Besides these so-called troops, the Amir had always available the jezailchis, who were formerly the only infantry in the country. They were light troops, armed with matchlock and jezail, accustomed to hill warfare and perhaps as good skirmishers as were to be found at this time in Asia. Experience had taught them to be judges of ground and distance, while instinct made them chary of ambush. These were of two classes. The one class was in the service of the Amir, on a nominal salary of five rupees per mensem, which was paid in grain. These men were armed by the State and mustered some 3500 men, employed in holding forts and posts throughout the country. They were commanded by Sadbashis and Dahbashis, captains of hundreds and heads over tens, who received a proportionately higher rate of pay. The other class, the immediate following of the different chiefs, may be considered as a local militia. They were assigned rent-free a piece of land in lieu of pay; and, as a rule, these several bodies of militia numbered in each instance between 1000 and 1500 men.
The Irregular Afghan Horse, as they existed at this time, are even more difficult than the jezailchis to compute. They were not particularly numerous, although Kandahar and its dependencies could furnish 8000; Ghazni, 5000; Kabul, including Jelalabad, Logar and the Koh-i-Daman, 15,000; while Balkh, with its Uzbeg population, returned 10,000. These men were the equal of any undisciplined horsemen in Asia; mounted upon small but wiry horses, carrying a perfect arsenal of weapons, among which shield, spear, matchlock, sword, pistol and knife were prominent, they were always rough and invariably ready for the field. Capable of undergoing great fatigue and exceedingly harassing to a flying foe, they were, when led by a determined chief, anything but contemptible in a mêlée.
MEN OF THE AMIR’S BODYGUARD
The establishment of the regular and auxiliary forces, as they existed at this date, boasted no commissariat department. In districts, where the revenue was paid in grain, a certain proportion was allotted to each fort; if the troops were on the march, orders upon the headmen of the various villages were issued, the villages being credited with the amount of grain, etc., supplied when the revenue came to be collected. Upon any occasion where the whole available force was collected en masse, each district had to furnish a certain amount of grain as well as its fighting contingent, the daily ration of every man being estimated at one seer of flour. So long as this supply lasted the men considered themselves bound to remain with their chiefs; but the moment that the issue ceased there was a general dissolution of the forces. Similarly, there was no settled transport system nor ordnance supply, arrangements, haphazard in the extreme, rising as occasion required. In many respects, the changing conditions of military life, in the absence of specific reforms, brought no remedy of abuses which, existing under Dost Mahommed, found opportunity for increased activity in the new order of affairs. The inevitable break-down occurred; and at the first tests, imposed by the actions at Peiwar Kotal and Ali Masjid, the entire machine went to pieces. Later, at Charasiab and Ahmad Khel, the Afghan array had returned to its own style of fighting and, under tribal leaders, ill-disciplined, yet courageous and determined, fought valiantly and well.
In spite of the excellent beginnings which had been made by Shir Ali, the condition of the army at the time of his accession placed a very heavy burden upon the shoulders of Abdur Rahman. Handicapped by internal dissensions, it was not until he had established as paramount his authority over the tribes that he was able to turn attention to the crude structure which had been built by his predecessor. Elaborating the handiwork of Shir Ali by many personal touches, he gradually shaped the whole system to his own mould. To every regiment of cavalry and infantry he attached complementary engineer, medical and commissariat details, so that each unit was complete in itself and independent of its brigade. In a measure and as the outcome of this initiative Abdur Rahman became the actual founder of the army of Afghanistan. Recognising the many deficiencies in the military system, he increased its potential significance by substituting for the old feudal levies one central army, paid, created and controlled directly by himself. With implacable severity he chastised his enemies, breaking up their powers of resistance and developing his own position, until the foundations of his earlier work became the permanent supports to a military autocracy. Regiment after regiment was added to the permanent strength of his military establishment as opportunity offered; while, in addition, 50,000 pack-mules and pack-ponies were set aside as a park of transport, and immense reserves of grain were stored in readiness at Herat, Kandahar and Kabul. Monthly pay-sheets were drawn up, by which generals of the first class received six hundred Kabuli rupees monthly, a brigadier two hundred and fifty, a colonel of cavalry two hundred, a major one hundred and twenty, captains of cavalry eighty, of infantry and artillery thirty, down to corporals of foot, who received ten rupees. The rank and file were paid partly in kind, a trooper getting sixteen rupees in cash and four rupees’ worth of grain, a private of foot five rupees in cash and three rupees’ worth of grain. Every regiment was to have a chaplain (mullah), a physician (hakim) and a surgeon (yarrah). To some extent bribery and corruption were suppressed. A corps of signallers was formed and a body of sappers and miners instructed in the art of entrenchment, bridge-building and road-making. Further, the gunners were taught the technique of their matériel, while the Kabul regiments were put through courses of musketry and the elemental mysteries of tactics and strategy were disclosed to their officers.
INFANTRY IN PARADE STATE