Second expedition of the Persians defeated by Themistocles: 480.
5. The glory of frustrating the second mighty Persian invasion of Greece under Xerxes I. belongs to Themistocles alone. Not only his great naval victory off Salamis, but still more the manner in which he contrived to work upon his countrymen, proves him to have been the greatest man of the age, and the deliverer of Greece, now united by one common bond of interest.—All national leagues are weak in themselves: yet how strong may even the weakest be made when held together by one great man, who knows how to animate it with his own spirit!
Themistocles' plan for the conduct of the war; first, a common union of all the Hellenic states; a measure which succeeds to a certain degree, the honour of the command being left to the Spartans; secondly, the sea made the theatre of war.—Gallant death of Leonidas with his three hundred Spartans and seven hundred Thespians, July 6, 480. An example of heroism which contributes as much to the greatness of Greece as the victory of Salamis. About the same time naval engagements off Artemisium in Eubœa, with two hundred and seventy-one sail. The leaders of the Greeks are kept to their posts merely by bribery; the means of purchasing their services being for the most part furnished by Themistocles himself.—Athens, deserted by its inhabitants, is taken and burnt by Xerxes, July 20. Retreat of the Grecian fleet into the bay of Salamis: revocation of all exiles, Aristides among the rest.—Politic measures adopted by Themistocles to hinder the dispirited Greeks from taking flight, and at the same time to secure to himself, in case of need, an asylum with the Persian monarch.—Naval engagement and victory off Salamis, Sept. 23, 480, with three hundred and eighty sail, (one hundred and eighty of which were Athenian,) against the Persian fleet, already much weakened: retreat of Xerxes.—Poets and historians have disfigured these events by fanciful exaggerations: still, however, they may show us how commonly human weakness is attended with human greatness!
Battles of Platææ and Mycale, Sept. 25, 479.
6. The victory of Salamis did not conclude the war; but the negotiations entered into during the winter months with the Persian general, Mardonius, left in Thessaly, and with the Asiatic Greeks, to excite them to throw off the yoke, show how far the confidence of the nation in its own strength had increased. But by the battle fought on land at Platææ, under the command of the Spartan, Pausanias, (guardian to Plistarchus, son of Leonidas,) and the Athenian, Aristides; together with the naval battle at Mycale on the same day, and the destruction of the Persian fleet, the Persians are for ever driven from the territory of Greece, though the war continues for some time longer.
Sparta has the ascendancy to 470.
7. The expulsion of the Persians wrought an entire change in the internal and external relations of Greece. From being the aggressed the Greeks became the aggressors; to free their Asiatic countrymen is now the chief object or pretext for the continuation of a war so profitable; the chief command of which abides with Sparta until B. C. 470.
Athens rebuilt and fortified by Themistocles despite of Spartan jealousy, 478: formation of the Piræus, an event of still greater importance, 477.—Naval expedition under Pausanias, accompanied by Aristides and Cimon, undertaken against Cyprus and Byzantium, for the purpose of expelling the Persians, 470. Treachery and fall of Pausanias, 469. In consequence of the Spartans' haughtiness, the supreme command devolves upon the Athenians.
Athens assumes the chief command:
8. This transfer of the command to Athens had a decided effect on all the subsequent relations of Greece, not only because it augmented the jealousy between Sparta and Athens, but because Athens exercised her predominance for a purpose entirely different from that of Sparta.—Establishment of a permanent confederacy, comprising most of the Grecian states without Peloponnesus, especially the islands, and an adjustment of the contributions to be annually furnished by each, with the view of prosecuting the Persian war, and liberating the Asiatic Greeks from the Persian yoke. Although the common treasury was first established at Delos, the superintendence of it was confided to Athens; and such a manager as Aristides was not always to be found.—Natural consequence of this new establishment: 1. What had hitherto been mere military precedence, becomes in the hands of Athens a right of political prescription, and that, as usual, is soon converted into a sovereignty. Hence her idea of the supremacy of Greece, (ἀρχὴ τῆς Ἑλλάδος,) as connected with that of the sea, (θαλασσοκρατία.) 2. The oppression of the Athenians, sometimes real, at other times presumed, after a short time, rouses the spirit of discontent and contumacy among several of the confederates: hence, 3. The gradual formation of a counter league, headed by Sparta, who maintains her supremacy over the greatest part of the Peloponnesus.