errour, with moderate attention and clearness of thought.
11. We may find an example of this act of attention thus required, at any one of the steps of induction in our Tables; for instance, at the step in the early progress of astronomy at which it was inferred, that the earth is a globe, and that the sphere of the heavens (relatively) performs a diurnal revolution round this globe of the earth. How was this established in the belief of the Greeks, and how is it fixed in our conviction? As to the globular form, we find that as we travel to the north, the apparent pole of the heavenly motions, and the constellations which are near it, seem to mount higher, and as we proceed southwards they descend. 107 Again, if we proceed from two different points considerably to the east and west of each other, and travel directly northwards from each, as from the south of Spain to the north of Scotland, and from Greece to Scandinavia, these two north and south lines will be much nearer to each other in their northern than in their southern parts. These and similar facts, as soon as they are clearly estimated and connected in the mind, are seen to be consistent with a convex surface of the earth, and with no other: and this notion is further confirmed by observing that the boundary of the earth’s shadow upon the moon is always circular; it being supposed to be already established that the moon receives her light from the sun, and that lunar eclipses are caused by the interposition of the earth. As for the assertion of the (relative) diurnal revolution of the starry sphere, it is merely putting the visible phenomena in an exact geometrical form: and thus we establish and verify the doctrine of the revolution of the sphere of the heavens about the globe of the earth, by contemplating it so as to see that it does really and exactly include the particular facts from which it is collected.
We may, in like manner, illustrate this mode of verification by any of the other steps of the same Table. Thus if we take the great Induction of Copernicus, the heliocentric scheme of the solar system, we find it in the Table exhibited as including and explaining, first, the diurnal revolution just spoken of; second, the motions of the moon among the fixed stars; third, the motions of the planets with reference to the fixed stars and the sun; fourth, the motion of the sun in the ecliptic. And the scheme being clearly conceived, we see that all the particular facts are faithfully represented by it; and this agreement, along with the simplicity of the scheme, in which respect it is so far superior to any other conception of the solar system, persuade us that it is really the plan of nature.
In exactly the same way, if we attend to any of the several remarkable discoveries of Newton, which form the principal steps in the latter part of the Table, as for instance, the proposition that the sun attracts all 108 the planets with a force which varies inversely as the square of the distance, we find it proved by its including three other propositions previously established;—first, that the sun’s mean force on different planets follows the specified variation (which is proved from Kepler’s third law); second, that the force by which each planet is acted upon in different parts of its orbit tends to the sun (which is proved by the equable description of areas); third, that this force in different parts of the same orbit is also inversely as the square of the distance (which is proved from the elliptical form of the orbit). And the Newtonian generalization, when its consequences are mathematically traced, is seen to agree with each of these particular propositions, and thus is fully established.
12. But when we say that the more general proposition includes the several more particular ones, we must recollect what has before been said, that these particulars form the general truth, not by being merely enumerated and added together, but by being seen in a new light. No mere verbal recitation of the particulars can decide whether the general proposition is true; a special act of thought is requisite in order to determine how truly each is included in the supposed induction. In this respect the Inductive Table is not like a mere schedule of accounts, where the rightness of each part of the reckoning is tested by mere addition of the particulars. On the contrary, the Inductive truth is never the mere sum of the facts. It is made into something more by the introduction of a new mental element; and the mind, in order to be able to supply this element, must have peculiar endowments and discipline. Thus looking back at the instances noticed in the last article, how are we to see that a convex surface of the earth is necessarily implied by the convergence of meridians towards the north, or by the visible descent of the north pole of the heavens as we travel south? Manifestly the student, in order to see this, must have clear conceptions of the relations of space, either naturally inherent in his mind, or established there by geometrical cultivation,—by 109 studying the properties of circles and spheres. When he is so prepared, he will feel the force of the expressions we have used, that the facts just mentioned are seen to be consistent with a globular form of the earth; but without such aptitude he will not see this consistency: and if this be so, the mere assertion of it in words will not avail him in satisfying himself of the truth of the proposition.
In like manner, in order to perceive the force of the Copernican induction, the student must have his mind so disciplined by geometrical studies, or otherwise, that he sees clearly how absolute motion and relative motion would alike produce apparent motion. He must have learnt to cast away all prejudices arising from the seeming fixity of the earth; and then he will see that there is nothing which stands in the way of the induction, while there is much which is on its side. And in the same manner the Newtonian induction of the law of the sun’s force from the elliptical form of the orbit, will be evidently satisfactory to him only who has such an insight into Mechanics as to see that a curvilinear path must arise from a constantly deflecting force; and who is able to follow the steps of geometrical reasoning by which, from the properties of the ellipse, Newton proves this deflection to be in the proportion in which he asserts the force to be. And thus in all cases the inductive truth must indeed be verified by comparing it with the particular facts; but then this comparison is possible for him only whose mind is properly disciplined and prepared in the use of those conceptions, which, in addition to the facts, the act of induction requires.
13. In the Tables some indication is given, at several of the steps, of the act which the mind must thus perform, besides the mere conjunction of facts, in order to attain to the inductive truth. Thus in the cases of the Newtonian inductions just spoken of, the inferences are stated to be made ‘By Mechanics;’ and in the case of the Copernican induction, it is said that, ‘By the nature of motion, the apparent motion is the same, whether the heavens or the earth have a 110 diurnal motion; and the latter is more simple.’ But these verbal statements are to be understood as mere hints[22]: they cannot supersede the necessity of the student’s contemplating for himself the mechanical principles and the nature of motion thus referred to.
[22] In the Inductive Tables they are marked by an asterisk.
14. In the common or Syllogistic Logic, a certain Formula of language is used in stating the reasoning, and is useful in enabling us more readily to apply the Criterion of Form to alleged demonstrations. This formula is the usual Syllogism; with its members, Major Premiss, Minor Premiss, and Conclusion. It may naturally be asked whether in Inductive Logic there is any such Formula? whether there is any standard form of words in which we may most properly express the inference of a general truth from particular facts?
