Afghanistan

by A. Hamilton

TAKHT-I-RAWAN

Since his accession, in marked contrast with the policy of his father, he had received numerous deputations from the Afridi zone, including one from the most predatory of all the clans south of the Khyber, the Zakka Khels, whose hostility to the British Government has always been a prominent feature of the frontier. The good impression, created in September, when he had invited the Hadda Mullah to return finally to his own country, placing a takht-i-rawan at his disposal for the journey, was ruined by this foolish dalliance with Afridi tribes from within the Durand border. At the moment, taking time by the forelock, Habib Ullah was anxious to raise an Afridi bodyguard, composed of men upon whose personal loyalty absolute reliance could be placed in case of an émeute in the palace. Knowledge of this fact acted as a spur to the more disorderly border-elements, who wished to separate the Afridis, as a tribe, from the control of the Indian Government. Embodying their several schemes in one, they put forward a plan which was presented to Habib Ullah by Khawas Khan, an Afridi malik, who, in 1897, had fled before the avenging arm of the Indian Government to Kabul. This worthy, now entirely dependent upon the benevolence of the Amir’s Government, urged his protector to raise an Afridi contingent, to which project Habib Ullah was foolish enough to assent. Robes of honour were issued to the tribal chiefs and a rate of pay, double the amount allowed to the Afghan soldiery, with a month’s advance, was promised to all recruits. Two thousand Afridis came forward in the first week, 500 of whom after receiving their rewards at once deserted. The success of this new departure appeared to be assured, when the corps was disbanded on account of the hostility which was displayed by the Afghans themselves to the scheme, the men being permitted to retain the clothing, modern breech-loading rifles and ammunition with which they had been supplied. The moving influence in this salutary change of mind on the part of Habib Ullah had been that of Nasr Ullah Khan; and it was with the greater regret that, in a little time, the Amir of Afghanistan was found to have broken away from the more masterful will of his brother to toy once again with the questionable ministrations of the Hadda Mullah. Early in November this holy, but tiresome, prelate wrote and persuaded Habib Ullah to hold a special Durbar in order to accept from the hands of the mullahs the title of Siraj-ul-Millat wa ud-Din—“The Lamp of The Congregation and The Faith.” In view of this it was generally felt that the happiest augury for the peace of the Indo-Afghan border, at the end of 1902, was the death of the Hadda Mullah on December 23, when the Afghan Government devoted a sum of 30,000 rupees towards the funeral obsequies of their sainted protégé.

The removal of the obstacles in the way of any cordial understanding between Russia and Great Britain in respect of Afghanistan was not assisted when, on January 14, 1903, the Foreign Office in St. Petersburg issued, in reference to the declaration made by Lord George Hamilton, the following communique:

As regards Russia’s relations with Afghanistan, it is necessary to declare that Russia addressed no request of any sort to the British Cabinet, but simply notified it of her desire and purpose to enter into direct relations with Afghanistan in the future.

No further declarations were made on this subject.

If language is to have any meaning at all in diplomacy, as in ordinary life, this utterance can only be characterised as one of the most flagrant perversions of truth that have ever disgraced the history of even Russian politics. Quite rightly the request of February 6, 1900, had been interpreted as a veiled demand for the right to establish a Russian representative at Kabul. The proposal admits of being supported by the plausible contention that such an agency would be a convenient means of settling disputes and avoiding collisions on the Russo-Afghan border. It must not be forgotten that it was over almost an identical question—the reception of the Stolietoff Mission by Shir Ali—that Great Britain fought the Second Afghan War; and it can hardly be denied that, if the concession demanded by the Note of 1900 were granted, the result would be to set up an influence in Kabul hostile in spirit to our own and from the first day of its existence there devoted to the sapping of our position.

Great inconvenience of course attaches to a system by which the smallest detail in the adjustment of any difficulty along the Russo-Afghan frontier must be referred for settlement from the Oxus to Tashkent, from Tashkent to St. Petersburg, from St. Petersburg to London, from London to the Government of India, and from the Viceroy’s Council to Kabul where, after much delay, the same process is repeated over the return journey. Unfortunately, the maintenance of such a cumbersome procedure is essential to the harmony of Anglo-Afghan relations since, although Russia professes to require facilities for frontier intercourse in commercial matters alone, similar protestations reduced Manchuria to the level of a Russian protected State until Japan intervened. Great Britain does not wish to embark upon a campaign in Central Asia and there need be no war so long as Russia, observing the pledges which she has given, tempers her desires with discretion. But continuation of the mischievous interference in Persia and Afghanistan, which has distinguished her actions hitherto, is a menace to the world’s peace, as the indulgent nature of the British Government has now been pushed to the limit of its endurance.

