A. The mob was there in opposition to the law, and they must leave the tracks, that they had no right there, and that the orders that I would give to my troops would be to keep the hill side clear, and the tracks open for the passage of any trains the railroad officials might see fit to send. There was considerable howling at that time, and some of them spoke about wanting bread, and says I, "If you want bread, if you will go away from there, I will send you a car load of bread. I will furnish you with all the bread you want, if you go away and let these tracks alone." The tracks then were comparatively clear. There was no person on the hill side with the exception of the troops. I then gave directions to General Brown, who had command of the infantry portion of the division, to keep the hill side clear, and allow no person upon the track, and to hold it in the position until he received further orders from me. He spoke of the fact that Twenty-eighth street was a public street, and that the public had a right to use it. I told him that was a matter he had no concern about whatever. I had the responsibility of closing up that street, and I gave him an order to keep the hill side clear, and the people off the track, and anything he might do to carry out that order I would be responsible for, and he would be doing what would place him in no false position. I then jumped on the locomotive, and returned to the Union Depot hotel. During this time numbers of people had come to me to expostulate with me for calling out the troops. I told them that was a matter in which I had no concern whatever; I was merely obeying orders. I was a sworn officer of the Commonwealth, and that every officer and every man in my command had filed their oaths to obey orders. I was there to obey orders, and anything that might happen would not be upon my shoulders, but upon those who were breaking the laws. I received telegrams from General Brinton from various points on his route to Pittsburgh from Philadelphia. When he reached Pittsburgh, it was then in the neighborhood of two o'clock. He had about five hundred and fifty men and two Gatling guns, and I think twenty thousand rounds of extra ammunition. Upon his arrival, we furnished his command—they came in two sections—when the first section arrived, we furnished the troops of that section with such rations as we could procure, which was nothing more or less than a sandwich and cup of coffee, and probably thirty minutes after the second section arrived, and we furnished the troops in that section with sandwiches and coffee. We took the ammunition and placed it in the small building near the track, and I then took General Brinton out and had a consultation with General Latta, who was then in the Union Depot hotel. He wanted to know what my plans were, and I told him, and he asked me the question, "Do you still think that it is better to overawe the mob with the large number of troops?" And I told him, certainly I did, and General Latta agreed with me. Says he, "I think you are pursuing a wise policy. We will try to avert the shedding of blood and loss of life if possible." He then wanted me to show General Brinton the situation of affairs, and I drew a small plot of Twenty-eighth street and the hill, and the track, the round-house, &c. And General Latta asked me, "Who will you send out with General Brinton to show him the situation?" I told him I had better go out myself. We started out the tracks, taking the two Gatling guns by hand. At that time a large crowd was congregated in the neighborhood of the Union Depot hotel, many of them looking over the fences, and others had got inside, and were mingling with the troops, but we pushed out the tracks, and in the neighborhood of Twenty-fourth street there was quite a crowd lining the tracks, standing on the cars, occupying the side of the hill. Probably at that time there was in the neighborhood of one thousand five hundred or two thousand cars laden with all kinds of goods there, and I suggested to General Brinton the propriety of leaving a portion of his troops to guard his flank and rear, as well as to protect the cars, which he did. I think that was probably General Loud's brigade, consisting probably of three hundred men. They were deployed over that locality clear up to the lower round-house. We pushed on with the balance of the troops, headed by the sheriff and his posse. When we got to Twenty-eighth street, instead of finding the tracks clear, and the hill side clear of people, there was one dense mass of humanity, men, women, and children—the hill side was crowded with people. I could not see Colonel Gray's regiment, the Fourteenth. I found a small portion of the Nineteenth occupying the right hand track of the railroad, and the entire tracks in possession of the mob. As we went up the track the sheriff was received with all manner of derisive shouts, calling him all sorts of names. I was received in a like manner, but the crowd seemed to know me very well by name. They pointed me out, and everything that a dirty, low man could say was said. At that time one of the mob pushed through the line of soldiers and struck at one of the officers—whether it was General Brinton, or General Mathews, who commanded one of his brigades, I don't know.