At first it might be supposed that the formula of Inductive Logic need only be of this kind: ‘These particulars, and all known particulars of the same kind, are exactly included in the following general proposition.’ But a moment’s reflection on what has just been said will show us that this is not sufficient: for the particulars are not merely included in the general proposition. It is not enough that they appertain to it by enumeration. It is, for instance, no adequate example of Induction to say, ‘Mercury describes an elliptical path, so does Venus, so do the Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus; therefore all the Planets describe elliptical paths.’ This is, as we have seen, the mode of stating the evidence when the proposition is once suggested; but the Inductive step consists in the suggestion of a conception not before apparent. When Kepler, after trying to connect the observed places of the planet Mars in many other ways, found at last that the conception of an ellipse would include them all, he obtained a truth by induction: for this conclusion was not obviously included in the phenomena, and had not been applied to these 111 facts previously. Thus in our Formula, besides stating that the particulars are included in the general proposition, we must also imply that the generality is constituted by a new Conception,—new at least in its application.
Hence our Inductive Formula might be something like the following: ‘These particulars, and all known particulars of the same kind, are exactly expressed by adopting the Conceptions and Statement of the following Proposition.’ It is of course requisite that the Conceptions should be perfectly clear, and should precisely embrace the facts, according to the explanation we have already given of those conditions.
15. It may happen, as we have already stated, that the Explication of a Conception, by which it acquires its due distinctness, leads to a Definition, which Definition may be taken as the summary and total result of the intellectual efforts to which this distinctness is due. In such cases, the Formula of Induction may be modified according to this condition; and we may state the inference by saying, after an enumeration and analysis of the appropriate facts, ‘These facts are completely and distinctly expressed by adopting the following Definition and Proposition.’
This Formula has been adopted in stating the Inductive Propositions which constitute the basis of the science of Mechanics, in a work intitled The Mechanical Euclid. The fundamental truths of the subject are expressed in Inductive Pairs of Assertions, consisting each of a Definition and a Proposition, such as the following:
Def.—A Uniform Force is that which acting in the direction of the body’s motion, adds or subtracts equal velocities in equal times.
Prop.—Gravity is a Uniform Force.
Again,
Def.—Two Motions are compounded when each produces its separate effect in a direction parallel to itself.
Prop.—When any Force acts upon a body in motion, the motion which the Force would produce in the 112 body at rest is compounded with the previous motion of the body.
And in like manner in other cases.
In these cases the proposition is, of course, established, and the definition realized, by an enumeration of the facts. And in the case of inferences made in such a form, the Definition of the Conception and the Assertion of the Truth are both requisite and are correlative to one another. Each of the two steps contains the verification and justification of the other. The Proposition derives its meaning from the Definition; the Definition derives its reality from the Proposition. If they are separated, the Definition is arbitrary or empty, the Proposition vague or ambiguous.
16. But it must be observed that neither of the preceding Formulæ expresses the full cogency of the inductive proof. They declare only that the results can be clearly explained and rigorously deduced by the employment of a certain Definition and a certain Proposition. But in order to make the conclusion demonstrative, which in perfect examples of Induction it is, we ought to be able to declare that the results can be clearly explained and rigorously declared only by the Definition and Proposition which we adopt. And in reality, the conviction of the sound inductive reasoner does reach to this point. The Mathematician asserts the Laws of Motion, seeing clearly that they (or laws equivalent to them) afford the only means of clearly expressing and deducing the actual facts. But this conviction, that the inductive inference is not only consistent with the facts, but necessary, finds its place in the mind gradually, as the contemplation of the consequences of the proposition, and the various relations of the facts, becomes steady and familiar. It is scarcely possible for the student at once to satisfy himself that the inference is thus inevitable. And when he arrives at this conviction, he sees also, in many cases at least, that there may be other ways of expressing the substance of the truth established, besides that special Proposition which he has under his notice. 113
We may, therefore, without impropriety, renounce the undertaking of conveying in our formula this final conviction of the necessary truth of our inference. We may leave it to be thought, without insisting upon saying it, that in such cases what can be true, is true. But if we wish to express the ultimate significance of the Inductive Act of thought, we may take as our Formula for the Colligation of Facts by Induction, this:—‘The several Facts are exactly expressed as one Fact if, and only if, we adopt the Conception and the Assertion’ of the inductive inference.
17. I have said that the mind must be properly disciplined in order that it may see the necessary connexion between the facts and the general proposition in which they are included. And the perception of this connexion, though treated as one step in our inductive inference, may imply many steps of demonstrative proof. The connexion is this, that the particular case is included in the general one, that is, may be deduced from it: but this deduction may often require many links of reasoning. Thus in the case of the inference of the law of the force from the elliptical form of the orbit by Newton, the proof that in the ellipse the deflection from the tangent is inversely as the square of the distance from the focus of the ellipse, is a ratiocination consisting of several steps, and involving several properties of Conic Sections; these properties being supposed to be previously established by a geometrical system of demonstration on the special subject of the Conic Sections. In this and similar cases the Induction involves many steps of Deduction. And in such cases, although the Inductive Step, the Invention of the Conception, is really the most important, yet since, when once made, it occupies a familiar place in men’s minds; and since the Deductive Demonstration is of considerable length and requires intellectual effort to follow it at every step; men often admire the deductive part of the proposition, the geometrical or algebraical demonstration, far more than that part in which the philosophical merit really resides. 114
18. Deductive reasoning is virtually a collection of syllogisms, as has already been stated: and in such reasoning, the general principles, the Definitions and Axioms, necessarily stand at the beginning of the demonstration. In an inductive inference, the Definitions and Principles are the final result of the reasoning, the ultimate effect of the proof. Hence when an Inductive Proposition is to be established by a proof involving several steps of demonstrative reasoning, the enunciation of the Proposition will contain, explicitly or implicitly, principles which the demonstration proceeds upon as axioms, but which are really inductive inferences. Thus in order to prove that the force which retains a planet in an ellipse varies inversely as the square of the distance, it is taken for granted that the Laws of Motion are true, and that they apply to the planets. Yet the doctrine that this is so, as well as the law of the force, were established only by this and the like demonstrations. The doctrine which is the hypothesis of the deductive reasoning, is the inference of the inductive process. The special facts which are the basis of the inductive inference, are the conclusion of the train of deduction. And in this manner the deduction establishes the induction. The principle which we gather from the facts is true, because the facts can be derived from it by rigorous demonstration. Induction moves upwards, and deduction downwards, on the same stair.
But still there is a great difference in the character of their movements. Deduction descends steadily and methodically, step by step: Induction mounts by a leap which is out of the reach of method. She bounds to the top of the stair at once; and then it is the business of Deduction, by trying each step in order, to establish the solidity of her companion’s footing. Yet these must be processes of the same mind. The Inductive Intellect makes an assertion which is subsequently justified by demonstration; and it shows its sagacity, its peculiar character, by enunciating the proposition when as yet the demonstration does not 115 exist: but then it shows that it is sagacity, by also producing the demonstration.
It has been said that inductive and deductive reasoning are contrary in their scheme; that in Deduction we infer particular from general truths; while in Induction we infer general from particular: that Deduction consists of many steps, in each of which we apply known general propositions in particular cases; while in Induction we have a single step, in which we pass from many particular truths to one general proposition. And this is truly said; but though contrary in their motions, the two are the operation of the same mind travelling over the same ground. Deduction is a necessary part of Induction. Deduction justifies by calculation what Induction had happily guessed. Induction recognizes the ore of truth by its weight; Deduction confirms the recognition by chemical analysis. Every step of Induction must be confirmed by rigorous deductive reasoning, followed into such detail as the nature and complexity of the relations (whether of quantity or any other) render requisite. If not so justified by the supposed discoverer, it is not Induction.
19. Such Tabular arrangements of propositions as we have constructed may be considered as the Criterion of Truth for the doctrines which they include. They are the Criterion of Inductive Truth, in the same sense in which Syllogistic Demonstration is the Criterion of Necessary Truth,—of the certainty of conclusions, depending upon evident First Principles. And that such Tables are really a Criterion of the truth of the propositions which they contain, will be plain by examining their structure. For if the connexion which the inductive process assumes be ascertained to be in each case real and true, the assertion of the general proposition merely collects together ascertained truths; and in like manner each of those more particular propositions is true, because it merely expresses collectively more special facts: so that the most general theory is only the assertion of a great body of facts, duly classified and subordinated. When we 116 assert the truth of the Copernican theory of the motions of the solar system, or of the Newtonian theory of the forces by which they are caused, we merely assert the groups of propositions which, in the Table of Astronomical Induction, are included in these doctrines; and ultimately, we may consider ourselves as merely asserting at once so many Facts, and therefore, of course, expressing an indisputable truth.
20. At any one of these steps of Induction in the Table, the inductive proposition is a Theory with regard to the Facts which it includes, while it is to be looked upon as a Fact with respect to the higher generalizations in which it is included. In any other sense, as was formerly shown, the opposition of Fact and Theory is untenable, and leads to endless perplexity and debate. Is it a Fact or a Theory that the planet Mars revolves in an Ellipse about the Sun? To Kepler, employed in endeavouring to combine the separate observations by the Conception of an Ellipse, it is a Theory; to Newton, engaged in inferring the law of force from a knowledge of the elliptical motion, it is a Fact. There are, as we have already seen, no special attributes of Theory and Fact which distinguish them from one another. Facts are phenomena apprehended by the aid of conceptions and mental acts, as Theories also are. We commonly call our observations Facts, when we apply, without effort or consciousness, conceptions perfectly familiar to us: while we speak of Theories, when we have previously contemplated the Facts and the connecting Conception separately, and have made the connexion by a conscious mental act. The real difference is a difference of relation; as the same proposition in a demonstration is the premiss of one syllogism and the conclusion in another;—as the same person is a father and a son. Propositions are Facts and Theories, according as they stand above or below the Inductive Brackets of our Tables.
21. To obviate mistakes I may remark that the terms higher and lower, when used of generalizations, are unavoidably represented by their opposites in our Inductive Tables. The highest generalization is that 117 which includes all others; and this stands the lowest on our page, because, reading downwards, that is the place which we last reach.
There is a distinction of the knowledge acquired by Scientific Induction into two kinds, which is so important that we shall consider it in the succeeding chapter.
CHAPTER VII.
Of Laws of Phenomena and of Causes.
Aphorism XXIV.
Inductive truths are of two kinds, Laws of Phenomena, and Theories of Causes. It is necessary to begin in every science with the Laws of Phenomena; but it is impossible that we should be satisfied to stop short of a Theory of Causes. In Physical Astronomy, Physical Optics, Geology, and other sciences, we have instances showing that we can make a great advance in inquiries after true Theories of Causes.
1. IN the first attempts at acquiring an exact and connected knowledge of the appearances and operations which nature presents, men went no further than to learn what takes place, not why it occurs. They discovered an Order which the phenomena follow, Rules which they obey; but they did not come in sight of the Powers by which these rules are determined, the Causes of which this order is the effect. Thus, for example, they found that many of the celestial motions took place as if the sun and stars were carried round by the revolutions of certain celestial spheres; but what causes kept these spheres in constant motion, they were never able to explain. In like manner in modern times, Kepler discovered that the planets describe ellipses, before Newton explained why they select this particular curve, and describe it in a particular manner. The laws of reflection, refraction, dispersion, and other properties of light have long been known; the causes of these laws are at present under discussion. And the same might be 119 said of many other sciences. The discovery of the Laws of Phenomena is, in all cases, the first step in exact knowledge; these Laws may often for a long period constitute the whole of our science; and it is always a matter requiring great talents and great efforts, to advance to a knowledge of the Causes of the phenomena.
Hence the larger part of our knowledge of nature, at least of the certain portion of it, consists of the knowledge of the Laws of Phenomena. In Astronomy indeed, besides knowing the rules which guide the appearances, and resolving them into the real motions from which they arise, we can refer these motions to the forces which produce them. In Optics, we have become acquainted with a vast number of laws by which varied and beautiful phenomena are governed; and perhaps we may assume, since the evidence of the Undulatory Theory has been so fully developed, that we know also the Causes of the Phenomena. But in a large class of sciences, while we have learnt many Laws of Phenomena, the causes by which these are produced are still unknown or disputed. Are we to ascribe to the operation of a fluid or fluids, and if so, in what manner, the facts of heat, magnetism, electricity, galvanism? What are the forces by which the elements of chemical compounds are held together? What are the forces, of a higher order, as we cannot help believing, by which the course of vital action in organized bodies is kept up? In these and other cases, we have extensive departments of science; but we are as yet unable to trace the effects to their causes; and our science, so far as it is positive and certain, consists entirely of the laws of phenomena.
2. In those cases in which we have a division of the science which teaches us the doctrine of the causes, as well as one which states the rules which the effects follow, I have, in the History, distinguished the two portions of the science by certain terms. I have thus spoken of Formal Astronomy and Physical Astronomy. The latter phrase has long been commonly employed to describe that department of Astronomy which deals with 120 those forces by which the heavenly bodies are guided in their motions; the former adjective appears well suited to describe a collection of rules depending on those ideas of space, time, position, number, which are, as we have already said, the forms of our apprehension of phenomena. The laws of phenomena may be considered as formulæ, expressing results in terms of those ideas. In like manner, I have spoken of Formal Optics and Physical Optics; the latter division including all speculations concerning the machinery by which the effects are produced. Formal Acoustics and Physical Acoustics may be distinguished in like manner, although these two portions of science have been a good deal mixed together by most of those who have treated of them. Formal Thermotics, the knowledge of the laws of the phenomena of heat, ought in like manner to lead to Physical Thermotics, or the Theory of Heat with reference to the cause by which its effects are produced;—a branch of science which as yet can hardly be said to exist.
3. What kinds of cause are we to admit in science? This is an important, and by no means an easy question. In order to answer it, we must consider in what manner our progress in the knowledge of causes has hitherto been made. By far the most conspicuous instance of success in such researches, is the discovery of the causes of the motions of the heavenly bodies. In this case, after the formal laws of the motions,—their conditions as to space and time,—had become known, men were enabled to go a step further; to reduce them to the familiar and general cause of motion—mechanical force; and to determine the laws which this force follows. That this was a step in addition to the knowledge previously possessed, and that it was a real and peculiar truth, will not be contested. And a step in any other subject which should be analogous to this in astronomy;—a discovery of causes and forces as certain and clear as the discovery of universal gravitation;—would undoubtedly be a vast advance upon a body of science consisting only of the laws of phenomena. 121
4. But although physical astronomy may well be taken as a standard in estimating the value and magnitude of the advance from the knowledge of phenomena to the knowledge of causes; the peculiar features of the transition from formal to physical science in that subject must not be allowed to limit too narrowly our views of the nature of this transition in other cases. We are not, for example, to consider that the step which leads us to the knowledge of causes in any province of nature must necessarily consist in the discovery of centers of forces, and collections of such centers, by which the effects are produced. The discovery of the causes of phenomena may imply the detection of a fluid by whose undulations, or other operations, the results are occasioned. The phenomena of acoustics are, we know, produced in this manner by the air; and in the cases of light, heat, magnetism, and others, even if we reject all the theories of such fluids which have hitherto been proposed, we still cannot deny that such theories are intelligible and possible, as the discussions concerning them have shown. Nor can it be doubted that if the assumption of such a fluid, in any case, were as well evidenced as the doctrine of universal gravitation is, it must be considered as a highly valuable theory.
5. But again; not only must we, in aiming at the formation of a Causal Section in each Science of Phenomena, consider Fluids and their various modes of operation admissible, as well as centers of mechanical force; but we must be prepared, if it be necessary, to consider the forces, or powers to which we refer the phenomena, under still more general aspects, and invested with characters different from mere mechanical force. For example; the forces by which the chemical elements of bodies are bound together, and from which arise, both their sensible texture, their crystalline form, and their chemical composition, are certainly forces of a very different nature from the mere attraction of matter according to its mass. The powers of assimilation and reproduction in plants and animals are obviously still more removed from mere mechanism; yet 122 these powers are not on that account less real, nor a less fit and worthy subject of scientific inquiry.
6. In fact, these forces—mechanical, chemical and vital,—as we advance from one to the other, each bring into our consideration new characters; and what these characters are, has appeared in the historical survey which we made of the Fundamental Ideas of the various sciences. It was then shown that the forces by which chemical effects are produced necessarily involve the Idea of Polarity,—they are polar forces; the particles tend together in virtue of opposite properties which in the combination neutralize each other. Hence, in attempting to advance to a theory of Causes in chemistry, our task is by no means to invent laws of mechanical force, and collections of forces, by which the effects may be produced. We know beforehand that no such attempt can succeed. Our aim must be to conceive such new kinds of force, including Polarity among their characters, as may best render the results intelligible.
7. Thus in advancing to a Science of Cause in any subject, the labour and the struggle is, not to analyse the phenomena according to any preconceived and already familiar ideas, but to form distinctly new conceptions, such as do really carry us to a more intimate view of the processes of nature. Thus in the case of astronomy, the obstacle which deferred the discovery of the true causes from the time of Kepler to that of Newton, was the difficulty of taking hold of mechanical conceptions and axioms with sufficient clearness and steadiness; which, during the whole of that interval, mathematicians were learning to do. In the question of causation which now lies most immediately in the path of science, that of the causes of electrical and chemical phenomena, the business of rightly fixing and limiting the conception of polarity, is the proper object of the efforts of discoverers. Accordingly a large portion of Mr Faraday’s recent labours[23] is directed, not to 123 the attempt at discovering new laws of phenomena, but to the task of throwing light upon the conception of polarity, and of showing how it must be understood, so that it shall include electrical induction and other phenomena, which have commonly been ascribed to forces acting mechanically at a distance. He is by no means content, nor would it answer the ends of science that he should be, with stating the results of his experiments; he is constantly, in every page, pointing out the interpretation of his experiments, and showing how the conception of Polar Forces enters into this interpretation. ‘I shall,’ he says[24], ‘use every opportunity which presents itself of returning to that strong test of truth, experiment; but,’ he adds, ‘I shall necessarily have occasion to speak theoretically, and even hypothetically.’ His hypothesis that electrical inductive action always takes place by means of a continuous line of polarized particles, and not by attraction and repulsion at a distance, if established, cannot fail to be a great step on our way towards a knowledge of causes, as well as phenomena, in the subjects under his consideration.
[23] Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Series of Researches, Phil. Trans. 1837 and 8.
[24] Art. 1318.
