PART IV
THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE
CHAPTER XXXVIII
THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE
AN opinion commonly expressed by philosophers is that the function of physicists should be to weigh, measure, tabulate, discover new chemical elements, new facts; and the aim of mathematicians, to solve equations. That so long as the scientist restricts himself to investigations of this sort, he is proceeding along strictly scientific lines and his efforts should be encouraged, but that when he proceeds to discuss the implications of his discoveries and to draw conclusions on the subject of space, time, energy, laws of nature, he is getting beyond his depth, and encroaching on the field of the metaphysician.
Bergson expresses this attitude very clearly in his book, “Duration and Simultaneity.” He informs us that the reason mathematicians have been so deceived by the significance of the theory of relativity, to the point of wishing to substitute space-time for separate space and time, lies in their lack of philosophical insight. They err by wishing to attribute a metaphysical significance to a concept which (according to Bergson) represents a mere mathematical fiction.
To these and kindred accusations, scientists (when they retort at all) will answer, with Kelvin: “Mathematics is the only true metaphysics.” Clifford, in his popular essays, voices the scientific attitude with increased emphasis when he writes: “The name philosopher, which meant originally ‘lover of wisdom,’ has come in some strange way to mean a man who thinks it his business to explain everything in a certain number of large books. It will be found, I think, that in proportion to his colossal ignorance is the perfection and symmetry of the system which he sets up; because it is so much easier to put an empty room tidy than a full one.” These opinions prove that there exists a definite misunderstanding between scientists and philosophers; a misunderstanding which might easily have been avoided had philosophers possessed a proper realisation of their inevitable limitations when discussing scientific matters. The simplest way to approach the source of the trouble appears to be to analyse the methods of scientists and ascertain in what respect they differ from those of philosophers.
The development of all the branches of physical science has proceeded roughly along the same lines. First we witness an accumulation of experimental and observational facts, furnished by crude observation and by the discoveries of the laboratory workers. Then, thanks to the efforts of the theoretical investigators, this raw material is co-ordinated into a consistent whole. In this way, out of a disconnected series of facts, a coherent doctrine or science is born. History proves that with very few exceptions (illustrated by such men as Newton, Archimedes and also Hertz), the most brilliant experimenters had but little theorising ability; and that, vice versa, the ablest theoretical scientists made poor laboratory men. We are thus led to differentiate between two distinct types of scientists: the practical and the theoretical workers. For example, in physics, Maxwell, Planck and Einstein must be placed under the heading of theoretical investigators, whereas Hertz and Michelson are splendid illustrations of able experimenters.
In modern science, at least in physical science, these works of co-ordination can be attempted only through the medium of advanced mathematical analysis; hence the theoretical physicists must necessarily possess a profound knowledge of mathematics. Yet they are not, properly speaking, great mathematicians. Mathematics, for the theoretical physicists, constitutes but a tool, a means of arriving at a co-ordination of the physical facts. These men have never entered into the study of mathematics as an art in itself; they have never forged new mathematical instruments, never made mathematical discoveries. Thus, they cannot be classed with mathematicians of the calibre of Lagrange, Gauss, Riemann or Poincaré, to whom modern mathematics owes its existence. Just as we were compelled to make a distinction between experimenters and theoretical physicists, so once again we must make a distinction between theoretical physicists and pure mathematicians. Again, with very few exceptions, as exemplified by Fourier, Poisson, Poincaré, Minkowski and Weyl, pure mathematicians have rarely contributed directly to the advancement of theoretical physics, although indirectly, of course, their discoveries have been made use of by the physicists. Since they are neither great mathematicians nor able experimenters, what are we to call such men as Maxwell, Lorentz and Einstein?
If we concede that the name philosopher should apply to those who are concerned more especially with a harmonisation of the whole than with the seeking of individual facts, or, again, with a general view of things rather than with a restricted view, we must agree that the theoretical physicists must be called philosophers. They are, then, the philosophers of the inorganic world, just as the pure mathematicians might be called the philosophers of abstract relations.
Now, as we have said, the facts which these scientific philosophers are seeking to co-ordinate are of a restricted species; they are mathematical, physical and chemical in nature; hence it is clear that there is room for a more general type of philosopher—a super-philosopher, as it were—whose facts would comprise all the spheres of human knowledge, including consciousness, emotions and the relationships between mind and matter. The traditional philosophers—or shall we say the lay philosophers, since we are discussing scientific matters?—aspire to be placed in this category of thinkers.
It would appear, then, that theoretical scientists, and lay philosophers have much in common; they differ only in the scope of the facts they are seeking to co-ordinate. But here is where the first breach arises. The theoretical scientist proceeds with the utmost caution and considers himself at liberty to theorise only after a sufficient number of facts have been established by experiment and observation; till then he remains silent. This cautious attitude is evidenced even in the most revolutionary theories, such as those of relativity and of the quanta. It was not one, nor two, nor even three of the negative experiments in electromagnetics that drove Einstein towards his revolutionary theory; it was the whole body of electrodynamics. Even so, he formulated his solution only after a number of more classical attempts to solve the same difficulties had failed.