Korea

by A. Hamilton

THE IMPERIAL LIBRARY, SEOUL

CHAPTER VIII

Foreign action in Korea—Exhausted Exchequer—Taxes—Budgets—Debased currency—The Dai Ichi ginko—Dishonest officials

The events, which have led up to the present complex condition of Korean politics, originated in the attempt of the Russians to secure control of the Customs and Finance of the Empire in the autumn of 1897. As the effort of the Russian Minister of that time, M. de Speyer, was only in part successful, his immediate successor, M. Matunine, the present representative, M. Pavloff, and his confrère of the French Legation, M. Colin de Plancy, have in the interval consistently directed their diplomacy to the completion of the task. Their inability to force compliance with their demands upon the Korean Government has embittered their action towards the British Minister and the Chief Commissioner of the Customs. In the prosecution of a work, at once discreditable and inspired by very petty prejudices, no single diplomatic device, which could serve their purpose, has been omitted from their policy. The check, which the plans of the Franco-Russian-Korean party received in consequence of British action has only retarded their development for the moment. It does not perceptibly relieve the situation, nor make the office of the Chief Commissioner more comfortable or the path of the British Minister more easy to follow. Indeed, it is quite certain that the opposition of the Russian and French Ministers to British activity will become more vigorous in the future.

The assistance accorded by the British Government to Mr. Gubbins during the recent crisis, has done much to dispel from the minds of the Koreans those illusions which our past indifference had created. It is improbable that quite identical methods will be employed in any future attempt of the Court to oust Mr. McLeavy Brown from his position. If the Court gave way in the face of the British demonstration, the tact and consideration for the interests of both parties, which Mr. Gubbins subsequently displayed, materially contributed to the restoration of the status quo. Upon the other hand, the apathy of the British Government in failing to protect Mr. McLeavy Brown when he was deprived of the Comptrollership of the Finances at the instigation of the Russian Minister, in 1897, was of course conducive to the late disturbances. The two offices are so closely related, and the masterful and aggressive spirit of the Franco-Russian policy is such, that the accession of a Russian or French nominee to the Chief Commissionership of the Customs would imply their subsequent fusion to the complete obliteration of British influence. This, of course, should be impossible; and it would be, if the British Government would awaken to the importance of maintaining unimpaired its prestige in Korea. We have little material interest in Korea, but it must not be forgotten that our position in the kingdom should be superior to that of France, and equal to that of Russia. If it were not that France is the partisan and ally of Russia in Korea, as well as elsewhere, there would be no occasion to do aught but support benevolently the policy of Japan, without unnecessarily endorsing the aggressiveness which distinguishes the attitude of the Island Empire to its neighbour. But if we wish to preserve our position we must put a little more vigour into our policy, and, while maintaining our working agreement with Japan, proceed to guarantee the integrity of our own interests. These would be best served by insisting upon the retention of a British nominee in the supervision of the Korean Maritime Customs. Our action in this respect would meet with the unqualified approval of Japan and the United States of America, whose trading interests, equally with our own, justify predominance in this control.

The financial embarrassment of the Korean Government, at the present time, is the outcome of the abnormal extravagance of the Court. Anything which would tend to increase the load of debt with which the Emperor encumbers the dwindling resources of the national wealth, is neither politic nor desirable. The sources of the Imperial revenue resemble in lesser degree those which prevail in China. There are the Land Tax, paid no longer in grain, which returned four and a half of the seven million yen odd, composing the total domestic revenue in 1901; a House Tax, assessed capriciously and evaded by the practice of a little discreet bribery; the net Customs revenue, which was returned for 1901 at more than one million and a quarter yen (1,325,414 yen; £135,303 sterling at exchange of 2s. 0½d.), and the proceeds of the various concessions, monopolies, mines, and mint, and the sums derived from such miscellaneous and irregular taxation as may suggest itself to that keen-witted Minister Yi Yong-ik.

Taxation is heavy and relentless. The list of the more important objects, upon which an impost is levied, includes, in addition to the land, customs and house taxes, salt, tobacco, fish, fur, lumber lands, minerals, ginseng, minting, cargo-boats, guilds, licences, paper, cowhides, pawnbroking, &c. In more recent times certain taxes have become obsolete. But this list, however, does not by any means exhaust the means by which the Emperor contrives to make his subjects “pay the piper.” Quite subsidiary to the regular cases, but of great value in themselves, are the donations which are sent up from various parts of the country for the gratification of the Throne. These gifts are very comprehensive, and embrace the fruits of the land as well as the products of the sea. Little escapes the schedule of donations, and no intervention can bring about the discontinuation of the custom, while a failure on the part of a prefect to attend to this matter would result speedily enough in the loss of his office.

The Budget for the year 1901 was assessed at nine million yen odd, of which one million yen odd was dedicated to Imperial expenditure, and a trifle more than this sum paid to the Imperial Privy Purse. The estimated difference between the revenue and the expenditure of the same year was the small sum of 775 dollars. The Budget for 1902 provided for seven and a half million yen; the estimated revenue was placed approximately at the same figures, the balance between expenditure and revenue being 653 yen. It will be seen, therefore, that there is little reason for the financial difficulties in which the Throne is placed. If it were not that his Majesty frittered away his income upon the purchase of land, the adornment of his Palaces and his person, his relatives, his women, and the perpetual entertainment of his Court, this chronic impoverishment of his exchequer would not exist. Moreover, at least one quarter of his revenue is appropriated by the native officials through whose hands it passes. Under these circumstances he has never been averse from accepting the assistance of interested parties; but this ill-omened relief does not free the country from its burden of mortgage and taxation.

The disbursements upon the different departments engage the revenue to a degree which is out of all relation to the precise utility or importance of any of these fantastic bureaux. The War Office claimed in 1901, in round figures, more than three and one half million yen, and the Foreign Office a quarter of a million yen, the Finance Department three-quarters of a million yen, the Palace a little more than one million yen, and the Home Department a little less than that amount. One million yen is roughly £100,000. The amount paid to the War Office for 1902 was, in round figures, very nearly three million yen; to the Foreign Office, something in excess of a quarter of a million yen; to the Finance Department, rather more than half a million yen. The Departments of Law, Agriculture, Police, Education, and Communications in this highly expensive and totally inefficient administration, all make good their claims upon the Budget, until there is nothing left and very little to show for this lavish distribution of the public moneys.