BREAKING CAMP ON MANŒUVRES, TASHKENT
It is said occasionally that the disasters which attended Russia in Manchuria have stimulated the ambitions and desires of the Mahommedan population of Asiatic Russia to throw off the yoke of Muscovite rule. Hence it is possible that the reading of the existing situation in Central Asia, which is here presented, may not be accepted. In point of fact, the Mahommedan attitude towards Russian rule in Mid-Asia has no relation whatever to the outcome of the late war in Manchuria; nor was it influenced in any way by the developments of that unfortunate struggle. Contrary belief is based upon the impression that the animus entertained against the Russians by the races of British India, where it is now assumed by the ignorant and very foolish that Russian arms would be at once defeated in any Indo-Russian conflict, exists equally among the Mahommedan population of Asiatic Russia. The comfortable acceptance of this doctrine of Indian superiority—one of the most amusing and dangerous fallacies of public opinion—shows the need of more discriminating criticism, upon the character of Russian administration of native races in Central Asia, to distinguish all shades of public and Indian opinion. The Russians are no less careful of the several peoples that find refuge under their rule than our own authorities, a fact which, unfortunately, we are inclined to ignore in our estimate of their present position through a conceit which inspires Anglo-Indians to regard British administration of native races as heaven-born. The opinion in reference to the Russo-Japanese War is equally erroneous; because, while it is known that our Indian subjects had recourse to all reports upon it and thus were at liberty to arrive at their preposterous conclusions, native opinion in Central Asia knew almost nothing of its course, character and result. Even if suspicions of the actual results were entertained, the constant display of troops, which was made in all Central Asiatic centres of importance during the progress of the campaign, would have dispelled the belief that the Russian military resources were straitened. Apart from this fact, the public in Central Asia were supplied only with those versions of the truth which were most acceptable—and useful—to the Russian amour propre. It will be seen, therefore, that wherever Mahommedan feeling may be opposed in the Tsar’s Asiatic dominions to Russian domination, such sentiment is spontaneous and as deeply rooted or easily appeased as the circumstances, which may have excited it, dictate. It is well to understand this phase of the situation in Central Asia since, in itself, it is very significant.
Merv, perhaps, is a case in point. On the surface the aspect of affairs there is placid enough; but the Russians in Central Asia have read so many effective lessons to their subject races that at best opinion upon the possible chances of an outbreak is a blind hazard. Doubtless religious and racial prejudices are smouldering; yet, if there is any feeling of discontent, it must arise from an animosity born of pure fanaticism. Certainly the Russian rule in Mid-Asia is tolerant—now that the lesson has been taught—and there is neither religious nor educational interference. Moreover trade, fostered by very careful protection, prospers; and at least one secret of success in any Central Asian system of government is to let well alone and appeal to the vulgar through their pocket. This principle the Russians support with admirable patience, taking precautions at the same time that their benevolent administration shall not be endangered by too much licence in the matter of importing or possessing arms. A native rising would be difficult upon this account alone; while it should be remembered, too, that many years of leisured ease have brought about considerable deterioration in the instinctive passion for rape, bloodshed and plunder, which distinguished, only a few years ago, the inhabitants of these Central Asian Khanates.
Again, always pre-supposing the steady loyalty of the great bulk of the European troops, Russia has not enrolled any large number of native recruits in regions beyond the Caspian Sea; although her policy in the Caucasus has not been quite so exclusive. The success of any native insurrectionary movement in Trans-Caspia would depend, therefore, upon the precise amount of support that it received from any disaffected sections of the Caucasian establishment that might be incorporated with the Russo-European army on service in the Khanates. No doubt the wide area covered by the rebellion in the Caucasus will encourage the Caucasian element in the Trans-Caspian army to be troublesome; and, since the Caucasian races in a measure are akin with the Central Asian peoples, mutual sympathy may give rise to positive revolt in Central Asia. Between the European soldiers and the native races, however, there is little in common; and unless revolutionary agents from St. Petersburg, Moscow or the larger centres of disturbance contaminate the adherence of the men, there is really nothing to cause them to listen to any seditious overtures which might emanate from native sources. It is very easy in Central Asia to remove the rails of the permanent way or to interrupt telegraphic communication, since the railway and the wires run for hundreds of miles unguarded and at the mercy of any wandering, discontented miscreant. Such instances of disaffection would be sporadic. Difficulties of combination—if the great distances separating Khiva, Merv, Bokhara and Tashkent were ignored, which they cannot be if the position of affairs is to be appraised properly—would alone prevent any simultaneous co-operation; while whatever unanimity might be disclosed by actively hostile parties of native or European revolutionaries, the forces at the disposal of the military authorities must enable them to suppress the movement rapidly and at once.
Of course the agitation in European Russia cannot leave Russians in Central Asia unaffected; continuation of the widespread irruptions of disorder in European Russia obviously imparts a new and most serious complexion to affairs in Asiatic Russia. Moreover signs of unrest, in consequence of interference by revolutionary agents from St. Petersburg, have already been displayed. At Askhabad the officers were locked in their quarters; at Kushkinski Post 200 soldiers joined in a strike of railway and telegraph officials. Further, at the instigation of Sokoloff an engineer and Simonoff an engine-fitter, a variety of farcical intentions were proclaimed, the main outcome of this signal act of rebellion culminating in a little temporary dislocation of the railway and telegraph services and the arrest of the ringleaders. None the less, the activity of these revolutionary agents does constitute a possible menace to the peace of Mid-Asia; for, while the native population recks little of the wiles of European agitators and can be overawed by the authorities, the situation, where it concerns the ultimate effect of the revolutionary propaganda upon the Russo-European army, rests upon the knees of the gods. There, unfortunately, it must remain; emphasising the fact that, on account of the means of checking the dissemination of revolutionary heresies and the growth of the operations of the agitators in Central Asia which the Russian authorities have at hand, the chances are much against any violent or widespread upheaval of the peace in these territories.
[5] Lecture before the Central Asian Society, December 1905.
