Afghanistan

by A. Hamilton

A CARAVANSARY COMPOUND

The city has declined considerably from its quondam opulence. There is scarcely any trade and the houses are deserted. It is, nevertheless, famous for its fruit and its breed of horses; but the Heratis have endured too many of “the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” to be able to withstand adversity and bad seasons. Wars and sieges, pestilence and famine have had their effect; and the scene, which Vambéry described so brightly, is now sombre and melancholy. No longer is Herat the great central market between India and Persia. It still receives a certain amount of merchandise from Kabul, such as shawls, indigo, sugar, chintz, muslin, bafta, kincob, hides and leather. These are exported to Meshed, Yezd, Teheran, Baghdad and Kirman, and exchanged for tea, sugar-candy, china-ware, broadcloth, chintz, silk, copper, pepper, dates, shawls, numnahs, carpets and all kinds of spices. Silk is obtainable in the vicinity of Herat, and lambs’ fleeces and sheep-skins are made up locally into caps and cloaks. There are, too, a number of native craftsmen who work in silk and metals, leather, iron and wood; but there are few opportunities for their skill and no money with which to pay for it. The carpets of Herat, once so famed for softness and for the brilliance and permanence of their colours, are no longer in demand. At one time they were made in all sizes, ranging in price from 10 to 1000 rupees; but their day is gone. Indeed, in its present impoverished state, the city is eloquent only of a bygone grandeur. Everything is decayed and decrepit.

RELIGIOUS FESTIVAL ON THE PERSO-AFGHAN BORDER

In relation to future developments in the military position along the western frontier Herat, the immediate objective of Russia, has been for many years the pivot of our trans-border policy. Lying within 80 miles of Kushkinski Post, itself only eighteen hours by train from Merv, it would not be long after the outbreak of hostilities that a Russian force would be before its walls. The passage of reinforcements from Merv, in support of such detached or independent flying column, would be divided between Kushkinski Post and Tanur Sangi, which, when considered from Merv, the main depôt of supplies in Trans-Caspia, rank practically as ultimate bases, with an immediate base at Pendjeh. The position of Herat would be no worse than Maimana, Balkh, Kunduz and Andkhui, upon which an equally rapid concentration would be made. At such a time the forts established at Kala Khum, Chushka Guzar, Kelif and Termes—where, by order of Kuropatkin, a strong work has been placed to cover the debouchure opposite Patta Hissar of the road from Takht-a-pul, the central cantonment of Northern Afghanistan—would be sufficient to repel attack if the Afghans were rash enough to cross. Again, between the Oxus and the chain of main bases established along the Central Asian railway—Askhabad, Merv, Samarkand, Khokand and Margelan, with Tashkent as the great centre of arterial distribution—there would be a line of auxiliary depôts, such as Sharisabz and Hissar and no doubt possessing by the time war occurred railway communication with the Central Asian system on the one hand and the Oxus on the other, to serve as intermediate bases of supply to the ultimate frontier and fighting zone.

In the situation along the extreme eastern frontier, the Badakshan-Wakhan region, the same preponderating strength and advantage of position would be detected in the Russian dispositions. The existence of the several elevated areas composing the Pamirs and acting as a containing rampart to the Russian left flank renders the Russian sphere between Kala Khum and Langar Kisht sufficiently impervious to serious attack. As a precaution against sporadic forays from the Afghan posts on the opposite bank a number of permanent forts, usually included within the Pamir military district, would be available.

On the right bank, between the upper waters of the Oxus and Charog, there is the post of Langar Kisht where the Russians maintain one company of thirty men with a maxim gun. Charog itself, which is opposite Kala Bar Panja, is the principal post of the Russians in the region of the Pamirs. Here the strength of the garrison varies according to the season of the year. During the winter months the muster is fifty Cossacks with four officers and a maxim detachment. Two maxims and a single mountain gun have been mounted on the ramparts covering the river. Charog is connected with Fort Murghabi by a road along the Alichur Pamir and the banks of the Ghund Daria; built of clay, wood and stone, it possesses earthworks of an enduring character. Additional accommodation is in course of construction, as it is intended to establish quarters there for one battalion of troops. The winter strength of the Russian force in the Pamirs is 500 men; this will be raised to 1000 men so soon as the requisite barracks have been erected at Charog and Fort Murghabi. The probable disposition of the force will put 300 men into each of the three forts at Tashkurgan, Charog and Murghabi, the remaining 100 being detailed by companies to the smaller posts of Langar Kisht, Aktash and Kizil Rabat. At Kala Wanj there was an establishment of 300 levies from the native army of the Amir of Bokhara, a further detachment from the same establishment and similar in strength, being in garrison at Kala Wamar. At Kala-Khum, occupied by 1000 men, there was one native regiment. Along the reach of the Middle Oxus the same arrangement held good, native troops being distributed among all ferry and customs posts, constituting a useful supplement to the Russian troops in the riverine areas. Hitherto the employment of the Bokharan levies for garrison and frontier duty in Darwaz, Shignan and Roshan has been quite a feature of the Russian disposition along the Oxus. Drilled by Russian instructors and armed with modern weapons these territorial troops are regarded by the Russians as the equal of the Afghan soldiery. In war, they would be expected to relieve the regular forces of a multitude of fatigues and thus leave the energies and numbers of the Russian command unimpaired by that slow process of attrition by which, in the main, the fighting strength of an army becomes so quickly exhausted. Quite lately these posts have been taken over by the regular forces, the native troops being withdrawn for service in the Khanate. It has been always unlikely that, in the event of hostilities, the Russians would permit levies to take the field against the Afghan forces.