Q. What did he strike with?

A. Struck him with his fist. I got the fellow by the shoulder and quickly pushed him towards the sheriff. Says I, "Here is a fellow that will make trouble; take charge of this man." The sheriff pushed him into the midst of his posse. At that time there was a fellow standing upon my right, just off the railroad tracks, and he was doing a good deal of loud talking and making all sorts of threats. I pointed him out to the sheriff, and says I, "Here is another fellow you had better arrest; he will make trouble." I pushed through the mob and started up the hillside to find where General Brown was—to find where the Fourteenth regiment was, and the remainder of the Nineteenth was. I found Colonel Howard, who commanded the Nineteenth regiment, occupying a position on a private road leading to the West Pennsylvania hospital, and asked him the question what he was doing there. He said he had been ordered to report there, and, says he, "I am sorry to say you can place but little dependence upon the troops of your division, and some of the men have thrown down their arms and others have left, and I fear the situation very much;" and spoke in like terms—says he, "I think the Fourteenth regiment is in the same position." I then gave orders to Colonel Howard to move his command in such a position that they would be of some use in case of attack, which he immediately proceeded to do. I then came down, pushed through the mob, and having heard this information from Colonel Howard of the situation of affairs, and finding General Brown was not to be found, I did not see him, and did not know where he was—had not seen him that day at all—and finding the hill side occupied with people, the tracks in complete possession of the mob, the troops outnumbered in a very large degree, I concluded it was my duty then to notify General Latta of the state of affairs, and to ask that additional troops be sent for. I knew that four divisions had been ordered under arms prior to that—General White's, General Huidekoper's, General Gallagher's, and probably General Bolton's, had been ordered under arms prior to that. As I pushed through the mob I found that General Brinton had deployed, by what command I cannot state. But one single line of his troops occupied a portion of the westerly track. There was a single rank facing the hill side, and as I passed down the company was moving up from his rear and moving directly up the tracks towards Twenty-eighth street. I left my station there with Major Evans, walked down the tracks, entered the telegraph office at the corner of Twenty-sixth and Liberty avenue, and telegraphed General Latta of the situation of affairs, asking if he would immediately telegraph to the Fourth division commanders and order them at once. Probably that had hardly taken place, and in looking out of the window I found a man carrying a boy across his arms with his legs dangling down. I remarked to Major Evans that I feared there had been a conflict. He went out and came back with the report that a boy had been sun-struck. Just then I heard a cry on Liberty avenue, and looking out of the window I found the dead and wounded being carried past, and the crowd rushing down to the workshops of the railroad. At that instant Mr. Cassatt came in. He had been up in the cupola of one of the workshops, and had seen the firing and was the first to communicate the fact to me that the firing had taken place. I had not even heard the reports of the muskets. I presume the noise of the ticking of the telegraphic instruments and the steam which was up in half a dozen locomotives in the adjoining round-house was such that I did not hear the explosion of the pieces. Mr. Cassatt stated that as the mob was rushing round Twenty-eighth street and down Liberty, towards the round-houses, he feared destruction of property. The round-houses were filled with locomotives, the workshops filled full of valuable machinery, and the tracks lined with cars laden with all sorts of valuables of every kind and character, and stated that he feared that property would be destroyed. I had sent word to General Brinton asking him, if necessary, to send a staff officer to me or communicate in person. He came in in a moment or two, stating that he had cleared the tracks; that the mob had fired upon his troops; that many of the men had been knocked down by stones and pieces of iron, and without orders his troops had fired into the crowd; that the tracks were cleared, and that he was ready, and if they had any trains to send them out. It was then stated by some of the railroad officials that they had no crews to send out trains, and Brinton suggested that in as much as nothing could be done that night, and his men were almost in a famished condition, that they be brought into the round-houses or workshops. I then stated that it was the only thing to be done to save the property of the road. I issued orders to General Brinton to bring his troops in and to occupy the round-house, and I sent direct communications to Colonel Howard and Colonel Gray ordering them to bring their regiments in and take possession of the transfer offices, which were long wooden sheds, extending from Twenty-third, I think, to Twenty-fourth street. My orders were obeyed. Captain Breck brought two pieces of his battery in and placed them in position, facing Twenty-sixth street. Brinton's two Gatling guns were brought in and placed in a like position. The gates fronting Twenty-eighth street were closed, and everything at that time in as good a condition as could possibly be. Mr. Pitcairn, superintendent of the western division of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, who had been an observer of all the Twenty-eighth street troubles, came in, and I suggested the propriety that they should go down and send out rations from the depot hotel. They said they would, and they started off for that purpose. Towards evening an express wagon came up. General Brinton and his staff was occupying the second story, then, of the telegraph office, and I had my station there. We were congratulating ourselves upon the fact that we were going to have at least one decent meal. We could see the express wagon coming up with the supper, and just at that time the crowd made a rush upon the wagon and took entire possession, and instead of supper we got broken dishes through the windows, which did not add much to the good feeling existing in the building at that time. And after that an Irishman—I know he was an Irishman by the cut of his jib and his language—drove up on a bob-tailed, lantern-jawed horse and made a very inflammatory speech to the mob right in front of the gate. It was a very ludicrous speech, and the mob seemed to take it as such, because one of them pulled off a piece of board off a fence and struck the horse over the back, and the last we could see of this Irish orator he was going down Liberty avenue. Then a few shots were fired through the windows, and stones thrown, and General Brinton insisted upon firing into the crowd with his Gatling guns. I expostulated with him, telling him the situation was not serious enough to use his guns at that time, because then on Liberty avenue, directly in connection with where we were, there were very few of the rioters. Down Twenty-sixth and up there probably there were a thousand men, women, and children congregated, and particularly women and children, and as his officers would go up to his Gatling guns the active rioters who were on Liberty avenue would get behind the stone wall, leaving Twenty-sixth street exposed. I ran out and called attention to the fact. Says I, "If you fire now instead of killing these people that should be killed, you will kill a large number of women and children who are merely idle spectators," and gave direct orders to one of the officers not to fire that gun. They apparently cooled down and returned into the building, and the thing was repeated. I then gave orders again that until the affairs became more desperate that there was no occasion to use the Gatling gun, because the active rioters would not be injured—that merely women and children would be knocked down in the streets. At eight o'clock—in the neighborhood of eight and nine o'clock—General Brinton had been complaining during this time of the half-famished condition of his troops, and I knew the fact that they were in a half-famished condition, and I knew my own troops were no better off. My commissary—the officer who attended to the commissary of my division—was at Torrens station. General Brinton was at the Union depot, and he asked me the question, "Can you not go down and try to get some provisions of some kind to carry to my troops?" Says I, "I think I can." At that time everything was apparently quiet, and, accompanied by the members of my staff, we started down the railroad track, leaving General Brinton in command at that place, leaving him with orders to hold the position.