So far as Anglo-Afghan relations were concerned the New Year of 1903 held out little prospect of improvement. Possibly the mass of business, associated with Habib Ullah’s installation as Siraj-ul-Millat wa ud-Din, early in April, did prevent the Amir of Afghanistan from visiting India in the spring of this year. But, aside from the irregularity of the Amir’s behaviour, the incident of April 6, when Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Yate, commanding the 24th Baluchistan Infantry Regiment and stationed at Chaman, was arrested by Afghan officials for an innocent trespass beyond the Indo-Afghan border and removed to the fort at Baldak Spin, may be regarded as throwing light upon the precise quality of the bonds of amity which were uniting the two countries. Again, serious exception could be taken at the manner in which the Amirs of Afghanistan were employing the permission to import munitions of war which had been granted by the Government of India. The arrival of the thirty Krupp guns, acquired by Abdur Rahman on the eve of his death, had revealed the presence of a large number of castings for heavy ordnance which had been secretly obtained from Essen by the late Amir. A small army of carts and camels, lent by the Government of India, carried the thirty guns from Peshawar to Jelalabad, whence forty elephants, sent by Habib Ullah for the purpose, bore them to Kabul. Very properly transport was denied to that part of the purchase which disclosed Abdur Rahman’s strange dereliction of his treaty rights. Moreover, it was not difficult for Habib Ullah to recognise the irregularity of his father’s procedure, the immediate consequence of which was the repudiation of the order by the son. Unhappily, before this particular incident could be considered to have closed an immense consignment of rifle cartridges, numbering several millions of rounds, many of which were found to be of the explosive character condemned by the Hague Conference, arrived from the Amir’s agents in England. Since it never had been intended that the right to import munitions of war accorded to the late Amir of Afghanistan implied the power to amass an unlimited amount of war matériel in Kabul, no other course was open to the Viceroy of India than to see that these other stores were likewise detained by the frontier authorities.

Something more important than considerations of prestige, therefore, was embroiled in the indifference which the Amir of Afghanistan displayed towards India as the paramount state, making it incumbent upon the Government to repeat their earlier representations. There was no need, indeed the occasion had hardly arisen, for any violent coercion. The situation required merely such tightening of the reins as would bring to the ruler of Kabul a proper comprehension of the actual ties between his country and India. In the correspondence which ensued, the Amir claimed the right to import munitions of war under the treaty which had given similar powers to Abdur Rahman. Unfortunately Habib Ullah had no such right; nor was any moral obligation to honour the debit notes which Habib Ullah had drawn every month against the Indian Treasury attaching to the Government of India. These points were made clear to the Amir who had neither the funds to pay for nor the authority to order the armaments which were then waiting at the frontier. The lesson had been driven home, and the loftiness of tone, which the Amir of Afghanistan had adopted in the initiatory letter, was hardly discernible in his concluding statement. Since there was no malice in the attitude of the Government of India, the Amir of Afghanistan was again invited to visit India for purposes of a conference with the Viceroy. A visitation of cholera, which swept through Kabul and North-eastern Afghanistan in 1903, the worst since the epidemic of 1879, permitted an excuse to be offered at which no exception could be taken. Before the scourge had subsided Russia had repeated her designs against Afghanistan. This, in view of the explicit denouncement of her treaty requirements, implied by the communique of January 1903, was not perhaps surprising. Their renewal was denied by Lord Cranbourne in the House of Commons both in the spring and autumn sessions of 1903. Nevertheless, in the middle of February, Sirdar Ali Khan, the governor of Afghan Turkestan, had sent to Kabul four Russian spies whom he had arrested near Mazar-i-Sharif; but the most flagrant of these insidious encroachments upon a British preserve occurred in the following August, when the governor of Russian Turkestan sent back some deserters from the Afghan army who had escaped into Russian territory. Obviously the note of defiance in the message which accompanied them was addressed to the suzerain power.