Mr. Evarts considered that this was a question rather of regularity of discussion, than a question to be now absolutely determined by the Court. He supposed that they were entitled to lay before the Court all the attendant facts governing the question of, whether the introduction of these criminals from the point of seizure on the high seas was, within the legal sense, made into the District of New York, or into that of Virginia—whether the physical introduction of prisoners, in the course of a voyage toward the port of New York, into the roads at Hampton, is, within the meaning of the law, a bringing them into the District of Virginia. If the substantial qualification of the course of the voyage from the point of seizure to the place of actual debarcation was to affect the act, this was the time for the prosecution to produce that piece of evidence; and he supposed that that important inquiry should be reserved till the termination of the case, when the proof would be all before the Court. He suggested that no large ship could enter the port of New York without physically passing through what might be called the District of New Jersey; and argued that, in no sense of the act, and in no just sense, should these prisoners be tried in New Jersey, because the ship carrying them had passed through her waters.
Mr. Larocque, for the defendants, contended that the arrest of the parties as criminals was at the moment when they were taken from on board the Savannah, placed on board the Perry, and put in irons. The learned gentleman (Mr. Evarts) had said that it would be impossible to bring them within the District of New York without first bringing them within the District of New Jersey; but that objection was met by the fact that, over the waters of the bay of New York, the States of New Jersey and New York exercised concurrent jurisdiction, and therefore they came within the District of New York, to all intents and purposes. He proposed to refer to the authorities on which the point rested.
In this case, the place where the arrest was made was the Perry, a United States cruiser, which, in one sense, was equivalent to a part of the national soil; and he held that the idea under this statute was, that their apprehension and confinement from the moment they were arrested as criminals was complete, without being required to be under legal process, it being sufficient that they were arrested by the constituted authorities of the United States. The moment they were brought within a Judicial District of the United States, that moment the jurisdiction attached; and no jurisdiction could attach anywhere else. This was an offence committed on the high seas. All the Districts of the country could not have concurrent jurisdiction over it; and this very case was an exemplification of the injustice that would result from permitting an officer, in times of high political excitement, to have the privilege, at his mere pleasure or caprice, of selecting the place of jurisdiction, and the place of trial. Suppose these prisoners, instead of being landed at the first place where the vessel touched, could have been taken up the Mississippi river in a boat, and up the Ohio river in another boat, and landed within the District of Ohio, for the purpose of being tried there,—would not their honors' sense of justice and propriety revolt at that? The same injustice would result in a different degree, and under different circumstances, if, after taking these prisoners to Virginia and ascertaining the difficulties in the way of their being tried there, the officer could change their course and bring them into the port of New York. The prisoners were entitled to the benefit of being tried in the District where they were first taken, in preference to any other District; and justice would be more surely done by holding a strict rule on that subject, by requiring that the facts should control, and that no mere intention on the part of the captors should be allowed to govern.
One of the cases on this subject which had produced a misapprehension of the question was that of the United States vs. Thompson, 1st Sumner's Reports, which was an indictment for endeavoring to create a revolt, under the Act of 1790. It was in the Massachusetts District. The facts in the case were these:—"The vessel arrived at Stonington, Connecticut, and from thence sailed to New Bedford, Massachusetts, where the defendant was arrested, and committed for trial. It did not appear that he had been in confinement before. Judge Story ruled on the question of jurisdiction. He said: 'The language of the Crimes Act of 1790 (Cap. 36, sec. 8) is, that the trial of crimes committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, shall be in the District in which the offender is apprehended, or into which he shall first be brought. The provision is in the alternative, and therefore the crime is cognizable in either District. And there is wisdom in the provision; for otherwise, if a ship should, by stress of weather, be driven to take shelter temporarily in any port of the Union, however distant from her home port, the master and all the crew, as well as the ship, might be detained, and the trial had far from the port to which she belonged, or to which she was destined. And if the offender should escape into another District, or voluntarily depart from that into which he was first brought, he would, upon an arrest, be necessarily required to be sent back for trial to the latter. And now there is no particular propriety, as to crimes committed on the high seas, in assigning one District rather than another for the place of trial, except what arises from general convenience; and the present alternative provision is well adapted to this purpose.'"