8. The process of obtaining new conceptions is, to most minds, far more unwelcome than any labour in employing old ideas. The effort is indeed painful and oppressive; it is feeling in the dark for an object which we cannot find. Hence it is not surprising that we should far more willingly proceed to seek for new causes by applying conceptions borrowed from old ones. Men were familiar with solid frames, and with whirlpools of fluid, when they had not learnt to form any clear conception of attraction at a distance. Hence they at first imagined the heavenly motions to be caused by Crystalline Spheres, and by Vortices. At length they were taught to conceive Central Forces, and then they reduced the solar system to these. But having done this, they fancied that all the rest of the machinery of nature must be central forces. We find Newton 124 expressing this conviction[25], and the mathematicians of the last century acted upon it very extensively. We may especially remark Laplace’s labours in this field. Having explained, by such forces, the phenomena of capillary attraction, he attempted to apply the same kind of explanation to the reflection, refraction, and double refraction of light;—to the constitution of gases;—to the operation of heat. It was soon seen that the explanation of refraction was arbitrary, and that of double refraction illusory; while polarization entirely eluded the grasp of this machinery. Centers of force would no longer represent the modes of causation which belonged to the phenomena. Polarization required some other contrivance, such as the undulatory theory supplied. No theory of light can be of any avail in which the fundamental idea of Polarity is not clearly exhibited.
[25] Multa me movent, &c.,—Pref. to the Principia, already quoted in the History.
9. The sciences of magnetism and electricity have given rise to theories in which this relation of polarity is exhibited by means of two opposite fluids[26];—a positive and a negative fluid, or a vitreous and a resinous, for electricity, and a boreal and an austral fluid for magnetism. The hypothesis of such fluids gives results agreeing in a remarkable manner with the facts and their measures, as Coulomb and others have shown. It may be asked how far we may, in such a case, suppose that we have discovered the true cause of the phenomena, and whether it is sufficiently proved that these fluids really exist. The right answer seems to be, that the hypothesis certainly represents the truth so far as regards the polar relation of the two energies, and the laws of the attractive and repulsive forces of the particles in which these energies reside; but that we are not entitled to assume that the vehicles of these energies possess other attributes of material fluids, or that the forces thus ascribed to the particles are the primary elementary forces from which 125 the action originates. We are the more bound to place this cautious limit to our acceptance of the Coulombian theory, since in electricity Faraday has in vain endeavoured to bring into view one of the polar fluids without the other: whereas such a result ought to be possible if there were two separable fluids. The impossibility of this separate exhibition of one fluid appears to show that the fluids are real only so far as they are polar. And Faraday’s view above mentioned, according to which the attractions at a distance are resolved into the action of lines of polarized particles of air, appears still further to show that the conceptions hitherto entertained of electrical forces, according to the Coulombian theory, do not penetrate to the real and intimate nature of the causation belonging to this case.
[26] Hist. Ind. Sc. b. xi. c. ii.
10. Since it is thus difficult to know when we have seized the true cause of the phenomena in any department of science, it may appear to some persons that physical inquirers are imprudent and unphilosophical in undertaking this Research of Causes; and that it would be safer and wiser to confine ourselves to the investigation of the laws of phenomena, in which field the knowledge which we obtain is definite and certain. Hence there have not been wanting those who have laid it down as a maxim that ‘science must study only the laws of phenomena, and never the mode of production[27].’ But it is easy to see that such a maxim would confine the breadth and depth of scientific inquiries to a most scanty and miserable limit. Indeed, such a rule would defeat its own object; for the laws of phenomena, in many cases, cannot be even expressed or understood without some hypothesis respecting their mode of production. How could the phenomena of polarization have been conceived or reasoned upon, except by imagining a polar arrangement of particles, or transverse vibrations, or some equivalent hypothesis? The doctrines of fits of easy transmission, the doctrine of moveable polarization, and the like, even when 126 erroneous as representing the whole of the phenomena, were still useful in combining some of them into laws; and without some such hypotheses the facts could not have been followed out. The doctrine of a fluid caloric may be false; but without imagining such a fluid, how could the movement of heat from one part of a body to another be conceived? It may be replied that Fourier, Laplace, Poisson, who have principally cultivated the Theory of Heat, have not conceived it as a fluid, but have referred conduction to the radiation of the molecules of bodies, which they suppose to be separate points. But this molecular constitution of bodies is itself an assumption of the mode in which the phenomena are produced; and the radiation of heat suggests inquiries concerning a fluid emanation, no less than its conduction does. In like manner, the attempts to connect the laws of phenomena of heat and of gases, have led to hypotheses respecting the constitution of gases, and the combination of their particles with those of caloric, which hypotheses may be false, but are probably the best means of discovering the truth.
[27] Comte, Philosophie Positive.
To debar science from inquiries like these, on the ground that it is her business to inquire into facts, and not to speculate about causes, is a curious example of that barren caution which hopes for truth without daring to venture upon the quest of it. This temper would have stopped with Kepler’s discoveries, and would have refused to go on with Newton to inquire into the mode in which the phenomena are produced. It would have stopped with Newton’s optical facts, and would have refused to go on with him and his successors to inquire into the mode in which these phenomena are produced. And, as we have abundantly shown, it would, on that very account, have failed in seeing what the phenomena really are.
In many subjects the attempt to study the laws of phenomena, independently of any speculations respecting the causes which have produced them, is neither possible for human intelligence nor for human temper. Men cannot contemplate the phenomena without clothing them in terms of some hypothesis, and will 127 not be schooled to suppress the questionings which at every moment rise up within them concerning the causes of the phenomena. Who can attend to the appearances which come under the notice of the geologist;—strata regularly bedded, full of the remains of animals such as now live in the depths of the ocean, raised to the tops of mountains, broken, contorted, mixed with rocks such as still flow from the mouths of volcanos,—who can see phenomena like these, and imagine that he best promotes the progress of our knowledge of the earth’s history, by noting down the facts, and abstaining from all inquiry whether these are really proof of past states of the earth and of subterraneous forces, or merely an accidental imitation of the effects of such causes? In this and similar cases, to proscribe the inquiry into causes would be to annihilate the science.
Finally, this caution does not even gain its own single end, the escape from hypotheses. For, as we have said, those who will not seek for new and appropriate causes of newly-studied phenomena, are almost inevitably led to ascribe the facts to modifications of causes already familiar. They may declare that they will not hear of such causes as vital powers, elective affinities, electric, or calorific, or luminiferous ethers or fluids; but they will not the less on that account assume hypotheses equally unauthorized;—for instance—universal mechanical forces; a molecular constitution of bodies; solid, hard, inert matter;—and will apply these hypotheses in a manner which is arbitrary in itself as well as quite insufficient for its purpose.
11. It appears, then, to be required, both by the analogy of the most successful efforts of science in past times and by the irrepressible speculative powers of the human mind, that we should attempt to discover both the laws of phenomena, and their causes. In every department of science, when prosecuted far enough, these two great steps of investigation must succeed each other. The laws of phenomena must be known before we can speculate concerning causes; the causes must be inquired into when the phenomena have been 128 reduced to rule. In both these speculations the suppositions and conceptions which occur must be constantly tested by reference to observation and experiment. In both we must, as far as possible, devise hypotheses which, when we thus test them, display those characters of truth of which we have already spoken;—an agreement with facts such as will stand the most patient and rigid inquiry; a provision for predicting truly the results of untried cases; a consilience of inductions from various classes of facts; and a progressive tendency of the scheme to simplicity and unity.
We shall attempt hereafter to give several rules of a more precise and detailed kind for the discovery of the causes, and still more, of the laws of phenomena. But it will be useful in the first place to point out the Classification of the Sciences which results from the principles already established in this work. And for this purpose we must previously decide the question, whether the practical Arts, as Medicine and Engineering, must be included in our list of Sciences.
CHAPTER VIII.
Of Art and Science.
Aphorism XXV.
Art and Science differ. The object of Science is Knowledge; the objects of Art, are Works. In Art, truth is a means to an end; in Science, it is the only end. Hence the Practical Arts are not to be classed among the Sciences.
Aphorism XXVI.
Practical Knowledge, such as Art implies, is not Knowledge such as Science includes. Brute animals have a practical knowledge of relations of space and force; but they have no knowledge of Geometry or Mechanics.
1. THE distinction of Arts and Sciences very materially affects all classifications of the departments of Human Knowledge. It is often maintained, expressly or tacitly, that the Arts are a part of our knowledge, in the same sense in which the Sciences are so; and that Art is the application of Science to the purposes of practical life. It will be found that these views require some correction, when we understand Science in the exact sense in which we have throughout endeavoured to contemplate it, and in which alone our examination of its nature can instruct us in the true foundations of our knowledge.
When we cast our eyes upon the early stages of the histories of nations, we cannot fail to be struck with the consideration, that in many countries the Arts of life already appear, at least in some rude form or other, when, as yet, nothing of science exists. A 130 practical knowledge of Astronomy, such as enables them to reckon months and years, is found among all nations except the mere savages. A practical knowledge of Mechanics must have existed in those nations which have left us the gigantic monuments of early architecture. The pyramids and temples of Egypt and Nubia, the Cyclopean walls of Italy and Greece, the temples of Magna Græcia and Sicily, the obelisks and edifices of India, the cromlechs and Druidical circles of countries formerly Celtic,—must have demanded no small practical mechanical skill and power. Yet those modes of reckoning time must have preceded the rise of speculative Astronomy; these structures must have been erected before the theory of Mechanics was known. To suppose, as some have done, a great body of science, now lost, to have existed in the remote ages to which these remains belong, is not only quite gratuitous, and contrary to all analogy, but is a supposition which cannot be extended so far as to explain all such cases. For it is impossible to imagine that every art has been preceded by the science which renders a reason for its processes. Certainly men formed wine from the grape, before they possessed a Science of Fermentation; the first instructor of every artificer in brass and iron can hardly be supposed to have taught the Chemistry of metals as a Science; the inventor of the square and the compasses had probably no more knowledge of demonstrated Geometry than have the artisans who now use those implements; and finally, the use of speech, the employment of the inflections and combinations of words, must needs be assumed as having been prior to any general view of the nature and analogy of Language. Even at this moment, the greater part of the arts which exist in the world are not accompanied by the sciences on which they theoretically depend. Who shall state to us the general chemical truths to which the manufactures of glass, and porcelain, and iron, and brass, owe their existence? Do not almost all artisans practise many successful artifices long before science explains the ground of the process? Do not arts at this day exist, in a high state 131 of perfection, in countries in which there is no science, as China and India? These countries and many others have no theories of mechanics, of optics, of chemistry, of physiology; yet they construct and use mechanical and optical instruments, make chemical combinations, take advantage of physiological laws. It is too evident to need further illustration that Art may exist without Science;—that the former has usually been anterior to the latter, and even now commonly advances independently, leaving science to follow as it can.
2. We here mean by Science, that exact, general, speculative knowledge, of which we have, throughout this work, been endeavouring to exhibit the nature and rules. Between such Science and the practical Arts of life, the points of difference are sufficiently manifest. The object of Science is Knowledge; the object of Art are Works. The latter is satisfied with producing its material results; to the former, the operations of matter, whether natural or artificial, are interesting only so far as they can be embraced by intelligible principles. The End of Art is the Beginning of Science; for when it is seen what is done, then comes the question why it is done. Art may have fixed general rules, stated in words; but she has these merely as means to an end: to Science, the propositions which she obtains are each, in itself, a sufficient end of the effort by which it is acquired. When Art has brought forth her product, her task is finished; Science is constantly led by one step of her path to another: each proposition which she obtains impels her to go onwards to other propositions more general, more profound, more simple. Art puts elements together, without caring to know what they are, or why they coalesce. Science analyses the compound, and at every such step strives not only to perform, but to understand the analysis. Art advances in proportion as she becomes able to bring forth products more multiplied, more complex, more various; but Science, straining her eyes to penetrate more and more deeply into the nature of things, reckons her success in proportion as she sees, in all the phenomena, however 132 multiplied; complex, and varied, the results of one or two simple and general laws.
3. There are many acts which man, as well as animals, performs by the guidance of nature, without seeing or seeking the reason why he does so; as, the acts by which he balances himself in standing or moving, and those by which he judges of the form and position of the objects around him. These actions have their reason in the principles of geometry and mechanics; but of such reasons he who thus acts is unaware: he works blindly, under the impulse of an unknown principle which we call Instinct. When man’s speculative nature seeks and finds the reasons why he should act thus or thus;—why he should stretch out his arm to prevent his falling, or assign a certain position to an object in consequence of the angles under which it is seen;—he may perform the same actions as before, but they are then done by the aid of a different faculty, which, for the sake of distinction, we may call Insight. Instinct is a purely active principle; it is seen in deeds alone; it has no power of looking inwards; it asks no questions; it has no tendency to discover reasons or rules; it is the opposite of Insight.
