The Regular Field and Mountain Artillery is armed with 2.95 in. quick-firing equipment, with hydraulic compressor, throwing a 10 lb. projectile. This is known as the Arisaka equipment. The Fortress and Siege Artillery have the latest models of Krupp and Schneider-Canet in siege guns, guns of position, and mortars. The Reserve Field Artillery are armed with a 2.95 rifled cannon of bronze on the old Italian model. The Japanese have no Horse Artillery, and the only difference between the field and mountain equipments is that the latter is the shorter and lighter gun, and has not as long a range. The Cavalry is the least efficient army of the service. It carries sword and carbine, but no lance. The horses are badly trained; the men are very indifferent riders.
The strength of the Russian forces in Manchuria embraces 88 battalions, 60 squadrons and 50 batteries, which, together with the garrison forces and fortress armament, numbers 200,000 men and 300 guns. These troops in Manchuria are formed into two army corps of the first line and two of the second. Two new Rifle Brigades have just been added to the existing strength. They are composed as follows:
| 7th Brigade Port Arthur General Kondratenko | 8th Brigade Vladivostock General Artamanoff | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 25th | Regiment | 29th | Regiment | ||||
| 26th | ” | 30th | ” | ||||
| 27th | ” | } | (new) | 31st | ” | } | (new) |
| 28th | ” | } | 32nd | ” | } | ||
The Russian is a phenomenal marcher; the actual weight of his equipment is 58 lbs. 2 oz. One tent is carried in section between six men. Each soldier carries in his haversack two and a half days’ biscuits. The ration in daily use for war consists of
| Biscuit | 1 lb. 13 oz. |
| Meat | 7¼ oz. |
| Groats | 4⅘ oz. |
| Salt | ⅘ oz. |
| Tea | ⁹⁄₄₀ oz. |
| Sugar | ⁸⁄₂₀ oz. |
| Spirits | ¹⁄₂₇ of a pint |
In the exigencies of active service it happens that the Russian soldier must forage for himself. Under any circumstances, however, he sustains himself on very little nourishment, and relies in a great measure upon what he can find. The Russian cavalry is armed with sword, rifle and bayonet. The latter is invariably carried “fixed,” even when the weapon itself is slung. A few regiments only carry the lance. The field guns are steel breech-loaders manufactured at the Obukhov works. They are akin to the Krupp pattern; many, however, have the interrupted screw breech piece and the de Bange obturation. At present there are many varieties of artillery with the Russian troops, particularly in their fortified positions, to which places the Russian transported the seizures which they made from the Chinese during the Boxer crisis. These embraced French, German and British examples of artillery.
On land, the immense superiority of the reserve numbers of the Russians reduces the advantages which would accrue to the Japanese if the fighting were confined to the sea. At the same time, however, it should be remembered that the Russian troops are slow movers, and although they may exhibit magnificent endurance, and although they may be relied upon to fight well, the lack of individual initiative upon the part of the Russian officers robs the operations of that dash and address which is embodied in the spirit of the Japanese army. Curiously enough, each side favours the Continental school of infantry and cavalry tactics, the underlying principles in the training of the Japanese revealing a close adherence to Teutonic methods. Neither side will profit, therefore, by any degree of indivisibility to which they may have attained. The winter great-coat of either army is very nearly identical in colour, and for warm weather Japanese and Russians alike favour a white blouse. There has been talk of the Japanese adopting a khaki tint; upon the other hand, the blouse of the Russian soldier is by courtesy equally white or khaki. In the more important direction of land transport, it might appear that the Manchurian railway would be a crowning triumph for the Russian authorities. Unfortunately, this immense length of rail, badly laid and indifferently equipped, will impose a perpetual strain upon the military resources. If the country population could be relied upon to maintain a benevolent neutrality towards telegraph poles and lines, railway sleepers and rails, the stone pillar and balks of the bridges, the possibility of any serious interruption of traffic would be materially lessened. Unhappily for the Russians, the attitude and acts of the native population, who, in a general way, will lose no opportunity to harass their enemy, must impede the effective co-operation of the Russian forces.
Against this instinctive feeling of animosity there may be set the racial sympathy with the Japanese which governs every Chinaman. In Manchuria particularly, the Japanese enjoy a high reputation in the minds of the populace, while there is remembered, above aught else, that prompt redemption of all obligations during the Chino-Japanese War which distinguished the policy of the invaders towards local interests. This policy of benevolence was exhibited for the second time during the Boxer crisis, and, of course, the striking example offered by the Japanese, in comparison with the Russians, was not lost upon the Chinese. These things are recalled to-day in Manchuria, and they may be calculated to offset any reactionary sentiment which may take place in Korea. Between the hospital arrangements of each belligerent there is little to choose. The more efficient system of the Japanese service is equalised by the greater facilities which the possession of railway communication by the Russians will present to the transportation of the wounded. It should be pointed out, however, that the principal medical service—the Russian Red Cross Society—is wholly patriotic, and that it is not, in any degree, a military organisation. It is liable to be withdrawn from the field at any moment after the conclusion of the major operations.