Q. Where was Cassatt?

A. Mr. Cassatt had, long before this, gone to the Union Depot hotel. I do not think any of the railroad employés were there at all.

Q. What time was it you started?

A. I think it was between eight and nine o'clock that night. We started down the tracks, and when we reached the depot——

Q. Were you dressed in uniform?

A. Yes; my entire staff was in uniform. All had our swords and everything. When we reached the depot, everything was silent as a graveyard in and about the depot, and we passed down and entered the Union Depot hotel. We went up to General Latta's room, and there found General Latta, Colonel Quay, and Mr. Farr, the Governor's private secretary, Colonel Norris, of the Governor's staff, and several other gentlemen. There seemed to be a very great deal of surprise manifested at the fact that we had got through the crowd and reached the Union depot. I had established my head-quarters there at the beginning of the entire affair, and it was then suggested that, inasmuch as the rioters had blamed me for ordering the firing and killing the citizens, that my remaining in further command of the troops would only aggravate affairs, and that was doing a very material injury to the troops, and it was stated by some one in the room that the rioters had gone through the hotel looking for me. That they had gone from the cellar to the roof, and if found, I and any with me, would be hanged. I thought the threat was an idle one, and wanted to know what they wanted me to do. At that time we could hear bodies of men marching up with drums and fifes, and hear them shouting.

Q. What room was that?