4. Art is not identical with Instinct: on the contrary, there are broad differences. Instinct is stationary; Art is progressive. Instinct is mute; it acts, but gives no rules for acting: Art can speak; she can lay down rules. But though Art is thus separate from Instinct, she is not essentially combined with Insight. She can see what to do, but she needs not to see why it is done. She may lay down Rules, but it is not her business to give Reasons. When man makes that his employment, he enters upon the domain of Science. Art takes the phenomena and laws of nature as she finds them: that they are multiplied, complex, capricious, incoherent, disturbs her not. She is content that the rules of nature’s operations should be perfectly arbitrary and unintelligible, provided they are constant, so that she can depend upon their effects. But Science is impatient of all appearance of caprice, 133 inconsistency, irregularity, in nature. She will not believe in the existence of such characters. She resolves one apparent anomaly after another; her task is not ended till every thing is so plain and simple, that she is tempted to believe that she sees that it could by no possibility have been otherwise than it is.
5. It may be said that, after all, Art does really involve the knowledge which Science delivers;—that the artisan who raises large weights, practically knows the properties of the mechanical powers;—that he who manufactures chemical compounds is virtually acquainted with the laws of chemical combination. To this we reply, that it might on the same grounds be asserted, that he who acts upon the principle that two sides of a triangle are greater than the third is really acquainted with geometry; and that he who balances himself on one foot knows the properties of the center of gravity. But this is an acquaintance with geometry and mechanics which even brute animals possess. It is evident that it is not of such knowledge as this that we have here to treat. It is plain that this mode of possessing principles is altogether different from that contemplation of them on which science is founded. We neglect the most essential and manifest differences, if we confound our unconscious assumptions with our demonstrative reasonings.
6. The real state of the case is, that the principles which Art involves, Science alone evolves. The truths on which the success of Art depends, lurk in the artist’s mind in an undeveloped state; guiding his hand, stimulating his invention, balancing his judgment; but not appearing in the form of enunciated Propositions. Principles are not to him direct objects of meditation: they are secret Powers of Nature, to which the forms which tenant the world owe their constancy, their movements, their changes, their luxuriant and varied growth, but which he can nowhere directly contemplate. That the creative and directive Principles which have their lodgment in the artist’s mind, when unfolded by our speculative powers into 134 systematic shape, become Science, is true; but it is precisely this process of development which gives to them their character of Science. In practical Art, principles are unseen guides, leading us by invisible strings through paths where the end alone is looked at: it is for Science to direct and purge our vision so that these airy ties, these principles and laws, generalizations and theories, become distinct objects of vision. Many may feel the intellectual monitor, but it is only to her favourite heroes that the Goddess of Wisdom visibly reveals herself.
7. Thus Art, in its earlier stages at least, is widely different from Science, is independent of it, and is anterior to it. At a later period, no doubt, Art may borrow aid from Science; and the discoveries of the philosopher may be of great value to the manufacturer and the artist. But even then, this application forms no essential part of the science: the interest which belongs to it is not an intellectual interest. The augmentation of human power and convenience may impel or reward the physical philosopher; but the processes by which man’s repasts are rendered more delicious, his journeys more rapid, his weapons more terrible, are not, therefore, Science. They may involve principles which are of the highest interest to science; but as the advantage is not practically more precious because it results from a beautiful theory, so the theoretical principle has no more conspicuous place in science because it leads to convenient practical consequences. The nature of Science is purely intellectual; Knowledge alone,—exact general Truth,—is her object; and we cannot mix with such material, as matters of the same kind, the merely Empirical maxims of Art, without introducing endless confusion into the subject, and making it impossible to attain any solid footing in our philosophy.
8. I shall therefore not place, in our Classification of the Sciences, the Arts, as has generally been done; nor shall I notice the applications of sciences to art, as forming any separate portion of each science. The sciences, considered as bodies of general speculative 135 truths, are what we are here concerned with; and applications of such truths, whether useful or useless, are important to us only as illustrations and examples. Whatever place in human knowledge the Practical Arts may hold, they are not Sciences. And it is only by this rigorous separation of the Practical from the Theoretical, that we can arrive at any solid conclusions respecting the nature of Truth, and the mode of arriving at it, such as it is our object to attain.
CHAPTER IX.
Of the Classification of Sciences.
1. THE Classification of Sciences has its chief use in pointing out to us the extent of our powers of arriving at truth, and the analogies which may obtain between those certain and lucid portions of knowledge with which we are here concerned, and those other portions, of a very different interest and evidence, which we here purposely abstain to touch upon. The classification of human knowledge will, therefore, have a more peculiar importance when we can include in it the moral, political, and metaphysical, as well as the physical portions of our knowledge. But such a survey does not belong to our present undertaking: and a general view of the connexion and order of the branches of sciences which our review has hitherto included, will even now possess some interest; and may serve hereafter as an introduction to a more complete scheme of the general body of human knowledge.
2. In this, as in any other case, a sound classification must be the result, not of any assumed principles imperatively applied to the subject, but of an examination of the objects to be classified;—of an analysis of them into the principles in which they agree and differ. The Classification of Sciences must result from the consideration of their nature and contents. Accordingly, that review of the Sciences in which the History of the Sciences engaged us, led to a Classification, of which the main features are indicated in that work. The Classification thus obtained, depends neither upon the faculties of the mind to which the separate parts of our knowledge owe their origin, nor upon the objects which each science contemplates; but upon a more 137 natural and fundamental element;—namely, the Ideas which each science involves. The Ideas regulate and connect the facts, and are the foundations of the reasoning, in each science: and having in another work more fully examined these Ideas, we are now prepared to state here the classification to which they lead. If we have rightly traced each science to the Conceptions which are really fundamental with regard to it, and which give rise to the first principles on which it depends, it is not necessary for our purpose that we should decide whether these Conceptions are absolutely ultimate principles of thought, or whether, on the contrary, they can be further resolved into other Fundamental Ideas. We need not now suppose it determined whether or not Number is a mere modification of the Idea of Time, and Force a mere modification of the Idea of Cause: for however this may be, our Conception of Number is the foundation of Arithmetic, and our Conception of Force is the foundation of Mechanics. It is to be observed also that in our classification, each Science may involve, not only the Ideas or Conceptions which are placed opposite to it in the list, but also all which precede it. Thus Formal Astronomy involves not only the Conception of Motion, but also those which are the foundation of Arithmetic and Geometry. In like manner. Physical Astronomy employs the Sciences of Statics and Dynamics, and thus, rests on their foundations; and they, in turn, depend upon the Ideas of Space and of Time, as well as of Cause.
3. We may further observe, that this arrangement of Sciences according to the Fundamental Ideas which they involve, points out the transition from those parts of human knowledge which have been included in our History and Philosophy, to other regions of speculation into which we have not entered. We have repeatedly found ourselves upon the borders of inquiries of a psychological, or moral, or theological nature. Thus the History of Physiology[28] led us to the consideration 138 of Life, Sensation, and Volition; and at these Ideas we stopped, that we might not transgress the boundaries of our subject as then predetermined. It is plain that the pursuit of such conceptions and their consequences, would lead us to the sciences (if we are allowed to call them sciences) which contemplate not only animal, but human principles of action, to Anthropology, and Psychology. In other ways, too, the Ideas which we hare examined, although manifestly the foundations of sciences such as we have here treated of also plainly pointed to speculations of a different order; thus the Idea of a Final Cause is an indispensable guide in Biology, as we have seen; but the conception of Design as directing the order of nature, once admitted, soon carries us to higher contemplations. Again, the Class of Palætiological Sciences which we were in the History led to construct, although we there admitted only one example of the Class, namely Geology, does in reality include many vast lines of research; as the history and causes of the division of plants and animals, the history of languages, arts, and consequently of civilization. Along with these researches, comes the question how far these histories point backwards to a natural or a supernatural origin; and the Idea of a First Cause is thus brought under our consideration. Finally, it is not difficult to see that as the Physical Sciences have their peculiar governing Ideas, which support and shape them, so the Moral and Political Sciences also must similarly have their fundamental and formative Ideas, the source of universal and certain truths, each of their proper kind. But to follow out the traces of this analogy, and to verify the existence of those Fundamental Ideas in Morals and Politics, is a task quite out of the sphere of the work in which we are here engaged.
[28] Hist. Ind. Sc. b. xvii. c. v. sect. 2.
4. We may now place before the reader our Classification of the Sciences. I have added to the list of Sciences, a few not belonging to our present subject, that the nature of the transition by which we are to extend our philosophy into a wider and higher region may be in some measure perceived. 139
The Classification of the Sciences is given over leaf.
A few remarks upon it offer themselves.
The Pure Mathematical Sciences can hardly be called Inductive Sciences. Their principles are not obtained by Induction from Facts, but are necessarily assumed in reasoning upon the subject matter which those sciences involve.
The Astronomy of the Ancients aimed only at explaining the motions of the heavenly bodies, as a mechanism. Modern Astronomy, explains these motions on the principles of Mechanics.
The term Physics, when confined to a peculiar class of Sciences, is usually understood to exclude the Mechanical Sciences on the one side, and Chemistry on the other; and thus embraces the Secondary Mechanical and Analytico-Mechanical Sciences. But the adjective Physical applied to any science and opposed to Formal, as in Astronomy and Optics, implies those speculations in which we consider not only the Laws of Phenomena but their Causes; and generally, as in those cases, their Mechanical Causes.
The term Metaphysics is applied to subjects in which the Facts examined are emotions, thoughts and mental conditions; subjects not included in our present survey. 140
| Fundamental Ideas or Conceptions. | Sciences. | Classification. | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Space | Geometry | ⎫ | |
| Time | ⎪ | Pure Mathematical | |
| Number | Arithmetic | ⎬ | |
| Sign | Algebra | ⎪ | Sciences. |
| Limit | Differentials | ⎭ | |
| Motion | Pure Mechanism | ⎱ | Pure Motional |
| Formal Astronomy | ⎰ | Sciences. | |
| Cause | |||
| Force | Statics | ⎫ | |
| Matter | Dynamics | ⎪ | Mechanical |
| Inertia | Hydrostatics | ⎬ | |
| Fluid Pressure | Hydrodynamics | ⎪ | Sciences. |
| Physical Astronomy | ⎭ | ||
| Outness | |||
| Medium of Sensation | Acoustics | ⎫ | |
| Intensity of Qualities | Formal Optics | ⎪ | Secondary |
| Scales of Qualities | Physical Optics | ⎬ | Mechanical |
| Thermotics | ⎪ | Sciences. | |
| Atmology | ⎭ | (Physics.) | |
| Polarity | Electricity | ⎫ | Analytico-Mecha- |
| Magnetism | ⎬ | nical Sciences. | |
| Galvanism | ⎭ | (Physics.) | |
| Element (Composition) | |||
| Chemical Affinity | |||
| Substance (Atoms) | Chemistry | Analytical Science. | |
| Symmetry | Crystallography | ⎱ | Analytico-Classifi- |
| Likeness | Systematic Mineralogy | ⎰ | catory Sciences. |
| Degrees of Likeness | Systematic Botany | ⎫ | Classificatory |
| Systematic Zoology | ⎬ | ||
| Natural Affinity | Comparative Anatomy | ⎭ | Sciences. |
| (Vital Powers) | |||
| Assimilation | |||
| Irritability | |||
| (Organization) | Biology | Organical Sciences. | |
| Final Cause | |||
| Instinct | |||
| Emotion | Psychology | (Metaphysics.) | |
| Thought | |||
| Historical Causation | Geology | ⎫ | |
| Distribution of | ⎪ | Palætiological | |
| Plants and Animals | ⎬ | ||
| Glossology | ⎪ | Sciences. | |
| Ethnography | ⎭ | ||
| First Cause | Natural Theology. | ||
INDUCTIVE CHARTS
[Transcriber's note: Two large charts were inserted into the book at this point. Here they have been reproduced as tables. But since the originals were much wider than the book pages they are somewhat unwieldy tables. They are omitted in ePub and Kindle files. In the lines containing brackets, vertical lines are used to indicate the range of columns thus brought together, where this is not obvious. To move on to the text of Book III., click [here].]
NOVUM ORGANON RENOVATUM.