This was noticed, in the first place, in the case of the United States vs. Edward C. Townsend, of which he (Mr. Larocque) held in his hand a copy of the exemplication of the record. Townsend was charged, in the District Court of Massachusetts, with piracy, in having been engaged in the slave trade, in 1858. He was captured on board the brig Echo, by a United States cruiser. That vessel first made the port of Key West, putting in there for water; and thence proceeded to Massachusetts, where the prisoner was landed, taken into custody under a warrant of the Commissioner, and the matter brought before the Grand Jury, for the purpose of having an indictment found against him. In that case Judge Sprague charged the Grand Jury that, under the law, the prisoner could only be tried in Key West, because that was the first port which the vessel had made after he had been captured and confined as a prisoner. Under that instruction the Grand Jury refused to find a bill of indictment; and thereupon the District Attorney (Mr. Woodbury) applied to the court for a warrant of removal, to remove him to Key West, for trial; and also to have the witnesses recognized to appear at Key West, to testify on the trial. The counsel read a note from Mr. Woodbury on the subject, showing that Mr. Justice Clifford, of the Supreme Court of the United States, sat and concurred with Judge Sprague in granting the warrant of removal. He referred also to another case, decided by Judge Sprague—the United States vs. Bird—volume of Judge Sprague's Decisions, page 299: "This indictment alleged an offence to have been committed on the high seas, and that the prisoner was first brought into the District of Massachusetts. Questions of jurisdiction arose upon the evidence. The counsel for the prisoner contended that the offence, if any, was committed on the Mississippi river, and within the State of Louisiana; and, further, that if committed beyond the limits of that State, the prisoner was not first brought into this District. Sprague, J., said that, if an offence be committed within the United States, it must be tried in the State and District within which it was committed. Constitution Amendment 6, If the offence be committed without the limits of the United States, on the high seas, or in a foreign port, the trial must be had in the District 'where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may be first brought.'—Stat. 1790, cap. 9, sec. 8; Stat. 1825, cap. 65, sec. 14. By being brought within a District, is not meant merely being conveyed thither by the ship on which the offender may first arrive; but the statute contemplates two classes of cases: one, in which the offender shall have been apprehended without the limits of the United States, and brought in custody into some Judicial District; the other, in which he shall not have been so apprehended and brought, but shall have been first taken into legal custody, after his arrival within some District of the United States, and provides in what District each of these classes shall be tried. It does not contemplate that the Government shall have the election in which of two Districts to proceed to trial. It is true that, in United States vs. Thompson, 1 Sumner, 168, Judge Story seems to think that a prisoner might be tried either in the District where he is apprehended, or in the District into which he is first brought. But the objection in that case did not call for any careful consideration of the meaning of the word 'brought,' as used in the statute; nor does he discuss the question, whether the accused, having come in his own ship, satisfies that requisition. In that case the party had not been apprehended abroad; and the decision was clearly right, as the first arrest was in the District of Massachusetts. The statute of 1819, cap. 101, sec. 1 (3 U.S. Statutes at Large, 532), for the suppression of the slave trade, is an example of a case in which an offender may be apprehended without the limits of the United States, and sent to the United States for trial. Ex parte Bollman vs. Swartwout, 4 Cranch, 136."
Their honors would observe that in both the cases cited, correcting the manifest misapprehension of Judge Story, the point was distinctly held that the question of jurisdiction was controlled exclusively by the fact as to what District the prisoner was first brought into after his arrest on the high seas, out of the United States, for a crime committed on the high seas.
Judge Nelson stated that, as it was now late (half-past 5 P. M.), the question might go over till morning.
The counsel on each side assenting, the Jury were allowed to separate, with a caution from the Court against conversing in respect to the case.
Adjourned to Thursday, at 11 A.M.