1903
The sudden demand for a re-issue of this volume prevents my making any alterations beyond the correction of a number of misprints. Had the opportunity offered, I should have been glad, while leaving the main argument essentially as it stands, to have attempted certain improvements in details. I may mention in particular, as the most important of the changes I could have wished to make, that the treatment of the problem of infinite regress and of the Kantian antinomies would have been remodelled, and I trust improved, as a consequence of study of the works of Mr. Bertrand Russell and M. Couturat.
I should like to take this opportunity of thanking all those who have been kind enough to favour me with criticisms of the book.
CONTENTS
| BOOK I | ||
| GENERAL NOTIONS | ||
| CHAPTER I | ||
| THE PROBLEM OF THE METAPHYSICIAN | ||
| PAGE | ||
| [#§1.] | The generality and simplicity of the metaphysical problem make it difficult to define the study. [§2.] Problem is suggested by the presence of contradictions in ordinary experience. [§3.]. By making a distinction between reality and appearance the sciences remove some of these contradictions, but themselves lead to further difficulties of the same sort; hence the need for systematic inquiry into the meaning of the distinction between the real and the apparent, and the general character of reality as such. [§4.]. Metaphysics, as an inquiry into the ultimate meaning of “reality,” is akin to poetry and religion, but differs from them in its scientific character, from the mathematical and experimental sciences in its method, from common scepticism in the critical nature of its methods as well as in its positive purpose. [§5.]. The study is difficult (a) because of the generality of its problems, (b) and because we cannot employ diagrams or physical experiments. [§6.]. The objection that Metaphysics is an impossibility may be shown in all its forms to rest upon self-contradictory assumptions of a metaphysical kind. [§7.]. The minor objections that, if possible, the science is superfluous, or at least stationary, may be met with equal ease. [§8.] Metaphysics is partly akin to the mystical tendency, but differs from mysticism in virtue of its positive interest in the world of appearances, as well as by its scientific method. [§9.]. It agrees with logic in the generality of its scope, but differs in being concerned with the real, whereas logic is primarily concerned with the inferrible. [§10.] The problems of the so-called Theory of Knowledge are really metaphysical. | [1] |
| CHAPTER II | ||
| THE METAPHYSICAL CRITERION AND THE METAPHYSICAL METHOD | ||
| [§ 1.] | In the principle that “Reality is not self-contradictory” we have a universal and certain criterion of reality which is not merely negative, but implies the positive assertion that reality is a consistent system. [§ 2.] The validity of this criterion is not affected by the suggestion that it may be merely a Logical Law; [§ 3.] Nor by the raising of doubt whether all our knowledge is not merely “relative,” a doubt which is itself meaningless. [§ 4.] As to the material of the system, it is experience or immediate psychical fact. [§ 5.] It must be actual experience, not mere “possibilities” of experience; but actual experience must not be identified with “sensation.” [§ 6.] Nor must we assume that experience consists of subjects and their states; nor again, that it is a mere succession of “states of consciousness.” [§ 7.] The differentia of matter of experience is its immediacy, i.e. its combination in a single whole of the two aspects of existence and content. [§8.] This union of existence and content is broken up in reflective knowledge or thought, but may be restored at a higher level. [§ 9.] Experience further always appears to be implicitly complex in respect of its content. [§ 10.] An adequate apprehension of reality would only be possible in the form of a complete or “pure” experience, at once all-inclusive, systematic, and direct. The problem of Metaphysics is to ascertain['ascertain] what would be the general or formal character of such an experience, and how far the various provinces of our human experience and knowledge approximate to it. The knowledge Metaphysics can give us of the ultimate nature of reality as it would be present in a complete experience, though imperfect, is final as far as it goes. [§ 11.] As to the method of Metaphysics, it must be analytical, critical, non-empirical, and non-inductive. It may also be called a priori if we carefully avoid confusing the a priori with the psychologically primitive. Why our method cannot be the Hegelian Dialectic | [18] |
| CHAPTER III | ||
| THE SUB-DIVISIONS OF METAPHYSICS | ||
| [§ 1.] | The traditional sub-division of Metaphysics into Ontology, Cosmology, Rational Psychology, common to all the great modern constructive systems. [§ 2.] Precise sense in which we adopt these divisions for the purposes of our own treatment of the subject. [§ 3.] Relation of Cosmology and Rational Psychology to the empirical sciences | [42] |
| BOOK II | ||
| ONTOLOGY—THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF REALITY | ||
| CHAPTER I | ||
| REALITY AND EXPERIENCE | ||
| [§ 1.] | In a sense “reality” for each of us means that of which he must take account if his special purposes are to find fulfilment. [§ 2.] But ultimately the world must possess a structure of which all purposes, each in its own way, must take account. This is the “Ultimate Reality” or “Absolute” of Metaphysics. In Metaphysics we regard it from the special standpoint of the scientific intellect. There are other legitimate attitudes towards it, e.g., that of practical religion. [§ 3.] The inseparability of reality from immediate experience involves the recognition of it as teleological and as uniquely individual. [§ 4.] The experience within which all reality falls cannot be my own, nor yet the “collective” experience of the aggregate of conscious beings. It must be an individual experience which apprehends the totality of existence as the harmonious embodiment of a single “purpose.” The nearest analogue our own life presents to such a type of experience is to be found in the satisfied insight of personal love. [§ 5.] The experience of such an “Absolute” must not be thought of as a mere reduplication of our own, or of the scientific hypotheses by which we co-ordinate facts for the purposes of inference. [§ 6.] Our conception is closely connected with that of Berkeley, from which it differs by the stress it lays on the purposive and selective aspect of experience. [§ 7.] Realism, both of the Agnostic and of the Dogmatic type, is incompatible with the meaning we have been led to attach to “reality.” But Agnosticism is justified in insisting on the limitations of our knowledge of Reality, and Dogmatic Realism in rejecting the identification of Reality with experience as a merely cognitive function of finite percipients. [§ 8.] Subjectivism, according to which all that I know is states of my own “consciousness,” is irreconcilable with the admitted facts of life, and arises from the psychological fallacy of “introjection” | [50] |
| CHAPTER II | ||
| THE SYSTEMATIC UNITY OF REALITY | ||
| [§ 1.] | The problem whether Reality is ultimately One or Many is inevitably suggested to us by the diverse aspects of our own direct experience of the world. The different theories may be classed, according to their solution of this problem, as Monistic, Pluralistic, and Monadistic. [§2.] Pluralism starts from the presumed fact of the mutual independence of human selves, and teaches that this independence of each other belongs to all real beings. But (a) the independence with which experience presents us is never complete, nor the unity of the “selves” perfect. (b) The theory is inconsistent with the systematic character of all reality as presupposed in both knowledge and action. [§ 3.] Monadism again makes the systematic unity of the real either an illusion or an inexplicable accident. [§ 4.] Reality, because systematic, must be the expression of a single principle in and through a multiplicity. The unity and multiplicity must both be real, and each must necessarily involve the other. [§ 5.] If both are to be equally real, the whole system must be a single experience, and its constituents must also be experiences. A perfect systematic whole can be neither an aggregate, nor a mechanical whole of parts, nor an organism. The whole must exist for the parts, and they for it. [§ 6.] This may also be expressed by saying that Reality is a subject which is the unity of subordinate subjects, or an individual of which the constituents are lesser individuals. [§ 7.] The nearest familiar analogue to such a systematic whole would be the relation between our whole “self” and the partial mental systems or lesser “selves.” [§ 8.] The nearest historic parallel to this view is to be found in Spinoza’s theory of the relation of the human mind to the “infinite intellect of God” | [84] |
| CHAPTER III | ||
| REALITY AND ITS APPEARANCES—THE DEGREES OF REALITY | ||
| [§ 1.] | Reality being a single systematic whole, the nature of its constituent elements is only finally intelligible in the light of the whole system. Hence each of its “appearances,” if considered as a whole in itself, must be more or less contradictory. [§ 2.] But some “appearances” exhibit the structure of the whole more adequately than others, and have therefore a higher degree of reality. [§ 3.] This conception of degree of reality may be illustrated by comparison with the successive orders of infinites and infinitesimals in Mathematics. It would be the task of a complete Philosophy to assign the contents of the world to their proper place in the series of “orders” of reality. [§ 4.] In general any subordinate whole is real in proportion as it is a self-contained whole. And it is a self-contained whole in proportion as it is (a) comprehensive, (b) systematic; that is, a thing is real just so far as it is truly individual. [§ 5.] The two criteria of individuality, though ultimately coincident, tend in particular cases to fall apart for our insight, owing to the limitation of human knowledge. [§ 6.] Ultimately only the whole system of experience is completely individual, all other individuality is approximate. [§ 7.] In other words, the whole system of experience is an infinite individual, all subordinate individuality is finite. Comparison of t“his position with the doctrines of Leibnitz. [§ 8.] Recapitulatory statement of the relation of Reality to its Appearances | [104] |
| CHAPTER IV | ||
| THE WORLD OF THINGS—(1) SUBSTANCE, QUALITY, AND RELATION | ||
| [§ 1.] | The natural or pre-scientific view of the world regards it as a plurality of “things,” each possessing qualities, standing in relation to others, and interacting with them. [§ 2.] Hence arise four problems: those of the Unity of the Thing, of Substance and Quality, of Relation, of Causality. [§ 3.] No simple answer can be given to the question, What is one thing? The Unity of the Thing is one of teleological structure, and this is a matter of degree, and also largely of our own subjective point of view. [§ 4.] Substance and Quality. The identification of the substance of things with their primary qualities, though useful in physical science, is metaphysically unjustifiable. [§ 5.] Substance as an “unknowable substratum of qualities” adds nothing to our understanding of their connection. [§ 6.] The thing cannot be a mere collection of qualities without internal unity. [§ 7.] The conception of a thing as the law or mode of relation of its states useful but metaphysically unsatisfactory. Ultimately the many can be contained in the one only by “representation”; the unity in things must be that of an individual experience. [§ 8.] Relation. We can neither reduce qualities to relations nor relations to qualities. [§ 9.] Again, the attempt to conceive Reality as qualities in relation leads to the indefinite regress. [§10.] We cannot escape this difficulty by taking all relations as “external.” And Professor Royce’s vindication of the indefinite regress seems to depend on the uncriticised application of the inadequate category of whole and part to ultimate Reality. The union of the one and the many in concrete experience is ultra-relational. Supplementary Note: Dr. Stout’s reply to Mr. Bradley | [120] |
| CHAPTER V | ||
| THE WORLD OF THINGS—(2) CHANGE AND CAUSALITY | ||
| [§ 1.] | The conception of things as interacting leads to the two problems of Change and Causality. The paradoxical character of change due to the fact that only what is permanent can change. [§ 2.] Change is succession within an identity; this identity, like that of Substance, must be teleological, i.e. must be an identity of plan or end pervading the process of change. [§ 3.] Thus all change falls under the logical category of Ground and Consequence, which becomes in its application to succession in time the Principle of Sufficient Reason. [§ 4.] Causality. Cause—in the modern popular and scientific sense—means the ground of a change when taken to be completely contained in preceding changes. That every change has its complete ground in preceding changes is neither an axiom nor an empirically ascertained truth, but a postulate suggested by our practical needs. [§ 5.] In the last resort the postulate cannot be true; the dependence between events cannot be one-sided. The real justification for our use of the postulate is its practical success. [§ 6.] Origin of the conception of Cause anthropomorphic. [§ 7.] Puzzles about Causation. (1) Continuity. Causation must be continuous, and yet in a continuous process there can be no distinction of cause from effect. Cause must be and yet cannot be prior in time to effect. [§ 8.] (2) The indefinite regress in causation. [§ 9.] (3) Plurality of Causes. Plurality of Causes is ultimately a logical contradiction, but in any form in which the causal postulate is of practical use it must recognise plurality. [§ 10.] The “necessity” of the causal relation psychological and subjective. [§ 11.] Immanent and Transeunt Causality: Consistent Pluralism must deny transeunt Causation; but cannot do so successfully. [§ 12.] Both transeunt and immanent Causality are ultimately appearance | [158] |
| BOOK III | ||
| COSMOLOGY—THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE | ||
| CHAPTER I | ||
| INTRODUCTORY | ||
| [§ 1.] | Distinction between the experimental sciences and a Philosophy of Nature and Mind. The former concerned with the description, the latter with the interpretation of facts. [§ 2.] Cosmology is the critical examination of the special characteristics of the physical order. Its main problems are: (1) The problem of the nature of Material Existence; (2) problem of the justification of the concept of the Mechanical Uniformity of Nature; (3) problems of Space and Time; (4) problem of the Significance of Evolution; (5) problem of the Place of descriptive Physical Science in the system of Human Knowledge | [191] |
| CHAPTER II | ||
| THE PROBLEM OF MATTER | ||
| [§ 1.] | The physical order, because dependent for its perceived qualities on the sense-organs of the percipient, must be the appearance of a more ultimate reality which is non-physical. [§ 2.] Berkeley’s criticism is fatal to the identification of this reality with “material substance.” The logical consequence of Berkeley’s doctrine that the esse of sensible things is percipi, would be the subjectivist view that the physical order is only a complex of presentations. [§ 3.] But this is clearly not the case with that part of the physical order which consists of the bodies of my fellow-men. These have an existence, as centres of feeling, over and above their existence as presentations to my senses. [§ 4.] As the bodies of my fellows are connected in one system with the rest of the physical order, that order as a whole must have the same kind of reality which belongs to them. It must be the presentation to our sense of a system or complex of systems of experiencing subjects; the apparent absence of life and purpose from inorganic nature must be due to our inability to enter into a direct communion of interest with its members. [§ 5.] Some consequences of this view | [198] |
| CHAPTER III | ||
| THE MEANING OF LAW | ||
| [§ 1.] | The popular conception of the physical order as exhibiting a rigid mechanical conformity to general laws, conflicts with our metaphysical interpretation. [§ 2.] Our interpretation would, however, admit of the establishment of averages or approximately realised uniformities by the statistical method, which deals with occurrence en bloc to the neglect of their individual detail. [§ 3.] “Uniformity” in nature is neither an axiom nor an empirically verifiable fact, but a postulate. A consideration of the methods actually employed for the establishment of such uniformities or “laws” of nature shows that we have no guarantee that actual concrete cases exhibit exact conformity to law. [§ 4.] Uniformity is a postulate arising from our need of practical rules for the control of nature. It need not for this purpose be exact, and in point of fact our scientific formulæ are only exact so long as they remain abstract and hypothetical. They do not enable us to determine the actual course of an individual process with certainty. [§ 5.] The concept of the physical order as mechanical is the abstract expression of the postulate, and is therefore essential to the empirical sciences which deal with the physical order. [§ 6.] Consideration of the character of genuine machines suggests that the mechanical only exists as a subordinate aspect of processes which, in their full nature, are intelligent and purposive | [216] |
| CHAPTER IV | ||
| SPACE AND TIME | ||
| [§ 1.] | Are time and space ultimately real or only phenomenal? [§ 2.] The space and time of perception are limited, sensibly continuous, and consist of a quantitative element together with a qualitative character dependent on relation to the here and now of immediate individual feeling. [§ 3.] Conceptual space and time are created from the perceptual data by a combined process of synthesis, analysis, and abstraction. [§ 4.] They are unlimited, infinitely divisible, and there is valid positive ground for regarding them as mathematically continuous. Thus they form infinite continuous series of positions. They involve abstraction from all reference to the here and now of immediate feeling, and are thus homogeneous, i.e. the positions in them are indistinguishable. They are also commonly taken to be unities. [§ 5.] Perceptual space and time cannot be ultimately real, because they involve reference to the here and now of a finite experience; conceptual space and time cannot be ultimately real, because they contain no principle of internal distinction, and are thus not individual. [§ 6.] The attempt to take space and time as real leads to the difficulty about qualities and relations, and so to the indefinite regress. [§ 7.] Space and time contain no principle of unity; there may be many space and time orders in the Absolute which have no spatial or temporal connection with each other. [§ 8.] The antinomies of the infinite divisibility and extent of space and time arise from the indefinite regress involved in the scheme of qualities and relations, and are insoluble so long as the space and time construction is taken for Reality. [§ 9.] The space and time order is an imperfect phenomenal manifestation of the logical relation between the inner purposive lives of finite individuals. Time is an inevitable aspect of finite experience. How space and time are transcended in the Absolute experience we cannot say | [241] |
| CHAPTER V | ||
| SOME CONDITIONS OF EVOLUTION | ||
| [§ 1.] | The concept of evolution['evolution] an attempt to interpret natural processes in terms of individual growth. [§ 2.] Evolution means change culminating in an end which is the result of the process and is qualitatively new. The concept is thus teleological. [§ 3.] Evolution, being teleological, is essentially either progress or degeneration. If it is more than illusion, there must be real ends in the physical order. And ends can only be real as subjective interests of sentient beings which are actualised by the process of change. [§ 4.] Thus all evolution must take place within an individual subject. [§ 5.] Further, the subject of evolution must be a finite individual. All attempts to make “evolution” a property of the whole of Reality lead to the infinite regress. [§ 6.] The distinction between progressive evolution and degeneration has an “objective” basis in the metaphysical distinction between higher and lower degrees of individuality. [§ 7.] In the evolutionary process, old individuals disappear and fresh ones originate. Hence evolution is incompatible with the view that Reality consists of a plurality of ultimately independent finite individuals | [265] |
| CHAPTER VI | ||
| THE LOGICAL CHARACTER OF DESCRIPTIVE SCIENCE | ||
| [§ 1.] | Scientific description may be contrasted with philosophical or teleological interpretation, but the contrast is not absolute. [§ 2.] The primary end of all scientific description is intercommunication with a view to active co-operation. Hence all such description is necessarily restricted to objects capable of being experienced in the same way by a plurality of individuals. [§ 3.] A second end of scientific description is the economising of intellectual labour by the creation of general rules for dealing with typical situations in the environment. In the course of evolution this object becomes partially independent of the former. [§ 4.] From the interest in formulating general rules arise the three fundamental postulates of physical science, the postulates of Uniformity, Mechanical Law, and Causal Determination. [§ 5.] The mechanical view of physical Nature determined by these three postulates is systematically carried out only in the abstract science of Mechanics; hence the logical completion of the descriptive process would mean the reduction of all descriptive science to Mechanics. That the chemical, biological, and psychological sciences contain elements which cannot be reduced to mechanical terms, is due to the fact that their descriptions are inspired by æsthetic and historical as well as by primarily “scientific” interests. [§ 6.] The analysis of such leading concepts of mechanical Physics as the Conservation of Mass and of Energy shows them to have only relative validity | [279] |
| BOOK IV | ||
| RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY—THE INTERPRETATION OF LIFE | ||
| CHAPTER I | ||
| THE LOGICAL CHARACTER OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE | ||
| [§ 1.] | The various sciences which deal with the interpretation of human life all avail themselves of the fundamental categories of Psychology. Hence we must ask how the concepts of Psychology are related to actual experience. [§ 2.] Psychology is a body of abstract descriptive formulæ, not a direct transcript of the individual processes of real life. It presupposes the previous construction of the physical order. [§ 3.] The psychological conception of conscious life as a succession of “mental states” or “images” is a transformation of actual experience devised primarily to account for the experience of other subjects, and subsequently extended to my own. The transformation is effected by the hypothesis of “introjection.” §§ 4, 5. The logical justification of the psychological transformation of facts is twofold. The psychological scheme serves partly to fill up the gaps in our theories of physiological Mechanism, and also, in respect of the teleological categories of Psychology, to describe the course of human conduct in a form capable of ethical and historical appreciation. Psychology may legitimately employ both mechanical and teleological categories. [§ 6.] The objections sometimes brought against the possibility of (a) psychological, (b) teleological description are untenable | [294] |
| CHAPTER II | ||
| THE PROBLEM OF SOUL AND BODY | ||
