Major Rice's next letter was written on the 10th April 1812, from Camp in front of the Albuhera River, Beresford's position of the late bloody fight—
"Since we crossed the Guadiana on the 16th March, of which I hastily apprised you, this Corps d'armée has been, I may almost say unceasingly, in motion, having made nearly the circuit of Southern Estramadura, the object of which was to force the French from the towns and positions they occupied, and to throw every impediment in the way of concentration. In our numerous night marches, with a view to surprise, we have in general failed, owing to the very superior intelligence of our active enemy. Some good, however, may have resulted, though they very speedily retraced their steps, and yesterday they appeared in force within a league of this, but I believe nothing more than a strong reconnaissance of cavalry. Report now says they are off and our dragoons advancing, but it is of little consequence, since they could not relieve Badajoz. This, I hope, will go by the packet which takes the intelligence of the capture of Badajoz by assault. The particulars of the gallant but bloody business you will have in a better shape than I can give you. It was the most awful and tremendous firing I ever heard. We have had the good luck to escape, though our labour and anxiety for this last twenty days has been such as to claim attention as assisting in the glorious cause.
"I have just been reconnoitring the ground of the battle of Albuhera, and have been conceited enough to think that even I could have managed it better. The blundering was great,[69] and terrible the sacrifice. Boots, caps, jackets, et cetera, are still kicking about—in short, it is the richest 'bed of honour' I have seen for a long while. If the French come on we are to act the farce over again on the same boards. I am scribbling this upon my knees amidst the greatest confusion of noises you ever heard—Babel a joke! Marmont, we hear, is not idle, and has invested Rodrigo. If so, we must again trot up to the north. No end to our labour. I am a good deal done up, but still hold on. I have not yet been into Badajoz. The confusion terrible, as you may suppose, after an assault, and given up to plunder. An order has this moment arrived to move to our front, I suppose to give chase. Soult has heard of our success, and I believe has thought it advisable to face about."
On the 19th April he wrote again, from Niza:—
"The morning after I last wrote to you we broke up from the position of Albuhera and made an advance movement on Santa Martha. Soult was within two leagues with 30,000. He made a little show with cavalry, but thought proper to retire with his infantry, having heard of the fall of Badajoz. Had it not fallen it is thought that a general action must have taken place, which was to have been tried again upon the same ground—but this, I think, I before stated. I, and we all, thought of a chase; but no, for suddenly operations were changed. Our lord had heard that Marmont was playing the devil in the north, and had pushed to Castello Branco and Villa Velha to destroy the bridge of boats. The latter was not actually done by the enemy, but in the general panic it was cut adrift, which has occasioned some trouble in restoring. The plain truth and matter of fact is that a deep game has been playing, for had not Badajoz miraculously fallen the siege must have been raised, we not having force to contend and resist the two divisions. We are now going all hands pell-mell north as hard as we can. Several divisions have crossed the Tagus—our turn to-morrow. God knows what is going to be done, as reports are so various. One thing is pretty clear: Marmont and his Goths have behaved with their usual barbarity, having destroyed and sacked most of the unfortunate towns which had previously escaped. Never in this world was so cruel and distressing warfare waged. It cannot last; the misery is too great to be endured, and all for what? Our army, pretty well jaded to death by one thing or other, cannot stand the incessant fatigue. The sickness is alarming, and every regiment worked to nothing. No energy whatever on the part of the Spaniards—at least not that I have seen. We shall in a few days pass the Coa, if Mr Frenchman will permit. I expect opposition; at all events he will annoy, and destroy the bridges. When we have arrived at Rodrigo, Soult will again show himself before Badajoz and down we shall come again, and so on until we are done up. You see I am not more sanguine as to general results than yourself. I am sorry to see so little hope. You can form no idea of the scene at Badajoz; no place was ever so sacked—and a variety of other things—nameless! The weather is horrible; constantly wet, and little covering."
The somewhat desponding tone of this letter is perhaps an indication of the writer's weariness of soul—a weariness produced by constant marching about without any apparent prospect of doing any good. The senior regimental officers, who had the welfare of their men at heart, and who understood, from long experience, that the soldiers' powers of endurance had limits, ever dreaded a breakdown, and their fears grew greater when they saw their regiment being harassed for no clear purpose. This is evident from their letters, as is also the fact that when once they knew that they were marching for the definite object of meeting the enemy and of giving battle, they cast aside their fears and prepared their men for the coming struggle. But let us get behind the scenes and see what was really happening at this particular time.
After the capture of Badajoz Wellington spent no time in inaction. General Graham was placed in command of the fallen fortress, and was given sufficient men to repair its defences and prevent its recapture by the enemy; while the bulk of the army marched away. Soult, who had been hastening from the south to the relief of the French garrison, and who had been held in check by the covering troops, on hearing that all was over, turned about and withdrew towards Seville. Marmont, however, had succeeded, while the siege was in progress, in invading Portugal and penetrating to Castello Branco. Wellington now advanced against him; but the French general, forbidden by Napoleon to attempt to form a junction with Soult, saw that little was to be gained by advancing farther. His first impulse was to fight, but he remembered that the rivers in his rear were in flood and would impede his withdrawal in the event of defeat, so he deemed it more prudent to retire behind the line of the Agueda river, and there await developments.
Meanwhile Wellington was straining every nerve to meet the heavy combinations which the French were bringing against him. King Joseph, in supreme command of the French in the Peninsula, was in occupation of Madrid, and thence issued orders to his subordinate generals, who, however, lacked confidence in the military plans of their chief—a fact which proved of the greatest advantage to Wellington. United action on the part of the French generals would have placed the Allies in a grave situation; but fortunately the three French armies were at this time widely separated, and Wellington contrived so to deceive his adversaries that they were quite unable to say against which force he intended to operate. Soult in Andalusia felt certain that the Allies would invade that province; King Joseph imagined that the Spanish capital would be the immediate objective; while Marmont, away to the north, had every reason to believe that Wellington was bringing all his strength against him. As a matter of fact, the original intention of the British commander had been to carry the war into Andalusia, but, abandoning the idea (for political and military reasons), he determined to attack Marmont. Yet, by means of false reports and ostentatious movements, he contrived to continue to deceive Soult as to his real plans.
Before following Marmont, however, Wellington deemed it necessary to prevent Soult and the army of Andalusia from reinforcing him. Soult, south of the Tagus, would have to cross that river before marching to the assistance of Marmont; his pontoon trains had been captured in Badajoz, and the only means of crossing the river was by the bridge of boats which Marmont had constructed at Almaraz. The importance of this crossing was well known to the French, who had consequently thrown up three strong forts and a bridge-head to protect it; but the destruction of Almaraz, with its bridge and its stores, was essential to Wellington's plans, and, though doubtful of the possibility of its being carried out, he ordered General Hill to make the attempt. As events turned out, the surprise of Almaraz was one of the boldest enterprises of the war, and by the 18th May Hill had done all that was required of him. But until the work had been completed, whither Hill had taken his force and for what purpose were things known only to Wellington, who had halted the remainder of his army to await news of the result of Hill's mission.
Writing from Castello Branco, 22nd May 1812, Major Rice describes what was going on—