Afghanistan

by A. Hamilton

PATROL OF HOUSEHOLD TROOPS

Deprived of the inspiring genius of Abdur Rahman, within the five years which have elapsed since his death there is every ground to believe that the army has fallen away in efficiency as well as in numbers, and that the work of reorganisation largely requires to be repeated. In a measure, the Afghans retain at the present time their old characteristics—their love of their own country and their hatred of alien races; but, through lapse of time and their intercourse on the one hand with the Russians and in the other direction with India, they are liable to flock to the standard of the Amir less than they were. It must not be forgotten that to-day Afghanistan reproduces the condition of a settled country, possessing a population much more peaceful than were the inhabitants a generation ago. Moreover through the penetrating associations of prosperity and through many years of peace the warlike instincts of the tribes have become numbed, while their martial ardour has evaporated, requiring constant amelioration of the conditions of service by way of stimulating their military zeal. Increases of pay and more generous rations have been conceded in the past and, lately, attempts have been made to soothe the susceptibilities of the officers. Habib Ullah has ordained that for the future promotions will go by seniority, although the system of selection, where it is concerned with posts which are hereditary in families connected with the Royal House, will not be altered. As a sop to the feelings of the rank and file the class-company system is to be enforced, the men of the different tribes being incorporated regimentally under their own tribal leaders. In this direction, too, it is of interest to note that every cantonment will be provided with a garrison mullah who, on Fridays, will read prayers before the assembled troops and address them on Saints’ Days, while teachers in religious instruction are to be attached to each regimental company.

Lately, Habib Ullah has shown signs of awakening to the responsibilities of his position; and it is to be hoped that, under pressure from recent political circumstances, he may abandon the foolish indulgence to which hitherto he has been a slave. Indications of this spirit are not very pronounced, but their manifestation does not come a moment too soon. In the main they are associated with military matters, although certain measures deal exclusively with the administration. Among the former, orders have been given to the leather factories in Kabul to manufacture 300,000 sets of infantry equipment and an agent has been despatched to India to purchase gear for the mounted branches of the service. At best these activities are no promise of an abiding interest in his service and, indeed, they are discounted by his refusal to hearken to advice. At the present time the army of Afghanistan, in its existing condition, admittedly possesses in a high degree the qualities of endurance, courage and mobility; but, in spite of its modern guise, it lacks discipline and cohesion and, as a fighting machine, is liable upon these grounds to be thrown quickly out of gear. Under these circumstances the observation may perhaps be hazarded that it would be as well before equipping it with first-class material to make sure that the men were sufficiently organised to understand its use. At present modern weapons are unknown to the great bulk of the forces of Afghanistan; and it cannot be denied that the absence of this quality makes it more of a menace to itself than to an enemy. Hitherto, there has been greater variety than method in the Afghan military equipment, irregularity of pattern distinguishing alike rifle, field-piece and ammunition, while the education of the officers and the training of the men has been neglected.

The continuation of these imperfections is due primarily to the inability of the Amir of Afghanistan to rely upon the loyalty of his troops. At the same time, their existence appertains to every Oriental army which is placed solely in native custody. They have always been a feature of the Afghan service. The condition of the garrison in the capital perhaps reveals some little superiority over those which are placed further afield, but it can be affirmed quite truly that the military qualities of Afghanistan proceed entirely from the inborn fanaticism of its people and not from the practical organisation of its active state. Nevertheless under conditions applicable to mountain warfare the Afghan army could become an invaluable auxiliary; although its capacity, as well as its determination, to offer any prolonged resistance are matters of doubt. Defects could be removed by re-organisation; good qualities enhanced by careful training under British officers or by the despatch of selected Afghan officers and men for training with our own troops.

In spite of the obduracy of Habib Ullah over this point, he has made known his intention of falling back upon the support of the Indian Government when his own arms have been defeated. This contingency, which is liable to arise at the outset of a war with any foreign power, imposes upon the Government of India a thankless burden, in no way lessened by the proposal of the Amir to create in Kabul an Afghan Staff College, and the determination of the Imperial Government to avoid insistence upon what is, by no means, an unreasonable precaution. As matters rest at present unless change is introduced the preposterous conceit, which distinguishes the Afghans, is destined to receive an unwelcome shock. Nevertheless the Amir cannot be persuaded to place his military affairs in the hands of the Indian Government; since, now that the Japanese have beaten the Russians and, in the mind of the Amir, the Imperial Government is frightened at the Russian Government, the Afghans argue, having defeated British arms, that they are now superior to the Japanese. Therefore, they deny us the possession of any point of advantage in their country, a consummation which, while not quite that towards which our diplomacy has been directed, may be ascribed to the results, in combination, of a policy of friendly missions and half measures. Now that we have given Habib Ullah permission to import without check unlimited supplies of arms and ammunition the disadvantages of such a situation increase rather than diminish; as it exists so close to the Indian frontier and in a way in which it cannot be controlled by the Indian Government, it behoves the Imperial Government to come to a definite decision at once with regard to its line of action in relation to Afghanistan.

INFANTRY ON THE MARCH

Abdur Rahman did not confine his work of reorganisation solely to the military system of Afghanistan. He devoted great attention to the military roads of the state, realising that a system of communications was as important as a well-equipped and efficiently-organised army. Kabul, as the capital, was united with Badakshan on the east, with Turkestan on the north and with Kandahar and Herat on the south and west. Prior to these works certain native roads did exist between the several centres; but it was due to the activity and initiative of the late Amir that improvements were introduced, or altogether new lines of communication opened. Undeterred by the difficulties which beset his engineers and as an index to the consistent vigour with which he assisted the development and execution of his policy, he threw roads across the Hindu Kush, facilitating by these means not only the trend of inter-provincial trade, but the pacification and administration of his provinces. In addition to these strategic roads, he improved the trade routes which led into the country from the Trans-Oxus, India and Persia. In the south the Khyber, Kurram and the Gomul routes received notice; in the north there were the routes from Russian Turkestan leading through well-known centres to points of admission upon the Afghan border. After the subjugation of Kafiristan he took the precaution of making a military road through that country from north to south, thus opening up communication with the Kunar Valley, and Jelalabad, where considerable numbers of troops are always stationed. Further, he directed that it should eventually be carried over the western Hindu Kush so as to give a better route to Kataghan, Badakshan, and the upper Oxus Valley. This portion of the work was finished in March 1904. The northern terminus of the road is at Faizabad, the principal town of Badakshan, where caravan routes meet from Bokhara on the north-west, the Pamirs and Kashgar on the north-east. The Afghan Government have constructed serais at all the halting-places, and caravans are encouraged to use the road in preference to that through Chitral.

Curiously enough in another direction, the construction of fortresses, Abdur Rahman was more neglectful. If he improved the lines of communication and re-organised the state of the army he built but few forts, relying almost entirely upon those which already had been constructed. Nowadays with the exception of the Kabul positions, Dehdadi, Mazar-i-Sharif and Baldak Spin, the two latter of which he built to command the approaches to Balkh and Kandahar, there are no modern forts in the kingdom. Those that do exist are made of mud and are of insufficient strength to withstand bombardment. The great majority serve merely as garrison depôts and are without interest save as interesting ruins.