| [§ 1.] | The problem of psychophysical connection has to do with the correlation of scientific abstractions, not of given facts of experience. [§ 2.] The “consciousness” of Psychology is thus not the same thing as the finite individual subject of experience, and Reality must not be said to consist of “minds” in the psychologist’s sense. Again, we must not assume a priori that there can be only one working hypothesis of psychophysical connection. [§ 3.] The possible hypotheses may be reduced to three, Epiphenomenalism, Parallelism, and Interaction. [§ 4.] Epiphenomenalism is legitimate as a methodological principle in Physiology; it is untenable as a basis for Psychology because it implies the reduction of psychical facts to mechanical law. [§ 5.] Parallelism. The arguments for Parallelism as necessarily valid to Psychophysics because of its congruity with the postulates of mechanical Physics, are fallacious. We cannot assume that Psychology must necessarily conform to these postulates. [§ 6.] As a working hypothesis Parallelism is available for many purposes, but breaks down when we attempt to apply it to the case of the initiation of fresh purposive reactions. A teleological and a mechanical series cannot ultimately be “parallel.” [§ 7.] We are thus thrown back on the hypothesis of Interaction as the only one which affords a consistent scheme for the correlation of Physiology and Psychology. We have, however, to remember that what the hypothesis correlates is scientific symbols, not actual facts. The actuality represented by both sets of symbols is the same thing, though the psychological symbolism affords a wider and more adequate representation of it than the physiological | [313] |
| CHAPTER III | ||
| THE PLACE OF THE “SELF” IN REALITY | ||
| [§ 1.] | The “self” is (1) a teleological concept, (2) implies a contrasted not-self (where this contrast is absent from an experience there is no genuine sense of self); (3) but the limits which divide self and not-self are not fixed but fluctuating. The not-self is not a merely external limit, but consists of discordant elements within the individual, which are extruded from it by a mental construction. (4) The self is a product of development, and has its being in the time-series. (5) The self is never given complete in a moment of actual experience, but is an ideal construction; probably self-hood implies some degree of intellectual development. [§ 2.] The Absolute or Infinite Individual, being free from all internal discord, can have no not-self, and therefore cannot properly be called a self. [§ 3.] Still less can it be a person. [§ 4.] In a society of selves we have a more genuinely self-determined individual than in the single self. Hence it would be nearer the truth to think of the Absolute as a Society, though no finite whole adequately expresses the Absolute’s full nature. We must remember, however, (a) that probably the individuals in the Absolute are not all in direct relation, and (b) that in thinking of it as a Society we are not denying its real individuality. [§ 5.] The self is not in its own nature imperishable; as to the particular problem of its continuance after death, no decision can be arrived at on grounds of Metaphysics. Neither the negative presumption drawn from our inability to understand the conditions of continuance, nor the lack of empirical evidence, is conclusive; on the other hand, there is not sufficient metaphysical reason for taking immortality as certain | [334] |
| CHAPTER IV | ||
| THE PROBLEM OF MORAL FREEDOM | ||
| [§ 1.] | The metaphysical problem of free will has been historically created by extra-ethical difficulties, especially by theological considerations in the early Christian era, and by the influence of mechanical scientific conceptions in the modern world. [§§ 2], [3]. The analysis of our moral experience shows that true “freedom” means teleological determination. Hence to be “free” and to “will” are ultimately the same thing. Freedom or “self-determination” is genuine but limited, and is capable of variations of degree. [§ 4.] Determinism and Indeterminism both arise from the false assumption that the mechanical postulate of causal determination by antecedents is an ultimate fact. The question then arises whether mental events are an exception to the supposed principle. [§ 5.] Determinism. The determinist arguments stated. [§ 6.] They rest partly upon the false assumption that mechanical determination is the one and only principle of rational connection between facts; [§ 7.] Partly upon fallacious theories of the actual procedure of the mental sciences. Fallacious nature of the argument that complete knowledge of character and circumstances would enable us to predict human conduct. The assumed data are such as, from their own nature, could not be known before the event. [§ 8.] Indeterminism. The psychical facts to which the indeterminist appeals do not warrant his conclusion, which is, moreover, metaphysically absurd, as involving the denial of rational connection. [§ 9.] Both doctrines agree in the initial error of confounding teleological unity with causal determination | [359] |
| CHAPTER V | ||
| SOME METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ETHICS AND RELIGION | ||
