"Ramming, that expedient of despair, was not attempted. Torpedoing, despite the opportunities afforded, was estopped by the quick service of rapid-fire guns on board an inferior but superbly handled construction, and that final effort, a 'charge through,' was never allowed to challenge the combined energies of our fleet. If audacity could have merited success, these Spaniards deserved much, but here the marrow of the war proverb was not with them.
"Pitted against similar ships, even in superior numbers, some of the fleeing cruisers might have slipped seaward in hot haste for the breaking of the Havana blockade. Failing that, all might have concentrated an assault upon certain selected vessels and found consolation for final defeat in the foundering hulls of their enemy. But audacity did not count, individual bravery went for naught; because, while heavier constructions barred the way, and superior guns smashed the pathways of escape, energized skill overcame untrained courage and patient discipline crushed unorganized effort.
"The battleships not only fought the armored cruisers in a long, stern chase down the shore, but destroying as they ran, finally forced them blazing in their own wrecks upon a hostile coast. The torpedo boat destroyers engaged single handed by the Gloucester succumbed so quickly to inferior armament and speed that their value in a day attack, or, indeed, their value at any time save as weapons of surprise, need no longer be reckoned with. This will be a rude awakening to the zealots who had seen in this weapon the downfall of the ship of the fighting line, but it will be a heart-cheering confirmation to the loyal seamen who in season and out have never ceased to proclaim that the integrity of sea nations rests on battleships and the well-served guns of a fleet."
"I think sometimes if it had not been for the work of the Oregon the Colon might have got away," was the statement made by an admiral on the retired list. "I am not sure that the Brooklyn, with all her speed, could have stopped the Colon, but I think it quite likely that the New York would have finally overtaken the Colon and stopped her."
More emphasis was laid upon the speed of the Oregon and the closeness of her position than upon her 13-inch shells, one of which played such havoc. The admiral was not seemingly impressed with the difference in effectiveness between the guns of large and small calibre, but continued to lay stress on the admirable speed of the Oregon.
"But," he continued, "the war has proved nothing so far as the navy is concerned. The Spaniards showed no enterprise. If we had come up against the navy of England there would have been some basis for a conclusion, but shooting in the air, as the Spaniards did, proves nothing. They had a fine fleet, with most modern equipment, and yet they could kill only one man in the whole encounter."
Admiral Sir George Elliot, of the British Navy, considers that at least five important lessons have been taught by the war. His opinions are as follows:
"First, in state of peace be fully prepared for war in every respect; second, the value of adequately-protected coaling stations; third, the value of superior speed for the cruiser class, and especially for the more weakly-armored vessels; fourth, the naval defense of seaports by gunboats and the raising of the naval volunteer corps as an integral portion of the naval reserve forces; fifth, that great importance be attached to a steady gun platform for quick-firing guns, looking to the small number of hits compared with numerous shots fired.
"In this connection," said Sir George Elliot, "I am informed that the Americans are likely to adopt Captain Hodgett's form of bottom for their new ships, which must give greater steadiness than bilge keels."
Admiral Sir Henry Nicholson, who was captain of the Temeraire at the bombardment of Alexandria, and has since been commander in chief at the Cape of Good Hope and at the Nore, has spoken thus: