The Land of Fetish

by A. B. Ellis

The following is an instance of how we manage matters in this part of the world. In January 1879, while I was at Accra, an ordinance was put into my hands, entitled the Towns, Police, and Health Ordinance, one clause of which provided for the seizure and destruction of all pigs and goats found at large, and for the punishment of their owners. I was told it would come into force on February 1st of the same year, and was desired to take all necessary measures. Accordingly I sent for the principal chiefs and told them that from February 1st any such animals found in the streets would be impounded and the owners fined; and that, consequently, they must build styes or make enclosures, or adopt some plan for keeping them confined. They did not like it, of course, for your Gold Coast barbarian is the most conservative creature in the world and would rather do almost anything than change old habits; but they saw it had to be done, and on February 1st not a pig or goat was to be seen at large. This happy state of things continued till February 3rd, when a high Colonial official came in from Christiansborg, and, in the course of conversation, said that this ordinance, commonly known as the Pig Ordinance, was not to be put in force. I asked why not; and was told that the Government thought it would not do, that the people would not like it, and there might be a disturbance. I replied that it had actually been in force for three days, and that there had been no difficulty at all; but it was of no use, and I had to send for the chiefs and tell them that they could let their animals run loose again, and of course the nuisance became as great as ever.

Thus at Cape Coast, as at Accra, a ridiculous fear of offending native prejudices and losing popularity has prevented the Government from enforcing sanitary regulations. The consequences of such a state of things would be deplorable in a temperate and healthy climate; what then must they be in a climate which is notoriously the worst in the world? An instance of how this climate, when sanitary arrangements are not made, affects Europeans, may be found in the case of the 104 Marines who were sent to the Gold Coast in 1873. Soon after their arrival 63 per cent. were on the sick-list, and on July 31st the whole detachment had to be sent home, having lost 18 out of their number, or at the rate of 17·30 per cent. per six months. It is the opinion of medical men, well qualified to judge, that nearly half the deaths on the Gold Coast are caused by the shameful neglect of even the most elementary sanitary principles, and if this be the fact, when one remembers the hundreds of valuable lives that have there been sacrificed, it must be acknowledged that successive Governors, who have permitted this state of things to continue, have much to answer for. Colonial officials endeavour to explain away this strange apathy on the part of administrators by saying that the Colonial Office is so tired of hearing the very name of the Gold Coast that that Governor is most praiseworthy in its eyes who allows things to jog along quietly without bother; and that, as the attempt to enforce sanitary measures would cause trouble and expense, no one cares to make it. If this be the true interpretation of the enigma then indeed the Colony is in a bad case, as it is not sufficiently inviting to induce Governors who may, through the possession of private means or influential position, be independent of the office, to go out, and so the present condition of affairs will continue. For my part, however, I am inclined to attribute this policy of laissez faire partly to the craving for popularity so often exhibited by Governors, and partly to the fact that many of them have risen to that position from subordinate posts on the Gold Coast, and that their residence there, and years of use, have dulled the sense of strangeness and disgust which a newcomer at once experiences.

On March 20th I was relieved from my command at Anamaboe, returning to Cape Coast to take up some new duties, and next day I went over to Elmina, where a meeting of the Executive Council was to be held, and where Colonel Justice was to take the oaths and his seat as officer commanding the troops.

From what occurred at that meeting it was evident that the Governor was fully alive to the evil consequences that might ensue from his combined policy of “masterly inaction” and ambiguous warnings, and that he was also determined to continue in the same path. After the events that had occurred had been recapitulated, a conversation took place amongst the members of the Council, in the course of which the Lieutenant-Governor exactly described the position by saying that the Ashantis had sent a formal message and were awaiting a reply, but that the Governor had thought it right to wait a little before giving his answers. He then added that, in his opinion, the Governor was acting wisely. This expression of opinion was, perhaps, what was to be expected from a subordinate under the circumstances; but if it was his bonâ fide opinion it is difficult to understand by what process of reasoning he arrived at it. The longer the Governor delayed sending his reply the longer the Colony would remain in an alarmed and unsettled state, and the longer trade would remain at a standstill. Besides this there was the danger of all communication between the king and the Government ceasing, and of the Ashantis being driven into war through fear of our aggression. These dangers were understood and pressed by the members of the Council; Captain Hope asking if it would not now be better to send a message up and conclude the matter; and Colonel Justice inquiring if European officers might not be sent up to negociate. The Chief Justice was of opinion that the Ashantis were thoroughly frightened, and wished to do all in their power to avert war; that they seemed to believe that we intended to take Coomassie, and that great care would have to be taken to prevent them declaring war with a view to prevent an invasion. All these sound reasonings and suggestions were, however, over-ruled by the Governor, and the Council adjourned sine die, leaving the conduct of negociations entirely in his hands.

Everybody well knew by this time that there was no prospect of a war unless we took the initiative, and the well-known peace proclivities of the political party then in office at home put that out of the question. Universal astonishment, therefore, was felt when it was known that on March 23rd the Governor had interviewed representatives from different tribes and chiefs in the protectorate, and had asked what contingent of fighting-men or carriers each could furnish. Apollonia, Axim, Akim, Assin, Anamaboe, and Elmina, were represented, and the delegates unanimously replied that all their men were fighting-men, and that some consultation would be necessary before they could say how many carriers they could furnish.

