The Yulatan oasis, which is inhabited by those Sarik Turcomans who moved from the Pendjeh valley, similarly possesses an unfailing supply of water from the huge dam, Band-i-Kazakli. This is drawn from the Murghab river by a canal and affords water to 125,000 acres, at a velocity of 1500 feet per second. The depth of the canal is sufficient to carry a camel off its legs. Near the site of the dam are the ruins of the Sultan-i-band, a work far vaster than any of the present day. It gave 28 feet head of water and made the fields and gardens of Old Merv the most fertile region upon the globe’s surface. The Sultan-i-band was destroyed in 1784 by the Amir Murad of Bokhara, an act which completely ruined the prosperity of Merv. Just a century later the Tsar, to whose private estates the site of Old Merv belongs, ordered the construction of an anicut 13 miles up stream. The work was carried out by Colonel Kashtalinski, superintendent of the State domains at Bairam Ali. It includes a dam which gives 14 feet head of water and it is connected with a series of storage basins, feeding a central canal 20 miles long. This in its turn supplies 35 miles of secondary canals and 105 miles of distributaries. The cost of these splendid operations was about £105,000; an expenditure which was declared by an eminent English authority on irrigation to be one-fifth of what a similar work would entail in India. It is in contemplation to restore the Sultan-i-band at an estimated cost of £210,000, by which a further measure of prosperity will be assured to the locality. The area thus irrigated amounts to 15,000 acres; 5000 of which are under cotton, while 3675 grow wheat and barley. The whole is let out to Turcomans and Bokharans. The mountains of cotton waiting for transport by rail in the season are a standing proof of the excellence of crops, which are said to return but little short of one hundredfold. The demand for farms within this fertile area is so great that the natives compete for the privilege of holding one at a rent in kind amounting to a quarter of the gross produce. In spite of prohibitions subletting is very rife and one plot frequently supports several families.
CHAPTER VII
HERAT AND THE WESTERN BORDER
The inception of the policy by which our relations with Afghanistan are controlled at the present time is due to the reflective intuition of Alexander Burnes[11] who, in 1831, when attached to the Teheran Mission under Sir John Macdonald, felt the necessity of combating the growing influence of Russia in Afghanistan. Circumstances, emanating from the presence of the Russian Mission under Prince Menzikoff at Teheran in 1826, disclosed the policy of Russia towards Persia and Afghanistan to be following two channels: the one, real, immediate and acquisitive; the other, remote, artificial and aiming at intimidation. The influence of these two methods of approach was inimical alike to Persia and Afghanistan, as also to the interests of India; to their existence may be traced the causes of the Russo-Persian War. The results of this campaign with Russia, in which the Shah was engaged from 1826 to 1828, left Persia smarting under its loss of prestige, broken up into a number of petty principalities and ready to attempt armed incursions across the frontier by way of restoring its good name. Khiva and then Herat in turn were considered, selection finally falling upon Herat as the object of attack. The expedition was begun; but owing to the death of Abbas Mirza, the father of the Prince Royal Mahomed Mirza who conducted the expedition, it was withdrawn and for the time being further action was deferred. In the meantime, affairs in Persia had attracted the attention of India; and, as the weakness of the Persian state increased, Russian diplomacy became more active. Distinguished by a marked hostility to England, the policy of Russia aimed at stirring up the tribes of Afghanistan. With this end in view Russian advice counselled Mahomed Mirza Shah to resume the operations against Herat at the same time that a Russian Mission was despatched to Kabul. The intimate association with the affairs of Persia and Afghanistan, which distinguished the position of Russia at this date, is interesting since it reveals how closely our Afghan and our Persian policies were interwoven, the one re-acting on the other with sympathetic consequence. There is, also, equal evidence of the influence exercised over India by the machinations of Russian diplomacy.
The existence of Russian influence at Kabul and behind the Herat expedition of 1837-38 synchronised with the formal enunciation of the policy by which, since 1838 down to 1906, our relations with Afghanistan have been governed. Indeed, no sooner was the Persian expedition of 1837-38 launched against Herat than the Government of India awoke to the urgency of the situation. Lord Auckland, embodying in more concrete shape the spirit of the idea put forward by Alexander Burnes in 1831, proclaimed upon November 8, 1838, the necessity of establishing a permanent barrier against schemes of aggression upon our north-west frontier. A treaty of alliance was made with Ranjit Singh and Shah Shujah and an expedition, ostensibly prepared for the relief of Herat but not without the intention of checking the growing influence of Russia in Persia and Afghanistan, crossed the Indus under the leadership of General Keane. Kandahar was occupied and Kabul entered in 1839, when Shah Shujah was proclaimed. Unfortunately, owing to one of those singular mistakes of judgment which, by their very frequency, confirm the impression that our success in Asia is more by good fortune than good management, Kabul was evacuated in the winter of 1841-42 and the beneficial possibilities of the occupation of Kabul dissipated in a disgraceful and signally disastrous retirement.
