6. The Trebizond-Tabriz-Teheran route.—Trebizond is the most westerly port of entry with which the trade of Khorassan and the commercial centres of Meshed and Seistan is concerned. The distance to Meshed is some 1400 miles and the time taken is seldom less than five months. The cost is about £12 per 650 lbs. This route exists owing to the fact that goods using it pay no Customs in Turkey; but it is a terribly long and expensive journey to Khorassan, while the strict application of the new Persian Customs rules is reacting unfavourably on its prosperity. The advent of the Russian rail-head within a few miles of Tabriz will also press it very hard. At the same time certain classes of goods, not affected by Russian competition, will continue to use this route. The total for the year 1904-1905 was returned at £17,770, as against £21,780 for 1903-1904.

To summarise: Route No. 1 is an artificial route called into being on account of the fiscal barriers erected around Afghanistan, otherwise the Kandahar-Herat route is shorter and cheaper. Routes 2 and 3 are the most natural, but receive little assistance from the Persian Government in the suppression of brigandage or in other ways. Their desert nature also constitutes a grave disadvantage. These routes are the main arteries of commerce from the south. Routes 5 and 6 are not primarily intended to serve Khorassan, but occasionally the market is more promising at Meshed than Teheran.

A table of these trade routes is appended:

Table of Routes, Freights, etc., to Meshed.
Route. Distance in miles to Meshed. Average Cost of Carriage per Kharwar (650 lbs.) Length of Journey in Days. Nature of Transport. Value of Trade.
£ s. £
1. Nushki, viâ Turbat 1000 6 0 85 Mainly Camels 22,654
2. Bunder Abbas, viâ Narmashir and Neh and Turbat 900 5 0 80-120 ” -
3. Bunder Abbas, viâ Yezd and Turbat 1020 6 0 100-140 ” -
4. Bushire, viâ Yezd and Turbat 932 6 10 100-140 Mainly Mules 35,592
5. Baghdad, viâ Kermanshah and Teheran 1050 8 10 120-150 Mules and Camels 14,491
6. Trebizond, viâ Tabriz and Teheran 1380 12 0 150-180 Mainly Camels 17,770

THE PERSIAN COMMISSIONER

It is, however, a question of politics more than of trade, and the Nushki-Nasratabad route is of less significance beside the political considerations which attach to the future state of Seistan. In this way the importance of the latter is as great as the value which attaches to Herat, because the occupation of Khorassan by Russia would imply a dominating control of Seistan. Moreover, any movement across Khorassan upon Seistan places the road to Kandahar from Herat, together with the strategical points of Sabzawar and Farah, at the mercy of Russia, a contingency which is certainly to be avoided in the present disordered condition of our own house in Asia. Seistan is equally related to the strategic positions of Russia in Central Asia and India, insomuch that if Russia were to become installed there the obstacle to an advance upon India, which is presented by Afghanistan, would have been surmounted and the road to the Gulf opened. Although she might not make any actual forward movement from Seistan towards India, countless opportunities would occur to her to foment disturbances among the Baluchi peoples and to spread an actively hostile propaganda throughout the trans-frontier region. Such a forward movement, too, an actual advance of 300 miles, would impose upon the Government of India many additional outlays of money, besides keeping India in a continuously unsettled and anxious state. It will be seen that the interests of Russia and India in Seistan proceed on identical lines. If India were able to control Outer Seistan an important position would be established from which she could frustrate Russia’s designs along the Perso-Afghan border and in the direction of the Persian Gulf. To do this it is not so much the interests of Seistan as our position in Afghanistan and Persia which require to be considered. The advantage with respect to Persia rests just now with the Russians, whose activity can only be countered with effect by a permanent understanding with the Amir and the strengthening of Persia in some enduring fashion. With Kandahar linked up by railway with India, Afghanistan definitely united in arms with us, and Persia, freed from the wiles of Russia, once more dependant upon us, our position along the Perso-Afghan border would be endowed with such strength that the combination well might serve to check any further Russian activities in the Middle East.

Note.—The names of the officers on the Seistan Mission were as follows:

Political.—Colonel A. H. (now Sir Henry) McMahon, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.; Capt. Ramsay (Personal Assistant).