| [§ 1.] | If Reality is a harmonious system, it must somehow make provision for the gratification of our ethical, religious, and æsthetic interests. [§ 2.] But we cannot assume that ethical and religious postulates are necessarily true in the forms in which our practical interests lead us to make them. [§ 3.] Thus, while morality would become impossible unless on the whole there is coincidence between virtue and happiness, and unless social progress is a genuine fact, “perfect virtue,” “perfect happiness,” “infinite progress” are logically self-contradictory concepts. [§ 4.] But this does not impair the practical usefulness of our ethical ideals. [§ 5.] In religion we conceive of the ideal of perfection as already existing in individual form. Hence ultimately no part of the temporal order can be an adequate object of religious devotion. [§ 6.] This leads to the Problem of Evil. “God” cannot be a finite being within the Absolute, because, if so, God must contain evil and imperfection as part of His nature, and is thus not the already existing realisation of the ideal. [§ 7.] This difficulty disappears when we identify “God” with the Absolute, because in the Absolute evil can be seen to be mere illusory appearance. It may, however, be true that religious feeling, to be practically efficient, may need to imagine its object in an ultimately incorrect anthropomorphic form. [§ 8.] The existence, within the Absolute, of finite “divine” personalities, can neither be affirmed nor denied on grounds of general Metaphysics. [§ 9.] Proofs of the “being of God.” The principle of the “ontological” and “cosmological” proofs can be defended against the criticism of Hume and Kant only if we identify God with the Absolute. The “physicotheological proof” could only establish the reality of finite superhuman intelligences, and its force depends purely upon empirical considerations of evidence | [381] |
| CHAPTER VI | ||
| CONCLUSION | ||
| [§ 1.] | Can our Absolute Experience be properly called the “union of Thought and Will”? The Absolute is certainly the final realisation of our intellectual and our practical ideals. But (1) it includes aspects, such as, e.g., æsthetic feeling, pleasure, and pain, which are neither Thought nor Will. (2) And it cannot possess either Thought or Will as such. Both Thought and Will, in their own nature, presuppose a Reality which transcends mere Thought and mere Will. [§ 2.] Our conclusion may in a sense be said to involve an element of Agnosticism, and again of Mysticism. But it is only agnostic in holding that we do not know the precise nature of the Absolute Experience. It implies no distrust of the validity of knowledge, so far as it goes, and bases its apparently agnostic result on the witness of knowledge itself. Similarly, it is mystical in transcending, not in refusing to recognise, the constructions of understanding and will. [§ 3.] Metaphysics adds nothing to our information, and yields no fresh springs of action. It is finally only justified by the persistency of the impulse to speculate on the nature of things as a whole | [408] |
| Index | [417] | |
ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS
BOOK I
GENERAL NOTIONS
CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM OF THE METAPHYSICIAN
[§ 1.] The generality and simplicity of the metaphysical problem make it difficult to define the study. [§ 2.] Problem is suggested by the presence of contradictions in ordinary experience. [§ 3.] By making a distinction between reality and appearance the sciences remove some of these contradictions, but themselves lead to further difficulties of the same sort; hence the need for systematic inquiry into the meaning of the distinction between the real and the apparent, and the general character of reality as such. [§ 4.] Metaphysics, as an inquiry into the ultimate meaning of “reality,” is akin to poetry and religion, but differs from them in its scientific character, from the mathematical and experimental sciences in its method, from common scepticism in the critical nature of its methods as well as in its positive purpose. [§ 5.] The study is difficult (a) because of the generality of its problems, (b) and because we cannot employ diagrams or physical experiments. [§ 6.] The objection that Metaphysics is an impossibility may be shown in all its forms to rest upon self-contradictory assumptions of a metaphysical kind. [§ 7.] The minor objections that, if possible, the science is superfluous, or at least stationary, may be met with equal ease. [§ 8.] Metaphysics is partly akin to the mystical tendency, but differs from mysticism in virtue of its positive interest in the world of appearances, as well as by its scientific method. [§ 9.] It agrees with logic in the generality of its scope, but differs in being concerned with the real, whereas logic is primarily concerned with the inferrible. [§10.] The problems of the so-called Theory of Knowledge are really metaphysical.