Two days after this meeting it was generally known that the Governor intended visiting Accroful and Mansu, and an officer started for the latter town with 145 Kroomen to prepare huts. Daily, after March 25th, quantities of stores and materials were forwarded to Mansu, viâ Effutu, a route which was chosen because it avoided the town of Cape Coast, though it was longer than the ordinary one through that place; and it was evident that a small expedition of some kind was being prepared, concerning which the military were, for some unintelligible reason, to be kept in the dark. In fact, when at this time Colonel Justice informed the Governor that he proposed going, without an escort and accompanied by only two officers, as far as Mansu to examine the road, the latter wrote that the Ashantis knew everything that was going on, that they fully understood the difference between civilians and military, and that, in his opinion, such a visit as that proposed would at once put the settlement of the difficulty beyond the possibility of any other than a settlement to be brought about by a resort to military force; yet all the time men and stores were being sent up country, under the conduct of military officers, thinly disguised as civilians, because they were temporarily in Colonial employ.

As, if the matter were finally to be settled peaceably, a palaver would have to be held with the Ashantis either at Elmina, Cape Coast, or Accra, it seemed an extraordinary proceeding for the Governor, under existing circumstances, to go up country at all. As the Ashantis knew everything that was going on they would know all about the concentration of supplies, carriers, and Houssas at Mansu; and, naturally inferring from this, and from the fact that no answer had been returned to two peaceable messages, that the Government intended to go to war and endeavour to crush them, they would sink all their political differences in the face of a great national calamity, and become once more a united people. Some said that the Governor was going to meet the envoys, whom rumour said were coming down, but such speakers forgot that that would be a most derogatory proceeding on the part of an individual representing Her Majesty: others even asserted that he intended, despite the well-known pacific tendencies of the Home Government, to bring on a war for some purpose of his own. Those, however, who had had the benefit of a former experience of the Governor, knew that he was possessed of an uncontrollable mania for playing at soldiers and commanding small expeditionary forces composed of policemen and carriers, and that this was the real reason of the proposed movement. So inopportune was the time he now selected for this pastime that only by the merest chance, as we shall see later, did he escape from rendering a peaceable solution of the Ashanti difficulty impossible.

On March 27th forty Sefwhee messengers, with two state-swords, who had arrived at Cape Coast on the previous day, had an interview with the Governor at Elmina. It was said they asked for powder, lead, and muskets, as they feared an immediate attack of the Ashantis; and two of them afterwards informed us that a large Ashanti force had appeared on their frontier near the point where the Ashanti territory abuts on both that of Gaman and Sefwhee.

On April 4th the Governor left Elmina for Mansu, taking with him two of the Elmina chiefs, Prince Ansah, and the Ashanti envoys, Enguie and Busumburu, who had remained at Cape Coast ever since the commencement of the palaver. On the 8th news reached Cape Coast privately that an Ashanti embassy, the principal member of which was Prince Buaki, husband of the queen-mother, had left Coomassie to sue for peace; but the messenger who brought this intelligence added, that, on account of news received from the coast, the embassy had suddenly stopped before reaching the northern frontier of Adansi. This report, coming so soon after that of the Sefwhees, seemed to foreshadow a new departure on the part of the king, and many people began to think that we should have a war after all.

What was really occurring in Coomassie may now be told. We have seen that Mensah, despairing of receiving any consideration at the hands of, or an answer from, the Government, had despatched messengers to solicit the intervention of the traders; that these had not succeeded in effecting anything, but had witnessed the arrival of the Second West India regiment from the West Indies. When these men returned to Coomassie with their intelligence, Mensah was thrown into a condition of extreme perplexity: both his peaceable message to the Government and his appeal to the traders had been alike ineffectual, and, notwithstanding his repeated pacific overtures, he heard of nothing but the landing of troops and preparations for war. With Ansah, Enguie, and Busumburu at Cape Coast, he was kept fully informed concerning everything that was occurring, and messengers passed backwards and forwards between the sea-board and Coomassie almost daily. The news of the meeting of his ancient foes at Elmina on March 23rd, and the purpose for which this meeting was convened, was at once conveyed to him; next he heard of the departure of Houssas and carriers with stores for Mansu, of the preparations going on at that place, and of the depôt being formed there; and there seemed a consecutiveness in all that had happened since the arrival of the Governor, beginning with the contemptuous silence with which his message was treated, which could only point to the one conclusion that the British had fully made up their minds to invade Ashanti and overthrow the kingdom. An important palaver was accordingly held at Coomassie, at which every chief of note in the nation was present; and the result was that every difference of opinion amongst themselves was at once put aside, and it was unanimously agreed to defend every foot of Ashanti soil from invasion. Mensah was desirous of making one more effort in the cause of peace, and after some discussion it was decided, not without much opposition, to send an embassy, consisting of deputies from every district of Ashanti, with Prince Buaki at their head, to endeavour to arrange matters with the Colonial Government; while, in accordance with the decision at which they had arrived not to tamely submit to invasion, from 12 to 15,000 men of the Bantama district were called out and sent to Amoaful to watch the approaches to the capital, and arrangements were made for the immediate calling-out of the whole army in case of emergency. Thus we see that the first mobilisation took place long after the downfall of the war-party, that it was intended solely for defence, and was caused by the very natural construction which the king and his chiefs placed upon the events occurring in the Colony.