CHAPTER XVI
ANGLO-AFGHAN RELATIONS
Under instructions addressed to Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart, commanding the forces in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan, by the Marquess of Ripon as Viceroy of India, Sir Lepel Griffin on July 20, 1880, communicated the following promise in the course of a letter to Abdur Rahman on his recognition as Amir of Afghanistan by the Afghan Sirdars at Kabul in 1880.
... If any Power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the dominions of your Highness, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid you to such extent and in such manner as may appear to the British Government necessary in repelling it, provided that your Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to your external relations....
In the first years of his reign Abdur Rahman certainly complied with the conditions stipulated by Sir Lepel Griffin, the correctness of his general conduct prompting Lord Ripon nearly three years later, June 16, 1883, in the course of a letter to write:
... Impressed by these considerations, I have determined to offer to your Highness personally ... a subsidy of 12 lakhs of rupees a year, payable monthly, to be devoted to the payment of your troops and to the other measures required for the defence of your north-western frontier....
In the following year, 1884, the gradual advance of Russia across Central Asia gave rise to apprehensions about the position of Afghanistan. Merv had been annexed in February of this year, when, after repeated inquiries on the part of Great Britain, it was arranged that an Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission should meet in October at Sarakhs, which had just been occupied. The course of events did not improve with this decision since, although Sir Peter Lumsden was despatched to the rendezvous, the Russian commissioner evaded a meeting. Fears for the situation of Afghanistan were not set aside by the seizure of Pul-i-Khatun in the very month—October 1884—for which the Sarakhs meeting had been originally convened, and the existence of very evident preparations for a further forward movement. The legitimacy of these proceedings was debated between St. Petersburg and London, Kabul and Calcutta, but, in spite of all pledges, the Russians in February of 1885 took possession of Zulfikar and Akrobat. Meanwhile in India plans for a full state Durbar at Rawal Pindi on April 8, in honour of T.R.H. the Duke and Duchess of Connaught, were in hand. The presence of the Amir of Afghanistan had been invited by the Viceroy, between whom and Abdur Rahman a conference upon the defence and demarcation of the north-western frontier, the strengthening of Herat, and the extension of the Sakkur-Sibi Railway to Quetta had been settled. While Anglo-Russian friction on the Afghan border did not prevent Abdur Rahman from paying homage to the august pair, the occasion was seized upon by the Russians to engage the Afghans at Tash Kepri on March 30, 1885, when more than 1200 of the Amir’s soldiers were ruthlessly butchered. The next day Abdur Rahman arrived in India, meeting with a magnificent reception. At an interview with Lord Dufferin the Amir, instancing the seizure of Pendjeh, complained that his predictions about the intentions of the Russians had been ignored. The Viceroy, in reply, informed him that any further aggression by Russia against Afghanistan would be considered by England as a casus belli, declared that preparations for war had been begun—orders for the mobilisation of two army corps had indeed been issued—and offered the services of engineer officers. At a subsequent audience on April 5, 1885, these fair words were confirmed by a gift of ten lakhs of rupees, 20,000 breech-loading rifles, a heavy battery of four guns, a mountain battery of six guns and two howitzers, besides very liberal rifle and artillery supplies. These presents were guarantees of the benevolence, sincerity, and goodwill of the Government of India; and three days later Abdur Rahman, expressing his appreciation, said, in his speech before the Viceroy:
... In return for this kindness and favour, I am ready with my arms and people to render any services that may be required of me or of the Afghan nation. As the British Government has declared that it will assist me in repelling any foreign enemy, so it is right and proper that Afghanistan should unite in the firmest manner and stand side by side with the British Government....
No doubt so keen a humourist as Abdur Rahman proved himself realised the grim jest which the action of the Russians at Pendjeh had instilled into the Viceroy’s formal confirmation of the pledges existing between India and Afghanistan. Such things are, however, among the unrecorded facts of life. Perhaps, too, it is to be deplored that, in later years, relations between Russia and Great Britain in respect of Afghanistan have been curiously productive of these little ironies.
Proceedings in connection with the Russo-Afghan Boundary question dragged on through 1886 until, after being transferred to St. Petersburg and London, and again returning to the scene itself, they were concluded in the winter of 1887. Difficulties between Russia and India, on behalf of Afghanistan, were for the moment at an end, when, in 1888, the Marquess of Dufferin gave place to the Marquess of Lansdowne as Viceroy of India. With the newcomer an active frontier policy was inaugurated. In quiet furtherance of this the Quetta railway, which in January 1888 had been carried to Kila Abdulla, was continued through the Khwaja Amran beyond Old Chaman to New Chaman. The Amir of Afghanistan professed to regard this extension as a violation of the Treaty of Gandamak which placed the Afghan-Baluch boundary at the foot of the Khwaja Amran—an undesirable site for a railway terminus. This undertaking was the forerunner of much military activity, and twice in this year expeditions took the field against the Hazaras of the Black Mountain. These ventures introduced a disturbing element into conditions prevailing upon the frontier and had an inflammatory effect upon Afghan opinion. At the moment, 1889, the Amir was on service in Afghan-Turkestan superintending certain defensive measures along the northern and north-western frontier, but by the summer of 1890 he had returned to Kabul. In the spring of this year the turbulence of the Khidarzais in the Zhob valley had been suppressed, the increasing energy of the Government of India bringing the danger of a rupture of relations between India and Afghanistan appreciably closer. In view of the position of affairs, the Government of India refused to permit the passage of war materials into Afghanistan, stopping not only the rifles, artillery and ammunition, but also all imports of iron, steel and copper. To this action the Amir replied by repudiating the subsidy of twelve lakhs which had been granted by Lord Ripon. At the same time he wrote a letter to Lord Salisbury, who was then Prime Minister, and, as a more practical measure and a protest against our occupation of New Chaman, he prohibited his people from using the railway from the terminus at the northern foot-hills of the Khwaja Amran to the first station on the south side of the tunnel through the mountains.