| 2,000 | cubic feet per second at low water. |
| 50,000-60,000 | ” ” ” ordinary flood. |
| 600,000-700,000 | ” ” ” abnormal flood. |
The fords are:
| Gardan Diwar (ford) | 40 | miles from source. |
| Ghaoch Khol (bridge) | 75 | ” |
| Diwal Khol | 100 | ” |
| Chakmakchak | 180 | ” |
| Garmab | 390 | ” |
| Three miles above Girishk (ford) | 450 | ” |
| Girishk (ford and ferry) | 450 | ” |
| Shamalan (ford) | 500 | ” |
| Karnashin | 550 | ” |
| Kal-i-Sabz (ford) | 570 | ” |
| Deshu (ford) | 590 | ” |
| Pul-alak (ford) | 650 | ” |
| Traku (ferry) | 680 | ” |
| Deshtak (ferry) | 740 | ” |
The fort of Girishk stands on the right bank of the Helmund about 1½ miles from the stream, upon the high road between Kandahar and Herat. Its position seems to have been determined by the neighbourhood of the fords across the Helmund; also by the vicinity of the ferry, which, when the river is not fordable, is usually established at a narrow part of the stream below the fort. From the far side of the river Girishk appears to have more strength and to be in better order than inspection proves to be the case. Upon two sides and part of the third there is a ditch, which contains water but is formidable neither in width nor in depth. On the north and north-eastern aspects, where the wall is situated upon the high bank of the river, it is not continued.
Girishk, as also Farah, comes within the jurisdiction of the officials of Kandahar province and a small garrison is detailed from Kandahar itself. Two squadrons of cavalry and one battery of field guns usually comprise the regular establishment, to which is added a certain militia strength. The soldiers camp outside the walls; the fort itself, which is only 700 feet in length and 250 feet in breadth, being the residence of the Governor of Pusht-i-Rud, the name by which the district goes. In no sense can the building be regarded as possessing any military value. The walls are weak and exposed from their parapet to their foundations. Moreover, there is cover close up to them on all sides except the northern where a ravine, which would afford an enemy protection, is enfiladed from the north-west tower. The setting of the fort is quite picturesque. In the low-river lands on the south side there are charming gardens, but their walls and trees are too likely to afford cover to troops to be other than a danger. In the fort itself are two gateways; one of which, a small one, has been blocked up. The main one is at the southern extremity. There are four corner towers and the water-supply is reliable and drawn from the river. But, equally with Farah and Sabzawar, the fortifications of Girishk need not be the subject of any detailed consideration here. Standing on the main route from Herat to Kandahar, controlling the fords across the Helmund and commanding the road to Seistan from which it is only 190 miles distant, the richness of the surrounding region makes its early possession essential to any force operating from the Indo-Afghan border. Villages are numerous and every one is a thriving centre. The pasturage is both fattening and abundant, while the agricultural capacity of the Zamindawar lands is well known. During the last operations in Afghanistan 4,000,000 lbs. weight of grain were collected from the Girishk district by the British force that was then in occupation, a return which makes it the most important of any of the bases which might be established on the Perso-Afghan border.
Girishk is 75 miles from Kandahar; mid-way between there is Maiwand, mournfully signalised by one of those inglorious reverses which British arms have experienced in Afghanistan—in this instance the defeat of General Burrows at the hands of Ayub Khan in 1880. Their incidence, unfortunately, has given rise to very exaggerated ideas upon the practical utility of the Afghan rabble and its powers of resistance at the present day. Kandahar, the scene of one brilliant episode when the victorious Roberts relieved an ominous situation, has been the centre of many ill-fated risings and mis-shapen schemes, yet of all none more so than that injudicious and most pretentious plan of uniting Quetta with Kushkinski Post by a trans-Afghan railway viâ Kandahar and Herat. No practical end can be served by such a line and, indeed upon the broadest grounds, there is absolutely nothing which can justify its construction. The policy of this country should be mistrustful of Russia always and our attitude should be actively suspicious. In Asia, High or Near, she is our inveterate opponent and the one element of danger which never can be removed from our path. We can neither believe in nor rely upon her bond, while her diplomatic morality no less than her most solemnly pledged word is instinctive with treachery. Whatever may be desirable for purposes of State at this moment, at least we should be mindful of our experiences at her hands and we should allow those lessons of past history to serve to-day as an active spur to our hostility. That she would stoop to any pretext, however infamous, to secure her ends is proven by the unctuous assurances which she tendered the Cabinet of the day in this country in respect of her campaigns in Central Asia. If this reminder be insufficient, let us reflect upon the manner in which she has excused to us, through long years, her nefarious designs against our interests in Persia and Manchuria. Therefore, remembering these things, it is necessary to repeat the warning to keep Russia at a distance.
CONSTRUCTING THE QUETTA-NUSHKI LINE
If Kandahar were to be concerned with any railway at all it should be through an extension from New Chaman. Without such provision our defensive strategy in Southern Afghanistan must needs recoil upon itself. Indeed, no practical value whatever attaches to our power of offence on the Afghan-Baluch border unless it contains the means of counteracting Russia’s schemes of aggression on the Afghan-Perso border. At present our position in Southern Afghanistan is en l’air; but our interests demand that it should be brought to earth and linked up with the steel rails of the military system of strategic lines on the Indian frontier. Just now the position of Russia in Persia is in the making, yet the challenge to our situation in Southern Afghanistan is none the less apparent. It will become quite definite when she occupies Seistan. Russia has the advantage of us in the Middle East in the matter of railway construction and she will build first where she is in no manner liable to be disturbed. If, in the interval, we do not measure our activity by her own, we shall find that we have delayed the extension of the rails to Kandahar until she herself is prepared to abide by the result of a single issue—the projection of the metals to Herat.