CHAPTER III.
VITALISM.
Its Extreme Forms—Early Vitalism, and Modern Neo-vitalism—Advantage of distinguishing between Soul and Life—§ 1. The Vitalism of Barthez—Its Extension—The Seat of the Vital Principle—The Vital Knot—The Vital Tripod—Decentralisation of the Vital Principle—§ 2. The Doctrine of Vital Properties—Galen, Van Helmont, Xavier Bichat, and Cuvier—Vital and Physical Properties antagonistic—§ 3. Scientific Neo-vitalism—Heidenhain—§ 4. Philosophical Neo-vitalism—Reinke.
Extreme Forms: Early Vitalism and Modern Neo-vitalism.—Contemporary neo-vitalism has weakened primitive vitalism in some important points. The latter made of the vital fact something quite specific, irreducible either to the phenomena of general physics or to those of thought. It absolutely isolated life, separating it above from the soul, and below from inanimate matter. This sequestration is nowadays much less rigorous. On the psychical side the barrier remains, but it is lowered on the material side. The neo-vitalists of to-day recognize that the laws of physics and chemistry are observed within, as well as without, the living body; the same natural forces intervene in both, only they are “otherwise directed.”
The vital principle of early times was a kind of anthromorphic, pagan divinity. To Aristotle, this force, the anima, the Psyche, worked, so to speak, with human hands. According to the well-known expression, its situation in the human body corresponds to that of a pilot on a vessel, or to that of a sculptor or his assistant before the marble or clay. And, in fact, we have no other clear image of a cause external to the object. We have no other representation of a force external to matter than that which is offered by the craftsman making an object, or in general by the human being with his activity, free, or supposed to be free, and directed towards an end to be realized.
Personifications of this kind, the mythological entities, the imaginary beings, the ontological fictions, which ever filled the stage in the mind of our predecessors, have definitely disappeared; no longer have they a place in the scientific explanations of our time. The neo-vitalists replace them by the idea of direction, which is another form of the same idea of finality. The series of second causes in the living being seems to be regulated in conformity with a plan, and directed with a view to carrying it out. The tendency which exists in every being to carry out this plan,—that is to say, the tendency towards its end,—gives the impulse that is necessary to carry it out. Neo-vitalists claim that vital force directs the phenomena which it does not produce, and which are in reality carried out by the general forces of physics and chemistry.
Thus, the directing impulse, considered as really active, is the last concession of modern vitalism. If we go further, and if we refuse to the directing idea executive power and efficient activity, the vital principle is weakened, and we abandon the doctrine. We can no longer invoke it. We cease to be vitalists if the part played by the vital principle is thus far restricted. At first it was both the author of the plan and the universal architect of the organic edifice; it is now only the architect directing his workmen, and they are physical and chemical agents. It is now reduced to the plan of the work, and even this plan has no objective existence; it is now only an idea. It has only a shadow of reality. To this it has been reduced by certain biologists. For this we may thank Claude Bernard; and he has thereby placed himself outside and beyond the weakest form of vitalism. He did not consider the idea of direction as a real principle. The connection of phenomena, their harmony, their conformity to a plan grasped by the intellect, their fitness for a purpose known to the intellect, are to him but a mental necessity, a metaphysical concept. The plan which is carried out has only a subjective existence; the directing force has no efficient virtue, no executive power; it does not emerge from the intellectual domain in which it took its rise, and does not “react on the phenomena which enabled the mind to create it.”
It is between these two extreme incarnations of the vital principle, on the one hand an executive agent, on the other a simple directing plan, that the motley procession of vitalist doctrines passes on its way. At the point of departure we have a vital force, personified, acting, as we have stated, as if with human hands fashioning obedient matter; this is the pure and primitive form of the theory. At the other extreme we have a vital force which is now only a directing idea, without objective existence, and without an executive rôle; a mere concept by which the mind gathers together and conceives of a succession of physico-chemical phenomena. On this side we are brought into touch with monism.
The Reasons given by the Vitalists for distinguishing Soul from Life.—It is, in particular, on the opposite side, in the psychical world, that the early vitalists professed to entrench themselves. We have just seen that their doctrines were not so subtle as those of to-day; the vital principle to them was a real agent, and not an ideal plan in the process of being carried out. But they distinguished this spiritual principle from another co-existent with it in superior living beings—at any rate, in man: the thinking soul. They boldly distinguished between them, because the activity of the one is manifested by knowledge and volition, while on the contrary, the manifestations of the other for the most part escape both consciousness and volition.
In fact, we know nothing of what goes on in the normal state of our organs. Their perfect performance of their functions is translated to us solely by an obscure feeling of comfort. We do not feel the beating of the heart, the periodic dilations of the arteries, the movements of the lungs or intestine, the glands at their work of secretion, or the thousand reflex manifestations of our nervous system. The soul, which is conscious of itself, is nevertheless ignorant of all this vital movement, and is therefore external to it.
This is the view of all the philosophers of antiquity. Pythagoras distinguished the real soul, the thinking soul, the Nous, the intelligent and immortal principle, characterized by the attributes of consciousness and volition, from the vital principle, the Psyche, which gives breath and animation to the body, and which is a soul of secondary majesty, active, transient, and mortal. Aristotle did the same. On the one side he placed the soul properly so called, the Nous or intellect—that is to say, the understanding with its rational intelligence; on the other side was the directing principle of life, the irrational and vegetative Psyche.