Buaki. “No, but while I am here the gold will come.”
On May 3rd a review of the troops and Constabulary was held for the benefit of the Ashantis, after which the Governor informed Buaki, that, if he would hand over the two thousand ounces of gold-dust, the whole question would be referred to the Home Government for settlement. About twelve hundred ounces were accordingly paid on May 23rd and the remainder on June 8th, Buaki, at his own request, remaining at Elmina as a hostage for the payment; and the whole sum is now in the hands of the Government. On July 16th Awoosoo, the Gaman refugee, committed suicide by leaping from the walls of Elmina Castle, for which act the Ashantis are no doubt much obliged to him; and, had they known that he was going to make away with himself so conveniently, they probably would not have troubled to send the embassy with the golden axe to demand his surrender.
The Ashanti question of 1881 is now at an end, but war with Ashanti has, however, only been postponed, and is, sooner or later, inevitable, unless we make a new departure in our Gold Coast policy, and, instead of regarding the Ashantis with suspicion as probable foes, enter into close and friendly relations with them. By establishing a British resident at Coomassie we should place matters on quite a different footing; and if we were to appoint a port to which the Ashantis might resort for trade, without having to employ the despised Fantis as middlemen, there would be no further friction. One of the members of the Buaki embassy said to me, on this subject:—
“Give us a town on the coast, say Moree.[10] Let it be ours; let us have a road of our own to it. If you say it is to be half-a-mile broad we will make it so. Then we can come there to trade without having anything to say to those women, the Assins and Fantis, who are really our slaves, and only saved from destruction by you English. Do this, and there will be no more trouble.”
Of course the Ashantis are really desirous of avoiding the payment of customs dues on imported goods, partly on account of the duties themselves, but principally because they consider that, being an independent people, they ought to have a port of their own. This non-payment does not seem to present any insuperable obstacles; goods thus landed duty-free would have to traverse the protectorate by a prescribed route, and a Colonial officer stationed at the point at which they would cross the frontier could examine the permits and see that everything was intact, thus smuggling would be made almost impossible. Were we to make this concession, a European resident would willingly be received in Coomassie, and the presence of such an officer would be the most effectual check upon human sacrifices that could be devised. It is difficult to see by what principle of equity we arrogate to ourselves the right of levying upon goods, intended for the use of an independent nation living beyond our borders, the same duty as is levied upon goods which are to be offered for sale in the Colony. It is just as if France should impose her tariff upon goods consigned to Switzerland, and merely passing through French territory.
By adopting such a policy I am convinced a lasting peace with Ashanti would be assured; and it certainly appears easier to found a peace upon the good-will and interest of the Ashantis themselves than to endeavour to keep them in check by forming a precarious combination of inferior native tribes, each one of which is jealous of the others, and the most powerful of whom, probably the Gamans, would, in the event of Ashanti being totally crushed, assume the position now held by that nation in West Africa, and necessitate the formation of a new combination against them. Should we, as is most probable, pursue our present policy, the end is not difficult to see. Continued friction and a species of armed neutrality cannot be kept up with a haughty and warlike race of savages with impunity; the Ashantis will continue arming themselves with improved weapons, and on the death of King Mensah, should he not first be dethroned, a monarch less peaceably disposed will ascend the throne, some pretext of quarrel will soon be found, and another Ashanti war will take place. Of course the Ashantis will be crushed, though not without much expenditure of blood and money, but what shall we do then? Shall we annex their territory or again retire? If the former, we shall find ourselves face to face with the warlike Mohammedan tribes of the inland plateau; and if the latter, the present state of affairs will continue, if not with Ashanti as the dominant power, with some other tribe that has stepped into its place.
In the much-to-be-deplored event of future hostilities with Ashanti, recent explorations made by Mr. McLaren, of the firm of Messrs. Alex. Miller Brothers, seem to show that the Volta river is the proper base of operations. That gentleman, in October 1879, crossed the rapids on the Volta, between Medica and Aquamoo, in the steam-launch “Agnes,” which was the first European-built craft that had ever reached the latter town. Prior to this the rapids had been considered impassable, but it is now known that in ordinary seasons they can be passed by steamers of sufficient power, drawing six feet of water, from the beginning of September to the middle or end of November.
The Volta itself has been found to be navigable to the falls of Klatchie, from 300 to 350 miles from Addah; but it is by its principal confluent, the Afram, that Coomassie should be approached. The Afram discharges into the Volta at the town of Ourahei on the western bank of the latter, about 130 miles from the sea, and to this town, prior to the invasion of Crepe by the Ashanti general Adu Buffo in 1869, great numbers of Ashantis used to resort for purposes of trade, Ourahei itself being only six days’ journey from Coomassie through an open grassy country. The Afram is both wide and deep, though a good deal obstructed by snags and fallen timber, and flows through Kwâow, at a distance of six hours’ journey to the north of Abeliffi, which place is only four days’ easy journey from Coomassie. Further than Kwâow the Afram has not yet been explored, but natives report that it has its source in a lake. If this be the case the lake must be either the Busum Echuy near Djuabin, or lake Burro to the west of the desert of Ghofan, far to the north-east of Coomassie. Its general direction from Kwâow is north-west. Even should the Afram be navigable no further than Kwâow troops could there be disembarked, where there would be only four days’ marching, as against ten or twelve from Cape Coast to Coomassie, and that too through open country in which the Ashanti never appears to advantage as a soldier.
In the present year, 1882, signs have not been wanting to show that the Ashantis are still pursuing their astute and unscrupulous policy with that unwearying tenacity of purpose which has ever distinguished them. A war with the Gaman party which supported King Ajiman was one of the first important events of the year, and now at the time of writing it is reported from Cape Coast that the Adansis are flocking in large numbers across the Prah, complaining that, in their own country, neither their lives nor property are safe from Ashanti aggression. In fact, the Ashantis, having learned for the first time during the scare in 1881 that we were not bound by any treaty obligations to defend Adansi, are now beginning to feel their way, with a view to recovering their dominion over that territory: this done, the last vestige of the treaty of Fommanah will have disappeared. They will undoubtedly compass their ends before long unless checked by us in some way; which, as the doctrine of non-intervention still prevails, is not probable. The prestige the Ashantis will gain will be great, British influence beyond our borders must proportionately decline, and we shall find ourselves in exactly the same position as we were in 1873; with this difference, that the Ashantis will be better armed, and, having learnt wisdom from past reverses, will know better how to cope with us should we again attempt to advance on their capital.