In respect of Herat, Persian designs upon the fortress were by no means crushed by the effect of the campaign—the first Afghan War of 1838-1842. Within ten years—in 1851—disturbances, arising out of the death of the Khan of Herat, caused the new ruler to throw himself once more upon the support of Persia. This situation gave rise to the Anglo-Persian Convention January 1853, by which the independence of Herat and its continuation in Afghan hands was assured. This step, although indicating the importance which the Government of India attached to Herat and giving direct confirmation to the pronouncement of Lord Auckland in 1838, was not sufficient to secure immunity to the Herat Khanate from Persian interference. Three years later—March 1856—the Government of Persia, taking advantage of a rupture of relations with Great Britain which had occurred in the previous December, despatched a force to Herat. The occupation of the city which followed was short-lived, an émeute occurring in which the Persian flag was replaced by that of the British. Within a few months the espousers of the English cause, receiving no encouragement from the Imperial Government, hauled down their flag and Herat passed once more into Persian hands. Surrendered to Persia on October 25, 1856, it was evacuated finally and restored to Afghanistan July 27, 1857, under pressure of the expeditionary column which disembarked at Karachi in the Persian Gulf on December 4, 1856.
This war, concluded by a treaty of peace signed in Paris March 4, 1857, marks an important epoch in our history with Afghanistan. It denoted the resumption of relations which had been in abeyance since 1842, preparing the way for that treaty of alliance which was signed at Peshawar with Dost Mahommed on January 27, 1857. By this engagement the assistance of the Afghans, in return for a monthly subsidy during the continuation of the war of 1856, was secured against the Persians. As events proved no such help was required. Although hostilities ceased within six weeks of the date of the agreement the monthly subsidy, beginning in the autumn of 1856, was continued until September 30, 1858, the accidence of the Indian mutiny dictating the prudence of preserving friendly relations with Kabul until the very disquieting influences, which were then at work, had been allayed. Relations with Afghanistan continued until 1863 to follow a course more or less overshadowed by the growing importance of Russian intrigue in Central Asia.
While our activities in Persia and Afghanistan demonstrated merely political expansion, a change of quite another order was beginning to define the position of Russia in Central Asia. From this it became evident that a severe test would be imposed upon our trans-border policy. By successive stages, Russian aggrandisement had subjugated the several States which were lying between her territories and the frontiers of Afghanistan when the principles of our policy in regard to that country were announced in 1838. One by one the Turcoman tribes were conquered until, by the capture of Samarkand in 1868 and the submission of the Amir of Bokhara, Russia gained direct approach to the waters of the Oxus, with the right to furnish its bank with armed posts. The moment was rapidly arriving against which all the energies of Indo-Afghan policy in the past should have been directed. In the interval, before the Russian domination of Central Asia was complete, the aim of British policy to bring about a strong Afghanistan had seemed upon the point of realisation when, in 1863, Dost Mahommed died.
None could foresee the developments of the future. The activity of the Russians in Central Asia boded no good; and with the death of Dost Mahommed it was recognised that the resulting situation contained a challenge to the principles of the policy by which, in years gone by, we had proposed to guarantee the inviolability of Afghan territory. Indeed, an attitude of non-intervention was no longer politic; but, instead of seizing the opportunity presented by the death of Dost Mahommed and occupying the territories of Afghanistan for ourselves, we hesitated. Yet, if the passing visit of a Russian mission to Kabul in 1838 had been accounted sufficient warranty for the invasion of Afghanistan, how much more the massing of Russian forces upon its northern and north-western frontiers should have propelled us to a renewed display of energy in 1863. Unfortunately for ourselves, the logic of our position was destroyed irretrievably by the train of hostile circumstance which our supineness had set in motion. Whilst our politicians debated Russia had acted; and Shir Ali, Khan of Herat and son of Dost Mahommed, spurred by Russian promises and intrigues, began a movement against Azim, Khan of Kabul. Varying fortunes distinguished the efforts of the rival factions between 1863-1868; but at length, in 1868, Shir Ali prevailed and he became recognised as de facto ruler of Afghanistan. For the moment the situation showed improvement, as Shir Ali veered from Russia to India. Practical assistance, in the shape of money and materials of war, was at once accorded him by the Government of India, between whose supreme chief, Lord Mayo, and himself as the ruler of Afghanistan a conference was arranged at Umballa in March of 1869. The outcome of this meeting, not by any means so definite as the interests of a trans-border policy demanded, was held to be sufficient to dispel the feelings of alarm which the prolonged military activities of Russia in the Trans-Caspian region had aroused. None the less, while the Russians were occupied with the conquest of Khiva and Shir Ali had been disappointed at the aloofness of the Indian Government, four momentous years 1869-1873 were passing. Their close revealed only the further and more complete estrangement of the Amir of Kabul through the amazing ineptitude with which the advisers of the Indian Government dealt with his difficulties. Bitter, indifferent, and relying upon the Russian promises of assistance of 1872, Shir Ali became openly defiant, repudiating all suggestions for any formal treaty of alliance, 1876-1877. At the same time, 1877, he flatly declined to admit to Kabul any British officers as the accredited representatives of the Government of India, although in 1878 he himself received a Russian mission there. With the failure of our own attempt (1878) to force a mission upon him, the Second Afghan War, 1878-1880, began.