[248] Dionys. ii. 14 (amongst the powers of the king were) τῶν τε ἀδικημάτων τὰ μέγιστα μὲν αὐτὸν δικάζειν, τὰ δ’ ἐλάττονα τοῖς βουλευταῖς ἐπιτρέπειν. It is difficult, however, to determine whether the reference is to civil wrongs or to crimes.
[249] ib. iv. 25 ἐκεῖνος (Servius Tullius) διελὼν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν (ἐγκλημάτων) τὰ δημόσια, τῶν μὲν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φερόντων ἀδικημάτων αὐτὸς ἐποιεῖτο τὰς διαγνώσεις, τῶν δὲ ἰδιωτικῶν ἰδιώτας ἔταξεν εἶναι δικαστάς, ὅρους καὶ κανόνας αὐτοῖς τάξας, οὓς αὐτὸς ἔγραψε νόμους. The principle here described perhaps refers to delegation rather than to the distinction between jus and judicium in civil process.
[250] For derivations of jus see Clark Pract. Jurisprudence pp. 16-20; Bréal “Sur l’origine des mots designant le droit en Latin” in Nouvelle Revue Historique de droit vol. vii. (1883) pp. 607 sq.
[251] Dionys. l.c.
[252] Liv. i 26.
[253] Zonaras vii. 13 (who attributes their institution to Publicola) identifies the quaestores with the quaestores parricidii, οἷ πρῶτον μὲν τὰς θανασίμους δίκας ἐδίκαζον, ὄθεν καὶ τὴν προσηγορίαν ταύτην διὰ τὰς ἀνακρίσεις ἐσχήκασι καὶ διὰ τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας ἐκ τῶν ἀνακρίσεων ζήτησιν. Cf. Varro L.L. v. 81. Mommsen (Staatsr. ii. pp. 523 sq.) thinks the financial quaestors as standing officials originated with the Republic; but he believes (p. 539) that they had their origin in the criminal quaestores (a word which bears the same relation to quaesitores as sartor to sarcitor or quaero to quaesivi, p. 537). Cf. Tac. Ann. xi. 22 (p. 81); Ulpian in Dig. i. 13.
[254] Liv. l.c.
[255] Cic. pro Mil. 3, 7; de Rep. ii. 31, 54; Festus p. 297.
[256] Liv. i 26 “Si a duumviris provocarit provocatione certato ... auctore Tullo, ... ‘provoco’ inquit.”
[257] ib. viii. 33.