Beyond these few observations it is difficult—if not impossible—to trespass with any certainty, although, as a closing remark, it may perhaps be added that, provided the investment of Port Arthur be satisfactorily accomplished by sea and that Vladivostock were enclosed by ice, the estuaries of the Yalu and Lico Rivers enables an admirable position to be taken up, from which the Russian position throughout Manchuria may be very readily threatened. Speculations as to the development of the campaign upon land are, however, quite absurd until something is known of the results of the naval engagements with which the war must open. Meanwhile the painful familiarity with the costs of war which distinguishes the British taxpayer has directed no little attention to the financial position of either country. An eminent German financier, interested in the public debt of Russia, lately explained to me that a very large proportion of the moneys, which have been raised for the construction of the Russian inter-railway communications in addition to the Trans-Siberian and Manchurian Railways, has been set aside from time to time to supplement her war chest. These sums, added to those collected by Count Mouravieff with the assent of M. de Witte, and including the large balances which have accrued to the State by departmental economies during the past year, represent approximately a capital of one hundred millions sterling. Against this accumulation it is said that the financial position of Japan is most favourable. There is, I believe, a specie reserve in the Central Bank which amounts to 113,000,000 yen, plus some 40,000,000 yen in London. Moreover, the bank’s note-issuing margin is 35,000,000 yen, which will be larger after the New Year. The Treasury has three capital funds, amounting together to 50,000,000 yen, besides some millions in London remaining from the bond sale of 1902. Finally, there are large sums lying idle in all the banks throughout the country, while an Ordinance has been issued which provides the Government with unlimited credit.
The more recent action of the Russians in Manchuria tends, of course, to support the view that war may be imminent. Nevertheless, bluff is a component part of Russian diplomacy, and there is ground for believing that the intentions of Russia in the Far East are by no means so warlike as the preparations now proceeding and the acts of the Russian administrative officials in Manchuria itself would imply. Russian diplomacy always covers the development of its plans by preparing to demonstrate in a contrary direction; and at the present time her occupation of Korean territory is little else than the screen, behind which she proposes to secure her hold upon Manchuria. Nothing short of war will cause her to retire from her position in Manchuria; but while Korean territory is of little value to the Russian protectorate, whatever the compromise which may be effected between Japan and Russia, she may be expected to make a determined effort to dominate the lower waters of the Yalu River. In fact, curious as it may seem, the estuary of the Yalu River is the very locale of the dispute between the two Powers, since, if Russia were ever permitted to dominate the Yalu River, she would gain at once that special position upon the frontiers of Korea which it is the desire of Japan to frustrate. In this Japan can rely only upon the shortshifts of diplomacy; and although the Russian occupation of Yong-an-po may be circumvented, the development of An-tung upon the opposite shore of the river cannot be prevented. It seems, therefore, as inevitable that some commanding position upon the Yalu River must ultimately fall to her lot. An-tung lies within Manchurian territory; the Yalu River is the border stream between Manchuria and Korea, and at Yong-an-po the nucleus of an important Russian settlement has been established. The future contains no promise of the immediate settlement of the present difficulty. At best the outlook is confused; while at the same time there is presented in a manner singularly clear and comprehensible the fact that Russia neither will evacuate New-chang, be driven out of Manchuria, nor abandon her position on the Yalu River. The position of Russia at New-chang has been indicated by past events, her occupation of Manchuria is an old story, and she is now engaged in the rapid development of her interests at An-tung. The position of this port endows it with unusual advantages, and the commercial potentialities of the place are very great. It lies about fifteen miles above Yong-an-po, on the opposite bank. At present the export trade is confined to millet and silk cocoons, the over-production of the latter commodity requiring close technical supervision. Eight miles below An-tung, situated on the right bank of the river, is the likin station San-tao-lan-tao, where junks and rafts must report and pay the stipulated excise before they proceed onward. The river then bears away to the north-east, and after another stretch of seven miles there comes An-tung, upon the same bank, at a point where the stream divides, the eastern branch being the Yalu River. An-tung is of quite recent construction, and a few years ago millet fields occupied its site. Under the care of native merchants large, solid-looking houses have been built, broad streets have been opened out, and an air of unusual prosperity distinguishes the place. The anchorage is thronged with junks, while timber is stacked in vast quantities below the limits of the town. Sea-going steamers of the coaster type can here discharge and load their cargoes, thus obviating transhipment at Ta-tung-kao.